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NOTE: 
"State" (upper case) will be used in the text to denote the national 
unit, or country, while "state" (lower case) refers to the system of 
government. 
Nobajir will be italicised throughout, as it is a contentious identity in 
Pakistan, and is not accepted as such by many people. 
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On 15 August 1947, the Partition of India into the two new 
States of India and Pakistan was officially completed. In Bengal 
and Punjab the murders and abductions that accompanied the 
Partition suggested a deep-rooted division, and the peoples of 
Pakistan, especially, have continued to live with a legacy of 
uneven economic development and fierce subnational rivalries. In 
many respects, the making of Pakistan has exemplified, and 
continues to exemplify, the problems that face so many post- 
colonial states in transition. 
The main tasks that have faced postcolonial countries have 
been two-f old: on the one hand economic development, on the other 
hand nation-building. In Pakistan, economic performance since 
Independence has shown some progress, but in the years immediately 
following 1947 the country was not helped by a continuing invasion 
of political and economic refugees from India and by the prior 
orientation of the Pakistan economy to British colonial interests. 
Pakistan effectively lacked an economic infrastructure at is birth. 
In terms of nation-building also, Pakistan started from a weak 
position. rhe very name of the country was conceived as an acronym 
of the supposed major territories of Pakistan (two ot which - Assam 
and Kashmir - would later fall within India), and as such might be 
seen as a lofty intellectual construction that failed to 
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acknowledge the ethnic situation on the ground. The fact that 
Bengal, or East Pakistan, was also missing from this construction 
is instructive and later proved to be fateful. The modern State of 
Pakistan was called forth in 1947 as a country with two main wings, 
separated by one thousand miles of potentially hostile Indian 
territory. Perhaps not surprisingly, given these initial 
conditions, the leaders of Pakistan have consistently looked to 
Islam as an identity which might hold the country together. Some 
leaders have also suggested that Urdu might serve as a unifying 
national language for Pakistan. 
Islam continues to play an important stabilising role in 
Pakistan, although its cultural and political mobilisations are not 
without contradiction, as we shall see later in this dissertation. 
The idea that Pakistan might also cohere around a single language, 
however, has proven to be a pious hope. The prior existence in what 
became Pakistan of powerful regional groupings and languages, 
together with the very uneven development of the country after 
independence, more or less ensured that the process of nation- 
building in Pakistan would be difficult at best and impossible at 
worst. Clear evidence of the latter came in 1971 when East Pakistan 
seceded from its western masters and reinvented itself as 
Bangladesh. Less dramatically, the unity of what remains of 
Pakistan has come under threat from several of the major ethnic 
communities which are recognised by the Constituion as constituent 
parts of the country. 
- 
The communities which seem to be most reconciled to the modern 
State of Pakistan are the Funjabis and the Pakhtuns in the north of 
the country. Punjab houses the national government, and Urdu was 
accepted early on as the "national language" in official circles. 
In the North West Frontier Province (NVFP) an early movement for a 
" Pakbtunlstan" dissipated f. hrough the 1950s, and the Pakhtun 
community is now well represented in the national government and 
armed forces. In the south, however, reconciliation with a national 
identity has been much less certain. On the border with Iran, the 
province of Baluchistan houses a sin ring separatist movement that 
met with heavy military suppression through the 1970s. The Baluchi 
Students Organisation (BSO) was also a powerful and violent force 
in the University and colleges of Karachi in the 1970s, and in 
certain low-income housing areas in this economically vital city. 
Meanwhile, in the wider province of Sindh there has for many years 
been a strong "subnationalist" movement that rejects the central 
government as an oppressive "Punjabi" neo-colonialist force. The 
movement is strongest in the lawless rural areas and has 
occasionally threatened to mobilise considerable sections of the 
population, notably during an anti-government drive in 1983 in 
which some Sindhi nationalists played a part. The Sindhis have also 
contributed politicians to key positions in central government - 
notably members of the Bhutto family - but this contribution has 
not always been welcomed by the Punjabi elite in Pakistan. 
- 
The struggles of the Pakhtuns, Baluchis, and to a lesser 
extent the Sindhis, has already generated a sizeable literature 
(see especially Barth (1969), A. S. Ahmed (1990), Harrison (1981)), 
but relatively little has been written about a fifth grouping in 
Pakistan, which in the mid-1980s was pushing to be recognised in 
the Constitution as an official "fifth nationality" and which has 
supported an ethnic and territorial politics which might also 
threaten the integrity of Pakistan. This fifth "subnationality" of 
Xbbajirs is largely comprised of an Urdu-speaking community 
concentrated in the major urban centres of Sindh province. The 
great majority of NobaJirs live in the cities of Karachi, Hyderabad 
and Sukkur. Most of the community are relatives of Muslims who 
migrated from Urdu-speaking districts of what became India after 
1947. These early migrants were themselves known by many people, 
and by the state in official documents published up to 1951, as 
Xobajirs. Vhile the community is numerically quite small, it is of 
great importance to the life and politics of Pakistan for two main 
reasons. Firstly, the fact that most Xbbaiirs live, work and own 
property in Karachi means that the community is located at the 
urban heart of Pakistan. The Nobajir community is small compared to 
the traditional subnationalities of Pakistan, but holds 
considerable economic power, which includes an ability to disrupt 
the economy of Pakistan. This power is rooted in a capacity to 
control particular urban spaces (notably Karachi and Hyderabad). 
Secondly, the rhetoric and x-alson d'etre of the Mohajlr- movement 
- 
encompasses a paradoxical patriotism that both identifies with a 
national culture and yet spurns the claims of some other 
communities upon the supposed essence of Pakistan. Although 
spokespersons for the Mobajir movement and its major political 
vehicle, the MQM - claim to speak for Pakistan, several of their 
actions have antagonised other communities which make up the nation 
of Pakistan. In a very real sense, the Xbbajir- movement embodies 
the contradictions that lie at the heart of the nation-building 
process in Pakistan. 
This dissertation presents the first major academic study of 
Nobajir subnationalism and of the rise and fall of its main 
political protagonist, the MQ11 and its leader Altaf Hussain. 'The 
research for the dissertation was not helped by the fact that Sindh 
Province - and Karachi and Hyderabad cities - was sporadically 
racked by political and other forms of violence when I was 
proposing to carry out fieldwork there (in 1990 and 1991). 1 will 
return to this at the end of this chapter. In general terms, 
however, I arrived at a research timetable and methodology (or 
methodologies) which allowed me to broach three related sets of 
questions bearing on Mohajir-subnationalism and the politics oi the 
MQM. 
A first set of questions concerns the construction, 
reconstruction and promulgation of a specific form of Xobajir 
identity Lbrough the 1970s and 1980s in urban Sindh. -These 
- 
questions bear upon a set of wider debates in the development 
studies literature, and in the literatures relating to nationalism, 
ethnicity and the politics of identity in post-colonial societies 
(see A. D. Smith, 1983,1991; Clapham, 1985; and Hawthorn, 1991). 
How, why, and in what settings do groups of men and women come to 
mobilise behind an ostensibly ethnic, or subnational identity? To 
what extent are these settings, or arenas, already produced by the 
activities of contending social groups (such as Sindhis and 
Baluchis) and by the central state itself? Does it make sense to 
theorise such ethnic or subnationalist movements in terms of a 
resource competition or resource mobilisation model, wherein 
various communities define themselves as contenders (or 
competitors) for the power and resources on offer in an arguably 
over-developed post-colonial state? (David Washbrook has explored 
this idea in the context of ramil Nadu politics in India: 
Washbrook, 1969; Myron Weiner has also made it a centrepiece of his 
account of the "politics of scarcity in India": Weiner, 1965). 
Night other models work just as well, or even better? Answers to 
such questions obviously require a close reading of the historical 
geography of the Nobajir movement in Pakistan; they also demand 
that attention be paid to certain wider literatures on nationalism 
and identity. Pakistan is not an archetypal post-colonial polity, 
as no one country can claim to be, but its politics will certainly 
be illuminated by careful comparative study. 
- 
A second set of questions refers specifically to the MQM, and 
the manner in which it has championed a version of Xdhajir identity 
in Sindb Province. I will examine the XQM in detail, paying 
attention lo its origins in Karachi student politics, to its means 
of organisation and funding, to possible factions and schisms 
within the party, to its goals, to its means of recruitment and 
political mobilisation, to its particular relationship with the 
local state in urban Sindh, and to the role played by its 
leadership and by its one-time supremo, Altaf Hussain. rhis in turn 
means engaging with certain wider debates: for example, on 
questions of charisma, clientalism and neo-patrimonialism in so- 
called "Third World politics" (Clapham, 1985). How can we explain 
the rise to power in urban Sindh of the MQM in the 1980s, and its 
subsequent collapse since 1990? The fragmentation and virtual 
demise of the XQM seem to suggest that it championed a banal 
politics Qlandy, 1980) -a politics that said a lot about 
personality and a cynical lust ior power, but little about 
ideology in a western sense. is it necessary to oppose these models 
of politics in this manner? It might be that we can "explain" the 
rise of MQM politics in urban Sindh in "traditional" social 
scientific terms - its ability to fill a void in existing identity 
politics, capacity to make the local state work, its strong cadre 
structure, and so on - and yet recogniEe that the MQM did embody a 
series of contradictions (ideologically, organisationally) that 
later unravelled in a seemingly meaningless bout of factionalism. 
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Clearly, there are important issues to address here, but always 
with attention tocussed : rirstly on the empirical dynamics and 
contours of the Xohajir-movement since the nid-1970s. 
A third set of questions concerns geography still more 
directly. Why should Xohajirs be active as Xbbajir-s mainly in Sindh 
and not in Punjab (where many more migrants settled after 1947)? 
Why has the MQM been successful in urban Sindh and not in rural 
Sindh, and why in Karachi and Hyderabad above all? How and why does 
geography matter to an account of Nobajir subnationalism in 
Pakistan? 
To answer these and other questions, I have divided the 
dissertation into three main Sections. These do not correspond 
directly to the three sets of questions just outlined, but they do 
provide a framework in which I can provide a sustained answer to 
most of the questions I have set (and which I put to my 
respondents). 
Section 1 comprises Chapters 2 and 3 and is rather more than 
the traditional literature review that opens a PhD dissertation. 
Chapter 2 offers a largely narrative account of the origins and 
formation of Pakistan and the major problems the country has faced 
since Independence. It also offers an account of the Mohailr 
migrations to Pakistan in the 1940s and 1950s, and the emergence of 
a Nobajir sense of identity prior to its later codification by the 
KQK. This historical narrative allows me to offer a critical 
- 
perspective on the MQM's construction of a Xobajir identity; in 
contemporary social scientific terms, it allows me to demythologise 
or denaturalise the accounts that have recently been offered up as 
"fact" by MQM activists and officers. (I return to this theme in 
Sections 2 and 3 also). Chapter 3 is a complementary chapter that 
looks at questions of nationalism, ethnicity and identity in 
Western and post-colonial societies. Insofar as this chapter 
reflects on the South Asian experience, it does so through a 
consideration of the role of Islam in the making of modern 
Pakistan, and of Islam's relationship more widely to identity- 
construction and nationalism in the contemporary developing world. 
Section 2, comprising Chapters 4 and 5, begins to introduce 
more obviously original and empirical material into the body of the 
dissertation. Its geographical point of : focus is the Province of 
Sindh. Chapter 4 shows how the emergence of a Xdbailr movement in 
southern Pakistan is intimately bound up with the nature and 
development of other community movements in the Province, and 
notably with the pressures exerted there by the majority Sindhi 
community. These pressures are apparent in the economic arena as 
well as in the more obviously political arena. Conflicts over 
economic resources (public and private) are central to the story of 
community politics in Sindh Province. Chapter 5 Tocusses on Lhe HQH 
as the major promoter of a contemporary Xabajlr politics in Sindh. 
I present a detailed chronology of the Movement's rise (and fall), 
together with an analysis of the Movement's rhetoric, internal 
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organisation and leadership. This chapter not only establishes the 
NQM as a largely urban-based pressure-group, but also begins to 
outline the inherently patrimonialist and seemingly paradoxical 
nature of the Movement's programmes and policies. The chapter draws 
heavily on interviews and discussions conducted in the field, and 
particularly those held with the most important political figures 
in Sindh - Altaf Hussain, his deputy Azim Fariq, and his key 
opponents, Benazir Bhutto, and Sindhi nationalist leader G. M. Syed. 
I also present a detailed analysis of English and Urdu-language 
party documents. 
Section 3 comprises Chapters 6 and 7 and focusses my analysis 
firmly on the urban landscapes of Karachi and Hyderabad (and 
especially the former). In Chapter 61 establish that the MQN has 
always been little more than a Karachi (and Hyderabad)-based 
pressure-group, emerging from a culture of student politics and 
concerned primarily with the pursuit of power in these two cities. 
At the same time, I show that this seemingly restricted spatial 
canvas has not, of itself, damaged the MQM as a political force. 
Indeed, the power of the MQM was very much bound up with its power 
to contiol and Lo script - otLen literally with flags and graffiti 
- the twin cities of Karachi and Hyderabad, and to deliver to some 
of its supporters the very real benefits which flow from 
controlling the formal and informal local states in urban Sindh- To 
this end I develop the concept of a parallel (local) state and I 
examine patterns of resource use and access in various subdivisions 
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of Karachi. Chapter -7 then considers the role of violence in the 
struggle for Karachi's formal and parallel state institutions. I 
examine the problem of serious civil disorder in Karachi through a 
detailed analysis of specific incidents and episodes of violence in 
the city through the 1980s and early 1990s. I also locate my case 
studies in the context of a slowly emerging literature on the crowd 
and urban violence in South Asia. 
The conclusions to the dissertation are presented in Chapter 8 
and I will not anticipate any more of them here. In the conclusion 
I also return to certain absences which necessarily mark this 
dissertation, given the situation that prevailed in Sindh at the 
time of my f ieldwork. Suf f ice it to say that the region was on the 
British Foreign and Commonwealth office's warning list for those 
foreign nationals living and working there at the time (a warning 
that was briefly given greater emphasis when the Gulf War broke out 
in January 1991). rhe extreme lawlessness of rural Sindh, together 
with the day-to-day violence of urban Sindh, necessarily imposed 
limits on the research that I was able to undertake for this 
dissertation. I endeavoured to overcome these problems, as I will 
explain later in the text. Even so, the dissertation would 
certainly have been prepared and researched differently in less 
extreme circumstances. Salman Rushdie once remarked that the 
telling of any one story necessarily imposes a silence on other 
possible stories (Rushdie, 1983). In this case, certain silences 
were imposed by material as much as by textual circumstances. 
- 11 - 
SECTION ONE 
ISLAM, NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY IN PAKISTAN 
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SINDH 
Birthplace and number 
of migrants to Sindh, 
1941-1951 
115,000-165,999 
25,000-49,999 
5.000-24,999 
1,000-4,999 
Less than 1000 
. .......... ..................... 
miles 500 
km 500 
Figure 2.1: Number of migrants to Sindh, 1941-1951 by birthplace 
Source: Census of Pakistan 1951, VoL 6, p. 66, Government of Pakistan, Karachi 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The problems of nation-building faced by the new State of 
Pakistan have been highlighted not only by the secession of East 
Pakistan in 1971, but also by the country's continuing reversion to 
military rule. Between 1947 and 1992, Pakistan was under an unelected 
military government for 24 years. Underlying the apparent lack of 
legitimacy of most of Pakistan's governments has been a basic lack of 
consensus on the z-aison dletre of the State. This is a question that 
springs from the controversies of the pre- Independence period, before 
the concept of separate partitioned states had been presented to the 
population of British India. Many of Pakistan's leaders have sought 
legitimacy and public consensus in Islam, the religion of the great 
majority of Pakistanis whatever their "ethnic" affiliations. This was 
particularly so at the time of General Zia's regime (1977-88). Yet those 
leaders who wished to retain their grip on central power could only 
pursue Islam so far, for fear that a permanent administration run by 
maulanas [Muslim clerics] would emerge, in the style of Iran. 
Other regimes, notably that of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-77) 
tried to stress the cultural and ethnic diversity of Pakistan, and 
supposedly sought legitimacy in a decentralisation of power. But the 
rhetoric of decentralisation was rarely more than rhetoric and Bhutto's 
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government was in many ways the most centralising to date in Pakistan. 
Both Bhutto and Zia tried to address the problems of the unity of 
Pakistan, but by the 1980s it was apparent that ethnic polarisation had 
not been halted. Indeed, the rise of the MQM - and a fifth, Xobajir 
losubnationality" - suggests that the unity of Pakistan remains under 
threat. 
This chapter offers a prelude to my analysis of the Xobajir 
movement in Sindh in the f orm of a narrative examination of the 
formation and history of the State of Pakistan. An analysis of the 
historical record is presented here in three main sections. Section 2.2 
examines the rise of Muslim politics in British India and the supposed 
formation there of two (religious) nations. Section 2.3 reflects on the 
political developments that led to the Partition of the subcontinent 
between India and Pakistan. Section 2.4 focusses on the political 
experience of Pakistan since Independence in 1947, and the continuing 
struggle to create a sense of national identity in that country. 
2.2 NUSLIN SUBNATIONALISM IN MIA 
Huslim leaders and intellectuals in British India f irst started 
forming a subnationalist policy towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, as British influence in the subcontinent began to effect 
fundamental changes in Indian society. In so doing, they were offering a 
reading both of the history of NuEbal India and of the prospects for 
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Hindu-Muslim (communal) relations in British India. rhis is not the 
place to engage at length with this pre-history of Muslim separatist 
politics in British India (Robinson, 1993). It will rather suffice to 
make some general remarks about communalism and the early Muslim 
leadership as a prelude to a more extended discussion of the politics of 
Muslim subnationalism in British India. 
Early history of "communalism" 
Rivalries between Hindus and Muslins in India long preceded the 
arrival of the British. Freeland Abbott (1968, p. 68) emphasised the ways 
in which the Mugb al emperors of India treated their Muslim subjects 
differently to their non-Muslim subjects. Certainly, Hindus and Muslims 
have developed very different historical memories of the period. For the 
Muslims, the period of NuEhal rule brought with it the Urdu language, 
the medium in which the public could communicate with the Nugbal courts 
in northern India, and which borrowed heavily from Persian in vocabulary 
and script. This was the language, together with Persian, of a fine 
vernacular literature and poetry developed in the courts of the Nughals, 
in such cities as Delhi, Lucknow and Lahore (see Sadiq, 1983). The 
MuSbals also brought tremendous works of architecture to the 
subcontinent, including the Taj Mahal monument in Agra, commissioned by 
Emperor Shah Jahan as a memorial for his wife, the Red Fort in Delhi, 
and the Badshahi Mosque and Shalimar Gardens in Lahore. All are fondly 
remembered, by Muslims in particular, as symbols of a powerful and 
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graceful period. Yet almost as powerful as these symbols was the 
humiliating and unceremonious end of the long Xugbal era, which came 
with the banishment of Bahadur Shah Zafar from British India after the 
so-called "Mutiny" of 1857. 
The most important issues which emerge from the Nugbal period 
as far as contemporary community relations in Pakistan are concerned, 
revolve around the issue of local community memories of the period. I 
have already noted that India's Muslims have long remembered the Xughal 
period with affection, while most Hindus and Sikhs tend to recall the 
persecution periodically unleashed on them and their cultures by 
Emperors like Aurangzeb (in the late seventeenth century). In some 
respects, however, this picture is too broadly drawn. If we are fully to 
understand the rise of Muslim separatist politics in British India - and 
later of a Nobajir- movement in Pakistan - we must first recognise that 
Muslim memories of NuEbal India (and later, British India) varied from 
place to place across a huge subcontinent. A love of the Nughal period 
and the Persian/Urdu culture it produced was most evident among Muslims 
of central and north-west India. This relates to the location of 
important NuEhal courts and buildings in such cities as Lahore, Delhi 
and Lucknow, which are either in what was West Pakistan, or are in the 
areas of origin of many important Nbbajir leaders and followers who 
migrated to West Pakistan after the Partition of India. In the Muslim 
areas of north-east India, however, a Xuýrhal/Urdu culture is less 
important than that ol certain Bengali leaders and poets, such as Qazi 
Nasrul Islam, or the Hindu writer Rabindranath Tagore (H. U Memon, 19t53, 
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p. 113). I will return to the political significance of these regional 
differences within 'Muslim culture' later on in this chapter. 
To the mass of Hindus, the Nugbals probably always seemed 
physically and culturally distant, much like the British who followed 
them (Hardy, 1972, p. 13). Hinduism calls upon more ancient traditions, 
and parades an apparent multitude of gods (which would be seen as 
idolatrous in Islam) to any number of whom temples are devoted. Urdu 
was used as a form of communication between the Pers ian- speaking NuEbal 
courts and indigenous Indians in northern and central India, but was not 
the language of the masses. By the late nineteenth century, Hindi was 
emerging as the lingua franca of the Hindu community. Hindi is a 
northern-Indian language close to Urdu in structure and vocabulary, and 
indeed equated with Urdu by the British under the title "Hindustani", but 
which is written in a different script and borrows more heavily from 
Sanskrit than from Persian. Language became a source of conflict as the 
communities polarised at the turn of the twentieth century, as did 
various differences in religious ritual. Music, for example, is important 
to much of Hindu ritual, while it is seen as ungodly in Islam, especially 
in relation to religious ceremony. Hindus also revere the cow as a 
sacred animal, while beef is one of the most important sources of meat 
for Muslims. Similarly, park and alcohol are unclean and forbidden in 
Islam, while both are widely used among non-Brahmin Hindus. For 
centuries, it seems, these factors had been largely tolerated by 
neighbouring communities. As conflict and bitterness grew, however, such 
differences became foci for attack and recrimination. Today, most people 
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in Pakistan take the division of the subcontinent for granted. "How 
could we live together", exclaimed an Urdu-speaking Muslim student to 
the author in Karachi, in March 1991, "when they worship the cow and we 
eat it? " 
The British period 
With the arrival of the British in India, the peoples of the 
subcontinent had to coexist under a new leadership. In 1835 Persian was 
abolished as the official language and Macauley's 1835 "Education Minute" 
made English the medium of all higher education in British India. 
European schools were established to supplement the Muslim madr-asseh 
[Islamic schools] and other indigenous schools, and the learning of 
English opened new opportunities for employment in government service. 
With the determined crushing of an uprising by the Third Native Cavalry 
in Delhi in 1857, known as the "Mutiny" (or the First War of 
Independence), the Muslims realised (finally) that the old XuEhal days 
had ended. For the Muslims, it was a time of shock, tragedy, and 
depression. The poet Ghalib (1797-1868) wrote at the time: "Here there 
is a vast ocean of blood bef ore me, God alone knows what more I shall 
have to behold" (Hardy, 1972, p. 70). The Muslims had reason to fear the 
future as many British people blamed them for the so-called Mutiny. 
William Howard Russell wrote in his diary in 1860 that: "the Mohammedan 
element in India is that which causes us most trouble and provokes the 
largest share of our hostility ... They are unquestionably more dangerous 
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[than the Hindus] to our rule" (W. Howard Russell, 1860, pp. 73-4; see also 
Robinson, 1993a) . 
As things turned out, British rule wasn't always or only a curse 
for the Muslims of India. Under the Queen-Empress Victoria, the British 
set to ruling India by means of a shifting policy of divide and rule. At 
times this did work to the disadvantage of some Muslim groups and there 
is certainly evidence to suggest that Muslims in north-west and north- 
east India suffered from continuing 'economic backwardness' in the 
British period (Brass, 1974). In the United Provinces of north-central 
India, however, some Muslims fared rather well, and their status was 
surely encouraged by British attempts to build up a loyal Muslim 
constituency as a counterweight to the growing community of 'Hindu' 
nationalists that was being championed by the Indian National Congress 
(founded in 1885). The British encouraged a specifically Muslim sense of 
identity in India by passing legislation which reserved jobs and later 
some Assembly Seats for individuals as members and representatives of 
particular religious communities. The British also encouraged the view 
that India was made up of two nations: a Muslim nation and a Hindu 
nation. The (temporary) partition of Bengal by Curzon in 1905 was one 
product - and sponsor - of this view (Broomfield, 1968). 
Such actions on behalf of the British soon found an echo in parts 
of the Kuslim community in India. In the second half of the nineteenth 
century certain influential Muslim intellectuals began to stress the 
importance of allegiance to the British, and of an appreciation of the 
educational opportunities linked to the learning of English. Societies 
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began to emerge, such as the Muhammadan Literary Society of Bengal, set- 
up in 1865, and the British Indian Association, founded in 1866 at 
Aligarh, United Provinces, that promoted literature and education and 
professed allegiance to the colonial authorities. At this time, also, two 
somewhat divergent elements of Muslim leadership were emerging. On the 
one side stood the Muslim "progress ives", including the founder of the 
British Indian Association, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. In 1875, Sir Syed 
established the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, which 
would later become Aligarh University in 1922. On the other side stood 
the mainstream Islamic leadership of India, which accused Sir Syed and 
his Western-educated colleagues of pandering to the "un-Islamic" British 
authorities. The ulama of Medina, one of the main centres of Islamic 
pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia, condemned Sir Syed to death for dealing with 
a secular European power (Ahmed, 1988, p. 127). 
There was also a regional bias to an emerging Muslim leadership, 
with the epicentre of the 'progressives' very clearly being in the United 
Provinces of north-central India. By 1902 the college at Aligarh was 
supplying 27% annually of all Indian Muslim graduates (Zakaria, 1970, 
p. 185). At the time of Independence, such graduates would represent a 
significant element of the government and bureaucracy of a new-born 
Pakistan. Table 2.1 shows the proportion of Aligarh graduates in the 
elite Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) between 1948 and 1953. The share 
of such graduates in the Civil Service was disproportionate to the 
number of northern Indian Muslims in the population of the new Pakistan. 
In the year 1950/51, migrants from United Provinces in India (where 
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Aligarh is located) accounted f or less than 1.5% of the population of 
West Pakistan (and less than 1.0% of all Pakistan; Census of Pakistan, 
1961, Vol. 3, Table 9,11 303). 
degrees as % of total 
1948 5.56 
1949 10.00 
1950 15.00 
1951 18.18 
1952 17.65 
1953 15.38 
Source: Annual Reports of the Pakistan Public Service Commission 1.948- 
64, Karacbi (1964), Table 8. 
Ccmmunity polarisation 
Among the wider Indian population, there was a growing sense 
that a "two-nation" rift was developing in Indian society throughout the 
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f irst years of 
-the 
twentieth century, notably in the form of communal 
rioting. One of the more dramatic episodes of such violence was the 
rioting in Kanpur, United Provinces in 1931, which led to the 
commissioning of a government enquiry an serious riots in India. The 
Enquiry report noted that in the decade 1921 to 1931 there had been 39 
recorded serious Hindu-Nuslim riots in India (Barrier, 1976, p. 228). The 
Enquiry report also uncovered examples of individual bravery where 
Hindus and Muslims had tried to help and protect each other (ibid, 
p. 232), but it seemed that a wave of Hindu-Muslim antagonism was 
overwhelming many local communities in this decade (Page, 1982). 
Communal riots may or may not date back as far as the eighteenth 
century, as Bayly maintains (Bayly, 1985); what is clear, however, is 
that such riots increased in incidence in the wake of a nascent 
industrialisation of India (Chakrabarty, 1989) and in line with a 
growing politicisation of Indian society along religious lines. 
In the latter regard, it is worth noting that the much-praised 
Kbilafa t/Non- cooperation movement of 1920-24, in which Hindus and 
Muslims joined together in an anti-British drive, involved different 
basic motives an the part of most Muslims and Hindus. The Muslims were 
fighting mainly for the restoration of the Islamic seat of spiritual 
authority, the Kbilafa [Caliphate] in Turkey, and their brief honeymoon 
with the Indian National Congress dissipated in 1924 when Kemal Ataturk 
abolished the Caliphate (Ali, 1967, p. 20). There is evidence that the 
ulama had always opposed an alliance with Gandhi, partly because his 
plans for Swaraj [home rule] involved such provisions as allowing women 
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to vote (Hardy , 1972, p. 195). It also bears repeating that the British 
administration worked hard to undermine Hindu-Muslim unity in the early 
twentieth century and that, to that end, the British wooed their Muslim 
subjects by means of guaranteed public service jobs and reserved Muslim 
constituencies. Against this background, and with the emergence in the 
late twentieth century of the aforementioned Indian National Congress, it 
is perhaps not surprising that a new community of Muslim politicians 
would emerge to champion a particular (and changing) vision of the place 
of Muslims within (and later without) British India. It is to a more 
detailed account of this history - the history of the emergence of 
Pakistan - that I now turn. 
2.3 THE EMERGENCE OF PAKISTAN 
The leader of the Muslim League after 1928, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 
whose life has been analysed in detail by Stanley Volpert (1984), is now 
revered as the Quald-i Azam (Father of the Nation) in Pakistan, for his 
leading role in the forging of Pakistan. His main policy throughout the 
twentieth century was to secure protected power for the Muslims of India 
as a separate community to the Hindus and others. Although the League 
did not endorse a sovereignty demand until 1940,1 Jinnah demonstrated 
the manner in which he viewed the Muslims of India in the aftermath of 
the 1937 elections: "Organize yourselves, establish your solidarity 'and 
complete unity ... Create the feeling of an espz-it de cor-ps, and of 
comradeship among yourselves" (Volpert, 1984, p. 153). This was the time 
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during which the notion of a "Muslim nationality" was being transformed 
into a political movement, and by 1940 the Muslim League was defining 
this movement for the first time as a separatist one. How and why this 
process developed remains a matter of growing controversy. 
The divergence of the two major religious communities of India 
led to the emergence of a variety of political groups that later jockeyed 
for position as it became clear that Britain would eventually relinquish 
power in the subcontinent. The Indian National Congress (henceforth the 
ING) declared on its launch in 1885 that it was a "national" party 
representing Indians of every community. In 1906 the Muslim League was 
launched (henceforth "the League") and challenged this claim, saying that 
it alone represented the Muslims of India. In 1927, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 
formerly a member of the INC, emerged from the Bombay-based 
"Nationalist Party" that he headed to lead one of two factions in the 
Muslim League. After a period in Britain, Jinnah returned to Indian 
politics in 1936 to revitalise the League and to lead its emerging 
quest for (what would become) the State of Pakistan. 
Stanley Volpert's autobiography of Jinnah (Volpert, 1984) 
supports the established view that the fight for Pakistan was a 
difficult one for the Muslim League, but that victory was achieved at the 
eleventh hour despite the continuing opposition of the INC. In 1985, 
however, Ayesha Jalal published another appraisal of Jinnah and the 
League, which together with the long-embargoed book of Maulana Abul 
Kalam Azad (1988), contributed to what has been called the "revisionist 
theory" of the Partition (Roy, 1990, p. 385). 
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The orthodox view has been that the Muslim League: "was the 
only party to achieve what it wanted [in 1947)" (A. I. Singh, 1987, p. 252). 
R. J Moore (Moore, 1983, p. 529) has also suggested that Jinnah's work was 
central to both the "Pakistan Resolution" of 1940 and the Partition of 
India in 1947. Jalal has led a revolt against this reading of history, 
claiming that a Partition of India was never the real aim of Jinnah, who 
rather desired the creation of a federal union in which the League could 
exercise some power Ualal, 1985, p. 4). Instead, it was an intransigent 
Nehru who finally crushed the possibility of such a federal framework, 
which had seemed imminent at the time of the Cabinet Mission Plan of 
1946 (Nehru, 1969, p-526). Naulana Azad, from whom Nehru assumed the 
full presidency of the INC in 1946, later revealed that he thought the 
latter's appointment a tremendous "blunder" (Roy, 1990, p. 385), paving 
the way for a Partition that otherwise might have been avoided (ibid, 
p. 386). Whatever the truth of this observation, it is clear that British 
India was divided hastily and bloodily in 1947 and that a good deal of 
the 'blame' for this must be shouldered by Mountbatten and his sponsors, 
and not Just by Nehru and/or Jinnah. To see that this is so, 
however, we 
have to move backwards to come forwards. 
The INC and the Xuslim League in British India 
The Indian National Congress (INC) was launched in Bombay in 
the mid-1880s. The reactions of pro-British Muslim intellectuals such as 
Sir Syed Ahmed Khan was that the INC was a seditious movement (Zakaria, 
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1970, p. 50). In the same year, Sir Syed launched the Muhammedan 
Educational Conference in Aligarh, which in turn promoted the All India 
Muslim League at its Dacca meeting in 1906. Hardy (1972, p-154) claims 
that the League sprang from a successful meeting between a group of 
Muslim leaders and Viceroy Lord Hinto at Simla that year, in which the 
Muslims warned that a simple adult franchise would destroy the Muslim 
community at the hands of the larger Hindu community. Hardy (1972, 
p. 158) describes the meeting in these terms: 
"The Simla deputation was the outcome of a marriage 
of convenience between British political necessity 
and upper-class Muslim interests - and those of the 
Muslims of the United Provinces above all others. " 
Hardy's reading of this meeting contains within it two important 
Judgements. Firstly, it is clear that the Muslim League was valuable to 
the British as a counterbalance to the rapidly growing Indian National 
Congress, whose rhetoric was far less pro-British than that of most 
Muslim intellectuals. Secondly, a major component of the League's early 
membership was made up of Urdu-speaking Muslims from the United 
Provinces. The Muslim leaders to whom the MQX now refer in their 
constructions of a Kohajir identity were thus a specific grouping of 
Urdu-speaking politicians and intellectuals. 
The link between the Muslim League and central- northern Indian 
Muslims was ever a strong one. At its inaugural session in Dacca 
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(December 1906), a Provisional Committee was formed to frame the 
League's constitution. Of the 57 members of the (all-India) Committee, 13 
came from the United Provinces (plus Delhi), with six of these coming 
from Aligarh alone (S. S Pirzada, 1969/70, pp. 11-12). This compares with 
just six members from Punjab province, and just nine from the whole of 
Bengal (ibid). The dominance of League members from the United Provinces 
might also be guessed at from the location of League sessions held 
between 1906 and 1943 (see Table 2.2), which leaned heavily to UP/Delhi: 
United Provinces 
Delhi 
Calcutta 
Punjab (Lahore, Amritsar) 
Bombay 
Karachi 
Nagpur (Maharashtra) 
Ahmadabad (Gujerat) 
Patna (Bihar) 
Madras 
Source: S. S. Pirzada, 1.969/70; Vol. II, pp. 608-9 
Number of spsslons 
9 
6 
7 
5 
4 
2 
2 
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We will also see that it was the Muslim electorate in the United 
Provinces that gave the heaviest endorsement of the League in the 
elections of 1937. These patterns indicate the specific cultural as well 
as political nature of the Muslim League, particularly in the use of Urdu 
as the party's lingua franca. This was the language of the Muslim 
intelligentsia in United Provinces, Delhi, Bihar (to a partial extent; see 
Bessaignet, 1960, p. 22) and even Punjab. As Jalal (1985, p. 2) observes, 
much of the political (and geographical) driving-force behind Pakistan 
was to be excluded from its eventual boundaries. 
Among the other major Muslim players in the immediate pre- 
Independence period were the intellectuals of Bengal, including Sir Syed 
Ameer Ali. Sir Syed established a London branch of the League in 1910. 
There was also an important Punjabi faction of the Muslim League, which 
was represented by a separate wing of the party between 1927 and 1933 
under Sir Mohammad Shafi (S. S Pirzada, 1969/70, p. xvi). Even at this 
early stage there is evidence that tensions occasionally existed between 
these various regional branches of Muslim leadership (Hardy, 1972, 
p. 154). This is an important point to bear in mind when regarding future 
relationships between East and Vest Pakistan. 
It was in the years immediately after 1927, when the League was 
experiencing damaging internal schisms, that Jinnah stepped into an 
important position in the party as the head of the non-Punjabi faction. 
At this time, Jinnah presented a plan of "14 points"2, endorsed by the 
Jamiat-1 Ulaiva-i Hind [Party of the Ulama of India; an Islamic party and 
that later became the Jamiat-1 Ulama-i Pakistan], which called for 
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separate communal electorates and a federal India committed to a high 
degree of provincial autonomy. The report formed the basis of Muslim 
demands during the Round Table Conference in London starting in 1930, 
from which a White Paper finally emerged in 1933. Here was described a 
framework of Provinces in a Federation, such as came into operation in 
1937, when Sindh was separated from the Bombay Presidency, and the 
North Vest Frontier Province was given full provincial status. These 
administrative changes were to prove important forerunners to the shape 
of Vest Pakistan. 
In 1934, elections to the central Legislative Assembly were held 
under the Government of India Act of 1919, from which the INC emerged 
with 34.65% of the seats, and independent Muslims with 14.96% (Qureshi, 
1987, p. 71). The first major test of the relative strengths of the Muslim 
League and INC, however, came in the provincial elections of 1937, under 
the new provincial system emerging from the Round Table Conference. It 
is important to remember that, at this time, the manifestos of each 
party were united on one key issue; namely to secure swar-aj [home-rule) 
for India. 
1937 and after 
The elections of 1937 can be described as a success for the INC 
and a disaster for the Muslim League (see Table 2.3). The League fell 
foul of regional Nuslim parties and leaders, such as the Punjabi 
Unionists, and won just 4.4% of the total Muslim vote (Jalal, 1990, p. 12). 
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The INC won clear majorities in five of the eleven Provinces and 
ultimate ly formed the ministries in eight, including NWFP. 
Total Muslim 
Legislative Assembly Muslim Seats 
seats won by MI, 
Madras 28 9 
Bombay 29 17 
Bengal 117 35 
United Provinces 64 23 
PunJab 84 1 
Bihar 39 - 
Central Provinces and Berar 14 5 
Assam 34 10 
NVFP 36 - 
Orissa 4 
Sindh 33 
TOTAL 482 100 
Source: Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937; Nov. 
1937, Cmd. 5589, Accounts and Fapers (6), Vol. XXI, pp. apff. 
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NWFP, Sindh and Punjab, as Provinces inhabited by a majority of 
Muslims, constituted three of the Muslim League's more conspicuous 
failures in the elections of 1937. Meanwhile the INC, which unlike the 
League was standing in both Muslim reserved seats and "general" seats, 
won fifteen Muslim seats in NWFP, four in Bihar and two in Punjab. In 
United Provinces, four Muslim League delegates with "Congress leanings" 
won Muslim seats in addition to those shown in Table 2.3. In the huge 
Province of Bengal furthermore, the League failed to win a single seat 
among Muslims in rural areas (where the bulk of the Muslim votes were 
situated), winning all its 35 seats in urban constituencies. 
Significantly, it was in United Provinces that the Muslim League made 
the biggest impact among Muslims. Even at this time, the electorate in 
United Provinces was acting somewhat differently to those in the areas 
that were to become Pakistan. 
The results of the 1937 elections led to a sea-change in the 
central policy of the League, as expressed in the Lahore session of the 
party in March 1940 when it was declared for the first time that 
nothing short of the partition of the subcontinent would be acceptable 
to Muslims. rhis shift from a demand for a federal India to a demand 
for separate States became known as the "Pakistan Resolution", although 
the specific name of the new State had not been mentioned by the Muslim 
League and only came into common parlance some years later3. 
The seeds of separatism had been sown in the years leading up 
to 1940. In 1938, the Sindh provincial administration (having achieved 
separation from the Bombay Presidency in 1936), headed by the Muslim 
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League, proposed a partition of India and became the first Province to- 
do so. I will show later on that this very event has become a bitter 
debating-point in modern-say Sindh, and is used by some Sindhi leaders 
to argue that the Province was the most enthusiastic of all the Indian 
Provinces in its support for the idea of Pakistan. 
The poet and philosopher Muhammad Iqbal is widely credited with 
first propounding the concept of what would become Pakistan. He declared 
at the Allahabad session of the Muslim League in December 1930 that: 
"I would like to see the Panjab, North-West Frontier 
Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalganated into a single 
State. Self-government within the British Empire or without 
the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North- 
West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the f inal 
destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India [sic]. " 
(N. Iqbal, Presidential Address, All India Muslim League 29 December 
1930, Allahabad; in Abbott, 1968, p. 163) 
Seen in these terms, the principle of separation was driven by a 
desire not to be part of a State in which Hindus led by the INC held 
sway. But Iqbal's address also identified a specific geographical area of 
and for Muslims, the majority of whom were assumed to desire the same. 
A scholar from the Punjab, writing in Persian, Urdu and English, and 
revered today in Pakistan as one of the Most important historical 
-32- 
figures, Iqbal made no mention of the Muslims of Bengal, among others. 
These people were later to form over half the population of Pakistan. 
This factor links Iqbal culturally to the Punjabis and Urdu-speaking 
Xcbajiz-s of West Pakistan, rather than to the Bengalis of East Pakistan, 
and highlights the inherently problematical nature of the future State of 
Pakistan. (I will show later on that figures such as Iqbal are important 
to the construction of a Nobajir identity in a way that they are not to 
other Pakistani communities such as Sindhis [or indeed Bengalis]. A 
recent ethnic conflict in Hyderabad, Pakistan, saw a provocative erection 
of portraits of Iqbal and others by Xobajir youths at "flashpoint" sites 
of importance to the Sindhi community (Newsline, February 1990, Karachi, 
p. 43). Such actions are testimony both to the esteem in which Iqbal is 
now held by the Xobajirs, and the less respectful manner in which he is 
remembered by most Sindhis. The erection of th e portraits also 
highlights the importance of a selective memory of pre- Independence 
events and personalities by contemporary ethnic activists, and the use 
of such historical symbols in the arena of contemporary ethnic politics 
in Sindh). 
By the time of the Lahore Resolution of 1940, Jinnah and the 
Xuslim Lea gue were proposing separation for six Indian Provinces; 
Punjab, NWFP, Sindh, Baluchistan, Bengal and Assam, the last two 
separated from the four others by over 1000 miles. (Significantly, the 
fate of Jammu and Kashmir had not been resolved). The INC, meanwhile, 
was launching a renewed period of anti-British agitation under a "Quit 
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India" banner, which rapidly led to the internment of Gandhi and many 
top INC ministers. 
The incarceration of INC politicians allowed the Muslim League 
to make considerable gains. Between 1938 and 1942, the Muslim League 
won 46 of the 56 by-elections held in Muslim seats (S. S Pirzada, 
1969/70, p. xxi). By the end of 1943, the League headed ministries in 
Bengal, Assam, Sindh and NWFP. The League also managed to strike an 
agreement with the Punjabi Unionists (a traditionally pro-British party 
of landowners and local notables) in the Punjab. On the back of this 
agreement the Muslim League effectively controlled most of the areas 
described (or claimed) by the Pakistan Resolution of 1940. 
The negotiations and deals that led to the formation of these 
ministries showed that Muslim politicians across India were coalescing 
around the Muslim League. Between 1940 and 1941, membership of the 
party increased by over 26% to 112,078 (Pirzada, ibid). This was a 
remarkable achievement considering that the 1930 Lahore session, where 
Iqbal had delivered his historic address, had failed to achieve a quorum 
of 75 delegates (ibid, p. xvi) 
The fiual acts 
By 1944, an ex-INC member, Rajagopalachari, with British 
backing, was shuttling between Gandhi and Jinnah with the beginnings of 
a new compromise plan for Partition. This plan invited Jinnah's famous 
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TA LE 2.4: Results of Central Leglslative Assembly Plectinnr-, Dece7shtxr 
124ii 
Party % ol Votes won 
AU Muslim 
seats Rpatq 
Indian National Congress 59.8 1.3 
Muslim League 27.7 86.7 
Akali Sikhs 2.1 - 
Nationalist Muslims 2.8 8.9 
Others 4.0 3.1 
Source: Return Sbowing the Results of Elections to the Centr-al 
Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures In 1945-56, 
Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1948, p. 8 
interpretation of a "truncated and moth-eaten Pakistan" (Jalal, 1990, 
p. 19). By t#is time, I would argue, Pakistan had already been won, and 
negotiations were mainly aimed at hammering out the precise geographical 
description of the new States. 
Yet, two more developments paved the way for the independence of 
India and Pakistan in August 1947. These were the elections of 1945/46 
in which the electorate polarised around the two major parties, and the 
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TR'RT. R 2.5o Results nf prnvin! Qial elections. January 1946 
Legislature/seats Votes polled M 
m M. League 
MADRAS Total 68.3 9.6 
Muslim 0.5 93.1 
BOMBAY Total 78.9 5.3 
Muslim 2.1 93.2 
BENGAL Total 42.2 37.2 
Muslim 0.5 84.7 
U. P* Total 64.4 24.1 
Muslim 13.4 65.1 
PUNJAB Total 23.1 32.8 
Muslim 0.4 65.3 
BIHAR Total 71.3 13.7 
Muslim 5.1 73.9 
(continues over) 
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Legisli2ture Votes polled M 
IK M. League 
C. P/B** Total 72.5 5.3 
Muslim 0.9 82.3 
ASSAN Total 48.0 25.3 
Nuslim 0.3 68.9 
NWFPI"-**- Total 40.1 38.9 
Nuslim 38.6 41.4 
ORISSA Total 76.8 5.3 
Nuslim 6.6 90.8 
SINDH Total 16.6 46.3 
Muslim - 60.2 
Source: Return Sbowing the Results of Elections to the Central 
Legislative AssemblY and the Provincial Legislatures In 1945-56, ibid, 
pp. 6.9ff 
f United Provinces; ff Central Provinces and Berar; *44 Morth-West 
Frontier Province. 
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appointment of Admiral Mountbatten as Viceroy of India in February 1947. 
At the end of 1945, elections to the central Legislative 
Assembly were held. The results are shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. The 
Provincial elections of January 1946 continued the pattern of the 
central elections, whereby the Nuslim League won most of the Nuslim. 
votes, approximately 75% (Jalal, 1990, p. 20), and the INC won most of the 
non-Muslim vote. 
The stage was then set for Partition as each side strengthened 
its claims on the basis of these results. Even now, however, the Muslim 
League was frustrated in its desire to form Ministries in all of the 
Provinces covered by the Pakistan demand. In Punjab, most Punjabi 
Unionists and their supporters, who had won the elections of 1937, had 
by now shifted their support to the League. But the League failed to 
gain an absolute majority in Punjab and the Sikhs would not cooperate 
with the League without assurances of an independent state (of 
Khalistan) that could secede from a future Pakistan. Ultimately, the INC 
formed the Ministry in Punjab with the support of the Sikhs and others. 
In the NVFP, the INC won a clear majority under the Pakhtun nationalist 
Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Assam also fell to a clear INC majority, taking the 
total of INC-majority provinces to eight of eleven. 
In Sindh, too, G. M. Syed split from the Muslim League on the 
eve of the elections to form his own group demanding the separation of 
Sindh. He won four seats, and thus denied the Muslim League a majority 
in Sindh. Failure to form a ministry led to fresh elections in December 
1946 which the League finally won. In Bengal also, the League under 
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Suhrawardy narrowly failed to win a clear majority, but managed to form 
a ministry in coalition with Muslim independents (Qureshi, 1987, pp. 239- 
42). Baluchistan did not have a provincial assembly as it was 
administered centrally in cooperation with tribal saz-dar-s [lords]. On the 
day of Independence, one of these, the Khan of Kalat, declared 
Independence for Baluchistan (Harrison, 1981, p. 24). 
These last-minute frustrations for the Muslim League leadership 
begin to suggest that the State of Pakistan, which was achieved just a 
year and a half after the elections of 1946, was incoherent and 
insubstantial from the beginning. Even the territory of the State was a 
matter for debate, and one which, it can be argued, has still not been 
resolved in the light of the continuing Kashmir crisis. 
The British hand 
By 1945/46 it became apparent that the British were willing to 
leave India, and were being encouraged to do so by the United States 
(Tomlinson, 1977). In August 1946 the colonial authorities injected a 
greater haste towards achieving this goal by asking Nehru to form an 
Interim Government, which he promptly did in September 1946. Naturally, 
Jinnah felt sleighted, but he eventually decided to Join the government 
in which the future first Prime Minister of Pakistan, the Urdu-speaker 
Liaquat Ali Khan, was finance minister. The government's first session 
was then boycotted by the Muslim League over a perceived lack of 
representation on its benches, and the administration never functioned. 
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By May 1947, Lord Mountbatten had assumed the mantle of Viceroy 
and injected a new urgency into the proposed transfer of power in India. 
He presented a plan, drafted by a Hindu advisor V. P Menon, proposing a 
partition of the subcontinent in which Pakistan would be close to the 
"moth-eaten" state proposed by Rajagopalachari, in 1944. 
Jinnah's determination to achieve a sovereign state for the 
Muslims did not diminish (though see Jalal, 1985), and an 3 June 1947, 
after much debate, he announced the Muslim League's acceptance of 
Mountbatten's plan. Perhaps more surprisingly, the INC signalled its 
acceptance on 14 June. The sudden transition from deadlock to agreement 
is a matter that some historians have failed to confront, and it 
continues to generate a good deal of controversy. Chaudury Muhammad Ali 
(C. M. Ali, 1967, p. 122), a Prime Minister of Pakistan in the early 1950s, 
claimed that Nehru finally agreed to Partition in the belief that 
Pakistan was an unviable concept, and would fail shortly after its birth. 
Ali's theory was an interesting precursor to the "revisionist" theory of 
the Partition of India that emerged later. 
For Jinnah and the Muslim League, the problems and territorial 
controversies that marked the pre- Independence negotiations for Pakistan 
were to continue. There was to be a referendum in NWFP asking which 
State the province wished to join; a consultation of the Shabi Jlx-ga 
(Assembly of Kings) in Baluchistan; and votes in some other Provincial 
assemblies as to which new State they wished to accede to. Orissa, 
Central Provinces, United Provinces and Assam, despite high votes for 
the Muslim League in Muslim seats (see Table 2.5 above), were to be 
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excluded from Pakistan. Bengal and Punjab were to be partitioned between 
'Hindu and Muslim regions. The ensuing votes defimed the nature of the 
new Pakistan, and on midnight of 14/15 August 1947, the two new 
dominions of India and Pakistan came into being. 
Transition to Independence 
Pakistan was barn just seven years after the Lahore Resolution, 
at which time even the name of the proposed new State had not been 
adopted by the League. The new State 'for Muslims' was composed of two 
separate wings, and housed just over half of the Muslims of the 
subcontinent. Some 40 million Muslims remained within the territory of 
the new State of India (Davis, 1951, p. 198). Most of the economic wealth 
and facilities of the former British India also remained in what would 
became the Republic of India, while the new capital and principal part 
of Pakistan, Karachi, was little more than a medium-sized city with few 
major industries. 
According to the 1941 Census of India, Lahore was the largest 
city in what became Pakistan, and ranked fifth among the cities of 
India. Karachi was the twelfth largest, while Dacca, the provincial 
capital of East Pakistan, was only the nineteenth largest (Davis, ibid, 
p. 200). As the site of West Pakistan's only major port and its only' 
functioning Muslim League ministry at the tine of Independence (Sindh), 
Karachi war. ultimately chosen as the new capital. 
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The territorial conflicts and confusions continued through the 
first months of Independence. In the province of Kashmir a rebellion 
against the Indian government was encouraged by Pakistan, leading to 
hostilities between the two nations' armies. A ceasefire line bisecting 
the province was finally established in January 1949, and this broadly 
constitutes the border between India and Pakistan today. Meanwhile the 
Nawabs [princely chiefs] of Hyderabad and Mysore, in south-east and 
south-west India respectively, refused to accede to India until the army 
took control and forced their accession. 
Perhaps the most disruptive experience of Independence, however, 
was the migration of large groups of people between the new States. 
Within West Pakistan many Sikhs and Hindus started to travel east 
towards India, while many thousands of Muslims were travelling in the 
opposite direction. In some places, such as in Bihar, West Bengal and 
Punjab, the migrations were accompanied by large-scale violence. 
Reliable figures of the number of people abducted or killed during this 
period are not available. rhe figures concerning refugee movements are 
also probably not very accurate, although I use Census data on such 
matters in this dissertation. Table 2.6 depicts the situation in the two 
countries by means of the 1951 Censuses of Pakistan and India. In the 
Table, "cross-border" migrants means those that left India for Pakistan 
and vice versa. 
C. N Ali (C. M. Ali, 1967, p. 274) estimates that nine million 
refugees entered West Pakistan in the ten years immediately after 
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TABLE 2.6: Humbpr of Partition ! ýmlgjants" in Ndia and Pakistan. 19514 
Country Number of cross-border 
INDIA 8,229,699 
(West Bengal) 2,618,938 
(East Punjab) 2,099,479 
(United Provinces) 491,499 
(Delhi) 479,744 
PAKISTAN 7,415,000 
(Vest Pakistan)* 6,706,652 
(East Pakistan) 701,000 
(Punjab) 5,393,308 
(Sindh) 1,226,928 
(Karachi) 655,811 
Sources: Census of India 1.951, Vol. I, Fart 11-A, Table D-IV; 
Census of Pakistan 1961, Vol. 3, West Pakistan, Table 9,11 302-5. 
f Excluding areas under Deputy Commissioners and Agencies, within wbicb 
there were some 11,500 migrants. 
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Partition, while Tayyeb quotes an International Labour Organisation study 
which claims that about 7 million entered both wings of Pakistan by 
1951, and that up to two million more in both countries were killed in 
communal genocide during the movements (Tayyeb, 1966, p. 169). In 
Pakistan, the refugees constituted about 10% of the population by 1957 
(Tayyeb, ibid, p. 170), and in 1958 100,000 migrants were still living in 
self-built shanty dwellings in the city of Karachi alone (S. Ansari, 
lecture, 28 November 1990, Centre of South Asian Studies, Cambridge). 
There are two key elements to note concerning the distribution of 
post-Partition migrants shown in Table 2.6. Firstly, it was the two 
partitioned provinces of Bengal and Punjab that saw the greatest 
movements of people. In Bengal, it seems that many more fled west into 
India than entered East Pakistan, while in Punjab, more Muslims moved to 
Pakistan than did non-Muslims travelling in the opposite direction. 
Secondly, within Pakistan, not only did the Western wing receive many 
more migrants than the East, but Punjab received the largest number of 
migrants. This is an important point to bear in mind, considering that 
it is among the migrant families of Sindb that a new XdbaJ1r- identity 
has arisen since the 1970s. (For the distribution of migrant source- 
areas to Sindh see Figure 2.1). 
In relation to the movement of peoples after 1947, it is useful 
to examine the words of the founder of Pakistan, the "Quaid-i Azazil, 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, speaking to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan 
at Karachi an 11 August 1947, Just days before Independence : 
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"You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you 
are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of 
worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong 
to any religion or caste or creed - that has'nothing 
to do with the business of the State.. " 
(Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1989, 
p. 46) 
If we take Jinnah at his word, his statement seems to indicate a wish 
that Pakistan should be a broadly secular state (in the sense that its 
law and government would not be structured under an Islamic sbarlat 
plan). But herein lies a paradox. The supposed basis for Pakistan, as 
Jinnah repeatedly argued throughout the 1940s, was that the Muslims of 
India were a "nation" distinct from other "nations" in the subcontinent. 
The basis for this nationality could only have been the religion of 
Islam, since the Muslims were as diverse in language and culture across 
India as they were different from the Hindus and some other communities. 
The motivation for forming a new State in areas where Muslims were in a 
majority was to protect this "nationality", by enshrining it in a State 
where the basis for a common [religious] identity applied to all, or 
most, of the population. If Jinnah did not see Islam as the ralson dldtre 
of the new State, as the above statement suggests he did not, then he 
could only have pressed for a State of Pakistan as a rebuff to the 
political -ambitions of Gandhi, Nehru and the INC. 
-45- 
Seen in these terms, Jinnah may have wanted to f orge a separate 
State for Muslims in India so as to offer greater political and economic 
opportunities for the people in that State, but he was disingenuous to 
suggest that the State should be secular and loosely federal if, as he 
claimed, the basis for the State was a Muslim "nationality". The 
secular wishes expressed in the statement above, and the federal 
framework proposed in "Jinnah's 14 points" that formed the foundations 
of Independence negotatiations after 1929, support the theory, voiced by 
Mujeeb (Mujeeb, 1970, p. 410), that the real foundations of Pakistan were 
not to be found in Islam as such, but derived from the desire for a 
political framework in which a Muslim elite could exercise power. Within 
India, the Muslims were always in a minority compared to the Hindus, and 
thus faced stiff competition in business. This was particularly so in 
provinces such as Bengal, where Muslims were in a majority in the 
province as a whole, but in which the major industrial centre, Calcutta, 
was dominated by Hindu businesses. With the creation of a new State of 
'Muslim' Pakistan, many Muslim business-people clearly hoped to benefit 
from a new commercial environment largely free of Hindu competition. 
An "economic" theory of the creation of Pakistan, and Jinnah's 
position as regards the movement of Muslim capital, gains support f rom 
an analysis of Pakistan's major industries before and after Independence. 
In the 1940s, Jinnah worked closely with major Muslim industrialists in 
Bombay on a scheme for the creation of "nation-building" companies. At 
the time, Bombay housed India's most important concentration of Muslim- 
owned industry. Habib Bank, established in Bombay in 1941 and now one 
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of the principal banks in Pakistan, was one of the four "nation- bu i ld ing" 
companies set up with the cooperation of Jinnah (H. Papanek, 1972, p. 13). 
Of these four companies, only one - the Rustom Cowasjee shipping line of 
Karachi - was already located in an area that was to become Pakistan 
after 1947. The other companies transferred operations from India in 
order to map out a new future in a largely Muslim Pakistan. 
2.4 THE EXPERIENCE OF PAKI113TAN 
The composition of the Muslim League in pre-1947 India held 
important implications f or the early government of Pakistan, since it 
was from the ranks of the League that all the central and provincial 
administrations up to 1955 were selected. The one exception to this was 
a two-month period in East Pakistan in 1954, during which an elected 
United Front administration held power before being dismissed by the 
Governor-General (Callard, 1957, p. 25). 
The position of Urdu-speakers within this configuration was 
particularly important. The f irst central Constituent Assembly was 
composed of those elected to Muslim seats in the elections of December 
1945 in areas that became Pakistan. In addition to these seats, six 
extra "refugee" seats were added, with the members being given new 
constituencies in Pakistan (the f inal size of the Assembly was 79 
members). The first Prime Minister, the East Punjabi migrant Liaquat Ali 
Khan, was given a constituency in East Pakistan, despite living and 
working in Karachi. In the Sindh Provincial Legislature, seven refugee 
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seats were added and "co-opted" by the Muslim League, while in Punjab 
those elected in the eastern half of the Province in the elections of 
January 1946 were entitled to seats in the assembly in Pakistan Punjab 
(Wright Jr., 1974, p. 194). Within the Muslim League, however, newspapers 
reported that party elections held in April 1949 saw not a single 
Punjabi returned, while those from United Provinces swept most of the 
positions (Yawal Waqt, 21 April 1949, Lahore). Rawal Waqt also reported 
that such positions in the Muslim League usually signified great ease in 
securing import/export licences, loans, planning permission and so on 
(ibid). 
In the economic sphere, a great deal of work was necessary in 
creating a new infrastructure and coping with the influx of refugees. In 
the East, the port of Calcutta, the major outlet to the Bay of Bengal, 
was now in India. Dacca was to be developed as the new provincial 
capital and economic hub. In the West, Karachi faced similar problems in 
transforming itself from a medium-sized port city to the new capital 
and centre of Pakistan's economic development. Most Muslim refugees, 
about 93%, (Tayyeb, 1966, pp. 169-70) headed for the western wing of the 
country, while largely Urdu /Hindi-speaking migrants from Bihar and 
surrounding areas migrated to the more proximate eastern wing. We have 
seen that the western refugees settled mostly in the provinces of Punjab 
and Sindh, with a majority in the former. 
I will now present a chronology of Pakistan's political history 
divided into four main phases, between each of which fundamental changes 
in government occurred. The phases are as follows: 
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1. The first ten years of Pakistan, followed by the military 
dictatorships of Ayub and Yahya Khan (1947-71) 
2. The government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-77) 
3. The military regime of General Ziaul Haq (1977-88) 
4. The re-birth of civilian government following General Zia's death 
(1988-1993). 
Period One: 1947 to 1971 
With hindsight we can see that a common theme of the period 1947 
to 1971 related to an evident structural weakness in the central 
government of Pakistan, which began its existence in Karachi. The 
government failed to frame a constitution until 1956 (India had a 
constitution by 1950), and failed to develop a representative system of 
parliament before power was handed over to the military regime of Ayub 
Khan in 1958. Although the first ten years of Independence were 
supposedly under some form of democracy, Jalal terms the period a 
"constitutional dictatorship" Ualal, 1990, p. 193) and suggests that the 
assumption of power by the army in 1958 was merely a continuation of an 
already authoritarian system. This view mirrors the wider concept of a 
"military-bureaucratic oligarchy" promoted by Hamza Alavi (Alavi, 1973, 
p. 145) in relation to most "postcolonial societies". In Pakistan, the 
army, and to some extents the bureaucracy, were the only established 
institutions of state at Independence. The civil political system was far 
from established, especially considering the differing viewpoints on 
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what "Pakistan" was to mean and the hasty provincial bargainings that 
preceded the birth of the State. Given this background, it is not 
surprising that the army won the battle for central control so easily. 
Pakistan's first cabinet was hand-picked by Jinnah from the 
ranks of the Muslim League. Some of the ministers in this cabinet faced 
the problem of having no constituencies within Pakistan itself, an 
account of their recent migration from India (Jalal, 1990, p. 62). In 
March 1948, the Governor-General, Jinnah, addressed a rally in Dacca, and 
announced (in English) that the national language of Pakistan was to be 
Urdu. Wolpert (Volpert, 1984, p. 359) suggests that this decision 
unleashed "the most volatile, divisive issue in Pakistani politics". The 
adverse reaction to the announcement in East Pakistan cannot be 
underestimated. Demonstrations against the status of Urdu had started in 
Dacca as early as February 1948 (Taylor, 1983, p. 193). On the night of 
the 21st February 1952, the matter claimed its first sbabeed [martyrs] 
in the East, as an anti-Urdu demonstration based at the University of 
Dacca culminated in a battle with police, during which many were killed 
(Ziring, 1971, p. 119). Ominously, even at the time of Independence, some 
were describing East and West Pakistan not as one state but as "two 
Pakistans" (Griffiths, 1947, p. 55). 
Regional tensions thus made themselves felt in Pakistan 
immediately after Independence. It seemed as if the common f ight against 
a prospective Hindustan and the INC had dissolved to reveal the 
underlying differences and conflicts between Muslims from different 
parts of what had become Pakistan. The struggle f or Independence had 
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also hidden the fact that the Muslim League was hardly representative of 
all Pakistan. The area in which it was weakest was East Pakistan. 
Meanwhile, in West Pakistan, Karachi was made a Federal Capital 
Area in July 1948. In this way, the city and its new constituencies were 
effectively removed from Sindh and were not returned to the province 
until the capital was moved to Lahore (and subsequently to Islamabad) 
after 1959. Malik Mohammad Jafar (M. M. Jafar, 1990, p. 24) describes this 
move as "[having] far-reaching and ... quite disastrous results in the 
subsequent history of Pakistan, particularly with regards to the ethnic 
and lingusitic disputes that arose in the politics of the Province of 
Sindh". Karachi had become physically dominated by Xobajirs (migrants) 
after Partition, and was physically and spiritually no longer a "Sindhi 
city" after 1948. The wider relationship between community and zameen 
[territory/land] in Sindh will be examined more closely in Chapter 3. 
We have also seen that in Sindh, G. M. Syed, who is now regarded 
as the spiritual head of the Sindhi nationalist movement, and who was 
under house arrest in Karachi in the first half of 1992 after calling 
for the complete dismemberment of Pakistan between its constituent 
ethno- linguistic parts, decided on the eve of Partition to split from the 
mainstream Muslim League and forge his own sub-nationalist movement. 
Thus, Sindhi nationalism emerged simultaneously with the Independence of 
Pakistan. The Province has always been seen since as one of the most 
likely contenders for secession from Pakistan, and no t least by General 
Zia who ordered a large-scale crackdown on an anti-government movement 
in rural Sindh in August 1983. 
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The new State of Pakistan also had to deal with other 
subnationalist movements after Independence. In Baluchistan, the Khan of 
Kalat declared Independence from Pakistan in August 1947, thus forcing 
Pakistan to annex the area. In December of the same year, a Baluchi 
member of the Constituent Assembly, Bizenjo, asked why Afghanistan and 
Iran should not also be amalgamated with Pakistan, since Baluchistan had 
only become a part of the new State on the basis of Islam (Harrison, 
1981, pp. 24-25). In NWFP, the former head of the Congress ministry, 
Abdul Ghaffar Khan, was thinking more in terms of a "Pakbtunistan", 
incorporating parts of NWFP, Afghanistan and Baluchistan (where ethnic 
Pakbtuns are concentrated). In protest at the fact that the referendum 
on the eve of independence in NWFP only allowed two choices, between 
Pakistan and India, Abdul Ghaffar Khan boycotted the vote (Qureshi, 1987, 
pp. 300-301). Two weeks after Independence, the provincial ministry that 
Ghaffar Khan headed was dismissed by Jinnah (Noman, 1988, p. 11). 
In 1955, the central government instituted the federal "One 
Unit" system where West Pakistan was made one province, in parallel to 
the single province of East Pakistan. Provincial autonomy was thus 
denied by the dissolution of provincial units, and West Pakistan was put 
on an equal footing with the more heavily populated East Pakistan. The 
One Unit system was a lynch-pin of the military regime of Ayub Khan 
that peacefully took the reins of power in 1958. 
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The f irst military regime: Ayub Khan 
The period leading up to Ayub's rise to power was one in which 
the old Muslim League gradually reduced in influence within the 
government in favour of new regionalist parties and alliances. In East 
Pakistan the League had never been strong, largely because of the 
language issue. In the first Provincial Elections (held in March 1954), 
the League's lack of a support-base in East Pakistan resulted in its 
heavy defeat, with the party securing just ten of 237 seats. The United 
Front (headed by the Awami League) was victorious with 223 seats 
(Callard, 1957, p. 55). This was the first public demonstration that the 
Muslim League was in decline in Pakistan, although Munir claims that its 
decline had begun long before this time and was demonstrated by the 
longstanding failure of the party to call an election of its executive 
committee (Munir, 1980, p. 135). 
It is important to remember that the MQM would later draw much 
inspiration from the personalities of -the early Muslim League, and 
particularly that of the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali 
Khan. The construction of a Xobajir- identity in Sindh by the MQM has 
involved the depiction of these historical actors as "true patriots" of 
Pakistan, and their detractors such as G. M. Syed as gadaron (traitors]. 
Seen in these terms, the decline of the Muslim League in the first 
decades of Pakistan's life in many ways anticipated a gradual political 
alienation of the Urdu-speaking communities of urban Sindh from other 
communities in Pakistan. 
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The fall of the old guard in Pakistan was reflected in a shift 
of power towards the army and to political figures in Punjab, the most 
populous province in West Pakistan. Even before the time of Ayub's 
regime, the General's brother, Sardar Bahadur Khan, had been installed as 
the Chief Minister of NWFP (replacing Sardar Rashid) to push through 
the "One Unit" scheme in 1955 (Dawn, 25 July 1955, Karachi). 
Meanwhile, in the powerful bureaucracy, Punjabis were beginning 
to become the dominant group. We have seen that migrants from United 
Provinces were important in the early Pakistan bureaucracy. Braibanti 
explains that it is impossible to pinpoint accurately how many Civil 
Service officers elected to transfer to the Pakistan Civil Service from 
that of India at Independence, but by 1966 the proportion of Pakistan's 
bureaucracy who had transferred from India could have been no more than 
20% (Braibanti, 1966, pp. 267-8). Between 1948 and 1964, Punjabis were the 
largest block of probationers in the elite corps of the bureaucracy, the 
Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), at 34.6% of the total, just ahead of 
East Pakistanis at 31.5% (Annual Reports of the Pakistan Public Service 
Comission, 1948-64, Table 8). The number of Punjabi probationers in the 
early 1960s was approximately twice that recorded in the early 19508 
(ibid). Furthermore, while a policy was instituted in 1950 allowing for 
10% of the annual CSP recruitment to be drawn from the armed forces5, 
this was never put into practise until 1960, under Ayub Khan's regime 
(Central Public Service Commission, 1964, p. 10). By 1963,14 army 
officers had been drafted into the CSP (Braibanti, 1966, p. 286). 
Recruitment from the armed forces also favoured Punjabis, who dominate 
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the forces in rank and numbers. In these terms, the "military-bureacratic 
oligarchy" to which Alavi refers was clearly growing in power in 
Pakistan and was becoming more integrated through the 1960s (Alavi, 
1973, p. 152). 
Economically, the period was also one in which development was 
largely controlled by an oligarchy of investing families, most of whom 
in the industrial sector came to be based in Karachi, and which in the 
agricultural sector comprised large and long- established land-owning 
families. We have seen how some of the major industrial concerns 
transferred to Pakistan from cities like Bombay around the time of 
Independence. Table 2.7 lists the top twelve business houses in 
Pakistan's industrial hub, Karachi, in the late 1960s. The Table shows 
that Memons (from Kathiawar, north-west India), Bohr-as and Kbojas (Shia 
trading communities from Gujerat, west India) and Punjabi Cbiniotls (a 
Sunni community from Chiniot, Punjab) dominate the scene, and all but 
two families transferred from outside Pakistan after 1947. Importantly, 
while most of these industrial families migrated to Pakistan from India, 
they have not been successfully targeted by the MQM as major financial 
supporters of a Xdbaii2- political presence. I discuss the reasons for 
this in later Chapters. 
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1. Dawood Memon Bombay 
2. Habib Khoja Bombay 
3. Adamjee Memon Calcutta 
4. Crescent Punjabi (Chiniot) Delhi 
5. Saigol Punjabi (Chakwal) Calcutta 
6. Valika Bohra Bombay 
7. Hyesons (mixed) Madras 
8. Dawany Memon Rangoon 
9. Amin Punjabi Calcutta 
10. Wazirali (mixed) Lahore 
11. Fancy Khoja East Africa 
12. Colony Punjabi (Chinict) Lahore 
Source: H. Papanek, 1972, p. 27 
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In over-all terms, the late 1950s and 1960s was marked by rapid 
economic growth in Pakistan (when compared to its South Asian 
neighbours: Burki, 1980, p. 43), by a limited degree of rural economic 
liberalisation that was particularly effective in the Punjab, and by a 
period of political stability, notably in the early 1960s. (Economic 
gains were also boosted by the commencement of US aid to Pakistan). 
Burki (Burki, 1976) suggests that this era saw a shift in political 
power from the hands of the traditional large landowners to those of an 
emergent rural middle class. Alavi disagrees, claiming that the large 
landowners retained basic power but that the "mode of articulation" of 
this power changed (Alavi, 1976, pp. 343-47). In Punjab, certainly, and to 
a more limited degree in NWFP, new axes of power were forged both by an 
emerging new middle class, and by older agricultural families who began 
to invest in industrialisation. In rural Sindh and Baluchistan, however, 
tribal and feudal forces retained a dominant grip on the rural economy 
and politics, and very little progress was made towards economic and 
political modernisation. 
Perha ps the most significant aspect of the Ayub era was a 
growing disparity between East and West Pakistan. The seeds of this 
disparity were apparent before the time of Ayub's regime in terms of 
rates of industrial investment and development in the two wings of 
Pakistan. Before 1955, Rs. 167 million of government aid went to 
industry in East Pakistan, while Rs. 232 million went to West Pakistan. 
The military regime had claimed that it would reverse this trend 
(Tayyeb, 1966, p. 147). However, it is clear that economic conditions in 
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West Pakistan developed more rapidly than was the case in East Pakistan 
throughout the 1960s. Noman (1988, p. 41) claims that the difference in 
per capita income between West and East Pakistanis rose from +30% in 
1958 to +45% in 1965. 
National disintegration 
The latter half of Ayub Khan's presidency saw the growth of 
anti-government agitations in East Pakistan, where Mujibur Rahman of the 
Awami League had become increasingly vocal on the matter of redressing 
the economic and political grievances of the East. Heavy-handed army 
responses followed, until full elections were held in December 1970. The 
Awami League said it was prepared for East Pakistan to remain in 
Pakistan if the new government committed itself to a serious 
reorganisation of the economy. The results of the elections are shown in 
Table 2.8. 
The election results show that an east-west polarisation of 
voting had occurred, with the Awami League sweeping all but two seats in 
East Pakistan, and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto triumphing in West Pakistan. The Awami League had also become 
the largest single party in the whole of the country, but this did not 
mean that Mujibur Rahman was invited to form the new government. 
General Yahya Khan, who had assumed the mantle of President when Ayub 
voluntarily stepped down in 1969, stalled a meeting of the National 
Assembly, and on 25 March 1971 ordered a new military crackdown in East 
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Pakistan coupled with the arrest of Mujibur Rahman. The estrangement 
between East and West was complete. 
Party Seats 
Awami League 160 
Pakistan People's Party (PPP) 81 
Pakistan Muslim League (Quyum) 9 - 
Council Muslim League 7 - 
lamlat-1 Ulama-1 Pakistan (JUP) 7 - 
, Tamiat-I Ulama-1 Islam (JUI) 7 - 
National Awami Party (NAP; Wali K) 6 - 
. Tamaat-1 Islami 4 - 
Pakistan Muslim League (Pagaro) 2 - 
Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP) - 1 
Independents 15 1 
TOTAL 138 162 
Source: Dawn, 2 December 1970, Karacbi 
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In the west of the country, many Pakistanis viewed the Bengalis 
as dangerously close to Hindus in culture. This was a view encouraged by 
Ayub Khan (A. Khan, 1965, p. 187), and it reflected the fact that East 
Pakistan was around 25% non-Muslim in population, and that an 
archetypal Bengali identity embraces both Islam and Hinduism. Again, the 
ultimately irreconcilable conflict between the unitary view of Pakistan 
held by the Punjabi/military central government, and the concept of 
regional diversity held in the provinces, is evident in the way the 
Bangladesh situation was handled by the central government at the time. 
In East Pakistan itself, the non-Bengali Muslims, many of whom 
had migrated from India after the Partition, and who generally supported 
the State of Pakistan in 1970/71, were termed inaccurately and rather 
derogatively ". Bibarie' by the Bengali majority. The term refers to one 
source of post-Partition migrants, Bihar, yet was used generally to refer 
to all non-Bengalis (M. U Memon, 1983, p. 108). There are allegations that 
thousands of these people were massacred in 1971 by Bengalis, yet there 
can be no accurate verification of this today (Oldenburg, 1985, p. 728). 
As the conflict escalated, the Indian army finally intervened, partly as 
a response to the growing tide of refugees flooding into India. The 
Pakistan army eventually surrendered to the Indian army in Dacca on 15 
December 1971 to pave the way for the formation of Bangladesh. 
The disintegration of Pakistan has been a subject of much 
debate. Stephen Cohen suggests that it was only the practical 
difficulties of Pakistan being in two parts on either side of India that 
led to its division (Cohen, 1986, p. 302). The Bhuttos called the 
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situation a "tragedy" (Z. A. Bhutto, 1971). Benazir Bhutto claimed that a 
"united Pakistan ... died with the emergence of Bangladesh" (B. Bhutto, 
1988, p. 60), although neither Bhutto explained why MuJibur Rahman was 
never invited by President Yahya Khan or Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to head a 
new government, when clearly he had been the victor in the 1()70 
elections. Philip Oldenburg (Oldenburg, 1985, p. 712) suggests that the 
secession was due to the fact that West Pakistanis, and particularly 
Ndhajirs and Punjabis, had always equated "Pakistan" with their own wing 
of the country. Muhammad Umar Memon (M. U. Memon, 1983, p. 123) supports 
this view, suggesting that there was a general lack of understanding 
about a national "selfhood" in West Pakistan. Many in the West did not 
greatly mourn the "loss" of East Pakistan; the "real" country was still 
intact. Much criticism has also been levelled at the operations of the 
Pakistan army in the run-up to secession. A special feature on the 
creation of Bangladesh in the Karachi monthly "Herald" in January 1992 
demonstrated that the issue is still an emotional one in Pakistan, as 
shown by the letters to the Journal published the following month 
(Herald, February 1992, Karachi, pp. 13-14)6. 
The Bangladesh episode also highlighted the "Biharl issue" in 
contemporary Pakistani politics. Following Independence, a large 
community of non-Bengali Urdu-speakers has continued to inhabit refugee 
camps in Bangladesh and is denied full citizenship rights there. The MQM 
has taken up the cause of these people, referring to them as "patriots" 
(of Pakistan), and demanding their "repatriation" to Pakistan. rhe demand 
is fervently opposed by Sindhi nationalists, who see it as a method of 
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swelling the support of the MQM in Sindh. This is another issue I will 
return to in later Chapters. 
Period Two: 1971 to 1977 
In West Pakistan, the new name of the reduced state became 
simply "Pakistan", in a sense Justifying allegations in the East that 
West Pakistanis had always seen their version of the State as the 
dominant one. Bhutto's PPP had emerged as the largest party in West 
Pakistan and was invited to form a new government. The PPP proclaimed 
itself a left-of-centre party, practising "Islamic socialism". The party 
slogan was ". rot!, Aapra aur makan " (bread, clothes and housing], and 
Bhutto claimed that wide-ranging changes would be made in Pakistan. 
Yet, despite PPP rhetoric that a devolution of power to the 
provinces would be the order of the day, the new national Constitution 
drafted by the PPP government in 1973 was the most centralising to 
date. The 1973 Constitution contains no "provincial list" of powers, 
while most non-federal powers are in the "concurrent list" over which 
the federal government holds ultimate jurisdiction (Zafar Hassan Shah, 
1983, p. 160). General fears of centralisation were confirmed in 1973, 
when Bhutto dismissed the Jamaat-1 Ulama-i Islam (JUD provincial 
ministry in Baluchistan and accepted the subsequent resignation of the 
JUI-National Awami Party administration in NWFP. 
With two of Pakistan's f our provincial administrations 
antagonistic to his rule, Bhutto's administration faced fundamental 
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problems of legitimacy. In Baluchistan, furthermore, a subnationalist 
agitation led by certain tribal leaders became more openly hostile, and 
drew a heavy federal army response. In 1973, three Baluchi nationalists 
(Bizenjo, Mengal, and chairman of the Baluchistan NAP Khair Bux Marri) 
were jailed along with many others, so accelerating hostilities until 
early 1975. At the height of the battle, it is estimated that up to 
80,000 federal troops were engaged in operations in Baluchistan 
(Harrison, 1981, p. 36). Baluchi nationalism remains a persistent 
underlying threat to the cohesion of Pakistan. At present its most 
active agent is probably the Baluchi Students Organisation (BSO), which 
is much in evidence in Baluchi- inhabited areas of Karachi. 
Bhutto certainly instituted some radical changes in Pakistan, 
many of which were designed to break the bureaucratic-nilitary nexus 
that had dominated Pakistan since Independence. The 1973 Constitution 
removed many of the safeguards to employment in the Civil Service of 
Pakistan (CSP), including those which guaranteed Job tenure and 
protection against parallel transfers. The army also received a new 
panel of government ministers to regulate promotions and transfers at 
higher levels (Burki, 1980, p. 103). Perhaps more significant was the 
development of the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI), which was 
related not only to the expansion of Pakistan's international interests, 
but also to a desire in the Bhutto administration to know what the 
armed forces were doing behind the scenes (Herald, January 1991, 
Karachi, p. 29>. Ironically, the ISI later became closely allied to the 
military under General Zia. 
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Land ref orm was only partially addressed by Bhutto. It is 
estimated that the reforms of 1972, which set a ceiling on land holdings 
above which land should be "resumed" by the state, led to the resumption 
of just 0.01% of the total farm area in Pakistan. Furthermore, 59% of the 
resumed land in Punjab was among the poorest quality agriculturally and 
was unirrigated (A. Hussain, 1989, p. 63). Wignaraja and Hussain (1989, 
pp. 220-1) also claim that the economic growth achieved in the Bhutto era 
was largely in consumer goods, rather than in the heavy industries that 
would fashion a sound base for the economy. Noman (1988, p. 83,110) is 
also critical of both the industrial policy of the Bhutto government, and 
the later political measures that aimed to appease the rising dissent of 
the ulama. In general, Burki's (1980) analysis agrees with this 
criticism, though he adds that inequalities in income distribution in 
Pakistan worsened under Bhutto (ibid, p. 166). 
The political knock-on of this failure to address the gross 
inequalities of the rural economy in Pakistan is the continued dominance 
of large "feudal" landowning dynasties at all levels of politics, and 
particularly in Sindh Province. The "structure of control" that the 
British colonial state adopted in such areas as Sindh, where the 
population was regulated at a distance through feudal families whose 
wealth and limited power was maintained by the colonial rulers, saw very 
little change up to and beyond the 1970s. 
In other areas, Bhutto made many enemies. In Karachi, where the 
. Tamaat-i Islamils only major concentration ot support was situated, anti- 
Bhutto feelings grew strong, particularly after a series of legislative 
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measures in the early 1970s that attempted to discriminate positively in 
favour of the rural areas of Sindh province. The pressure against 
Bhutto from Jamaat-1 Islaml in Karachi led him to take some 
controversial steps, ranging from superficial measures such as banning 
all bars and nightclubs in Pakistan, and the changing of the day of 
Sabbath from Sunday to Friday, to more serious moves such as declaring 
the Qadlanls to be un-Islamic and a religious minority. (Qadianis, or 
"Abmedlyyadl believe that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1839-1908) was a prophet 
of Islam). The move encouraged bitter anti-Qadiani riots in Karachi, 
Lahore and many other cities in Pakistan (Zakaria, 1988, p. 235). 
The end of the first Bhutto era 
It was at the end of Bhutto's government in 1978 that the All- 
Pakistan Xdhajir Students' Organisation (APMSO) emerged in Karachi 
University. The link between the two events was not entirely 
coincidental. The first PPP government had instituted some fundamental 
changes in the power structure of Pakistan as it had existed since 
Independence. The bulk of the party's support lay in the provinces of 
Punjab and Sindh, including amongst some sections of XdbaJ1r- industrial 
workers in the latter. However, within Sindh, the PPP government had 
instituted a tilt in the balance towards the "Sindhis" in particular. The 
Language Bill of 1972, which reinstated Sindhi as an official language 
in the province, was one of the more symbolic aspects of this shift in 
emphasis. The Bill certainly hit at the pride and "national vision" of 
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the Mobajirs, to whom Urdu was essential. (We have already seen how 
Bengali culture confronted this vision). 
Perhaps more important to a process of alienation among the 
Xdbaj1r community in the 1970s were more structural matters, and 
particularly the Constitution of 1973, which included a provincial 
"nationa lity"- based Quota System for federal public sector employment. 
The workings of the system will be examined more close ly later; the key 
aspect of note here is the matter of further quota arrangements within 
each provincial quota. These differed for each province, but in Sindh the 
19% federal quota was divided between "urban areas" (representing 
Sukkur, Hyderabad and Karachi) and "rural areas" (covering all other 
areas), by a 40/60 % ratio (thus giving a 7.6% quota for urban areas, 
and 11.4% for rural areas). 
It should be noted straight away that the effects of these quota 
arrangements on the fortunes of the urban citizens of Sindh were more 
symbolic than physical. Be this as it may, the Quota system was 
interpreted by many as a process of "victimisation" of NobaJIrs. The 
system has worked to an extent in Sindh, since rural Sindh's share of 
employment, in the federal bureaucracy increased through the 1970s 
relative to that that of urban Sindh (see Table 2.9). But Table 2.9 also 
shows that the Punjabi community was continuing its march to dominance 
in the bureaucracy and its progress conflicted more directly with the 
fortunes of the Sindh MobaJIrs. 
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Quota Area 
Punjab/ Islamabad 
NVFP 
Urban Sindh 
Rural Sindh 
Baluchistan 
Northern areas/FATA* 
Azad Kashmir 
Source: Government of Pakistan, 197611-984 
4- Fe. derall7 Administered Tribal Areas 
Share of total employment W 
1973 1983 
49.2 54.0 
10.5 13.4 
30.1 17.4 
3.1 5.4 
2.5 3.4 
2.6 3.6 
1.8 1.9 
It was opponents of the PPP, and particularly the main party 
supported by the Mobajirs of Sindh, the Tanaat-i-Islami, that led the 
call for the removal of Bhutto's government towards the end of the 
1970s. Elections were finally held in March 1977, with the PPP standing 
against a diverse opposition grouping called the Pakistan National 
Alliance UNA), which included the Islamic parties. The elections 
resulted in a dramatic victory for the PPP, which emerged with 77.5% of 
all National Assembly seats (including 90.3% of all seats in Punjab), 
against 18.0% for the PNA (Burki, 1980, p. 196). Indeed, the victory was 
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so dramatic that charges of electoral rigging were raised in many 
quarters and the PNA boycotted the next round of Provincial elections. 
The Opposition then launched an agitational movement, spearheaded by 
JNdbaJIr supporters of the Jaamat-i Islami in Karachi. On the night of 4 
July 1977, soldiers acting on the orders of recently- promoted Chief of 
Army Staff General Ziaul Haq, surrounded the Prime Minister's residence 
in Rawalpindi, Punjab, and placed Bhutto in "protective custody". Bhutto's 
daughter Benazir describes a telephone call between Zia and the 
astonished Prime Minister after the soldiers arrived: 
"'I'm sorry Sir, I had to do it, ' Zia blurts out, 
making no reference to the peaceful agreement just 
concluded. 'We have to hold you in protective custody 
for a while. But in ninety days I'll hold new elections. 
You'll be elected Prime Minister again, of course, Sir, 
and I'll be saluting you. 111 
(Benazir Bhutto, 1988, p. 92) 
In 1971, the armed forces had little choice but to hand power to 
an elected government, after rising opposition to the Ayub regime at the 
end of the 1960s and the debacle on the battlefield with the Indian army 
in East Pakistan. But Bhutto had subsequently alienated the old power- 
structure in which the army had held sway. During its sabbatical from 
power, the army soon began to oppose Bhutto's government. Joining the 
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army in opposition to Bhutto were -the ulama, who saw the encouragement 
of regional community identities as contravening their own conception of 
the umma of Pakistan. In Karachi, such parties as Janaat-i Islami found 
willing critics of Bhutto in the Nobajir community, which had been 
alienated by his apparently pro-Sindhi cultural and structural policies, 
and to a lesser degree by the decline of Mohajir- influence in the public 
sector. As on many occasions, dissent in this important city held 
significant implications for the fortunes of the national government, 
and on this occasion gave the army the excuse it needed to restore 
'order' to the economic heart of Pakistan. Ironically, while Bhutto had 
trusted few army generals, he had promoted Zia above many of his 
colleagues to reward his apparent loyalty. In July 1977 he was made to 
realise the error of his Judgement. 
Period Three: 1977 to 1988 
Bhutto had represented a pro-Sindhi administration at the 
federal centre. For this reason the Xobajirs may have initially welcomed 
the replacement of his regime by that of General Zia, a former East 
Punjabi who promoted a national, Islamic programme in which the unitary 
status of Urdu was said to be important. However, the repression of 
political organisations and leaders throughout the Zia years caused 
widespread dissent to emerge across Pakistan. This was also the period 
in which the MQM emerged. Many in Pakistan, such as the Punjabi academic 
Akmal Hussain (interview, 24 February 1991, Lahore), believe there is a 
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link between the General and the MQM, and that Zia consciously sponsored 
the establishment and development of the Movement in 1984. His supposed 
motive for doing so was to position the MQM as a counterbalance to 
Benazir Bhutto's Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), which 
had become active in Sindh after 1983. It seems certain that the MQM 
could not have grown so meteorically in such a climate of political 
suffocation without a blind-eye being turned on occasion by the central 
government. Whether the army actually armed and trained the Movement is 
another matter. 
The use of "Islam isation" as a policy by the Zia regime, while 
stifling provincial political movements, has been interpreted by Rakisits 
as a method of confronting centre-province tensions by converting them 
into "a clash between secularism and Islamic fundamentalism" (Rakisits, 
1988, p. 78). Zia saw that Islam was the sphere in which a national 
culture could be defined, partly by turning public attention away from 
the charms of regionalism. A. S Ahmed (A. S. Ahmed, 1988, p. 83) supported 
Zia's efforts to promote Urdu as a national language - where Bhutto had 
promoted regional languages - and argued that such a process offers 
great potential for Pakistan (A. S. Ahmed, 1989, p. 67). Were Bhutto had 
enjoyed power and some "legitimacy" (Alavi, 1990, p. 57), however, in the 
sense that he had once been elected, Zia faced a continual lack of 
legitimacy by failing to seek a popular mandate (ibid. p. 58). 
The problems of regionalism could not be wished away. In the 
early 1980s, dissent in Baluchistan, which even Zia himself had admitted 
was "ripe for seeds of subversion" (Sayeed, 1982, p. 41), continued to 
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simmer. In Sindh, Benazir Bhutto assumed the mantle of the PPP 
(initially while in exile in Europe), and launched the Movement for the 
Restoration of Democracy IMRDI in August 1983. The MRD reached its 
zenith in the Sindhi-speaking rural areas of the province at this time. 
By the end of August 1983 the MRD claimed that the security forces had 
responded with 100 public floggings, over 1000 arrests, and the claiming 
of 60 lives (Inqlab Sind, Aug. /Sep. 1983, London). These reports also 
suggest that the MRD was led by Sindhi-speakers and accompanied by a 
Sindhi nationalist rhetoric (Dawn, 17 August 1983, Karachi) that led to 
it being largely ignored by Mobajirs. Unlike in 1977, the large cities of 
Sukkur, Hyderabad and Karachi saw little public disturbance (Inqlab Sind, 
ibid). In the long run, however, the Zia regime was no more advantageous 
for Nobajlr-s than it was for any other community in Pakistan. As a 
consequence, in party-less local elections in 1985, candidates implicitly 
affiliated to the Jramaat-d Islami (who had initially been an important 
advisory element of Zia's regime) were routed in the urban areas of 
Sindh for the first time. Alavi apportions the blame for this failure on 
the fact that "the country had had enough of Islamic fundamentalism" 
(Alavi, 1990, p. 61) 
With respect to economic development, the available evidence 
reflects more kindly on the Zia years. Progress was helped by political 
stability (in the shape of Martial Law), favourable weather conditions 
that boosted agricultural production in the mid-1980s (Hyman et al, 
1988,97), and the continuing influx of remittances from Pakistanis 
working in the Gulf countries. A not inconsiderable flow of US aid, 
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facilitated by Zia's pro-Xujahideen stance on the Afghan issue, also 
benefitted the economy substantially during the 1980s. 
At the same tine, however, a persistently high defence budget 
led investment in social projects such as health and education to remain 
woefully low. By 1985 only five countries in the world were spending 
less in per capita terms on health care than was Pakistan (Noman, 1988, 
p. 174). In 1985 Pakistan spent 2.1% of its GNP on education, while the 
corresponding figure for India was 3.6% (Govt. of Pakistan, Federal 
Bureau of Statistics, 1991, pp. 320-21). The 1980s also saw a dramatic 
increase in the trade of illicit drugs and weapons in Pakistan, largely 
as a result of the porosity of the Afghan border areas following Zia's 
"open-door" policy for Afghan refugees. This factor has had major 
implications for Karachi especially, where drugs and gun operations have 
expanded enormously, and where slum clearance and "regularisation" 
operations in Afghan areas have led to violent local conflicts. Finally, 
the long experience of military rule for the second time in Pakistan's 
history stifled the development of a national participatory political 
culture, and has further hampered the development of independent 
institutions other than the army. 
I will show that by the end of the 1980s the MQM had quickly 
risen to become the dominant force in the major urban centres in Sindh, 
and particularly in Karachi. Simultaneously, Benazir Bhutto had returned 
to Pakistan from exile to tumultuous welcomes in many areas. For a brief 
period from 1985 to 1988, Zia attempted to calm demands for democracy 
by instituting a government headed by the Sindhi politician, Junejo. In 
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May 1988, however, Zia dissolved this government. Shortly afterwards, on 
17 August 1988, a bomb on a military plane killed General Zia, the US 
ambassador to Pakistan, and many of Zia's closest advisors. The long 
period of military rule had come to an abrupt end, and there was little 
the incumbent President, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, could do but call new 
elections for October 1988. 
The return of democracy 
Benazir Bhutto and the PPP were widely tipped to usher in a new 
democratic era. Success almost turned to disaster, however, when the 
mandate for the PPP in the elections fell short of what many expected. 
The PPP was eleven seats short of an outright majority, with 44.9% of 
National Assembly seats against 26.6% for the Islam! Jamboarl Ittehad 
EIJI; Islamic Democratic Alliance; a newly constructed group of anti-PPP 
elements, the major component being the Pakistan Muslim League]. 
Nevertheless, after some deliberations, Bhutto became the new Prime 
Minister, in coalition with the Awami National Party (ANP) of Wali Khan 
in NVFP, and with a hung assembly in Baluchistan headed by the Jamboori 
Watan Farty (JWP). The latter soon shifted allegiance to the opposition 
IJI. In Sindh, the MQM's dominance of the major urban centres led Bhutto 
to sign an accord with the Movement in December 1988, known as the 
Karachi Declaration. 
The accord rapidly went sour, as did the general experience of 
the Bhutto administration. The Prime Hinister found herself constantly 
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fighting the President, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and the Chief Minister of 
Punjab, Nawaz Sharif. Both of these men were important figures in the 
Zia regime, and both were very much in place after the General's death. 
In a sense it was astonishing that power was ever handed to Benazir 
Bhutto, as Christina Lamb points out: 
"Only a few months earlier it would have been an 
unthinkable scene. On one side sat the generals, stiff- 
backed and unsmiling, about to hand over the power thay 
had enjoyed for more than half Pakistan's existence. On 
the other, close friends and relations of Benazir Bhutto 
and leading members of the Pakistan People's Party chatted 
and laughed ... until recently, censorship had meant that 
the name of Pakistan's first elected Prime Minister and 
founder of the PPP, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto could not be mentioned. 
Today his daughter was being sworn in as Prime Xinister. " 
(Lamb, 1991, p. 36) 
Less than two years later the miracle came to an end, as the 
President announced that he was dissolving the National and Provincial 
Assemblies, dismissing Benazir Bhutto, and holding new elections in 
October 1990. The short-lived PPP government had been plagued by 
financial scandals surrounding prominent PPP members, and a rise in 
political and non-political violence in the province of Sindh. The 
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violence had included some nightmarish chapters in the cities of 
Hyderabad and Karachi, where the MQM, estranged from the PPP, was facing 
a resurgence in militant Sindhi nationalism aimed at Xobajirs. Once 
again, civil unrest in the key city of Karachi had assumed a 
significance of national proportions. Ghulam Ishaq Khan's rider to the 
dismissal notice to Benazir was that Bhutto, her husband Asif Ali 
Zardari and many other members of the PPP were to be charged with 
fraud, and in the case of Zardari with complicity in political 
intimidation and murder. Benazir Bhutto faced personal and political 
disaster. 
It was hardly surprising that the IJI swept the new elections 
in October 1990, with Nawaz Sharif becoming the new Prime Minister of 
Pakistan. The PPP charged the alliance with massive electoral fraud, 
producing a lengthy White Paper entitled "How an Election was Stolen" 
(Pakistan Democratic Alliance, 1991, Islamabad). 
By forming a nebulous coalition party, the IJI, which Alavi 
(Alavi, 1990, p. 64) and others believe is basically an army faction and 
its associates in civilian clothing (The Economist, 3 December 1988, 
London)), the government of Nawaz Sharif headed for the first time in 
Pakistan a regime that nominally ran administrations in all four 
provinces. In Sindh, the tenuous coalition included both Sindhi 
nationalists and the MQM, thus defusing the Sindhi/Nobajir ethnic 
subnationalist conflict for the time being. For the MQM, violent 
estrangement from the PPP in 1988-90 meant that the IJI offered itself 
as the MQM's only viable alternative electoral partner. In the sphere of 
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Islam, the final adoption of a Sbariat Bill in March 1991 was criticised 
by many of the ulama for being largely symbolic and promising no real 
action (interview with Naulana Fazlur Rehman, Herald, June 1991, p. 47). 
The resultant debates have reopened the whole question of Pakistan's 
"national culture" and its relation to a "national religion". 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The questions now being raised by the MQM relate to those faced 
by the State of Pakistan as a whole since 1947. The central problem is 
how a community identity is framed and presented, and how this, in turn, 
should relate to a national Pakistani identity. For Mobajir-s, the 
question is particularly difficult, since the community's culture and 
origins are rooted in areas beyond Pakistan's fron tiers. We have seen 
that many MobaJirs have confronted this problem by allying with a 
unitary, national programme, in which Urdu and Islam are central 
elements. Such a policy suits the Xdbajir community since it offers a 
chance to "belong" to the national culture on at least an equal footing 
with other Pakistanis. 
I have shown that the move towards the formation of Pakistan by 
the Muslim leaders of pre- Independence India involved a conflict between 
a unitary idealistic vision of how the State should be structured, and 
the demands for provincial autonomy and diversity put forward by the 
various regional communities that made up the actual population of 
Pakistan. These conflicts did not emerge fully until the State of 
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Pakistan was won and the twin problems of economic development and the 
construction of a national identity were finally confronted. The first 
casualty for Pakistan arising from both these problems was the 
secession of Bangladesh, while other subnationalist movements, including 
the recent growth of a jYohajiz- movement, threaten still further tensions. 
Pakistan's postcolonial experience has also involved a failure 
to develop a sound civil political culture, as opposed to the authority 
of the army. Under army rule, a unitary national vision has been imposed 
on the population by force rather than by consensus. Zia made the most 
concerted effort to impose a national identity with his policies oý 
Islamisation. But repression has given an even greater impetus to 
regionalist and subnationalist movements, whose leaders have little faith 
in the willingness and ability of Pakistan's rulers to give them a fair 
share of the cake. I will argue in later chapters that a lack of a 
democratic vocabulary in Pakistan has also made subnationalist 
movements more violent than might otherwise have been the case. 
In many ways, Sindh Province province has served as a 
microcosm of these historical developments and tensions. Different views 
on the foundations of the State have been presented by the Sindhis on 
the one hand, and by the urbanised Urdu-speakers (Mobajirs) on the 
other. Fissiparous tendencies arising from this intellectual conflict 
have been encouraged by the actions of central government (especially 
the two Bhutto governments), and the Mobajir movement is one product of 
this. The physical conflict between the subnationalist communities of 
Sindh has called into question the original r-aison detre of Pakistan as 
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a homeland for a "Muslim nationality", and threatens the very integrity 
of the institutions for which these submationalist. movements are 
nominally competing to access or control. 
It is important to analyse f urther sucb questions of identitY, 
community, nationalism and the state, both in terms of general theories 
and debates and with specific reference to the population of Sindh 
province. It is to these questions that Chapter 3 now turns. 
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FOOTNOTES: 
1, The "Pakistan Resolution" was not known as such at its delivery in 1940, since the 
name of the state had not entered into common parlance in India by this time, The 
Resolution is perhaps more accurately referred to as the 'Lahore Resolution", 
2, The "Fourteen Points', drawn up by the Muslim League in December 1928, formed the 
basis of the League negotiating position in the following years, The points can be 
summarised as follows: 
1, The future constitution should be federal, 
2, There should be provincial autonomy, 
3. All legislatures should have "adequate representation" for minorities, 
without reducing existing majorities, 
4, Muslim representation in the Central Legislature should be at least a 
third of all seats, 
5, Separate electorates should be continued for "communal groups", but such 
groups can opt to become part of the general joint electorate, 
6. Territorial redistributions must not affect Muslim majorities in Punjab, 
Bengal and NWFP, 
7, Religious freedom must be guaranteed to all, 
8, Laws can only be passed with at least three-quarters majority of each 
community represented in regional legislatures, 
9, Sindh should be separated from Bombay Presidency, 
10, NWFP and Baluchistan should be made subject to the same reforms as other 
provinces, 
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11, Muslims should be given 'adequate shares" in government agencies, taking 
regard of efficiency, 
12, Safeguards for Muslim culture and institutions must be constructed, 
13, All central and provincial cabinets must have at least one third of the 
total as Muslims, 
14, The Central Legislature can only change the constitution af ter 
consulting States in the Indian Federation, 
3, In 1933, a Muslim scholar at Cambridge University, Chaudury Rahmat Ali, proposed 
the formation of a "Pakistan" (Land of the Pure, which is also the meaning of the 
'A'halislae proposed by Sikhs in present-day Indian Punjab] in a leaflet distributed 
among expatriate Indians in Cambridge, (1933; "Now or Never"; Cambridge), Ali also 
claimed that he had first suggested the idea as long ago as 1915 (C. R. Ali, 1947, 
p, 119), In another publication, Ali also gave suggested separate Muslim Bengali and 
Deccan states, named Bang-i Islamand Usmanistan respectively (C, R, Ali, 1940), One of 
these is effectively a forerunner to Bangladesh, However, Ali's sphere of influence 
was not great in the Indian subcontinent, 
4, The 1951 Census of India defined "migrants" as those born in areas that became 
Pakistan after 1947, who were situated in India in 1950151 (Government of India 1951, 
Volj, Part II-A, Table D-M, 
5, Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat Branch (Establishment Branch), 
Resolution No. F-2SI4/50 - Ests, (SED, 8 November 1950, Karachi, 
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6, The sentiments of many concerning the Bangladesh affair were conveyed by the 
following letter, from Ishrat Hussain in Karachi, referring to a photograph of General 
Niazi of the Pakistan army signing the surrender documents in the presence of Indian 
army generals in 1971; 
'The cover of your December 1991 issue pains me as I witnessed, 
from very close quarters, the events in the eastern wing of 
Pakistan, Your photo shows a proud Pakistani soldier humiliated 
through sheer trickery" 
(Herald, February 1992, Karachi, p, 13) 
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CHAPTER THRFF MLAX. ETHYIC MENTITY AND NATIONALISM 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter I examined the historical processes 
leading to the birth of the State of Pakistan, and the manner in which 
that State has been shaped since Independence. I also highlighted 
certain differences which emerged in the leadership of the Indian Muslin 
community in South Asia, and especially between the Muslim religious 
clericy and a more westernised political and economic intelligentsia. It 
was Muhammad Ali Jinnah, a member of the "progressive" intelligentsia, 
who ultimately gained most of the credit for forging the Independent 
State of Pakistan in 1947. 
The differences in outlook between these schools of Muslim 
leadership in Pakistan raised many questions about the shape that the 
new State should assume. These questions revolved around the 
relationship between local and national identities in an ostensibly 
federal state structure. Jinnah had claimed that the Muslims of India 
ultimately deserved their own country because they constituted a 
"nation". Yet, after Independence, two problems confronted the new State. 
Firstly, it quickly became apparent that the Muslims of Pakistan are not 
a unitary community, a millat, but are rather a loose collection of 
regional ethnic and linguistic communities all demanding a degree of 
representation. Secondly, in recognition of such regional diversity, 
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Jinnah had laid precise conditions for the structure of the new State; 
namely that it should be secular in intent (in terms of tolerating 
religious freedom and not framing its- Constitution under Islamic 
Shariah), ' and that it should embrace a degree of provincial autonomy. 
Had Jinnah been granted more than his one year of worsening health 
following Independence, he would have seen both these wishes denied by 
the power-brokers of the new Pakistan. 
Chapter Two also drew attention to the changing nature of the 
leadership in Pakistan after Independence. We have seen that a denial of 
provincial autonomy and a lack of "legitimacy" in central governments 
helped the rise of regionalist movements, which in the case of East 
Pakistan culminated in the secession of Bangladesh. Since that time, 
Pakistan has had to grapple with important theoretical and political 
debates surrounding questions of Islam, secularism, regionalism and the 
legitimacy of central governments. In Sindh, debates on the relationship 
of the provincial state to the central state, and on the position of 
diverse community identities within a federal framework, ultimately 
encouraged a powerful and aggressive Mobajir- movement to emerge, which 
championed the rights to representation of a "new" regional (or 
subnational) community identity. 
In this chapter I begin to consider the emergence of Xobajir 
subnationalism in the wider context of debates on ethnicity, identity 
and nationalism. I argue that, historically, most debates on ethnicity, 
identity and nationalism embrace one or other of two polar positions, 
although there is an emerging common ground in between. These two 
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positions relate firstly to the primordial qualities of "given" ethnic 
communities, and secondly, to the degree of cleavage within and between 
"constructed" - or "situated" (A. D. Smith, 1991, p. 20) - ethnic groups. 
There is also disagreement about the role of the state in postcolonial 
societies in shaping ethnic and subnationalist identities. 
In the next chapter 1 will present my own findings from 
research in Sindh and appraise how my theory of community identity- 
formation relates to existing theories on the topic. I will argue that 
the Hobajir movement is best explained in terns of a circumstantial ist 
account of ethnicity and identity that pays particular attention to 
questions of political and economic nobilisation (often for public 
resources) at different levels of the Pakistani state. The remainder of 
this chapter is split into two sections. In the f irst section I analyse 
some debates and theories on ethnicity and identity, and attempt to 
refer these theories to examples from community politics in Pakistan. 
The second section offers a partial review of the history of debates on 
nationalism, and analyses the interface between community politics and 
"national-state" formation in what is now the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan. 
3.2 ETHRICITY AND IDENTITY 
It is true to say that community identities in Pakistan, as in 
many postcolonial states, are far from unitary and obvious to the 
external observer. Ahmed suggests that the formation of Pakistan among 
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Muslims in India was warranted, but that "Pakistan's chronic problems - 
including the breakaway of Bangladesh in 1971 - are a result of its 
leaders failing to appreciate its ethnic compulsions" (Ahmed, 1990b, 
p. 28). At the same time, Ahmed maintains that such compulsions need not 
be a problem to the Pakistani whole, provided that a policy of 
recognising them in a suitable way is pursued. Sadly, the formation of 
Bangladesh in 1971 was the final expression of the way in which a 
singular Nuslim nationalism emerging in British India had been allowed 
to ride roughshod over a complex map of local and ethnic identities in 
what became West and East Pakistan. These underlying identities did not 
suddenly emerge after 1947. They had always been present under the 
surface (interview with Akmal Hussain, 24 February 1991, Lahore). 
Ahmed's parable illustrates two aspects of identity and 
nationalism in Pakistan (as elsewhere) on which scholars have tended to 
hold differing opinions. Firstly, I would argue that there are different 
"levels" of identity that apply to different situations, and which can be 
interchangeable depending on circumstances. Thus, in some situations, a 
Baluchi, Sindhi or Punjabi may cheer the same national cricket team, 
while on other occasions regional ethnic identities will come to the 
fore and differentiate these communities. 
The second important foundation of both identity-formation and 
nationalism is the notion that political exigencies and desires, and 
their development over time, can lead to a complex shuffling of 
identities. Daniel Bell suggests that such shuffling is the product of 
identities consisting of "multiple overlapping components" (Bell, 1975, 
-85- 
p. 156). Thus, Muslim nationalism in the 1940s became Bengali nationalism 
in East Pakistan after the State of Pakistan was achieved and defined, 
and may undergo further, ever more 1ccalised differentiations, as still 
other units of government are achieved. Alavi argues that Pakistan has 
always been a palimpsest of various identities, including class, 
language, religious and territorial markers, between which community 
groups have shifted depending on immediate exigencies, the movement for 
Bangladesh again being a perfect example (Alavi, 1989, pp. 223-4). In 
1947 the immediate aim of the Muslim League was to achieve an 
independent State within the subcontinent. With this achieved, regional 
groups within the new State of Pakistan could reappraise their position 
within the country. Such has been the dilemma of Pakistan ever since. 
In socio-cultural terms, Nirad Chaudhuri (Chaudhuri, 1965, p. 30) 
identified two levels of identity in India, which he refers to as 
"nationality" and "citizenship". The term "Indian citizen", for example, 
refers to and includes a wide variety of national, religious, linguistic 
and other identities (as of 1993 the Indian Constitution recognises 15 
official languages, while the 1971 Census identified 1652 distinct 
languages). Some analysts offer a related and even more generalised 
picture, in which "downward shifts in the central focus of ethnic 
identity" (Horowitz, 1975, p. 135), such as the movement from Pakistan to 
Bengali nationalism, affected many countries around the world as they 
broke free from a colonial past. Horowitz suggests that processes of 
regional separatism in post-colonial societies will tend to progress to 
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ever more localised definitio. ns, but not inany scholars would agree with 
the teleology implicit in this proposition. 
ftimordialisin and circumstantialism 
In some cases, a search for very local ethnic identities arises 
from the prinordialist approach to ethnicity and identity that is one 
extreme point in the anthropological (and other) literature. In the 
twentieth century, however, and particularly in Europe in the 1960s and 
1970s when Marxist ideology influenced many theoretical and political 
writings, various circunstantia list theories of ethnicity gained in 
popularity. These theories directly challenge primordialist theories by 
suggesting that ethnic identities are the products of political 
mobilisations and manipulations and not just the result of some 
underlying "objective" factors or markers. Alavi argues that 
circumstantialist theories of ethnicity were dominant in academic 
circles by the end of the 1980s (Alavi, 1989, p. 223). I will now consider 
these two dominant theoretical traditions before saying a word or two 
about various Marxist accounts of identity and ethnicity (which are 
broadly circumstantialist in form). I will also assess some of the 
contributions made to these debates from within (or with specific regard 
to) South Asia. 
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Primordialism 
The primordialist account of ethnicity, or the "Dark Gods" 
theory as Ernest Gellner terms it (lecture; "Identity and Ethnicity", 21 
November 1990, New Hall, Cambridge), has been popular with nationalist 
politicians as a way of naturalising a particular form of political and 
cultural mobilisation. As might be expected, "primordialism" suggests 
that ethnic identities are based on certain "primordial" givens that have 
applied to a community from time immemorial, and which inextricably 
define a person's membership of a community. Such characteristics can 
range from physical features, to language, religion and/or ancient 
customs. Primordialist theories also helped to fuel some of the racist 
and Orientalist ideologies that were popular in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries as props to imperialism and colonial rule. As 
Said (Said, 1985) has pointed out, it was the White Man's Burden to look 
after, and rule, the less well equipped races and ethnic groups of 
Europe's colonial periphery (or "Other"). 
Of course, the mere existence of primordial qualities needn't 
encourage iýacist ideologies, and most anthropologists have been happy 
just to speak of differences in primordial traits (as opposed to ranking 
them as more or less good or strong). Frederik Barth, for example, 
presented Pakhtun society (which occupies a large area encompassing 
parts of Afghanistan, Iran, and western Pakistan) as an example of a 
society in which the defining characteristics of ethnicity relate to 
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cultural factors handed-down over the centuries (Barth, 1969). These 
factors are, broadly, adherence to Islam, belief in a relationship of 
lineage to Qajs (a contemporary of Mohammad), and Pakbtunwali -a 
Pakhtun code based primarily on Ebeyr-at [a complex term meaning 
bravery, but also ethnic loyalty and certainty in dealings with non- 
Pakhtuns: Edwards, 1990, p. 661. Such factors are, in a sense, diacritical 
features of Fakhtun societies that influence both internal Pakhtun 
relations and Pakhtun interactions with other communities and the 
external world. 
The aspect of family lineage in the construction of an ethnic 
identity is a primordialist feature that Yestern theorists often 
discount, particularly in the metropolitan context of modern capitalist 
societies where families with known ancient lineages are not so evident 
(Gellner, 1987, p. 22). However, in other societies, such as Japan, the 
whole nation is believed to be patrilineally related (Van der Berghe, 
1981, p. 16). In South Asia, too, family lineage is often an element of 
ethnic identity. In India, name-groups among Muslim communities such as 
Qureshis (who claim to be descended from Mohammad's Quresb tribe) and 
Ansaris (from the Ansars, who were the original supporters of Mohammad 
at the time of his first teachings) are codified in official documents 
as blradex-is (clans/tribes]. This allows some analysts to refer to such 
groups as accepted ethnic communities, sometimes following specific 
occupations and recognisable by other defining traits. Similarly, in 
Pakistan, Mir-zas by name are recognised as Abmeddiyyas (or Qadianis); 
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the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed Qadiani (1839-1908), believed by 
some to be the latest prophet of Islam. 
Circumstantialism 
In contrast to primordialism, circumstantialism suggests that 
ethnic identities are defined not so much by ancient atavistic features 
of custom, or genetic factors handed-down over generations, as by a more 
conscious formation of community markings in response to contextual 
needs or pressures. In this way it differs from the seemingly more 
"objectivist" accounts of some primordialists. As A. D. Smith puts it: 
"Belonging to an ethnic group is a matter of attitudes, 
perceptions and sentiments that are necessarily fleeeting 
and mutable, varying with the particular situation of the 
subject. ... This makes it possible for ethnicity to be used 
'instrumentally' to further individual or collective interests, 
particularly of competing elites who need to mobilize large 
followings to support their goals in the struggle for power" 
(A. D. Smith, 1991, p. 20). 
(Smith himself favours a more historical and symbolic-cultural account 
of ethnicity, as do I: this will become apparent in later chapters), 
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Adopting such a circumstantialist approach, Alavi (Alavi, 1989, 
pp. 244-5) focusses more critically on "Sindhi" ethnic identity. He argues 
that the promotion of a Sindhi "nationality" has everything to do with 
the activities of certain Sindhi politicians, the most prominent of whom 
has long been G. M. Syed. Syed's "success", Alavi argues, has resulted from 
his attempts to def ine a Sindhi identity - or nation - in terms of 
certain "fixed", "diacritical" features such as language, common history 
and zameen I land /territory] (interview with G. X Syed, 13 March 1991, 
Karachi). Yet it is sometimes difficult to identify precisely where the 
boundaries of this identity are to be drawn. Another Sindhi nationalist 
leader, Dr. Hamida Khuhro, counts certain communities of Baluchis as 
Sindhis, by virtue of their long history of residence in Sindh and their 
cultural affinity to other Sindhis (interview with Tanvir Tahir of All 
Pakistan Newspaper Society, 16 March 1991, Karachi). In this manner, 
membership of the Sindhi community is related to striking "roots" in 
Sindh in which the Baluchis believe (although they do not generally 
speak Sindhi in the home environment), and which supposedly are not 
shared by certain other groups such as Punjabi agriculturalists (Alavi, 
1989, p. 244). (This is closer to A. D. Smith's historical-cultural 
account). 
Alavi is broadly suggesting, therefore, that Sindhi nationalists 
cut their ethnic communities to suit their political cloth. The selective 
use of ancient historical markers or traits is a ploy to suggest a 
certain immutability in community identities (and thus a set of 
undisputed claims to a share of local resources and representation). 
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Meantime, the specific exclusion of Punjabis living among Sindhis from 
the Sindhi fold is a convenient socio-political strategy for Sindhi 
nationalists. (Alavi would seem to be taking up a position at one end of 
the circumstantia list spectrum). 
The crucial factor influencing the definition and transformation 
of ethnic identity, for many circumstantialists, is that of power. Keyes 
(Keyes, 1981, pp. 10-11) claims that in societies where access to power 
is codified in a stratified system of community groups, ethnicity acts 
as "a variable in social action", or, in other words, as a bargaining- 
point in community political strategies. This analysis can be applied to 
the history of Pakistan since 1973, when four "nationalities" (Punjabis, 
Sindhis, Pakhtuns and Baluchis) were designated as $@official 
nationalities" in the Constitution. Similarly, electoral success and 
subsequent access to provincial or federal power may defuse the energy 
of ethnic movements. Washbrook cites the case of the Tamil separatist 
movement in India, which "appears to move in an inverse direction to the 
success of Dravidian (Tamil) parties in constitutional politics" 
(Washbrook, 1989, p. 178). In Pakistan, again, it is interesting to note 
that after the MQX assumed some powers in provincial and federal 
government in November 1990, the leadership of the Xdbaj1r National 
Xdvement moved to redefine the Movement as class-based in spirit and 
"non-ethnic". The implication is that "ethnicity" had served its purpose. 
Marxism shares with circunstantialism a concern for the access 
of particular communities to power and resources in society. Marxism 
generally discounts primordial aspects of identity and any vertical 
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community markers that might cut across the more basic class divisions 
that are assumed to exist in most societies. Some Marxist scholars' have 
even seen ethnic identities as the product of (or akin to) a "false 
consciousness" (Wallerstein, 1979, p. 181). In Marxist terms, power is 
equated with access to capital. Thus, conflicts and movements that 
appear as outwardly ethnic in form are often thought to be underpinned 
by socio-economic considerations. Engineer, for example, suggests that 
the root of the conflict between Sikhs and Hindus in India's Punjab has 
very little to do with religion (at least before 1984), and can be more 
reasonably understood as a community political struggle to capture the 
benefits of the region's Green Revolution (see also Bhushan, 1984). 
Early Marxist writers also tended to concentrate more on 
nationalism than on ethnic identity. This is particularly so in the case 
of the Russian leaders, Stalin and Lenin, as we shall see later. One 
general theme that did emerge within Marxism was that ethnic community 
differences are cultural in form (which is to say not primordial), and 
will gradually disappear as more fundamental - more rational - political 
and economic processes begin to shape modern society. Since the state 
largely defines these processes, it is the state (and the market) that 
largely defines the importance of "cultural" factors in any given 
society. In the USSR religion was thus proscribed by the at 
tast 
at the level of decree. (The situation in Asia was only briefly alluded 
to by Marx and then rather superficially. The "Asiatic Mode of 
Production" was presented, rather condescendingly, as a "stagnant 
offshoot" to the core world economies arising from an ancient "tribal" 
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organisation: Giddens, 1981, p. 7). Ironically, the collapse of the 
communist world in eastern Europe and western Asia at the end of the 
1980s has shown that ethnic and other forms of identity (such as 
religion) have survived the economic and political processes of 
communist development, to persist as important aspects of community 
organisation and relations. Religion still provides a vital "imagined 
community" for many people in eastern Europe, as elsewhere (Anderson, 
1983). 
Other analysts, while not considering themselves to be Marxists 
as such, have also highlighted the important relationship of economic 
power and resources to community politics. Schermerhorn claims that 
increasing capitalist penetration in a society forces communities to 
compete together on the same political stages for limited resources 
(Schermerhorn, 1978, p. 12). Weiner and Katzenstein amplify this point in 
relation to India's preferential policies, where the provision of public- 
sector jobs and Reserved Seats in assemblies for named - or scheduled - 
communities encourages political mobilisation by and within these 
communities to protect or extend their ascribed "niches" (Weiner and 
Katzenstein, 1989, p. 203). Seen in these terms, ethnic politics in the 
developing world - as elsewhere - is underpinned by a struggle to 
access (or mobilise) those resources made available to different 
communities through the market or (more crucially) by various agencies 
in the public sector of the economy. Since these resources are by 
definition finite, Weiner has called this the "politics of scarcity" 
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Weiner, 1965). The state itself becomes the primary target for ethnic 
and other groups pursuing scarce public goods. 
Shifting identities - Other interpretations 
One of the key arguments of circumstantia list ethnic theories is 
that a community is defined not Just by its own characteristics, but 
also by the way in which other communities and societies perceive and 
treat it. This applies particularly to migrant communities (such as 
Mobajirs), whose sense of identity is greatly shaped by the actions of 
the host communities with whom they live (Keyes, 1981, p. 16). Such 
interrelationships are also crucial to Ahmed's concept of "district 
ethnicity", which is presented as a "third way" beyond prinordialist and 
circumstantialist theories (A. S. Ahmed, 1990b, p. 29). 
Ahmed discusses the example of Hazara ethnicity in the border 
region between Pakistani Punjab and North West Frontier Province. The 
unit that gives the area its name was imposed by the British authorities 
for administrative purposes. One of the key elements of the Hazara sense 
of identity is that the people of Hazara are not accepted as a distinct 
community by the major ethnic groups on either side of them, the 
Pakhtuns and the Punjabis. The two communities tend to amalgamate the 
Hazaris with the one "other" community they do recognise (Ahmed, 1990b, 
p. 33). The result has been a cultural distancing of Hazaras from the two 
major neighbouring communities, in such a way that a Hazara identity 
seems strongest when the Hazarawali is away from home and among 
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strangers (ibid, p. 42). - 
Indeed, during my own fieldwork in Pakistan in 
Spring 1991,1 discovered a huge painted slogan on a wall in Clifton, 
Karachi, which read (in English), "Proud to be Hazarawali! ". It is 
interesting to note that the concept of district ethnicity involves 
primarily circumstantialist factors; the ethnicity referred to is created 
largely by external physical factors, and is consciously "used" by 
Hazar-awalis in their fight with neighbouring groups for economic and 
political resources (ibid, p. 34). 
Ahmed is not alone in considering the role of neighbouring 
groups in the construction of group identities. Schermerhorn has 
presented a model of five "intergroup sequences" (or stages) as an aid 
to understanding questions of ethnicity and identity in South Asia. 
These are broadly conditions in society through which ethnic groups 
develop, which Schermerhorn later extended to six sequences/stages,. as 
f ollows: 
1. Emergence of pariahs, 
2. Emergence of indigenous isolates, 
3. Annexation, 
4. Migration, 
5. Colonisation, 
6. Religious cleavage 
(Schermerhorn, 1978, p. 11). 
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Schermerhorn does not contend that this sequence is always a linear one, 
with groups passing neatly through each of the stages in turn. In some 
societies some of the stages do not apply, or do so only at certain 
points in history. As can be seen, the stages are structured in terms of 
the relationship of a group to its neighbours (and their own identities) 
over time. The six stages were used by Schermerhorn to classify the 
variety of "minority groups" in Indian society. Certain groups, such as 
linguistic minorities, are excluded since they are "fractioned groups of 
such minor size that it is nearly impossible to treat them on a societal 
basis" (Schermerhorn, 1978, p. 14). The third stage - annexation - is not 
considered to apply to Indian society (ibid, p. 12). 
Schermerhorn's model is a useful tool in the analysis of 
community development, and the second stage is not inappropriate as a 
description of Sindhi society. This stage is defined as "where an 
aggregate of nonliterate people are surrounded or doninated by a 
literate, usually considerably urbanised, sector of the population" 
(Schermerhorn, 1978, p. 12). Sindhi-speakers in the province do represent 
a largely rural-based aggregate group in the Province, with lower levels 
of literacy and education than their urban counterparts. While not 
surrounding the Sindhis, since they are smaller in number, the Xobajirs 
are largely urbanized, comparatively well-educated, and certainly account 
for the major part of Sindh's economic output. Of course, identity is 
not static over tine, but is closely related to the dynamics of other 
social groups. Identity is also related to access to power in society, 
and the way in which this changes, or shifts, over time. 
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Xusl. iin identity 
Shifts in identity are also apparent within Islam, 
notwithstanding certain claims to the contrary. Mann (Mann, 1986, p. 11) 
observes that, on the Arabian peninsula in particular, Islamic power has 
been unable to subvert ancient tribal organisations and conflicts. This 
much is true also in Afghanistan, where efforts to replace the communist 
regime were being hampered by ethnic conflicts between NuJabideen 
groups, despite Islam being common to all of them. In another sense, 
however, it was the very prize of power in Kabul, won after twelve years 
of battle by the rebel fighters, that forced a reappraisal of the 
relationship between ethnic and Islamic identif icat ions. 
In other cases, an Islamic resurgence has united antagonistic 
tribal groups to forge a unified "community". This was broadly the 
process experienced by Algerians in the long push to reject French 
colonialism (Gellner, 1987, p. 44). Here the circumstantial ist perspective 
would be that, in each case, the assertion of a dominant identity 
(Pakhtun, or Algerian Muslim) was dictated by certain political goals; 
the formation of a new government in one case, the uniting against an 
external enemy in the other. 
No simple theory of ethnicity and identity- formation can 
relate adequately to the inter-weaving of Islamic, nationalist and ethnic 
identities that have surfaced in Pakistan at various times. The manner 
in which later subnationalist identities relate to wider Islamic 
identities is particularly confusing. When I asked why Karachi was 
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relatively quiet during Winter/Spring 1992, just months after neighbours 
had been attacking one another in "ethnic" violence, a Karachi taxi- 
driver replied that "it is because everyone is Muslim now" (meaning that 
Islamic "brotherhood" had overcome ethnic differences between 
Pakistanis). 
Part of the complexity lies in the role of Islam as the r-aison 
d'eAtre of the State of Pakistan. Before 1947, the ulama appposed 
nationalism as a Western intellectual invention which was fundamentally 
"un-Islamic" (Abbott, 1968, p. 181). The Tamaat-1 Islami of Maulana 
Maudoodi opposed the Muslim League and the demand for Pakistan in the 
1940s. Jinnah himself stated that he wanted a broadly secular state, in 
which religious or other identities would be held within a broader 
"Pakistani" identity. After furious arguments with the ulama (Zakaria, 
1988, p. 230), the rule of Ayub Khan (1958-69) did see the State become 
an Islamic Republic. In 1977, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto declared Abmediyyas to 
be officially a religious minority recognised by the Constitution. In the 
long military regime that followed under General Ziaul Haq (1977-88), 
"Islamisation" became the central policy of the state. In 1991, the 
Sba. riat Bill (a system of Islamic law) was passed in the Assembly, 
making Islam not only the "official religion" of the Pakistan State, but 
also enshrining a specific form of Islam that excludes certain sects. 
Thus, the identities of "Pakistani" and "Muslim" have been equated with 
one another in many specific ways. In these terms, the State has been 
equated with a specific form of Islam. Other social groups and 
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communities - including the MQM - interpret matters very differently, as 
we shall see. 
The question of Islam and its relationship to ethnicity poses 
many problems for Western theories and models. From a Western point of 
view, Muslin identity often seems paradoxical, if not opaque. Sometimes 
it is an additional identity to regional or national identities, as when 
the Pakhtun nationalist, Wali Khan, said that he had been a Pakhtun for 
4,000 years, a Muslim for 1,400 years, and a Pakistani for 40 years 
(A. S. Ahmed: Lecture on "Identity and Ethnicity" - New Hall College, 
Cambridge, 7 November 1990). On other occasions, "being Muslim" serves 
to differentiate a community from linguistic or other communities, as is 
demonstrated in the former Yugoslavia. The Census of Yugoslavia used to 
list a bewildering number of communities, with Muslims being listed 
alongside Serbs, Croats, Albanians, "Others" and even "Yugoslavs" (for 
those who objected to being categorised under the other identities; 
Ramet, 1984, p. 20). Such identities are signified as either relating to 
perceived community characteristics, or as local responses to the 
("improper") naming of a community by others. In a sense, the Muslims of 
Yugoslavia are signifying that they are largely "different" from other 
groups in their social life, and thus the term "Muslim" can serve as a 
convenient marker where one is needed. Yet the mixing of religious and 
ethnic identifications makes Islam a shifting set of identities that 
cross various "stable" boundaries. A writer in the Soviet leaflet 
"Samlzdat' described the Soviet situation in 1988 in the following terms: 
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"Soviet identity is too large; it is like saying one 
is an Asian. It is at the sane time too narrow because 
it is limited to a specific type of socio-political 
organisation ....... Personally I have no objection to 
being described as a Soviet Muslim or a Muslin citizen 
of the USSR. The 'Soviet' bit remains valid as long 
as I am associated with the Soviet state. What if I 
left the citizenship of the USSR? Would I suddenly 
evaporate? What if Uzbekistan left the USSR and chose 
another political system as it has the constitutional 
right, in theory at least? Would I cease to exist? 
....... Only the term 'Muslim' is large enough, accurate 
enough and, paradoxically, neutral enough to describe 
what we are in this corner of the world.. " 
(Samizdat, 12 March 1988; in Taheri, 1989, p. 184) 
Identity in Sindh 
Muslim identity can, then, act as a supplement or as an 
alternative to other identities, depending on the social and political 
environment in which it is constructed. In the case of Pakistan, the 
strength of Muslim identity is being tested for its ability to rise 
above regional and other forms of cultural identity. In all the Provinces 
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of Pakistan there is a complex mixture of different Muslim community 
groups (and even some non-Muslim groups). Furthermore, the term "Muslim" 
does not imply a uniform religious culture; there are important 
differences between Sunni and Sbia Muslims. In Sindh, as in Punjab, an 
already muddled situation before 1947 was further complicated after 
Independence with the arrival of Muslim migrants from India. In Sindh, 
these migrants usually spoke a different language to their "hosts" and 
presented a more obviously urban, if not urbane, culture than most 
Sindhis were used to. Their arrival only encouraged the regionalist 
ambitions of Sindhi politicans like G. M. Syed, who now freely refers to 
the State of Pakistan as a "fraud" (interview, 13 March 1992, Karachi). 
Exactly how "a" Xohajir identity fits into this wider matrix of 
regional and religious identities is not easy to see at first. One of 
the principal demands of the MQM, which more than any organisation has 
acted to politicise an assumed XdIaJJr identity, has been that Xobajirs 
should be granted official "subnationality" status so that quotas for 
government employment can be redefined in a way that favours the 
inhabitants of urban areas in Sindh (a sizeable proportion of whom are 
NobaJIrs). This is a case of a community mobilising to stake its claim 
to a share of the state's resources; a claim that Schermerhorn 
associates with the "indigenous isolate" stage of ethnic community 
formation (Schermerhorn, 1978, p. 12). But the Mobajiz- identity is far 
more than just an economic convenience, as I will show later. my 
research suggests that socio-cultural factors are definitely part of the 
story. The Urdu language is certainly common to a majority of the people 
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who have supported the XQM and its nationality demands, although 
G. M. Syed claims that the Mohajir-s are actually made up of a mixture of 
linguistic groups - including Gujeratis, Kutchis and even Tamils - and 
cannot therefore be considered a nationality (inter-view with G. M. Syed, 13 
March, 1991, Karachi). A. D. Smith warns, however, against applying 
linguistic nationalist theories, modelled on Slavic and other European 
examples, to African or South Asian situations where language is not 
necessarily a dominant factor in identity (A. D. Smith, 1983, pp. xi-xii). 
De Vos (De Vos, 1975, p. 15) also claims that language can act as merely 
a symbolic element of identity, without applying to all the members of 
the community. The example he cites is that of the Welsh, of whom only 
approximately 20% regularly use the Welsh language. G. M Syed's dismissal 
of Xobajir- identity on linguistic grounds also relates to the relatively 
dominant role that the Sindhi language plays in Sindhi identity. 
Other aspects of Xobajir identity are less easy to define. The 
"NobaPi" name suggests a collective experience of migration (which 
would apply to Afghan refugees in Baluchistan, NWFP and elsewhere who 
are also known locally as Mobailrs), although the MQM electorate is 
dominated by people who were born in Pakistan. The name also carries 
some Islamic connotations in its reference to the "first Muslim 
migrants", although Islamic issues are far from central to MQM ideology 
and the Xbhajirs are nixed in terms of Islamic sect (most, however, are 
believed to be Sbias). "NobaJir"' also indicates a sense of rootlessness, 
alienation, a differentiating of oneself from those around, that compares 
in many ways to the manner in which Muslim identity itself is used as 
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an "Other" in some non-Muslim societies. The question of XbbajIr identity 
is taken up at greater length in Section Two of the dissertation. 
3.3 THE STATE AND NATIONALISM IN POST-COLONIAL SOCIETIES 
The way in which observers have viewed the dynamics of ethnic 
identities in post-colonial societies has been closely related to views 
on the nature of the state in the postcolonial developing world. Thus, 
the formation of a Xdbajir identity is one matter, but its further 
construction and promotion by a powerful political party eager for 
representation links that identity to a wider spatial interface between 
politics and the state. This in turn raises certain questions about the 
state, and about its relationship to community groups and identities and 
their national and sub-national ambitions. Most academics now accept 
that the state is not just a set of neutral institutions and political 
actors that sits in impartial Judgement on society and which adjudicates 
fairly between the competing claims of different groups. States are more 
usually captured by one or more contending social and economic groups 
and made to do their bidding. To that end, states and state institutions 
themselves partake actively in the construction - and attempted 
destruction - of particular communities and even sub-nationalities. This 
is certainly the case in Pakistan, as we shall see in later Chapters. 
States are also intimately bound up with attempts to create *a national 
identity, and nationalism, for a "given" country or "nation". 
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Nationalism and Europe 
Much of the theoretical work an nationalism springs not from 
South Asia but from Europe, in terms both of its subject and object. By 
the nineteenth century, nationalist cultures and nation-states were 
forming rapidly in Europe, to a point where nationalism was accepted as 
a natural and inevitable process linked to industrialisation (Gellner, 
1983, p. 6). This was particularly so in the west, while in eastern Europe 
at the end of the nineteenth century various Marxist theories were 
developed and applied to the political arena. One such theory held that 
capitalism would defuse nationalism, and that nationalist ideologies 
would become merely part of a general cultural framework. 
Kedourie claims that nationalism is an ideological product of 
nineteenth-century Europe "with a meaning and a resonance which until 
the end of the eighteenth century it was far from having" (Kedourie, 
1961, p. 9). The ideology soon became accepted as a natural instinct of 
humanity that was assumed always to have been present. Seton-Watson 
claims that it is impossible to define the process of nationalism 
precisely. It is enough simply to realise that it happens, that it 
"existed and exists" (Seton-Watson, 1977, p. 5). 
But, as Gellner (1983, p. 6) explains, it was not always so. 
Changes in society, and particularly in Europe, paved the way for the 
new ideology of nationalism to emerge in the nineteenth century. In 
economic terms, cities became superseded by nation-states as the "power- 
containers" of society (Giddens, 1981, p. 12) through improvements and 
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expansion in industry and communications. Intellectually, eighteenth- 
century Euope experienced an Age of Enlightenment, in which a 
possibilist ideology emerged, founded on the belief that the universe 
was governed by unvarying laws of nature that needed only to be 
understood and codified. The end of the century also witnessed the 
French Revolution, in which a popular secular culture scored the first 
major "nationalist" victory over a European feudal dynastic regime. 
By the nineteenth century such intellectual developments were 
acompanied by industrialisation, which in turn began to link wider 
populations through education and the labour-process. Here arose the 
opportunity for one of Mann's four "power-sources" to be extensively 
exercised; that of ideological power (Mann, 1986, p. 11). Gellner asserts 
that the creation of a specific "high culture" is the secret of 
nationalism (Gellner, 1983, p. 18). The emerging "modern" societies 
demanded a degree of literacy for "effective citizenship". Gellner (ibid, 
p. 127) concludes that language (and literacy in the language) are at the 
heart of nationalism. Education and literacy encouraged the "invention" 
of national symbols such as a flag, an anthem and an emblem to which 
the whole nation could respond ritually (Hobsbawm, 1983, p. 11). Anderson 
agrees in large part, and points out that education and literacy allowed 
nations to be "imagined" through newspapers and books (Anderson, 1983, 
p. 30). He stresses the point, however, that it is not language itself 
that allowed this process, as Gellner claims, but more precisely the 
process of "print capitalism" (ibid, p. 122). A language and its 
associated culture are thus the medium of nationalism, but newspapers 
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and books (the circulation of which expanded rapidly in tandem with 
industrialisation) are its physical natter. They allow a "nation" to 
store and transmit a collective memory. 
We have seen that questions relating to language and identity 
are controversial. Many have claimed that a specific single language is 
a "prerequisite" for nationality status. This includes Stalin (Stalin, 
1913, p. 8) and Lenin (Lenin, 1964, p. 396) in the case of Russia, and the 
Sindhi nationalist G. M Syed in Pakistan (interview with G. M. Syed, 13 
March 1991, Karachi). However, in non-European examples, as elsewhere, 
there is a danger of a eurocentric analysis based on those nationalisms 
where language is and was important. 
Xarxist and neo--Narxist interpretations 
Karxists and neo-Marxists have tended to view class as the 
primary structure in society, so much so that the entry an nationalism 
in the Dictionary of Marxist Thought suggests that: 'Nationalism is a 
subject on which Marx and Engels are commonly felt to have gone astray 
... by greatly underestimating a force which was about to grow 
explosively" (Bottomore, 1983, p. 346). Insofar as Marx and Engels did 
discuss nationalism they tended to condemn it and particularly so when 
they referred to the nationalisms of various Slav populations within the 
Habsburg empire (ibid. ). But this was not ever the case. - On other 
(usually later) occasions, Marx and Engels, together and separately, 
would support nationalist aspirations in Ireland and Poland as a 
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precondition lor the more generalised social wlass-based) progress, to 
which they looked forward. Lenin would later take a similar line, 
offering his support for national liberation movements against colonial 
powers, but warning good socialists against a narrow-minded nationalism 
which blinded itself to important class cleavages and conflicts within 
the "nation". Stalin codified this view in his pamphlet on Marxism and 
the National Question, written in 1913 (ibid. ). In his view, and probably 
in that of Lenin, 'minority nationalism could only be counteracted by a 
socialist pledge of full rights of self-determination" (ibid. ). 
Such formulations by Stalin and Lenin clearly had regard for the 
practical problems facing the Bolsheviks at the time of the First World 
War (when one "national" working class was slaughtering another 
"national" working class) and in the early years of the Soviet Union. 
Although these sorts of practical concerns would continue to inspire (or 
to complicate) the attempts of some Marxists to take a. line on national 
liberation struggles, it is not clear that classicial Marxism has ever 
properly confronted the reasons wby men and women might lend their 
support - often very fervently (Anderson, 1993) - to something called a 
nation and the politics of nationalism. 1n very many cases, nationalism 
has been viewed by Marxists either as a pathology or a disease (see 
Bottomore, 1983), or as the product of specific political and economic 
calculations on behalf of interest groups and/or states that sought to 
divide and rule. 
One partial exception to this generalisation is Hechter's nea- 
Marxist attempt to fashion a theory of ethno-regionalism on the basis 
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of an account of a hierarchically defined cultural division of labour 
(Hechter, 1973). Writing firstly about the Celtic fringe in Britain, 
Hechter adapted the work of Frank and others on the exploitation of 
peripheries by cores to argue that nationalist movements would arise in 
areas like Wales and Scotland which were resource peripheries for an 
exploitative England, but which retained (in Wales at least) cultural 
weapons like language to defy this exploitation and to demand rights to 
self-determination. Hechter's account at least addressed the "whys" of 
nationalism, even if it remained imprisoned in the economistic framework 
that has typified so much Marxist writing about politics. The main 
problems with Hechter's model of internal colonialism, as several critics 
have pointed out, is that it is empirically weak in the British context 
and that it fails (in this version) to predict the rise of nationalist 
movements in certain "richer" regions like Punjab in India and Catalonia 
in Spain. Hechter's model is mainly of interest for the way it challenged 
structuralist-functionalist theories of national social synthesis under 
industrialisation, and theories such as Durkheim's (Durkheim, 1964, 
p. 187) "acculturation thesis", or Deutsch's (Deutsch, 1961, pp. 493-514) 
model of "social mobilisation". Hechter claims that separatist movements 
in peripheral zones of modern industrial nations (such as the Basque 
movement in Spain) prove that industrialisation does not automatically 
create a unified national culture, a point that it is not without some 
resonance in modern Pakistan. It is significant, though, that Hechter's 
later, and more sensitive, work on nationalism and regionalist movements 
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moved away from Marxism in certain important respects (see Hechter and 
Levi, 1979). 
Pluralist theories of society 
On the other side of the fence stand various group-pluralist 
theoreticians, who view the state in multiethnic societies as an arena in 
which communities can bargain with one another. The main differences 
between pluralist theories of the state relate primarily to the element 
of perceived propensity to conflict in multiethnic socities. M. G. Smith 
and Kuper saw the problems and failures associated with nation- building 
in postcolonial States as relating to insurmountable "cultural 
incompatibilities" among sections of the population (M. G. Smith and 
Kuper, eds. 1969, pp. 13-14). Furnivall, in a study of "Netherlands India", 
related such conflicts to a legacy of precolonial society, whereby 
independent socio-cultural groups had developed with very little contact 
with one another in a fundamentally "immobile" society (Furnivall, 1939, 
p. 447). 
The theory of a nplural society" was f irst developed by J. S 
Furnivall Gur-nivall, 1948) and was based on tropical colonial examples 
(such as Burma) in which a multiethnic society was structured around the 
dominance of a particular ethno-social group. M. G Smith developed the 
theory further in relation to Western Europe, which he saw as emerging 
f ram feudalism into a nbeterogeneous" system of "universalistic 
incorporation" MG. Smith, 1969, pp. 58-9). This differs from homogeneous 
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societies in which the nation-state is cotermincus with a single ethnic 
group (ibid). 
Other cultural pluralists have reappraised both class and 
ethnicity in society, and in so doing have moved across the political 
spectrum towards neo-Marxist views of multiethnic States. Van den 
Berghe, for example, examined the ethnic political situation in Peru and 
Nigeria and presented an appraisal of class in community-group politics 
that earlier group pluralists had tended to ignore (Van den Berghe, 1978, 
p. 162). In these terms, interest-group politics can relate to a complex 
combination of socio-cultural and economic considerations. The varying 
propensities to conflict suggested by these theories raises the question 
of nation-building and its problems in many multiethnic postcolonial 
societies. In South Asia, a wealth of theories on state structures have 
been encouraged by continuing postcolonial conflict between ethnic and 
regional communities and between these communities and the state itself. 
Nationalism in South Asia 
South Asian and other non-European examples do not readily fit 
into European theories and models of nationalism. In the subcontinent a 
debate emerged in the 1930s and 1940s over the relationship between 
"communalism" and nationalism. The former, argues Pandey, has been 
applied to India in particular (Pandey, 1990, p. 1). The debate on 
commmunalism has been revived more recently. Alavi (Alavi, 1989, p. 222) 
-111- 
claims that while India experiences "communalism", Pakistan suffers 
instead from a slightly different process termed "subnationalism". 
Pandey (Pandey, 1990, p. 5) contends that communalism was a 
term used differently by two main agencies. On the one hand the colonial 
state used the term to describe a "problem" endemic to the subcontinent, 
against which the colonial authorities were trying to battle. The Indian 
"nationalists", however, described communalism as their arch-enemy and 
blamed its rise on colonial rulers who manufactured it for political 
purposes (ibid, p. 11). As regards the first use of the term, there is 
much debate as to when the "problem" emerged in India's history. Pandey 
(Pandey, 1990, pp. 15-6) claims that it was only in the twentieth century 
that spatially extensive religious identifications allowed conflicts in 
which religion was primary rather than contingent; that is, essentially 
"communal" conflicts. In the case of Calcutta, too, Chakrabarty has 
linked comnunalism to the growing semi-educated jute mill labour force 
at the end of the nineteenth century -a labour force which could be 
addressed effectively by vitriolic religious leaders (Chakrabarty, 1989, 
p. 195). 
The Indian "nationalist" lobby was led by the INC which saw 
itself as the only progressive inter-community force in the country, and 
which considered "communalists" to be retrogressive (Pandey, 1990, 
p. 241). Gandhi, for example, declared in 1922 that "we are Indians first, 
and Hindus, Mussulmans, Parsis, Christians after" (ibid, p. 233). However, 
Page (Page, 1981, pp. 231-2) suggests that the gathering wave of communal 
conflicts in the twentieth century, as demonstrated in the 1931 Hindu- 
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Muslim riots in Kanpur, United Provinces, was submerging individual 
instances of inter-community cooperation, and irrevocably reinforcing 
the "two-nation" theory in the minds of the Muslim leadership at the 
time. By 1940, after the Muslim League's sovereignty resolution at the 
Lahore session, even Nehru was apparently starting to speak in such 
terms, declaring: 
" ... many knots of the Hindu-Muslim problem had been 
merged into one knot, which could not be unravelled by 
ordinary methods, but would need an operation ... he 
[Nehru] would say one thing very frankly that he had 
begun to consider them (the Muslim League] and people 
like himself, as separate nations. " 
(S. R. Mehrotra, 1970, p. 210) 
An appraisal of nationalism in the context of Pakistan 
necessarily entails an analysis of the position of Islam on the matter. 
We have seen that in terms of "identity" and "loyalty", Islam poses 
difficult questions for those living within nation-state units or 
federations such as the former Yugoslavia or Soviet Union. The reasons 
underpinning such discomfort are twofold: firstly the Quran suggests, in 
some interpretations, that vertical tribal or "national" boundaries 
between Kuslims should be overcome by pan-Islamism. Secondly, 
nationalism is viewed as a nineteenth-century European ideology, one of 
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the most. heinous results of which, for the Islamic ulama, was the 
carving-up of the Islamic heartlands into new national units, including 
the State of Israel. Many of the new States emerging in the early 
twentieth century, were based largely on flimsy European administrative 
considerations. This was true of the State of Iraq, established by the 
British in 1920, and of Syria and Lebanon, which were formed at the 
same tine under French rule. 
Islam offers thoughts on the matter that are not always easy to 
interpret in "modern" terms. The Quran states (Surah XLIX; 13) that: 
"We have created you nale and female, and have made you 
nations and tribes that ye may know one another. " 
(M. M. Pickthall, 1977). 
Ahmed (A. S. Ahmed, 1989, p. 57) suggests that this can be interpreted as 
meaning that regional and national differences should not be elevated 
above cultural similarities, and that Islam should represent the ultimate 
definition for all communities in society. In South Asia, the progressive 
Muslim Aligarh school was opposed by the dar-al ulum [Islamic seminary] 
estahlished at Deoband, United Provinces in 1867, which became the most 
important centre of the Indian ulama in the early twentieth century. 
Here, the Muslims of India were defined as an unmat (community of 
believers] rather than as a millat [nation]. The educated Muslim 
progressives, however, also occasionally expressed "pan-Islamic" 
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sentiments, as in the following statement delivered by Iqbal (1876-1938) 
in 1910, on the subject of Muslim nationality: 
"It is not the unity of language or country that 
constitutes the basic principle of our nationality. 
It is because we all believe in a certain view of 
the universe and participate in the same historical 
tradition that we are members of the society founded 
by the Prophet of Islam. " 
(in Hardy, 1972, p. 179) 
On another occasion Iqbal stated that "the ideal territory for such a 
nation would be the whole earth. " (ibid). 
Iqbal and other "progressive" Muslims later put their support 
behind the Muslim League and the separatist call for Pakistan. The 
Deoband ulama, led by Xaulana Madani of the Jamaat-i Ulama-i Hind 
opposed the Muslim League (Bahadur, 1977, p. 38). Another important 
Islamic leader, Naulana Maudcodi, who later took his Jamaat-i Islaml to 
Pakistan, condemned nationalism as an un-Islamic, Western ideology 
(Abbott, 1968, p. 181). In 1948, Maudoodi was jailed for a year in the new 
Pakistan for condemning the new state as "un-Islamic" (Bahadur, ibid, 
p. 59). Conversely, the founder of the Aligarh School, Sir Syed Ahmed 
Khan, was also opposed by the ulama. The latter obtained a fatwa 
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[ordinance] condemning Sir Syed as a fakir [traitor]; (Zakaria, 1970, 
p. 240). 
The "nation" of Pakistan 
Maudoodi's Jamaat-I Islami decided after 1955 to join the 
mainstream of Pakistani politics, and it has held an important position 
there ever since. The difficulties it faced in making such a decision 
concern the conflict between nationalism and Islam. In Pakistan the 
conflict is more difficult still because the founder of the State 
evidently did not want it to be an Islamic society in terms of the 
Sbariah. The response of later leaders to this problem, notably that of 
General Zia, has been to suggest that Islam is and always was the 
central feature of the Pakistani nation, as portrayed in the 1985 
Pakistan Day message from the President: 
"We started the process of Islamisation nearly eight 
years ago in order to attain the objectives underlying 
the struggle for the establishment of Pakistan" 
(Pakistan News, Xarch 1985, London). 
This statement requires of its audience a sense of amnesia about the 
formation of Pakistan and the words of Jinnah an the eve of 
Independence. Gellner (Gellner, 1983, p. 6) contends that such "amnesia" is 
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essential to the construction of any nation. The General's statement 
was intended to legitimise the Islamisation programme, yet according to 
Alavi (Alavi, 1990, p. 58) legitimacy was always Zia's "major problem". 
Jamaat-l Islani, who, for much of the time, stood behind Zia's Islamic 
programme, ultimately suffered at the hands of the electorate in the 
1985 non-party elections and thereafter. 
The problem with making Islam the raison d'gtre of the Pakistan 
nation lies in part with the nature of Islam. Sunni Muslims (from 
"Sunnab" - the actions of the Prophet) are believed to be in a numerical 
majority in Pakistan in population and and in the government (although 
some argue that the Sbias are in a majority there; see interview with 
Syed Muhammad Taqi, 13 January 1991, Karachi)2. Sunni code states that 
the deeds and intentions of the Prophet were as important as his words, 
and that consequently modern Islamic states can be built using a modern 
interpretation of the Prophet's words and deeds. The Shias, however 
(from "ShVi"; 'party', referring to the group of original followers who 
were excluded from and opposed to the first three Caliphs after 
Muhammad, and from the manner in which they were chosen) believe that a 
compromise situation between "nation-state" and Islam is not possible, 
especially when the Imam [spiritual leader] is not present on earth. 
Ayatollah Khomeinei of Iran (where Sbias are in a majority) was 
accepted as a Maz-j-a Taqleed [Source of Imitation; or legitimate Islamic 
leader], and could thus be supported and followed in the Iran that he 
led. In Pakistan, however, the State has been framed and ruled by 
servants of a secular state, such as army generals, bureaucrats and 
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capitalist industrialists. In sbilite terms, this is "illegitimate 
government" from which true allegiance should be withheld (Taheri, 1985, 
p. 176). In such terms, Shariat Bills have usually been condemned by the 
Sbia and other ulama in Pakistan as being little more than inadequate 
attempts to silence them on the issue. A notable example was the Shar-lat 
Bill of March 1991ý1, which was described by Naulana Fazlur Rehman, 
leader of Tamaat-i Ulama-i Islam (JUD as "aab-e zamzan [holy water] in 
a bottle of whiskey" (Herald June 1991, Karachi, p. 47). 
The group that benefitted most from General Zia's struggle with 
this problem of identity in the 1980s was probably the subnationalist 
NobaJir movement. Arising in urban Sindh - the only electoral stronghold 
of Jamaat-i Islami - the MQM at once identified itself with the founders 
of Pakistan, who it suggested were the "only people with Pakistan in 
their hearts" (interview with Azim Ahmed Tariq, 13 March 1991, Karachi). 
Yet the MQM also declared that Xohajirs had promised nothing in support 
of Pakistan or Islam (Alavi, 1989, p. 243). The group was different from 
"traditional" ideological subnationalities with long histories and an 
apparent cultural unity, such as the Sindhis or Baluchis, and some have 
claimed that it stands in opposition to these groups in certain key 
aspects (interview with Nadeem Nusrat, assistant to Altaf Hussain, 13 
March 1991, Karachi). The MQX at once condemned others for failing to 
build a strong Pakistani nation, yet created an ethnic conflict that has 
threatened the integrity of the State and made the nation-building 
process ever more difficult. 
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3.4 CONCLUSIONS 
I have suggested that "orthodox" theories of ethnicity or 
nationalism cannot easily be mapped on to the South Asian scene, 
particularly in the case of the Xbbajir- movement in Sindh. We have seen 
that Pakistan's development has been marked by an uneasy synthesis of 
various ethnic groups, one of which broke away in 1971 to form 
Bangladesh. The relationship of the Nobajir movement, as articulated by 
the MQM, to the State of Pakistan has been particularly paradoxical. The 
Movement's demands for official "nationality" status depended in its 
early phase upon a complex amalgam of pro-Pakistan sentiments and anti- 
Sindhi nationalist rhetoric. If the Xabajir-s are a legitimate 
"nationality", they cannot be straightforwardly recognised as such in 
terms of language or history, although each of these factors can be made 
to serve a nationalist purpose. 
Indeed in Sindh, the "ethnic map" comprises a complex collection 
of community groups. The identities of some of these groups can be 
termed "ethnic", yet some are more precisely religious groups (including 
both non-Muslim minorities and different Muslim "sects"), or lingustic 
communities. In some cases, political leaders have attempted to combine 
these groups under a broader Pakistani identity, by focussing attention 
on national economic or political issues. This has certainly been the 
intention of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). In still other cases, 
Islamic issues have been raised with the aim of presenting a more 
national forum for political debate. Yet a Muslim identity is not 
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entirely obvious or stable in Pakistan, and the Islamic political 
movement has often stumbled on the different interpretations presented 
by Sbias, Sunnis, or smaller groups such as the Abmedlyyas. 
Perhaps more disruptive is the manner in which nany political 
leaders have "played the ethnic card" in the province of Sindh, and 
exacerbated ethnic community divisions there. This has certainly been 
the motive of the Sindhi nationalist movement, which has promoted the 
concept of an autonomous province in which the largest single ethnic 
group in the province, the Sindhis, would hold a clear advantage. Sindhi 
nationalism is well established and would seem to fit the definition of 
nationalism offered by Anthony Smith (and which I support): "as an 
ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and 
identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to 
constitute an actual or potential nation" (A. D. Smith, 1991, p. 73). My 
argument in the next section of this dissertation is that Sindhi 
nationalism has provided an important condition of existence of Xohajir, 
(sub-) nationalism, and vice-versa. In Chapter 41 will attempt to show 
how Nobajirs have formed an identity both through an account of their 
own history and language, and in reaction to several other ethnic and 
community identities in the province of Sindh; the province in which 
most self-proclaimed Xcbajiz-s live and compete for resources. I will 
also say something more about the role played by the MQM in fostering 
this emergent sense of Xdbajir identity or "community inagining". 
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FOOTNOTES: 
1, Shariah is the code of Islamic law and government, that effectively provides a 
complete system of Islamic society, broadly followed by the early Caliphates, up to 
and including those of the Ottomans, The code is derived from the words and deeds of 
Muhammad, particularly as regards the organisation of the first Muslim community that 
he headed, Attainment of Shariat government in Pakistan, headed by a lyajlis-i Shoora 
[Assembly of councillors; a form of which was installed during the Zia regime], is the 
central policy of all the Islamic parties, 
2, Taqi's assertion is based on the claim that the Bengali Muslim leader, Syed Ameer 
Ali, once declared (before the Partition of India) that of 3S million Muslims in 
India, 15 million were Shias, Very few of these migrated to East Pakistan, while many 
migrated to Sindh, which, Taqi claims, is "90% Shia" (interview, 13 January 1991, 
Karachi), The view is supposedly given weight by the manner in which Benazir Bhutto 
(whose greatest support is in Sindh) persistently uses Shia rhetoric and imagery in 
her speeches (Taqi, ibid), such as that of 'ffarbala' (the battle in which Ali's son 
Husayn, was murdered along with many of his followers by the army of Yazid's Umayyad 
dynasty in 680 AD, beginning the rift between Sunni and Shia Islamic ideologies), The 
assertion conflicts with most theories that put Shias as a minority of Muslims in 
Pakistan, although precise figures are not available, Taylor describes the situation 
thus; 'The total Shia population of Pakistan today is uncertain but it is at least 10 
per cent and may be substantially more' (Taylor, 1990, p. 95). 
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3. The Shariat Bill, passed in Pakistan on 16 May 1991, was a fairly tempered Bill, in 
which the 'present parliamentary *democratic system of government shall not be 
challenged in any court" after the Bill becomes law, and "the rights of women as 
enshrined in the constitution shall not be affected" (Arab News, 17 May 1991, Riyadh), 
A full Shariat system reduces the weight of women's evidence in courts, removes 
women's rights in divorce cases, and their rights of inheritance or custody of 
children in disputes, all of which are currently protected by Pakistan's Constitution 
(1985), 
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SECTION TWO 
XDHAJIR IDENTITY, THE XQX, AND 
POLITICAL MOBILISATION IN SINDH PROVINCE 
-123- 


4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the 1980s Sindh province suffered from a 
deepening ethnic rift that claimed some 3,000 lives in bitter 
fratricidal strife (Ahmed Rashid, Independent, 18 January 1991, 
London). By the 1990s the animosity between the two largest 
communities in the province was plain to see in the areas where 
they came into contact. A particular site of confrontation was 
Hyderabad, Sindh's second city and a metropolis of around 1.3 
million people (Ahmed Rashid, ibid). 
Hyderabad has always been an important nodal point in Sindh, 
sitting beside the Indus River in a fertile region of the Province, 
just 100 kilometres from the Arabian Sea. After the Partition of 
India the city grew enormously with an influx of refugees from 
India pushing its population up from 135,000 in 1941 to 242,000 a 
decade later (Government of Pakistan, 1990a, p. 53). The enthusiasm 
felt by many in Sindh in those years was great, and most hoped 
that the new arrivals would soon integrate with their hosts. 
Yet by the 1980s, certain Sindhi nationalist leaders had 
begun to talk of the non-Sindhis in the province as usurpers, 
including the largely Urdu-speaking communities of cities such as 
Hyderabad. The emergence of the MQM, which held its first major 
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rally in Hyderabad on 31 October 1986, exacerbated the wrath- of 
many Sindhi leaders, who recognised the influence the Movement was 
beginning to exercise in Hyderabad and Karachi. In Spring 1988, a 
Sindhi-speaking doctor, Qadir Magsi, formed a breakaway faction of 
the Sindhi nationalist movement which quite openly condemned not 
Just the MQM but the Nobajir- "community" as a whole, and which 
suggested that such non-Sindhis should be expelled from the 
province. 
The real watershed in Sindh, however, occurred in the early 
morning of 30 September 1988. Many now consider events on that 
morning to have deepened irrevocably an emerging Sindhi/Mobajir 
ethnic rift. For a brief period of half an hour on that day, a 
coordinated campaign of bombings and shootings rocked the city of 
Hyderabad. The incidents all took place in districts of the city in 
which Urdu-speakers were prevalent. The immediate death toll was 
quoted in the press as 163, with many more being injured (Dawn, 2 
October 1988, Karachi). A great majority of the victims were Urdu- 
speakers. 
These incidents at once showed the levels to which militant 
factions of the Sindhi nationalist movement would be prepared to 
go, and ensured that the MQM would receive many more supporters 
from Urdu-speakers within the province. The incident raised the 
stakes of ethnic animosity and divided people in the Province 
almost irretrievably. Now Hyderabad displays a polarisation between 
Sindhi and XdbaJIr comminities that extends from the tea-shops to 
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hospitals and schools. Ahmed Rashid, a Punjab-based journalist, 
described the situation in the following terms: 
"Private schools have opened separate branches for 
Mohajirs and Sindhis, ensuring that young children 
will embibe the ethnic partition. The city's many 
bazaars, famous for women's glass bangles, cater for 
one or other ethnic group. Those factories still 
operating hire staff according to their ethnic 
affiliation. Even government offices have been 
divided along ethnic lines. 11 
(Independent, 18 January 1991, London). 
As Rashid describes it, the polarisation not only feeds on itself 
through the generations, but shatters the economic prospects of the 
host society. Whatever tax-breaks the government may offer, 
businesses will be reluctant to locate in a city where deep-rooted 
violence is just below the surface. 
Cities such as Hyderabad have thus undergone a fundamental 
change in their structure, whereby cultural differences that did 
not previously affect daily life have become heightened to the 
point of producing embedded spatial differences. Violence has 
ensured that Sindhis living and working in the central areas of the 
city have now largely fled to the outer suburbs, while Urdu- 
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speakers have come into the centre from outlying districts and 
satellite towns. 
This chapter analyses the nature of the "ethnic map" of 
contemporary Sindh. To understand why such ethnic polarisation has 
occurred in the province it is necessary to examine certain socio- 
political factors upon which comminity leaders have based their 
rhetoric. The ultimate purpose of the chapter is to focus on 
XbbajIr identity in contemporary Sindh and analyse the processes 
that led to its formation and development. I will end the chapter 
by examining critically the dimensions and efficacy of a Xobajir, 
identity, as presented by such agencies as the MQM. 
I will argue that to understand the formation and 
development of NdbajIr identity in Sindh it is necessary to 
consider two main sets of factors. Firstly, the success of a 
political movement based upon a concept of XdbajIr identity has 
owed much to the actions of non-Urdu-speaking communities Jn the 
province. I have already described how developments in Sindhi 
nationalism were pivotal in pushing support towards the MQM, 
particularly in such places as Hyderabad where Urdu-speakers come 
into more direct contact with Sindhis than is likely to be the case 
in Karachi. For this reason, I will begin my analysis of identity 
in Sindh with a discussion of the nature of local communities other 
than the XdbaJIrs. This includes not only the Sindhis, but also 
Pakhtuns, Punjabis, and other smaller community groups in the 
Province. 
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The second factor that must underpin an understanding of 
Mobaji. r identity in Sindh is the relationship*of a given community 
to the state in Pakistan. I have already suggested that conditions 
in Hyderabad are different to those in Karachi in certain key 
respects. I will argue that the nature of community identity- 
formation is closely related to such issues as inter-group 
competition for resources, and participation in administrative 
structures. In these terms, the nature of the local state, in 
Hyderabad and Karachi cities for example, forms one important arena 
within which identities are constructed. 
Of course, local city-states are embedded in a wider 
provincial and federal framework in the case of Pakistan. Karachi 
in particular is the largest economic centre and the only major 
port in all of Pakistan. The n ature of its economy and political 
structures is thus of crucial importance to the government in 
Islamabad. However, the Sindhi nationalist vision of an autonomous 
Province depends to a great extent for its feasibility upon a 
consideration of Karachi as a city firmly rooted within the 
Province, Here, I am presenting the state as an intrusive player in 
civil society, shaping and developing local and regional conditions 
for its own purposes. I will develop this theme further in Chapter 
6. In this chapter, three main community identity-groups in Sindh 
will be described, as derived from the fruits of my primary 
research in combination with secondary material. These are, 
firstly, the Sindhis, followed by the "others" who fall into 
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neither Sindhi nor Mo. bajir groupings, and finally the Nobajirs. 
Before discussing these descriptions and analyses, however, it is 
necessary to discuss the specific methods adopted in this research, 
and the sources of primary material that were consulted. 
4.2 METHODOLOGY 
The methodology relevant to this chapter concerns three 
sources of material, which derive from fieldwork conducted in 
Pakistan in Winter/Spring 1990-1 and Winter/Spring 1991-2. Firstly, 
a series of long semi-structured interviews were conducted. 
Secondly, a number of informal individual and group discussions 
were undertaken, and finally extensive use was made of archives in 
Karachi, Lahore and London. 
Fieldwork in Pakistan was heavily influenced by the law and 
order situation, and in particular by the dangers relating to 
ethnic violence in Sindh. An initial visit proposed for Summer 1990 
had to be cancelled after the outbreak of serious ethnic sectarian 
violence in Karachi, beginning in May 1990. The visits that were 
undertaken were hampered by continuing violence in educational 
institutions in particular, which made the educational sphere 
largely out-of-bounds to effective research, and in a smaller way 
by the Gulf War in 1991, which temporarily limited movement on the 
advice of the British Consulate (see Appendix 1). 
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The largest limitation on research, however, which affected 
the amount of time that could be effectively spent in Pakistan, was 
the prevailing situation in rural Sindh. Aside from Hyderabad, 
Thatta and some villages on the fringe of Karachi, it was not 
possible to visit any towns or rural areas in Sindh outside 
Karachi. The operation of dacoits (bandits], who have shown signs 
recently of targeting foreigners for kidnapping', has made large 
areas of the province unpassable for all but the most well-guarded 
parties. Indeed, it would have been reckless to underestimate the 
dangers of travel in rural areas. While this remains the most 
serious handicap to research on local perceptions of the "ethnic 
situation" in Sindh, the matter is instructive in itself, 
especially in relation to the nature of the social and political 
environment in contemporary Sindh. More will be said an this matter 
in Chapter 7. 
The purpose of my investigations was to develop a picture of 
the historical, economic, social and political processes in Sindh 
society, from which a politicised XbhajIr identity emerged in the 
1970s. I also examine the implications of this identity-formation 
for the State of Pakistan. Aside from providing details and 
opinions, the interviews and discussions also provide an account of 
community perceptions, biases and "myths", and give personal 
insights into some of the events and materials gained from other 
sources. 
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The Interview Survey 
The long interview survey was mostly conducted in Pakistan 
in Winter/Spring 1990-1, although subsequent interviews were 
undertaken in Britain and during the second field visit in 1991-2. 
In total, aside from various informal discussions, 53 long 
interviews were undertaken. The bias of such interviews and 
discussions is largely qualitative rather than quantitative. In 
general terms, the methodology adopted was similar to that adapted 
by Schermerhorn in his analysis of ethnic groups in India 
(Schermerhorn, 1978, pp. 3-4), namely: 
1. The sample population of respondents comprised members of the 
community groups about which information on community identity was 
being sought, and non-members of that community, 
2. Discussion was free-ranging, with each interview normally 
lasting between two and four hours, 
3. Occasionally more than one meeting was conducted with particular 
respondents (these are not counted separately in the total). 
The aim was to conduct a wide-ranging discussion that 
encompassed specific key research questions. These would either be 
answered in the natural course of discussion, or would be asked 
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directly. The purpose of such loosely-structured discussion, as 
opposed to rigid questionnaire techniques, was to allow a relaxed 
environment in which discussion could become progressively less 
inhibited. There are various reasons why such factors are important 
in research of this nature, primarily involving the sensitivity of 
some of the topics discussed. 
Work by non-Pakistani groups and scholars on areas 
encompassing the Nobajir community in Sindh has revolved 
principally around studies of housing and urban development in 
Karachi, mostly conducted by scholars associated with the Free 
University of Amsterdam. Similar work within Sindh has been 
undertaken by the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) and the Karachi 
Development Agency (KDA). Work on ethnic communities has been 
sparse to date, perhaps because of the problems and constraints 
mentioned above. Almost all of the secondary work on the matter by 
1993 has been conducted by Journalists, including those working for 
"Viewpoint" or "Herald" in Pakistan, or those working for foreign 
television companies2. The nature of this work, which necessarily 
has involved providing accessible "snapshots" of the ethnic 
situation, identified a need to conduct a detailed analysis of the 
processes developing in the political arena of Sindh. 
In general terms, the method adopted in this research can be 
compared to Cantori and Benedict's "lengthy aide memoire" used to 
initiate and direct discussion on community perceptions in Egypt 
(Cantori and Benedict, 1984, p. 47)3. Similarly Streefland claimed 
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that he adopted "loosely structured interviews" in corresponding 
with a Christian community in Karachi (Streefland, 1979, p. 35). 
Door-to-door surveys in the city, such as that conducted by Peter 
Rientied (Nientied, 1991, p. 115) were considered inappropriate in 
this case, due to the political and cultural sensitivity of my 
questions, and because Nientied's topic was more closely related to 
housing than to ethnic identity. 
The format of the interview consisted of the presentation of 
the "aide memoire", and a request for assistance (see Appendix 2). 
This form was written in English and on a handful of occasions it 
was translated into Urdu by a research assistant. The assistant was 
enrolled through the offices of a friend of the author (for whom he 
worked as a Personal Assistant), and he helped with meetings 
wherever he could fit them around his other work. (Since many 
meetings were in the evening this was not usually a problem for the 
assistant). For meetings where various applications had to be made, 
the form was submitted in advance of an interview. The author also 
carried forms of attestation from the Department of Geography at 
Cambridge University to verify the nature of business where 
requested. In most cases such verification was not necessary, but 
in some instances it was important to establish with the respondent 
that the author was a foreign researcher with general academic 
aims, and not a reporter attached to any newspapers in Pakistan or 
elsewhere (nor indeed a member of an intelligence agency). 
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The nature of the topic is such that confidentiality and 
respect for the respondent are of paramount importance. Before any 
interview was conducted, the respondent was asked firstly if notes 
or a recording could be made, and secondly if any of the material 
could be cited against the name of the respondent. On two or three 
occasions it was requested that no notes be made or names quoted, 
and in such instances the interview was treated as useful solely 
for background information. On other occasions, the respondent 
asked that certain passages of the interview in particular be made 
"off-the-record". This applied particularly to civil servants, 
whose position depends on not openly disclosing any political 
judgements or opinions to a third party. rhe importance of 
respondent confidentiality is clear, considering that many have 
been beaten, intimidated or threatened in the past for being quoted 
about certain political subjects, not just by political activists 
but also by members of state security forces. 
My form of request for assistance included a basic 
description of my project and its principal research questions. My 
aim was to begin a wide-ranging discussion, including general 
political and historical topics, into which questions could be 
introduced to effectively "guide" discussion where necessary. In 
many instances, a part of a meeting would involve a largely 
uninterrupted monologue from the respondent, in which many of the 
research issues were tackled without prompting. The purpose of the 
introductory form was to start discussion developing in a given 
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direction. The text of the form was designed to be as uncontentious 
as possible and thus suitable for all sides in the political 
arena. In a great majority of meetings, adverse reactions to the 
description and purpose of research did not occur, and the form 
provided an effective springboard for discussion. In those 
instances where negative reaction did occur, the resultant 
explanations were seen as useful in themselves, as will be 
explained. 
The interviewing process generally involved meetings ranging 
from two to four hours. In order to be flexible in regard to host 
sensitivities, the venues and settings of interviews varied. In 
most cases, meetings were made on a one-to-one basis, but 
occasionally it was necessary to interview a respondent in the 
presence of other people. This usually involved secretaries, 
assistants or bodyguards, but sometimes also involved family 
members or officials. Many of the interviews, particularly those 
with political leaders, were conducted in English, since most 
respondents were at ease offering statements in this language. In 
some cases, however, a certain amount of translation into Urdu was 
necessary. As part of the ground-work for this research I have 
developed a basic knowledge of Urdu. However, time-constraints on 
gaining a fluent knowledge of the language necessitated the help 
of the assistant in the field in certain cases where Urdu was used. 
Fortunately, in most cases the assistant was needed mainly for the 
setting-up, conveyance to and introduction at an interview meeting. 
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Most meetings were held at the respondent's home or office. 
The hostel in which the author was staying in central Karachi was 
always offered as a venue, but was used as such only once. Again, 
flexibility was important - it was considered better to have a 
meeting of some sort rather than no meeting at all. In the case of 
members of the MQM leadership, for example, interviews were 
conducted in a hospital on two occasions. 
The first task on arrival in the field was to arrange 
assistance with the setting-up of interviews, in the form of 
unearthing telephone contacts, negotiating for a meeting and 
locating the place of interview. Within the first two weeks after 
arrival in the field, assistance was enrolled through contacts of 
Pakistani friends of the author in Britain 4. In practise, such 
assistance involved the use of office facilities (in the form of 
telephones, typing facilities, photocopiers and such like), and the 
help of an assistant. 
Obviously, various other people met in the course of work 
were willing to help, primarily by suggesting suitable respondents 
to interview, and by offering general background information and 
opinions on other respondents, or on the research topic in general. 
It should be stressed, however, that a certain element of 
detachment was consciously maintained. This enabled me to meet 
representatives of different, and often sharply opposing factions, 
without the respondent knowing too much about who else had been 
interviewed. 
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The arranging of interviews took varying lengths of time and 
effort, depending on the nature and position of the respondent. The 
process of arranging a meeting with the leaders of the MQM began 
before departure from the U. K, in the foriý of dispatching details 
and requests for an audience through the MQX office in London. On 
arrival in Karachi the process was continued, and meetings with 
lower-cadre MQM "workers" were set up. Again, as far as the 
organisation of my time was concerned, flexibility was the key 
factor. In the sampling of the respondents, availability played a 
major role. Some were elusive for various reasons (such as feeling 
uncertain about the motives for an interview), although only one 
meeting was broken after having been arranged. For these reasons 
and others, a second visit to the field was deemed appropriate. The 
visit in Winter/Spring 1992 mostly yielded the required results. 
Many figures who had eluded contact in 1991 were interviewed, 
including Benazir Bhutto, and the Nalb-amir [spiritual leader] of 
the Jamaat-l Islaml, Professor Ghafoor Ahmed. 
In general terms, it can be reiterated that a certain 
element of danger played a role in the framing of fieldwork 
organisation. It was important, for example, to "separate" periods 
of work. spent with the MQK, from those spent with opposing 
organisations such as the PPP. Furthermore, it was important to 
avoid being identified with any particular organisations in the 
field. This was not entirely successful in practise, since an 
interview with Benazir Bhutto was reported the following day in 
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some national -papers! ' (see Appendix 3). Furthermore, despite 
efforts at separation of contact with opposing organisations, an 
interview with Sindhi nationalist G. M SYed, and one with MQM leader 
Altaf Hussain, were held on the morning and afternoon of the same 
day. (This may not have been possible had a certain independence of 
movement in the field not been rigidly maintained). 
Other interviews/discussions 
Aside from the long interviews, a number of more informal 
and group discussions took place. Here, questioning was not 
obviously structured, and the purpose was simply to lead general 
discussion on opinions and feelings in a relaxed atmosphere. These 
meetings were invaluable in many ways, since they gave an insight 
into comminity identities, perceptions and myths, more from the 
view of the "common person" than from that of a political leader 
or analyst. It was felt that to introduce questionnaires or other 
such trappings of "formal research" into these meetings would have 
destroyed the relaxed atmosphere in which discussion was allowed to 
develop. These meetings were with the following: 
- XdbajIr students from Karachi University (various separate 
individuals and groups). 
- Pakhtun and Kashmiri students from DS College, Karachi. 
- groups of Mobajir freight-forwarders. 
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- groups of Mobaiir office clerks. 
- residents in Orangi, Nazimabad, Azizabad, Nauripur, Lyari. 
- members of the Sindh Graduates Association, directors of the 
Roshan Tara private primary school in Old Golimar, Karachi, and 
residents of Old Golimar. 
- members of the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP)housing scheme in 
Orangi, Karachi. 
-a housing officer at the Karachi Development Agency. 
- groups of people visiting Altaf Hussain in Abbasi Sbabeed 
Hospital, Karachi. 
In all these cases, notes were made during or shortly after 
discussion. The meetings are separated from the list of long 
interviews because they did not follow the same procedure and 
format, but in terms of the information gained they were just as 
valuable to the research. Because of the nature of the subject, 
countless other discussions were held, since everyone has been 
affected by the politics of subnationalism in Sindh, and everyone 
has a theory or opinion on it. Among NobaJIrs, a discussion of 
Altaf Hussain and the MQM often occurs without prompting. 
Discussions with students were also important. Due to sporadic 
skirmishes between student groups on college campuses, which in 
Spring 1991 featured the XdbaJ1. r APMSO and the student wing of 
Jamaat-l Islami, the Islami Jamiat-i Talaba (IJT), the university 
and colleges were closed for much of the time I spent in the field. 
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For this reason, discussion with students and lecturers had to take 
place away from the campuses, sometimes in a less directed manner 
than I would have liked. 
The structure of the survey 
The sample population of the long interviews can be divided 
into two categories, by ethnicity and occupation. An important 
point in the former case is that some people reject the idea of 
ethnic categorisation altogether, and believe that the wholesale 
identification of people as belonging to ethnic groups has been at 
the root of the emergence of divisive subnationalist politics. For 
these reasons, an "Other" category was introduced into the ethnic 
categorisation of the sample, and was applied to those who would 
not readily give their ethnic identity, or whose identity was not 
clear. 
The sample is described in Table 4.1. Clearly it is biased 
towards Xobajirs and Sindhis in ethnic terms, and to political 
figures and analysts in occupational terms. In both cases, however, 
these two groupings are balanced by other occupations and 
identities. 
Table 4.2 combines the two factors depicted in Table 4.1, to 
show which ethnic identities relate to which occupations. My main 
aim in regard to respondent sampling was to select figures from 
various ethnic communities in the province and beyond (mainly men 
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Mohaj ir 26 
Sindhi 12 
Punjabi 6 
Pakhtun 1 
Baluchi 1 
Other (mixed, unidentifiable) 7 
TOTAL 53 
Political leader/worker 15 
Journalist/editor 13 
Academic 5 
Civil servant 4 
Lawyer 3 
Vriter 3 
Social services 2 
Municipal worker/mayor 2 
Trade Unionist 1 
Archivist 1 
Architect 1 
Government advisor 1 
Publisher I 
Surveyor I 
TOTAL 53 
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IN - Mohajir, S- Sindhi, Pu - Punjabi, Pk - Pakhtun, B- Baluchi, 
0- Other] 
Political leader/worker 7 5 1 
Journalist/editor 4 34 2 
Academic 3 11 
Civil Servant 4 
Lawyer 1 
Writer 3 
Social Services 1 
Municipal worker/nayor 2 
Trade Unionist 
Archivist 
Architect 1 
Government advisor 
Publisher I 
Surveyor 
TOTALS 26 12 6117 
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given the nature of Pakistani society and politics), and to talk to 
people in the following groups: 
- Leaders and workers of the MQM 
- Mobajir- political workers not in the MQM 
- Leaders and workers of non-Nobajir parties 
- Various Nobajir-observers 
- Various Sindhi observers 
- Other observers, both in Sindh and-Punjab. 
The two ethnic foci were the Sindhis and the Xdbajirs, since 
the ethnic conflict in Sindh has become largely a battle between 
elements of these two communities. (I will show in Chapter 7 that 
not all violence in Sindh is ethno-politically motivated). However, 
it was also important to speak to those outside these community 
groupings. In ethnic terms, this meant speaking to Punjabis, 
Pakhtuns and others, both in Sindh and in Punjab. Aside from these 
groups I also spoke to religious minority groups in Sindh, 
including non-Muslim groups. 
Research questiDns 
The principal research questions that emerged directly from 
the aide memoire can be listed as follows: 
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1. What does the XQM stand tor, and how is it organised and funded? 
2. What led the MQM to emerge and how does it mobilise . supporters? 
3. What constitutes a Nobajir identity and in what senses can it be 
seen as a single and stable identity? 
4. What has been the social and political legacy of the MQM and its 
opponents for the people of Sindh? 
5. What is the Nuttabeda Qauml Movement proposal (the proposed new 
name of the MQH which drops ethnic rhetoric and programmes), and 
will it be successful? 
6. Vhat has been the attitude of the state, and of other groups 
such as Sindhis, to Nobajir subnationalism? 
Methodological problems 
Inevitably, there are certain problems associated with this 
method of research, as with any other. Firstly, the spread of 
interviewing over more than a year meant that developments over 
time may have led to important differences in response to the 
questions among the respondent population. This is a problem that 
Casley and Lury identified in the general context of developing- 
world research (Casley and Lury, 1981, p. 230). This factor was 
particularly important to the fifth principal question, concerning 
the Muttabeda Qaum! Novement. The proposed new name for the MQM was 
publicly stated only at the end of 1990, simultaneously with the 
first batch of interviewing. By 1992 the matter was a more publicly 
-144- 
known and debated issue, particularly since it had caused a violent 
split in the MQM in the summer of 1991. However, the length of 
interviews, and the difficulties in securing many of them, made 
such a temporal spread inevitable. Furthermore, since identities 
and perceptions themselves change and develop over time, it was 
illuminating to compare responses to certain questions over a 
period of time. 
Other problems concern the narrow socio-economic banding 
from which most respondents are drawn. The research here focusses 
not only on identity, but more particularly on political leadership 
and mobilisation, as they relate to the state and to urban space. 
In these terms, it seemed appropriate to concentrate on the upper 
echelons of leadership and administration. 
The physical constraints of time and resources also 
contributed to the socio-economic "gap" in the survey. This problem 
is not unique to my research. Schermerhorn observes that "To fill 
[such a] gap would, however, require interviewing with the aid of 
interpreters in many vernaculars and multiple sociolinguistic 
adjustments. " (Schermerhorn, 1978, p. 4-7). While Urdu was used in 
this research, a full socio-cultural analysis of the ethnic 
situation in Sindh would require a similar use of Sindhi, and 
probably also Seraiki and other languages such as Pashto and 
Baluchi/Brahui. It was felt that such avenues were not appropriate 
to an examination of political leadership and mobilisation of this 
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kind, ' since an emphasis an socio-political rather than cultural 
factors was required. 
For wider popular opinions and perceptions, this research 
has concentrated on "archival" source data such as voting patterns 
(see Chapter 6). Other archival sources relevant to the study of 
identity in Sindh include the varied press archives which, aside 
from providing statements, reactions and interviews with a great 
variety of figures, also yield certain documents and publications 
which highlight the linguistic tropes and mythologies deployed by 
different political groups (the "rhetoric of politics"). It should 
be recognised that, in many instances, the press is the only 
documentary source of events relating to the development of ethnic 
relations in Sindh. The press and documentary archives of 
particular relevance here were those of the "Dawn" Group (which 
included "Herald", "The Star", and "Daily News"), "The Muslim", the 
"Jang" Group including "The News" in Karachi, Rawalpindi/ Islamabad 
and Lahore, "Takbeer", "Qauml Akbar, "Jaagd' and "Newsline" in 
Karachi, "Sind Observer" in Hyderabad, "The Nation", "Frontier 
Post", "Friday Times" and "Viewpoint" in Lahore, the personal 
archive of S. S. Jafri, the Khalid Shamsul Hasan Foundation, the All- 
Pakistan Newspaper Society and the Quaid-i Azam Academy in Karachi, 
and finally the facilities and archives of the Eastern Services of 
the BBC World Service in London. 
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The importance of the Lahore archives was considerable, 
since publications such as "Viewpoint" and "Frontier Post" (the 
head office of the latter being in Peshawar, NWFP) are able to 
comment on situations in Sindh without being subjected to the sort 
of local pressures that occasionally come to bear on Karachi 
publications. I recognise that the press is not a neutral organ, so 
cross-referencing of material gained from the press against 
interviews and official publications was always attempted. The BBC 
was important in this respect, less as a source of primary material 
than as a potential means of verification of certain matters. The 
importance of the BBC World Service as a source of "reliable" 
information to people in Pakistan should not be underestimated. 
The press archives were seen as a valuable primary source. 
In a sense, the press often battle with official censorship and 
pressures and endeavour to deliver more "accurate" information than 
official sources. Access to press archives involved lengthy 
procedures of security clearance, particularly in the case of 
"Dawn" in Karachi. 
Vhere it is certain that names can be attributed to 
quotations, this has been done, but in some cases instructions 
received from respondents mean that less precise attribution must 
be made, usually in the form of a broad occupational 
categorisation. Archival quotation is usually attributed to a 
particular publication, for example "Dawn, 30 September 1986, 
Karachi". All the press archives contain material not just from 
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their own publications, but also from those of their competitors. 
(The material is largely from English-language publications). It 
should be noted that some papers have different editions in 
different cities, notably "The Nation", and "The News". The 
specific edition is quoted wherever possible. 
The prevalence of Sindhis in Karachi is not great and for 
this reason the city contains few Sindhi-language publications on 
general release. However, there are honourable exceptions, such as 
"Jaagd' [Let's go! "] launched in the city in January 1991. From 
sources such as this, and from the All-Pakistan Newspaper Society 
(which provided press details from parts of interior Sindh to which 
I could not safely travel myself), and from interviews and 
archives, a partial analysis of Sindhi identity in contemporary 
Sindh can be presented. 
4.3 SINDHI IDENTITY 
Sindhi identity is in many ways a "traditional" ethnic 
identity relating to an ideological, territorial nationalism. In 
this way it is similar to Baluchi or Pakhtun identity and 
nationalism. An examination of the historical record reveals 
various instances of "Sindh" being considered as a distinct 
community within the Indian subcontinent. The Province's name is 
derived from that of the River Indus (once known as the Sindbu) 
which bisects its territory, from where the words Hind and India 
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are also believed to have originated. Around 500 B. C, the 
Archaemenian Shahs recorded 16 Aryan provinces, one of which was 
Hindu, with its people the Hinduyan (believed to be Sindh and the 
Sindhis; A. A Jafarey, 1981, p. 65). Similarly, the ancient Sanskrit 
epic the Mahabbarata decribes a people called the Sindbu (ibid). 
In British times, the Province was mainly administered as 
part of the Bombay Presidency. In the 1930s, a movement arose in 
Sindh to separate the province from the Presidency. This goal was 
finally achieved in 1936. Here was a forerunner to the modern 
Sindhi nationalist politics that G. M Syed pioneered in 1946 when he 
broke away from the Muslim League. Thus, ancient and contemporary 
history attest to the territorial distinctness of Sindh and the 
Sindhis. 
The Sindhi respondents in the interview sample, including 
important nationalist leaders, defined Sindhi identity as 
pertaining to certain clear-cut diacritical features. The most 
important elements of these can be described as the Sindhi 
language, the convergence of community with territory, a 
territorial history lasting up to 5000 years, and cultural 
features relating to Sindhi songs and poetry and codes of dress, 
and an adherence to a suf1stic tradition of Islam. 
From a non-Sindhi point of view, other less sympathetic 
perceptions of Sindhi characteristics were expressed. These 
referred to an overwhelmingly rural residence and a localised 
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"world-view" and low propensity to travel, sometimes branded as 
"laziness" or lack of competitive spirit, 
Language 
Language is one of the five factors that Sindhi nationalist 
leader G. M. Syed claims is necessary for a community to qualify as 
a nationality (interview, 13 March 1991, Karachi). It is also 
perhaps the firmest foundation of a distinct Sindhi identity. On 
this specific aspect the veteran leader follows the logic of such 
historical figures as Lenin. The other four factors he believes are 
essential to nationality status are identified as territory, 
culture, history, and political and economic interest. In this 
manner, Syed can both name other communities that "qualify" for 
their "due rights" such as Sikhs in India or Seraikis. in Pakistan, 
and disqualify those that should not be recognised as separate, 
such as Xdbajirs (ibid). Similarly, a Sindhi lawyer and writer 
living in Karachi (interview, 13 February 1991, Karachi), while 
claiming that Sindhis are a nationality on the basis of language, 
history and territory, discounts other communities such as the 
Hdbaj1rs under the same parameters, as follows: 
"Never in history has migration been a basis 
for nationality; there should be common language, 
territory and so on. Urdu-speakers were only 25% of 
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migrants - most were Punjabis ... Gujeratis have 
their own language with a rich culture. How can 
they be part of a subnationality? 
(ibid). 
The respondent is here referring to the inclusion of certain 
Gujeratis inhabiting urban Sindh as Mobajirs in terms of the 
rhetoric of the MQM leadership. I will return to this matter later 
in the Context of Nobajir identity in contemporary Sindh. 
The Sindhi language, which Jethmalani described as "the 
primary and paramount mark of Sindhi identity" (Jethmalani, 1980, 
P. xi), certainly has an ancient heritage relating to the 
development of Sanskrit (although to some it is not clear which of 
the two came f irst; Hiranandani, 1980, pp. 4-6). The language has 
eight main dialects, one of which is Seraiki, considered by some to 
be a separate language (Shackle, 1979, p. 153). Given its (former) 
position in north-west India, Sindh acted as a frontier region 
between the Indian subcontinent and the Persian lands to the West. 
The Sindhi language can be written in Gurumukhi, Nagr-l and Arabic 
scripts. In this way, the language is quite distinct from others 
around it such as Urdu or Punjabi, both of which are more closely 
related to one another than to Sindhi. 
The most important early protagonists of a Sindhi linguistic 
culture were the Islamic Sufi bards who wrote poems (kaf! ) and 
-151- 
songs (sur) in Sindhi. Heading the list of prominent poets were 
figures such as Sachal Samast (who was also the leading Seraiki 
poet; Shackle, 1981, p. 252), Sayed Janullah Shah Mir of Rohri, and 
Shah Abdul Latif of Bhit, among many others. Sindhi poetry and 
songs often involved an adoration of the Prophet and of God (ibid, 
p. 256), or recurrent themes such as a celebration of rain as a 
purifying force (Schimmel, 1981, p. 248). The mystical sufi nature 
of the poets would also cause them to mock the orthodoxy of the 
Islamic maulanas (Hiranandani, 1980, p. 32). 
One of the key aspects of this poetry and music is its 
familiarity to many Sindhis, having passed from generation to 
generation by word of mouth. By the end of the eighth century, 
Sindhis were viewed as a distinct culture by most South Asian 
scholars, with music and dancing identified as integral features of 
Sindhi community life (Gankovsky, 1981, p. 180). In many ways such 
activities are more closely related to Hindu culture than to the 
more austere Muslim cultures in other parts of northern India. 
By 1843 the British had arrived in the Lower Indus, and in 
1851 the first Chief Commissioner of Sindh made Sindhi compulsory 
for government officials in the Province. In 1853 a special 
committee made the Vicboli dialect and Arabic script standard in 
Sindhi education, which was compulsory at primary school level 
(this was opposed at the time by the Hindus, who generally used the 
Magr-1 script; Aziz, 1988, p. 176). By 1867, the first Sindhi 
newspaper emerged in the Province (Aziz, ibid., p. 178). 
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Sbfi sm 
The Sufis not only provided a vernacular literature of 
central importance to Sindhi identity, but also a specifically 
Islamic component of Sindhi identity and culture-Suf1sm originated 
in Persia with Al-Hallaj of Baghdad (b. 858), and has since grown to 
fourteen "orders", each started by a particular Pir (saint]. The 
mysticism and unorthodoxy of Sufl teachings and the veneration of 
their shrines by followers, have led the Sufl code to be suppressed 
in many Islamic societies, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia (W. C. 
Smith, 1957, pp. 198-9). The reasons for this are that "orthodox" 
Islam stresses the unitary importance of "one God" and his 
teachings, in the form of the Quran. Shrines are seen as 
distractions from such a practice. 
In Sindh, the Qadiri Order, founded by Abdul Qadir al-Gilani 
of Baghdad (d. 1166; Schimmel, 1975, p. 248), rose to dominance in 
the fifteenth century (A. Zahid Khan, 1981, p. 119). The Sufl code 
is "unorthodox" in that it has a close affinity to folk culture, 
seeing a love of God as opposed to the strictures of the maulanas 
as the most important aspect of religion. In this it is supported 
by the Barelvi ulama in Pakistan (of which the Jamaat-i Ulama-i 
Islam (JUD is the primary political agency in Pakistan), but is 
opposed by the orthodox Deobandi ulama characterised by Jamaat-I 
Islaml. The latter believes that Islam and the state cannot be 
separated, and that the strictures of the Sbaz-iat must be the basis 
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for political organisation and social life. In Suf1sm, however, 
spiritual leadership is considered to be in a different sphere from 
political authority, with the latter being responsible for the 
organisation of the state (Ewing, 1990, p. 168). In this sense, 
Islam is seen as being situated more in the realm of the social 
than the political, (which allows essentially "secular" ideological 
leaders such as Benazir Bhutto to be reverred in Sindh). 
Suf1sm is seen by many as central to Sindhi identity, but 
opinions on its precise legacy vary widely. Some see suf1sm as a 
potentially modernising force, through which Sindhis can respond 
and adapt to modern societal and political processes while still 
retaining allegiance to their basic Sindhi and Islamic culture 
(interview with Dawn Journalist Haider Rizvi, 10 March 1991, 
Karachi). Others see the suf1stic factor as being to the detriment 
of the Sindhis, in that its tolerant and flexible aspects have 
allowed Sindhis to be exploited by more determined outsiders 
(inter-view with Siraj-ul Haq, 13 February 1991, Karachi). 
Sindhi society and "feudalise 
Muhammad Iqbal, the great poet-philosopher of the Persian 
and Urdu languages, was influenced culturally by aspects of suflsm, 
but attacked the system of Pir's and shrines it spawned as "Persian 
mysticism" (Ewing, 1990, pp. 175-6). Indeed, Sindhi society (and 
Punjabi society for that matter; Ahmed, 1989, p. 288) still contains 
-154- 
extremely influential Pirs [ancestors of sufl saints] and Sajjada- 
nishins [hereditary keepers of sufi shrines], each with specific 
geographical territories of Jurisdiction. In some cases, certain 
tribes such as the Hurs of Sindh are headed spiritually and 
politically by a certain Pir by birth-right. The Pir of Pagaro, to 
whom the Hurs are linked, represents an important political force, 
directing his subjects to vote for candidates he endorses in a 
manner that "The Herald" (Election Special Issue, Nov/Dec. 1990, 
p. 48) describes as "Sindh's feudal politics". 
The other major element in this "feudal" society are the 
owners of the large estates, the wader-as, on whose land poor 
labourers (harls) work. Gankovsky estimates that at the turn of the 
twentieth century, almost 80% of agricultural land in Sindh was 
cultivated by such tenants (Gankovsky, 1981, p. 180). By 1980 this 
figure had fallen to 44.7%, but at this time the land in 
neighbouring Punjab cultivated by tenants was only 36% of the total 
(Nabi et al., 1986, p. 36). In 1960, farms of between 20 and 60 
hectares in size (the dominant quintile: Federal Bureau of 
Statistics, Government of Pakistan, 1990, p. 128) accounted for 
52.9% of all farm land in Sindh, while farms of three hectares and 
less in size (the bottom quintile) accounted for just 4.3% of the 
agricultural land area in Sindh (I. Husain, 1981, p. 210). 
The size of many of the wader-a estates is considerable. The 
Jatoi estate is believed to be the largest in Sindh, with estimates 
of its size varying from 25,000 acres (inter-view with economic 
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adviser_ to the Prime Minister, 21 February 1991, Islamabad) to a 
less believable 50,000 acres plus (inter-view with Mbbajir writer 
G. M. Mehkri, 12 February 1991, Karachi). Figure 4.1 shows one of 
the various Jatoi properties in the wealthy Defence district of 
Karachi. Like many of Sindh's Pirs, the waderas occupy a 
politically important position not only by moulding the voting 
patterns of sections of the rural population, but also by acting as 
political figures themselves. In 1986, the National People's Party 
under Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi broke from the Pakistan People's Party 
of Benazir Bhutto, and headed the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) 
alliance against the PPP in 1989. Following the dismissal of 
Bhutto's government in 1990, Jatoi was appointed the interim Prime 
Minister until the elections three months later. In 1992, when the 
Chief Minister of Sindh, Jam Sadiq Ali died, Ghulam Mustaphals son 
Ghulam Nurtaza Jatoi was presented as a candidate for his 
replacement (Anwer Iqbal, BBC World Service archive, 6 March 1992). 
This continued the family tradition of being at the centre of 
politics in the Province, and in the country in general. 
Other najor landowning families include the Khuhros, who 
have provided a Chief Minister of Sindh and the head of a Sindhi 
nationalist group, and the Bhuttos, supplying two Prime Ministers 
to date. Like the Pirs, such families often associate with whole 
tribes. The names of villager. often portray the dynastic link; for 
example Mirpur Bhutto and Garhi Khuda Bakhsh Bhutto in northern 
Sindh. Benazir herself attests to the size of the family estate: 
-156- 
"Our lands, like those of other landowners in Sindh 
were measured in square miles, not acres. As children 
we loved to hear the story of the amazement of 
Charles Napier, the British conquerer of Sindh 
in 1843. 'Whose lands are these? ' he repeatedly 
asked his driver as he toured the province. 'Bhutto's 
lands' came the inevitable response. 'Wake me up 
when we are off Bhutto's lands' he ordered. " 
(B. Bhutto, 1988, p. 29) 
The paternalistic attitude of waderas towards their workers 
is described by Bukhari: 
"The landlord shelters the tenant from the unsympathetic 
and little understood world outside his village. He 
writes letters of reco ndation on behalf of his tenants 
to the official world.... It is doubtful if the tenants 
could manage without his help. " 
(Bukhari, 1981, p. 197): 
Others write in more critical terms of this "feudal" system 
of political and economic control. One Mobajir respondent described 
the historical situation in the following terms: 
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"When the Hindus left, some Sindhis decided to 
appropriate their lands and exploit the Har-is, 
keep them suppressed, to keep the status quo. These 
Haris - they were just like slaves! " 
(discussion with grandmother of Nobajir family, 16 January 1991, 
Karachi). 
Similarly, the Karachi academic Karrar Husain claims that 
the waderas have organised against the MQX, through a fear of the 
modern education and political awareness that the Movement could 
bring to their poor tenants. In this sense, Sindhi nationalism is 
seen by some as a resource to divert Sindhis along an "emotional" 
avenue, thus maintaining the status quo (interview, 13 January 
1991, Karachi). A senior economic adviser to Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif offered the same account of Sindhi nationalism being used as 
a diversion, noting that many Sindhi nationalist leaders are large 
landowners themselves, such as Dr. Hamida Khuhro (Jiye Sindh Front) 
and Mumtaz Bhutto (Sindh National Front; interview, 21 February 
1991, Islamabad). 
Economic conditions 
There seems no doubt that inequalities in land ownership in 
rural Sindh produce socio-economic conditions among the rural 
population that compare poorly with conditions in the urban centres 
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of the Province. Table 4.3 presents some provincial statistics that 
illustrate the urban-rural divide in Sindh. 
Rates of literacy vary particularly sharply between rural 
and urban areas. In 1981, the literacy rate in Pakistan was 
estimated to be 26.17%. The average in rural areas across Pakistan 
was 17.33% (Male 26.24%, Female 7.33%); slightly above the level in 
Sindh. In Karachi meanwhile, 51.18% of the population was literate 
in 1981- in striking contrast to rural areas (Bureau of Statistics, 
Government of Sindh, 1990, p. 24). Indeed in 1984-85, Karachi 
accounted for 59.8% of all high schools in Sindh (81.5% of girls' 
schools; figures supplied by Directorate of School Education, 
Hyderabad/Karachi, April 1991), when it officially represented Just 
27.4% of the Province's population in 1981 (Government of Pakistan, 
1990a, pp. 16,50). 
The figures show not only a striking differentiation between 
education facilities and attainment levels in urban and rural 
Sindh, but also a male-female divide, whereby educational 
facilities in rural areas are more biased towards males than is the 
case in urban areas. Such a division is common throughout Pakistan, 
and indeed South Asia. 
It seems clear from official figures on language- 
distribution that the majority of Sindhi-speakers in Sindh inhabit 
villages or small towns as opposed to cities. However, there is 
some dispute on population figures and ratios, and on the accuracy 
of some of the sources of this data. One notable Sindhi doctor and 
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Literacy (1981) 15.56 50.77 
Households with drinking water source, 
inside (1980) 27.00 54.00 
Households with stream/river as sole drinking 
water source (1980) 31.00 2.00 
Households with electric lighting (1980) 11.00 68.00 
Death rate*: (1982-3, all Pakistan) 0.18 0.14 
Source: Bureau of Statistics, Government of SIndb, 1990, except; 
Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, 1990; 
(note: deatb rate per birtb). 
social worker claimed that there are "30 lakhs" (3 million) Sindhis 
in Karachi (inter-view, 5 March 1991, Karachi), while Dr Hamida 
Khuhro declares that the city of Karachi as a whole is "no larger 
than 60 lakhs" (interview, 14 February 1991, Karachi). The 1961 
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census claimed that 8.55% of Karachi district's population spoke 
Sindhi (Government of Pakistan, West Pakistan, 1961, Population 
Vol. 3, iv, pp. 42-3). With an estimated 1991 urban population of ten 
million, this would make no more than 855,000 Sindhi-speaking 
people in Karachi. It is impossible to be confident about such 
figures, especially in the light of the controversy in Sindh over 
the Census in 1991/92. (By 1993, Sindh's contribution to the 
national Census had deliberately not been completed, to avoid 
accusations of the distortion of ethnic proportions among the 
Province's population from all sides). It is interesting to note, 
however, that in 1989 there were 30 Sindhi-language newspapers and 
periodicals in circulation in Pakistan (all in the province of 
Sindh; Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, 1990a, 
pp. 370-1), while in 1991, only two of these were available in the 
city of Karachi (and one of which had only begun in January of that 
year Unterviewwith editor of "Jaagd', 4 March 1991, Karachi)). 
External views of Sindhi identity 
As already mentioned, views on Sindhi identity from outside 
the community are often negative, interpreting sufistic rural 
traits as evidence of indolence or a general failing in character. 
This highlights the degree of inter-ethnic rivalry in the Province, 
whereby Mbbajirs and others will paint derogatory pictures of the 
Sindhis and their culture, and vice versa. Many observers suggest 
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that Sindhis "choose" to concentrate in rural areas. This factor is 
particularly important in the light of the quota debate in urban 
Sindh, with XdhajIr-s suggesting that places of higher education are 
reserved for rural Sindhi candidates, thus denying a fair share to 
educationally superior Xobajir students. This sentiment was 
expressed by a Xc7bajlr approaching the end of her degree course at 
Karachi University in the following terms: 
"These people have reserved places in classes. But 
we get angry when it turns out that they have hardly 
any education, when we had to slave at the exams and 
score over 70% to get a place. When they are in class 
they do nothing, or just mess around. But most of the 
time they are away in their villages. All they care 
about is their village. " 
(interview with Karachi University student, 15 March 1991, 
Karachi). 
This statement indicates both a general resentment towards 
educational quotas (which, as will be demonstrated, is vitally 
important to the Nobajir movement), and a perception of a "village 
mentality" among the Sindhis. Similarly, a XbhajIr writer not 
unsympathetic to the Sindhi cause claimed that "the Sindhis call 
the boundaries of their village pax-adesh [foreign country]" 
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(interview with P. M. Mehkri, 12 February 1991, Karachi). The 
suggestion is that while rural conditions are poor and offer fewer 
opportunities than urban areas, many Sindhis will choose to remain 
in such a society if they can since their culture is village- 
oriented. The student's statement also suggests that even when 
Sindhis are assisted in gaining access to urban opportunities 
through quota arrangements, many of them will reject that 
assistance (a sentiment also conveyed by Dr. Saleem Haider, leader 
of the Nobajir Ittebad Tebrik, in far less uncertain terms when he 
described the Sindhi people as "Eudban " [donkeys]; Inter-view, 11 
February 1991, Karachi). 
The "discrimination thesie 
It js important to observe that Sindhi respondents disagree 
with the theory that they spurn urban opportunities, arguing that 
Mobaji. rs deny urban opportunities to Sindhis and attempt to "drive 
them away" from the cities. Mdbaj1z-s are said to drive the Sindhis 
away both directly, through intimidation in the spheres of 
employment and education, and indirectly through their control of 
civic amenity and utility boards under which decent facilities are 
withheld from Sindhi districts (discussion with various Sindhi 
residents of Old Golimar, Karachi, 21 January 1992). This also 
demonstrates the physical and psychological divide between 
connunities in Sindh. 
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Indeed, the "discrimination thesis" is often identified by 
Sindhis as the reason that socio-economic indicators are poor among 
their community. This parallels a more general claim made by Weiner in 
the context of India, that host societies receiving economically powerful 
migrant communities will often stress "exploitation" factors in their 
politics (Weiner, 1965). The negotiator for the PPP at the time of the 
accord signed with the MQM in December 1988, declared quite simply that 
"Sindhis are the most aggrieved people of Pakistan" (inter-view with P. K. 
Shahani, 12 April 1991, Karachi). Among many Sindhis, the feeling seems 
to be that opportunities, and particularly those in urban areas, have 
been denied to them. 
The Sindhis as a community identity 
In the "traditional" terms that G. M. Syed declares are needed to 
qualify for a subnationality (interview, 13 March 1991, Karachi), -the 
Sindhis represent one of the more read i ly-described community identities 
in Pakistan. The Sindhi language has a strong heritage distinct from 
other Pakistani languages, and is associated with a specific culture of 
songs and literature. This, in turn, is related to suf1stic Islamic 
factors that are revered and enjoyed by Sindhis from the bari following 
his oxen in the field, to the wade-ra and intellectual, as the nineteenth- 
century British traveller Richard Burton once observed (Schimmel, 1981, 
p. 245). 
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Other cultural factors, such as codes of dress, are less easy to 
identify as sound diacritical community features. The personal assistant 
to Altaf Hussain, Nadeem Nusrat, identified the sbalwar kameez [a loose 
pyjama suit], brightly-coloured flat cap, and ajr-ak [a colcured shawl 
worn over the shoulder, or wound into a small turban by men], as Sindhi 
items of dress that distinguish the community from Xobajirs in 
particular (interview, 13 March 1991, Karachi). The ajrak is perhaps the 
most symbolic item of dress, sustaining a demand in Sindhi villages 
because of its particular ethnic connotation (Cousin, 1981, p. 236). An 
example of an ajr-ak is shown in Figure 4.3, ironically around the 
shoulders of MQM leader Altaf Hussain (the significance of this is 
explained in the following -chapter). The wearing of the ajrak is used by 
Altaf Hussain in this example as a method of identifying with Sindhis; a 
testimony to the symbolic implications of the garment. 
However, as Gellner (1983, p. 7) and Seton-Watson (1977, p. 5) 
have observed, the becoming of a "nation" depends to great extent on the 
consensus of the community on the question of "being" a nation. Most 
Sindhis have rejected JIye Sindh's nationalism at the ballot box and 
have generally voted instead for the Pakistan People's Party, an anti- 
provincialist "Pakistani" party. As Sindhi nationalist candidates, G. M. 
Syed and his colleagues have the dubious honour of never winning a seat 
in any election to date. This presents a dilemma for G. M Syed, in that 
the Sindhi electorate appears to reject his vision of the rights of the 
Sindhi "nation" that he wants to be independent of Pakistan. The 
electorate accepts both Sindhi and Pakistani components of identity, but 
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believes the latter to be the more imperative when chosing the form of 
State under which it should live and work. 
4.4 PUIFJABIS, PA S AID OTHER ]EDEXTITIES 
Aside from Sindhis and MobaJIrs, the province of Sindh is 
populated by other communities of varying sizes. The most significant of 
these are probably the Punjabis, Pakhtuns and Baluchis, although there 
are numerous other distinct groups such as Hindus, Christians, Cutchis, 
Gujeratis, Seraikis and many more. 
At times, certain political parties have tried to blur the 
boundaries between such groups and amalgamate several identities into 
one. As will be described later on, this has been undertaken by the MQM 
with regard to Mobajir, identity, with the motive of increasing the 
apparent size of the community and achieving a degree of unitary support 
across space. Meanwhile Baluchis have occasionally been equated with 
Sindhis (when residing in Sindh), and Punjabis and Pakhtuns in the 
province tried to forge a Joint political front under the Punjabi-Pakhtun 
Ittehad (PPI) after 1986. The attempt failed within twelve months when 
the party split along ethnic lines. 
Section Three will describe how the development of a Xobajir- 
identity in the city of Karachi has been closely related to one of the 
largest communities in the metropolis after the MobaJIrs, the Pakhtuns. 
These migrants from the north-west of Pakistan have occupied specific 
niches in the urban labour market in Sindh, which generally are not 
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those for which the Xohajlrs also compete. However, conflicts have 
occurred over space in certain districts of the city, and over questions 
of "urban ownership" which are central to XQX lore (as I will later 
show). 
Baluchis 
Baluchis, like Sindhis, are often equated with their eponymous 
Province, particularly by subnationalists who wish to carve an 
autonomous or sovereign Baluchistan. Ahmed, however, differentiates 
Baluchi society from that of the Sindhis and simultaneously equates it 
with Pakhtun society by claiming that the Baluchis follow a more 
egalitarian tribal system than the prevailing SufilFir society in Sindh 
(A. S. Ahmed, 1989b, p. 288). In some respects this is true, as regards the 
Jir-gab [assembly of tribal elders] familiar to Pakhtuns and Baluchis. 
Pastner states that while egalitarianism is important to Baluchi 
rhetoric, however, the wade-ra is very much in a position of authority, as 
in Sindhi society (Pastner, 1990, p. 279). S. S Harrison, furthermore, 
claims that Baluchi society does in fact have a very inegalitarian basis 
in the form of the sardars [tribal chiefs] that Pakhtun society does not 
possess (S. S. Harrison, 1986, p. 286). 
For centuries, certain communities of Baluchis have been living 
in Sindh, and some have adopted aspects of Sindhi society such as 
language or dress. In some cases, they have even been involved with 
Sindhi nationalist politics, and there have been occasional suggestions 
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of a separatist alliance between Sindhi and Baluchi nationalists (S. S 
Harrison, 1981, p. 179>. When Sir Charles Napier arrived in Sindh in 1843, 
he found the Ta1pur Xir-s, a Baluchi tribal dynasty, to be the rulers 
there (the Ta1purs are still active in Sindh's politics). Today, the 
Khuhros are of Baluchi heritage, and Dr. Hamida Khuhro counts Baluchis 
resident in Sindh as Sindhis when giving estimates of the size of the 
Sindhi community (interview with Tanvir Tahir of All Pakistan Newspaper 
Society, 16 March 1991, Karachi). Many Baluchis live in Karachi, where 
they formed an important component of the industrial labour force 
before Partition (Baluchi and Brohui-speakers were just under 8% of the 
city's population in 1941, and were then the third largest linguistic 
group behind Sindhi and Gujerati- speakers; Census of India 1941, Vol. 
XII, pp. 76-7). Now, certain districts of the city house communities of 
Baluchis, notably the central low-income housing district of Lyari, where 
the Baluchi nationalist Baloch Students' Organisation (BSO) is active and 
very evident. S. S Harrison estimates that in the late 1970s there were 
also around 3000 members of the separatist Baluchi People's Liberation 
Front (BPLF) dispersed throughout Sindh, including Karachi (S. S. 
Harrison, 1981, p. 75). Other Baluchi community groups, such as Zikri 
fishermen, have settled in Karachi and its environs over the years, in 
this case to avoid intimidation at the hands of the Sunni Muslim 
majority in Baluchistan and rural Sindh (Pastner, 1990, p. 278). 
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Pakhtuns 
Karachi has also been a magnet for a burgeoning number of 
Pakhtun migrants. The Pakhtun community in the city comprises two 
distinct groups. The first is the community of migrants from NWFP in 
Pakistan, while the second is the flood of Afghan Pakhtuns who have 
headed for Sindh and Karachi at an accelerated rate since 1979. Hart 
claims that by the mid-1980s, 2.5 million Afghan refugees had entered 
Pakistan (Hart, 1990, p. D. Hyman, Ghayur and Kaushik (Hyman et al., 
1988, p. 75) meanwhile quote a Minister of Frontier Regions source, which 
claims that by the end of March 1988 3.48 million Afghan refugees were 
in Pakistan, 76,700 of whom had settled in Karachi (of these, only 26% 
were registered refugees; ibid). The flow of Afghans contributes to a 
steady flow of migrants into the city. Frits Selier estimated that in 
the mid-1980s, 150,000 new migrants joined Karachi every year. From 
various district surveys it was estimated that between 80% and 94% of 
these came from the northern provinces of Punjab and NWFP (Selier, 1991, 
p. 5). 
The official estimate of the number of Pashto-speakers in 
Karachi is around 9% (Herald, Election Special, October 1990, p. 120), 
although some, such as Benazir Bhutto, claim this understates the true 
proportion of Pakhtuns in Karachi, "the biggest Pakhtun city in the 
world" (interview, 22 January 1992, Karachi). The basis for this 
statement is that low-income housing areas are likely to be the least 
accurately enumerated in the city and it is in these districts that the 
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Pakhtun migrants concentrate. As regards Sindh as a whole, 1981 Census 
data suggested that with just over 3% of the population of the province 
speaking Pashto (Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, 
1989, p. 85), the great majority of the Province's Pakhtuns reside in the 
city of Karachi. 
Within Karachi, the Pakhtuns dominate specific occupational 
niches, most notably - transport, labouring and construction. The 
community is also evident in small businesses such as tea shops, ice 
cream houses and shoe-makers and repairers. A long discussion with a 
group of Pakhtun students in Karachi revealed their frustration over 
limited opportunities, and a suspicion that things were made worse by 
discrimination against the Pakhtun community (discussion, 25 March 1991, 
Karachi). One student mentioned a sports club of which he was a member, 
where most of the other boys were Bohras (a community of Sbia traders 
who mostly migrated from the Gujerat coast north of Bombay, and who are 
consequently often counted as Xdhajir-s). The Pakhtun complained that he 
had always been regarded with some contempt by the boys and the 
masters, simply because he was not a Bobra (ibid). 
The XdbajIz-s that I interviewed expressed various views on the 
Pakhtuns. Some were complimentary, claiming that the community is hard 
working (particularly compared to Sindhis) and helped to build Karachi 
with their labaur. National Democratic Party (NDP) chief Sirdar Mazari 
claimed simply that "Karachi was built by the Pakhtuns" Untarview, 13 
February 1991, Karachi). Still others, however, equated the community 
with the drugs, arms and land businesses that have grown in the city 
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since the end of the 1970s. Some even suggest that the Pakhtuns are 
uneducated, and that their language and culture are primitive. A film 
review in a Karachi monthly magazine (Herald, March 1991, Karachi, 
p. 148) described the Pakhtun film industry as "Peshawar's smut 
factories". Meanwhile, in a discussion with a group of Xdbajir traders in 
Karachi, one respondent likened the Pashto language to the sound of 
pebbles rattling in a tin can (discussion, 23 April 1991, Karachi). 
Xr. Shafi Khan, a prominent economist at the National Bank in 
Karachi (interview, 15 January 1991, Karachi) suggested that Pakhtuns 
have formed the major source of non-skilled labour in the city, often 
working on a seasonal basis with trips made and packages of money sent 
back to families in the north. This is similar to the patterns of 
seasonal labour migration made by Punjabis and Pakhtuns to areas of the 
Middle East, notably Dubai. This process echoes Selier's description of 
11circular migration" (or "repetitive mobility"), to be distinguished from 
upermanent" or "temporary" migration (Selier, 1991, p. 1; permanent in 
this case implies a complete move of address to the city, while 
temporary migration refers to one or two isolated visits, perhaps for a 
single temporary work contract). 
Similarly, architect and writer Arif Hasan (interview, 11 
February 1991, Karachi) identifies the way in which the Pakhtuns built- 
up and dominate private-sector transportation in Karachi (in a manner 
similar to their dominance of this sector in Baluchistan province). In 
an earlier observation, however, a less salubrious aspect of Karachi's 
economy was described: after the escalation of the war in neighbouring 
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Afghanistan in 1979, an increasing f load of guns and heroin (grown from 
poppies on the mountainsides of the Frontier) found its way into 
Karachi, where the informal sector began operating, based in the semi- 
regulated slum areas of Orangi in north-west Karachi and Sohrab Goth in 
the north. The money from such enterprises also financed the businesses 
of illegal ly- apportioned plots of land for sale or rent and the growing 
semi-regulated private transport sector (Arif Hasan, Herald, December 
1986, pp. 9-11). 
The expansion of these businesses and the pressures and 
violence they have entailed are interpreted by many non-Pakhtuns as 
being solely due to a flood of immigration from NWFP and Afghanistan. 
In this manner a stereotype is portrayed of the Pakhtun being a rough, 
uneducated person to whom drugs and guns are a way of life. Similarly, 
urban problems can be "explained" as resulting from unchecked Pakhtun 
migration. In the mid 1980s, both XQM and the Sindhi nationalists were 
active in propagating this opinion. For example, in December 1986, J1ye 
Sindb reacted to riots in Karachi by stating that all "outsiders" in 
Sindh should be repatriated, since the rioting was a direct result of an 
"immigration conspiracy" (Dawn, 20 December 1986, Karachi). This 
statement certainly referred to Pakhtuns and Afghans (ibid). 
At this time the newly-emergent XQM was close to G. M. Syed and 
the JIye Sindb. At the f irst major rally of the XdbaJIr- Movement in 
Karachi, on 8 August 1986, Altaf Hussain declared that all non-NdbaJirs 
and non-Sindhis should be denied residency rights in Sindh province. 
During the meeting, an Awami National Party (AMP)6 f lag was lowered and 
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replaced by the red, green and white MQM f lag (Dawn, 9 August 1986, 
Karachi). This was a pointed snub to the Pakhtun community of Karachi 
whose support is the major component of the ANP's following in Sindh. 
In January 1987 Altaf Hussain presented a long list of 
"demands", one of which was the "early repatriation of Afghans" (Dawn, 
21 January 1987, Karachi). At this time the MQM leader was in Jail with 
other subnationalist leaders, following serious ethnic rioting in Karachi 
and Hyderabad. As will be described in Chapter 7, the latest episode of 
rioting had begun in December 1986, when the north Karachi slum area of 
Sohrab Goth was bulldozed in line with the government's policies to 
tackle the illegal trade in guns and drugs. The operation prompted 
retaliatory violence across the city led by Pakhtuns and Afghans, who 
had constituted the major ethnic groups in Sohrab Goth. This episode of 
unrest followed a large riot in April 1985, when a Nobajix- schoolgirl 
Bushra Zaidi, had been run-down and killed by a speeding bus. 
Reaction to the "Bushra Zaidi incident" indicated that many 
observers in Karachi were equating the city's ills, such as heavy and 
unregulated traffic, with the existence of a particular community of 
Pakhtuns in the city, who supply the majority of bus, rickshaw and taxi 
operations. This negative stereotyping of transport- operaters permeates 
all levels of Karachi society. A statement in a pro-MobaJIr- Karachi 
evening paper reveals this, attributing the April 1985 riots to "Bushra 
Zaidi's cold-blooded murder under the wheels of a minibus trying to 
overtake another, to make its trip quicker ... and more money- 
yielding. " (Daily News, 6 November 1986, Karachi). 
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The implicit stereotyping of minibus-drivers as greedy and 
reckless is apparent in this statement, and it is a short step to 
equating those drivers with a particular ethnic group. In the mid-to- 
late 1980s, Altaf Hussain and the MQM clearly capitalised on these 
sentiments, by suggesting the "repatriation of Afghans" as a panacea for 
the city's problems. Later in the decade these official statements 
changed, as the repeated ethnic riots in Karachi began to lose their 
anti-Pakhtun identification. A Sindh government report on the rioting in 
June 1990 claimed that the last major disturbance involving large groups 
of Pakhtuns in the Province was in December 1988 (information supplied 
by Government of Sindh Information Department, Karachi, April 1991). At 
this time the MQM was becoming estranged from Sindhi agencies such as 
the nationalists and the PPP. 
On the ground in Karachi, however, my interview survey suggests 
that concerns over high immigration to the city and problems of 
transport, drugs and guns are still prevalent. Migration to the city was 
one of the main civic problems identified by the director of the Karachi 
Development Agency (KDA; Interview, 12 April 1991, Karachi). 
Interestingly the mayor of the city, Dr. Farooq Sattar (interview, 26 
February 1991, Karachi), who is also one of the key members of the XQM 
leadership, did not identify such factors as important. (This was in line 
with the direction of MQM policy at the time. I will return to this 
matter in the following chapter). 
One of the reasons that the rioting of the mid-1980s became 
embroiled in ethnic rhetoric, is related to Pakhtun community 
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organisation and leadership. In Karachi, as in the Frontier region, 
biraderi [tribe/clan] relationships are paramount among Pakhtuns. While 
trade unionist Karamat Ali (General Secretary of Pakistan Institute of 
Labour Education and Research; Interview, 2 February 1991, Karachi) 
clains that union development has worsened markedly since the emergence 
of such "ethnic" groups as the XQM after 1984 (a criticism levelled 
specifically at the MQM by many respondents), a Xobajlr- writer 
(interview, 10 February 1991, Karachi) observed that trade unions have 
never worked effectively in Pakistan precisely due to such vertical 
divisions in society as birader-I groups. Indeed, those working in 
informal housing areas (katcbI abadis) have observed that housing 
associations often fail to cross ethnic lines in mixed areas; an 
observation made by Jan Van der Linden (discussion, 29 January 1992, 
Karachi) with respect to Ghousia Colony in Karachi. There is evidence 
that Pakhtuns, in particular, distance themselves from such 
organisations, and from official agencies in general, including banks 
(which has made their homes vulnerable to looting in times of rioting - 
Dawn, 13 January 1987, Karachi). This, as Edwards writes, is related to 
the tribal code of gbeyrat 1honour, bravery] in which Pakhtuns guard 
against the homogenising processes of modern society (in socio-cultural 
terms) and sbabr- (the city) (Edwards, 1990, pp. 81-2). 
The tribal code of undertaking retribution for perceived wrongs, 
furthermore, may translate into a process of repeated rioting following 
a particular incident. A code of revenge can also lead to viewing a 
wbole community as "an other", from any member of which retribution can 
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be legitimately sought. This was evident, perhaps, in an incident which 
occurred in October/November 1986, when a clash on the Super Highway in 
Sohrab Goth was followed by organised Pakhtun attacks on Bibaz-1 
localities several miles away in Orangi. (I examine this incident in 
more detail in Chapter 7). The basis for such attacks was believed to be 
revenge for an episode in the party-less elections of 1985, when. a 
Pakhtun candidate battled unsuccessfully with a Bibarl in an Orangi 
constituency, in conditions of considerable inter-ethnic acrimony 
(Herald, December 1986, Karachi, p. 5). 
However, there is some controversy as to whether biz-aderi 
organisation or codes such as that of retribution and revenge are really 
to "blame" for political or developmental problems such as weak trade 
unions, or the poor spatial spread of development projects. In a study of 
a women's project in the large katcbi abadl of Orangi, Karachi, Verheijen 
noted that while there were many more NobaJir local organisers, termed 
"lane activists" (at 69% of the total in the project) than Pakhtuns, 
Sindhis or Baluchis (only 11% of the total activists were Pakhtuns, and 
just 3% were Baluchis or Sindhis), it is not at all clear why this 
pattern should be so (Verheijen, 1989, p. 24). One assessment would be 
that Mobajlr-s are more receptive to grassroots development projects, but 
there could also be cultural elements at work. Pakhtun, Baluchi or Sindhi 
attitudes to women working in such projects, for example, are generally 
more "austere" than those of the highly urbanised Ndbajlrýs. It is 
significant, furthermore, that the project's literature and administration 
is all in Urdu. Many of the non-XdbaJ1. r women claimed that this was a 
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specific deterrent to their involvement in the OPP (Verheijen, ibid). I 
will return to the OPP's relationship to the Nobajir- community and to 
the MQM in Karachi in Chapter 6. 
Punjabis 
Punjabis were well represented in the Orangi women's project 
(ibid), which reflects the usually strong position that this community 
holds in Pakistan in relation to such groups as the Sindhis, Baluchis, 
and to a lesser extent the Pakhtuns. 
Punjabis in Sindh are often regarded by Sindhi nationalists as 
agents of the repressive federal centre, by virtue of the federal capital 
and the military regime being based firmly in the Province of Punjab. 
As the largest "nationality" in Pakistan, Punjabis not surprisingly 
constitute an important community in Sindh. The Census of 1981 (the last 
full Census published by 1993) claimed that 7.69% of households in Sindh 
were Punjabi- speaking (Government of Pakistan, Federal Bureau of 
Statistics, 1990a, p. 66). Thus, by using language as a loose indication 
of identity, we can say that Punjabis are the third largest community 
group in Sindh behind Sindhis and MobaJIrs. Indeed, there is a movement 
of Punjabi nationalism that holds language to be very important. Ahmad 
Bashir (Star, 25 April 1985, Karachi) writes that Punjabi "is the 
Punjab's cultural signature ... Without it the Punjabis are rootless. " 
By using this same parameter of language, it can be suggested 
that Punjabis are the second largest ethnic group in Karachi with 14% of 
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the city's population (Herald, Election Special, October 1990, Karachi, 
p. 120). These figures suggest that, like the Pakhtuns, most Punjabis in 
Sindh mainly inhabit the city of Karachi. However, an important group 
has also settled in certain rural areas to undertake farming. Mahmud 
Mirza (in Dawn, 16 October 1986, Karachi Uafri archivel) writes that the 
Hindu-dominated zamindar- class of landlords and money-lenders came to 
control 60% of Sindh's agricultural land shortly before Independence. 
Following Partition and the exodus of many Hindus, a large proportion of 
such holdings transferred to migrant and Punjabi hands, aided by 
official regulations and statutes. 
More recently, the irrigation of large areas of Sindh following 
the construction of Indus River barrages, has seen newly-available land 
pass into the hands of large Punjabi farming concerns (Dawn, ibid). The 
reason for such a process is that much of the land has been "awarded" 
to retiring or high-achieving members ot the bureaucracy and army, most 
of whom were Punjabis, particularly in the Ayub Khan and Zia years ol: 
military dictatorship. To make matters worse, it is widely perceived 
that Punjabi landowners (and industrialists) in Sindh often import 
Punjabi labourers to work their land rather than employ Sindhi locals 
(interview with Jam Saqi, leader of the Sindh Hari Committee; Star, 8 
January 1987, Karachi (Jafri archivel). 
The problem is that the Sindhi nationalists' vitriolic attacks 
against Punjab as the seat of federal government can become a form of 
ethnic chauvinism directed at Punjabis in general. G. K. Syed has again 
raised the question of repatriation (interview, 13 March 1991, Karachi), 
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declaring that all those Joining the Province after 1954 and not forging 
wroots" (specified as becoming Sindhi and calling oneself "Sindhi"; ibid) 
must either "merge" with the Sindhi identity or leave the Province. The 
1954 cut-off date, in addition to the demand for an amalgamation with 
Sindhi culture, is certainly aimed at Punjabi industrialists, and Punjabi 
farmers on irrigated barrage lands (the demand also refers implicitly to 
"economic migrants" arriving in Sindh from India through the second half 
of the 1950s). As Ahmad Bashir wrote on the aftermath of the formation 
of the Sindh-Baluchistan-Pakhtun Front (SBPF) in 1985 (Star, 16 May 
1985, Karachi [Jafri archivel), Sindhi and other subnationalist rhetoric 
often attacks the Punjab as a "cultural and political unit". This 
detracts from the fact that many ordinary Punjabis -suffer the same 
problems as other Pakistanis (ibid). 
In urban Sindh, Punjabi immigration appeared to accelerate in 
the 1980s under General Zia, when Punjabi penetration of the bureaucracy 
and large national business was made easier (Alavi, 1990, p. 29). The rise 
of the Punjabis and others was principally at the expense of the 
Mobajlrs (concentrated in the urban Sindh quota). Furthermore, the scale 
of the rise was more than percentages might suggest, since the 
bureaucracy greatly increased in over-all size between 1973 and 1983. 
Thus, the Punjab/ Islamabad component in recruitment actually saw an 
increase of just under 77% over the ten years, to 73,736 officers 
(Government of Pakistan, 1976/1984). 
The role of Punjabis in the expanding bureaucracy and in 
Karachi's growth (and in relation to the MQM's initial relationship with 
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Jiye Sindh), led the community to be equated with Pakhtuns in MQM 
rhetoric concerning usurpers of urban opportunities in Sindh. In an 
interview with the "Indian Expatriate" newspaper in late 1988, Altaf 
Hussain claimed that the penetration of Punjabi and Pakhtun business 
ventures into the Sindh economy "undermines the country's integrity and 
solidarity" (12 March 1988 [Dawn archive, Karachi]). He further suggested 
that such businesses should leave Sindh and invest in their own 
Provinces to discourage migration to Sindh (ibid). This is an argument, 
not without some economic logic, that is expressed also by Sindhi Hari 
[rural peasant] leader Jam Saqi (Star interview, 8 January 1987, Karachi 
[Jafri archivel). 
Punjabis compete more directly with XdbaJ1z-s in urban Sindh 
than do the Pakhtuns or other groups, since they occupy all economic 
niches in the cities from katcbi-abadi dwellers to top executives. Above 
all, Punjabis dominate the artisan class in Karachi; the tailors, 
carpenters, blacksmiths, and other positions such as restaurant and 
hotel owners (interview with NDP chief Sirdar Mazari, 13 February 1991, 
Karachi). I will show that all these occupation categories are ones for 
which NobaJirs also compete in the cities of Sindh. Some of the Punjabi 
labour is based on circular migration (like much Pakhtun labour in 
Karachi), as I discovered in discussion with a small group of Punjabi 
printing workers in 1991, who make quarterly trips with their earnings 
to their families in Rawalpindi. 
A more immediate worry in Karachi, however, has concerned 
possible large-scale "capital flight" from Karachi to Punjab (inter-view, 
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12 April 1991, Karachi). The northward flight of capital is evidenced by 
rising commercial property values in Punjabi cities against a stagnant 
market in Karachi. The matter is one of great controversy (with the 
Nawaz Sharif government in the 1991/92 period denying that there was 
any "capital flight" from Sindh; see Jam Sadiq Ali's statement in Dawn, 
18 January 1992, Karachi), and its effect an Punjabi migration to Sindh 
is not clear. One Punjabi computer salesman in Karachi told me that 
whatever the ethnic troubles or economic recession in Karachi, there 
could never be any more attractive opportunities for work in Punjab 
(interview, 5 February 1992, Karachi). He claimed that this was a 
sentiment shared by most of his Punjabi colleagues working in the city 
(ibid). 
In Narch 1987, political leaders of Sindh's Punjabis and 
Pakhtuns formed the Punjabi-Pakhtun Ittehad (PPI; Punjabi-Pakhtun 
Union), which* set out its stall straight away as opposing Afghans and 
Xbbaiir-s in Sindh. The Pakhtun secretary-general Hakik Khan Swabi 
declared: "Xdhajirs whether from India or Afghanistan should be sent 
back to their native places" (Muslim, 10 March 1987, Karachi). The party 
addresses an estimated constituency of around two million Punjabis and 
Pakhtuns living in Karachi (Muslim, ibid), and secured 11% of the vote 
in the city in the October 1988 elections (Election Commission of 
Pakistan, Islamabad), winning one Provincial Assembly seat. In general, 
however, Islamic parties and the IJI achieved better results in Punjabi 
and Pakhtun districts of the city, and the PPI (whose Punjabi and 
Pakhtun wings split in January 1989 after a financial contoversy; The 
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Nation, 2 January 1989, Lahore) remains more important as a pressure 
group . than as an electoral force. 
&--miki and other identities in Sindh 
On the border between Punjab and Sindh, a Seralki community is 
situated that promotes its own distinct language as the emblem of its 
identity. Seralki identity is sometimes seen as part of the culture of 
one of the provinces on either side of it (see A. S. Ahmed's (1990b) 
discussion of "district ethnicity" in Chapter 3), and the language is 
sometimes seen as a dialect of Sindhi (such as by Daswani and Parchani, 
1978, p. 4). In the mid-1980s community leaders received some publicity 
by demanding political and administrative autonomy for their region. The 
movement is led by a disparate variety of small groups, headed by the 
Seralki Suba Mabaz, who at the beginning of 1985 were calling for a 
Seralki suba [province]; (Dawn, 3 April 1985, Karachi). 
The Seralki movement has achieved the endorsement of various 
political figures, such as NDP chief Sirdar Mazari (Dawn, 23 October 
1985, Karachi), and more recently G. M. Syed, who in January 1992 was 
placed under house arrest after calling for the formation of the 
independent States of Sindhudesh, Baluchistan, Pakhtunistan and 
Seralkidesl (Herald, February 1992, Karachi, p. 24; note that nothing was 
said of a State for Punjabis). Despite being linked to a movement for a 
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concentrated on achieving recognition of the language and its culture, to 
which the Sufl poet Sachal Samast is important. 
Various other identities in Sindh wish not to be allied to a 
subnationalist movement, but merely to be recognised as community 
identities. For non-Muslim groups, separate electorates were re- 
established under General Zia, in which religious minorities vote only 
for their own candidates in a parallel election. This reversed the 
previous situation of dual electorates, whereby minorities could also 
vote in the mainstream national and provincial elections. From 
discussions with minority-group members, it transpired that while some 
are happy to have some representation, others feel cheated, believing 
that the parallel minority elections have no impact on government 
composition or policy. One respondent claimed that in elections he felt 
"horrible ... like a castaway". Furthermore, the Sbar-iat Bill and the 
stance of its main protagonist, the Deobandi ulama (characterised by the 
, Tamaat-I Islami), are viewed as grim portents by many Christians and 
Hindus. 
Before Partition, Hindus are believed to have constituted around 
25% of Sindh's population (Census of India 1931: see Alavi, 1987, p. 71). 
Their position was an important one, representing the bulk of the urban 
middle-class and elite in the province, in addition to owning much 
farmland (Gankovsky, 1981, p. 181). Following Independence, so many 
Hindus left Sindh (inter-view with Siraj-ul Haq; 13 February 1991, 
Karachi) that the 1981 census recorded only 6.4% of the province's 
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population as Hindus (Government of Pakistan,. Federal Bureau of 
Statistics, 1990a, p. 617). 
In India, Hindu-Muslim "communal" violence still flares regularly 
(much of it deliberately provoked by political leaders), while in Sindh 
many claim that before Partition the Province was largely free of 
communal violence (Hiranandani, 1980, p. 33). Since Independence however, 
certain instances of anti-Hindu violence have occurred in Sindh, such as 
in Hyderabad in May/June 1987, when Muslims attacked Hindus in 
retaliation for attacks on Muslims in parts of India at the time 
(Frontier Post, 1 June 1987, Lahore). Similarly, the Babr-i Xasj1d affair 
in IndiaG led to reprisal attacks on Hindus in Pakistan, as in Sukkur in 
November 1989 (Herald, Election Special, October 1990, Karachi, p. 59). 
Since Z. A. Bhutto's Second Amendment to the Constitution in 
1974, the Ahmediyya sect of Muslims has been officially recognised as a 
religious minority (that is, not part of the state's definition of 
"Muslim"). The community is small, and over 60% live in Punjab (Herald, 
ibid, p. 62). In total, the separate electorate system for minorities 
provides for Just ten reserved seats in the 237-seat National Assembly 
(four Christian, four Hindu, one Parsi, one Abmedlyya) and offers no 
representation in the Senate (upper house). 
Various smaller Muslim community groups are important in Sindh, 
many of them having migrated from the Gujarat coastal areas before 
Partition. These include Xemons (Sunni Muslims), Bobr-as and Kbojas (sub- 
groups of Ismaili Sbias), Gujaratis (a general term identifying with the 
language), Katblawar-is and Cutcbis (who also have a distinct language). 
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Trade brought such groups to Sindh before and after Independence (Alavi, 
1987, pp. 76-7). Today, such communities can be identified in Karachi and 
elsewhere by such features as the Babri Bazaar in Saddar, central 
Karachi (which also testifies to the major occupational "niche" of the 
Bobras in tailoring and textiles). 
It is interesting that the MQM has on occasion tried to include 
such groups within a Xdhaj1r- umbrella identity, on the basis that they 
originally migrated from outside Sindh. In June 1988, MQM chief Altaf 
Hussain addressed Xamons, Cutcb1s and "Gujerati-speakers", and claimed 
that they were essentially Mobajirs and should ally with the MQM 
(Morning News, 20 June 1988, Karachi). Rebuff to such a claim came from 
M. S. Junejo, the President of CutcbI Ittebad Sindb, who denied that 
Cutcb1s and other groups were Xobajiz-s (Star, 10 July 1988, Karachi). 
This difference of opinion underscores the complex nature of the Xo1aj1. r 
identity in Sindh. Most of these smaller groups have histories of trade 
and other links with Sindh reaching back long before the Partition of 
India. In this way they cannot be equated easily with those Muslims who 
migrated after the Partition, and upon whom the MQM models its rhetoric 
and appeal, as I will show. 
4.5 XOHAJIIR IDENTITY 
The heritage of the Nczhajir identity as used in present-day 
Sindh begins in August 1947, when groups of Muslims began arriving from 
India in the east. The majority of such migrants who eventually settled 
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in Sindh came from central- northern areas of India and spoke Urdu. Thus, 
in the loosest terms, a prospective Nobajir identity can be identified 
with migration from India and with speaking Urdu. However, unlike Sindhi 
or Baluchi identities, the story is more complex than such a simple 
equation of diacritical community features would suggest. The question of 
Xdbajir identity did not arise in and for political discourse until the 
1970s, when the tern was revived and applied to an ostensible community 
by certain Urdu-speaking political leaders. 
In 1978, a group of Karachi University students revived this 
idea when they formed a student group, the All Pakistan Mobajir Students 
Organisation (APMSO). Six years later, the same people upgraded the 
group to a fully-fledged political movement, which, by 1986 had achieved 
the support of a striking majority of Urdu-speakers in urban Sindh. rhe 
movement is at a crossroads in 1993, with the MQH in disarray over a 
plan to drop the ethnic emphasis from its central programme. 
An analysis of Xt2bajIr identity involves a discussion of 
mythology", in the sense used by Roland Barthes (Barthes, 1972, p. 154), 
or in the sense that Geertz uses the term in his accounts of the 
nineteenth-century State of Bali (Geertz, 1980). That is to say, political 
and other communities actively mobilise a reading of local histories 
(and mythologies) to provide a basis for seemingly naturalised present- 
day political programmes (ibid, pp. 14-15). For the Nobajirs, key 
foundation "myths" involve readings of the controversial and confused 
events following the Partition of India, when many Muslims decided to 
migrate to Pakistan. 
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However, the formation of a XdbajIr identity lies not only with 
the community itself, but also with Sindhis and other Pakistani groups 
with whom the Nobajirs have joined in forming Pakistan as a whole. 
These groups also figure in Xobaj1. r mythologies. After all, as Tayyeb 
explains, it was the migrants' hosts who first introduced the term to 
refer to the migrant community in the early years after Independence 
(Tayyeb, 1966, p. 172). The story thus relates as much to inter-community 
relations and contingent processes in Pakistan, as to so-called 
primordial nationalist fervours. My research focusses on the manner in 
which a Nobajir- identity has been presented by the All-Pakistan Nobajir 
Students Organisation (APHSO) and MQM in particular, since it is these 
agencies who have elevated the term onto the stage of national politics. 
Early origins of the mKobaJiMm in Sindh 
There is some conf usion as to how the term "Nobajir-" became 
applied to, and was registered by, the post-1947 migrants. The original 
Islamic meaning of the term refers to the act of migration in the name 
of Islam. In this manner, those fleeing the communist regime in 
Afghanistan in the 1980s to join the border areas of Pakistan have also 
been known as Nobajirs, and form a sizeable group in some areas such as 
Quetta, Baluchistan. Thus, "Xobaj1z" does not just refer to migration, but 
specifically to the migration of Muslims. 
Tayyeb claims that migrants Joining Punjab and Sindh af ter 
Partition were "endearingly called the 'nuhajir... (Tayyeb, 1966, p. 172). 
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This conflicts with the views of MQM members and supporters. rhey claim 
that the Sindhi hosts continued treating the migrants as miErants long 
after their arrival, so that Xobajir- status was retained for the 
community in sarcastic terms - as a denial of membership of the "Sindhi 
club". This might have been due either to cultural and social differences 
between migrant and host communities, or to the hosts' feeling of being 
threatened as the new migrants began to accumulate local economic 
resources (Tayyeb, ibid). There was also much controversy over the 
system of land and property rehabilitation for new migrants, which in 
Sindh involved a widely-abused system of verbal affidavits of resources 
"left behind" in India (interview with Justice Dorab Patel, 12 January 
1991, Karachi). Other less endearing terms tor the new arrivals 
abounded, such as makkab [a spider that continually scampers around]; 
(interview with MQM women's worker, 6 February 1991, Karachi), or, more 
commonly in Punjab, tilyat [a small bird that hops from place to place]; 
(interview with Nadeem Nusrat, Personal Assistant to Altaf Hussain, 13 
March 1991, Karachi). 
For MQK activists the point is that NobaJirs did not initially 
want to be seen as Xchajirs, but came to realise that they had little 
choice in the matter. XQM secretary Azim Ahmed Tariq puts it this way: 
"Originally we never thought as a submationality, Just 
as Pakistani and Muslim. But on arrival, being a Pakistani 
was just a slogan, it was not in hearts and minds of 
people here. All these people Just thought of their 
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province; being "son of soil" was the f irst thing ..... 
We had to join hands as a community to be accepted" 
(interview, 6 February 1991, Karachi). 
A similar view was expressed by Sindhi nationalist G. M. Syed, 
when he said that; "We have had our name for 5,000 years. Pakistan has 
had its name for 50 years" Untarview, 13 March 1991, Karachi). In this 
way, identities are ranked, with the Sindhi ethnic community coming 
first in people's affections and the nation-state last. Furthermore, as 
with the Pakhtun identity, Islam is taken to be an integral part of 
Mobajir- identity. This is not so true of Sindhi identity, which by 
relying an cultural factors such as language, can encompass other 
religious identities (there are a number of non-Muslims who consider 
themselves "Sindhis", including some Hindus in India; see Hiranandani, 
1980, p. 15). 
The original Partition migrants from India, according to Azim 
Tariq, felt very differently to their hosts about the ranking of identity 
components when they migrated to Pakistan. They believed that 
identification with the State of Pakistan and Islam were paramount, and 
that a sub-community identity was largely irrelevant (not least because 
their own zameen [territory /land] had been left behind in India). The 
difference between the outlook of Xdbajlrýs and that of communities 
originally living within the boundaries of Pakistan was demonstrated by 
Mumtaz Bhutto, leader of the Sindh National Front, when he claimed: "You 
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can't become a nation on someone else's land... The sooner they Join us 
the sooner they can become Pakistanis. There is no room for 'Nobajir' - 
you have to be one of the four" (interview, 21 June 1991, London). Here 
again "Pakistan" is equated with just four sub-nationalities, which in 
turn are equated with the "land". The nigrants may have Joined the 
population of Pakistan but cultura117 they did not really become part of 
the "land" on which it was situated (by virtue of not becoming absorbed 
by Sindhi or other local cultures). Oldenburg (1985, p. 712) maintains 
that a similar difference in outlook was at the heart of the 
disintegration of Pakistan in 1971, with the Nobajirs considering their 
own version of the State to be "correct" and at odds with that held by 
Bengali culture (ibid, p. 724). 
But the root of the problem with respect to this research 
relates more specifically to Sindh. This is because it is in Sindh alone 
that a Xohajir political identity has emerged, despite the fact that 
Punjab province received many thousands more migrants from India around 
the time of Partition. The explanation for these different outcomes 
relates partly to the nature of administrative arrangements in Punjab 
after Partition. In Punjab, provincial laws had determined that migrants 
from one half of the partitioned province entering the other half would 
have priority over land claims and would receive full compensation for 
abandoned property (interview with federal Civil Service officer, 10 
February 1991, Karachi). Such preferential policies in the Punjab may 
have encouraged a secondary flow of migration of non-Punjabis out of 
urban Punjab to undeveloped urban Sindh in the late 1940s (Wright, 1974, 
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p. 195), where departing Hindus were leaving behind property and good 
business opportunities. Furthermore, the system ot land compensation and 
claims in Sindh was loosely policed in comparison to the system 
elsewhere, in that uncontested statements were often sufficient as 
claims of property abandoned in India. 
In Punjab, therefore, various factors aided the synthesis of 
migrant and host. One was the cultural af f inity between the two. Others 
concerned local official procedures, and a shattered provincial awareness 
arising from the Partition of Punjab. These factors were not so 
applicable in Sindh, and hence the synthesis was not so easy. This 
explanation differs slightly from the MQX's own view, as stated by 
Karachi's mayor Dr. Farooq Sattar, that the urban agglomeration of 
migrants in Sindh, as opposed to the greater urban-rural spread in 
Punjab, encouraged a distinct urban culture of migrants to emerge in 
Sindh (interview, 26 February 1991, Karachi>. The difference between 
urban and rural communities is important in developing societies such as 
Pakistan. Indeed, Clapham (Clapham, 1985, p. 81) claims that such 
differences are the "Third World's" equivalent to class differences (see 
also Lipton, 1977). 
It seems, therefore, that in Sindh, a physical and psychological 
separation of migrants from the host culture contributed to the 
emergence of a Nobajir identity. From the host society's point of view, 
the separation related to an adherence to "land" (in terms of history 
within a particular territory), that was a more important component of 
Sindhi identity than such factors as the new nation, Islam, or least of 
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all Urdu (which was not spoken indigenously within the areas that 
became Pakistan). In 1947, "land" had been physically and culturally 
severed from the life of the migrants by definition, and it could not be 
an important part of their identity. The sense of alienation felt by 
many Nobajlr-s is effectively portrayed in a poem by Fahmida Riaz, an 
Urdu-speaking writer who migrated from Meerut, in the United Provinces 
of British India, to Sindh, some years after Partition: 
"Nobajir 
These blue and yellow balloons 
burst of their own volition. 
From the heights of improbability 
the shreds of rubber 
like dead skin 
fell so rapidly. 
These lifeless rubber pieces, 
where will they f ind a home? 
They do not like the earth, 
they will not merge with it. 
Each pure and clean drop of water 
tells them that 
the stream that's sprouted from the rock 
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will flow its own way. 
The balloons are very unhappy 
with earth and water. " 
(Fahmida Riaz, in Mahmood Jamal, ed. and trans. 1986, p. 158) 
Constructing community identities 
My research attempts to show that the mainstream XdbaJir 
identity in contemporary Sindh is founded on three principal pillars of 
"myth" and identity- construction. The term "construction" is used because 
the term 'Wobajir" has been consciously and rapidly elevated onto the 
national political stage since the mid-1980s by the XQM. Thus, while the 
term Xobajir has existed for many years in Pakistan and elsewhere in 
the Muslim world, it is the MQM that has developed the term into the 
emblem of an ethnic community, and has claimed that it alone is the 
creator and arbiter of the community identity. 
Historically, the physical separation of communities in Sindh 
has involved a cultural distancing of the two major groups from one 
another. Sindhis can be proud and even presumptuous about their own 
history and the strength of their ethnic culture. But the migrants also 
brought with them pride in certain cultural and social achievements. 
Urdu is the key cultural symbol of XobaJIr identity today. The language 
implies not only a noble link with the great Xugbal emperors in whose 
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courts it was developed (Oldenburg, 1985, p. 725), but also a special link 
to Pakistan itself, since the national language of the State is Urdu. The 
identification of a certain ethnic group with the essence of a State - 
and subsequent criticism of other supposedly less "loyal" groups - is 
not confined to Pakistan alone. Iraq offers another example, with the 
ruling Balatb party in Baghdad seeing other groups such as the "marsh 
Arabs" in the south of the country, as somehow "un-Iraqi" and thus 
fundamentally alien (Independent, 1 August 1992, London). In Pakistan, 
the crisis of 1970/71 allowed chauvinistic sentiments to be levelled by 
Hchajirs and others at the Bengalis and their culture, which was 
considered to be intertwined with Hinduism in form and thus "un- 
Pakistani" by definition (see Ayub Khan, 1965, p. 187). 
Identification with Pakistan is thus a central element of 
Xchajir identity. This includes not only the matter of Urdu, but also the 
historical factor of migration from India after the Partition. This is 
the second main pillar of contemporary ffobajir identity in Sindh. As in 
many "nationalist" constructions, the use of history is often highly 
problematic and keenly contested. Furthermore, it is important to note 
that the power-base of the MQM rests on people born within Pakistan, 
rather than their parents, who were the original Nobajirs. This 
complexity extends to the Bibar! sub-identity, which has become an 
important element of MQM support in recent years. The factor supposedly 
uniting these people and making them Xobajirs is a commitment to the 
building of a unitary Pakistani national culture. In this sense, the 
Nobajirs also identify with the Muslim League, the Quaid-i Azan [Father 
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of the Nation], and -the Pakistan movement, since a major component of 
the League was the Urdu-speaking contingent of northern India. 
A third major element of Xchajir identity is that of the 
mazloomiat [oppression), which the MQM claims has been visited upon the 
Mobajii-s in two ways. Firstly, it is claimed that the community has been 
progressively marginalised and discriminated against in Pakistan, 
socially, politically and economically, by other groups such as Sindhis 
and Punjabis. Secondly, it is claimed that the Xoýhajirs of urban Sindh 
have been the victims of several "massacres" in the 1980s. This claim is 
less easy to verify than the first. Q will return to the events on 
which this claim is based in Chapter 7). 
Language and culture 
H. U Memon claims that Urdu was the first South Asian language 
to produce a "novel" in the Western sense of the term (M. U. Memon, 1983, 
p. 106). The novel was Vmrao Jan Ada" by Mirza Muhammad Hadi Rusva 
(1858-1931), about which Memon (ibid) claims: 
"It would be impossible to f ind another novel of 
comparable artistic f inesse and psychological depth 
written at that time in any of the other languages 
of northwestern India (Pakistan since 1947). " 
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This statement implies not only the cultural superiority of Urdu over 
other languages, but also -a greater inherent "modernity" in Urdu culture. 
Memon (ibid) stresses the point by observing that the Progressive 
Literary Movement of the 1930s (which encompassed such writers as Prem 
Chand) wrote almost exclusively in Urdu. 
Pride in Urdu culture persists in the families of most post- 
Partition migrants today. A senior Xohajir- journalist with "The Star" 
maintained that: 
"We Xdhajirs have a different language, Urdu, a different 
culture, and our own 'powerful traditions' that belong 
to India ....... We were superior, in education, culture, 
ways of living. " 
(Interview, 27 January 1991, Karachi). 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah instituted Urdu as Pakistan's national 
language in 1948. As Urdu-speakers, most Xdbajjrs had a distinct 
advantage over their compatriots, especially in the Civil Service where 
Urdu became the official language. Punjabis were also favoured since 
their language is not dissimilar to Urdu, and there has always been a 
tradition of using Urdu in educated and literary circles in Punjab. 
Bengalis, meanwhile, were perhaps the most disadvantaged, since their 
language was the furthest removed from Urdu of all the regional 
languages in Pakistan. The issue became an explosive one in East 
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Pakistan f rom the day of Independence, with Jinnah and other 
politicians, such as Khwaja Nazimuddin (Prime Xinister 1951-53), 
repeatedly stressing that there could be no compromise on the matter of 
Urdu's official status (Ziring, 1971, p. 112). 
Urdu remains as the single national language today, with 
observers such as A. S Ahmed reiterating its potential as a symbol of 
"national identity" (A. S. Ahmed, 1989a, p. 67). However, while Urdu 
newspapers may have the highest circulation of all newspapers in 
Pakistan (Memon, 1983, p. 106), only 17.9% of the population of ten year- 
olds and above was recorded as literate in the language in 1981 
(Government of Pakistan, 1987, Economic Survey 1985-86, p. 17), and only 
7.6% of households are "Urdu-speaking" (Government of Pakistan, 1990a, 
Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, p. 66). (In a sense, of course, this problem 
can be seen as a general one of education and literacy as much as one 
of the choice of language, since Urdu Is the medium of instruction at 
government schools. in Pakistan). 
Mbbaji. rs have ofen reacted violently to efforts to diminish or 
alter the status of Urdu in Pakistan. The most striking example of this 
occurred when the Language Bill of July 1972, moved in the Sindh 
Provincial Assembly, instituted Sindhi as a joint official language with 
Urdu in the province. The Bill was immediately followed by an episode of 
serious civil unrest in Karachi, which effectively paralysed the city for 
a few days and necessitated a State of Emergency to be imposed there. 
The rioters claimed to be reacting to a discriminatory attack on the 
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. ffobajir community, and were mobilised 
behind such slogans as the banner 
headline on the front page of the leading Urdu daily newspaper "JanS": 
"Urdu ka janaza bay, 
zara dboom sey nikley! ' 
[This is the funeral of Urdu, 
announce the funeral-procession! ] 
(Jang, 8 July 1972, Karachi [author's translation]) 
Once again, identification of the Mohajirs with the role of Urdu in the 
state machinery of Pakistan was invoked in the affair, as groups such as 
the "Karachi Citizens' Committee" declared that Z. A Bhutto was "defying 
the wishes of the Quald-1 Azam" in instituting the Bill (Dawn, 8 July 
1972, Karachi). On 15 July, Bhutto announced that a new ordinance was 
being incorporated into the Bill, whereby discrimination against Urdu- 
speakers on the grounds of language in the public sector in Sindh would 
be prohibited for a grace-period of twelve years (Dawn, 16 July 1972, 
Karachi). The announcement finally brought the disturbances in urban 
Sindh to an end. Interestingly, Bhutto also underlined the Sindhi 
position on the matter, saying that while he had made accommodations 
for the Urdu lobby, the Bill had been democratically passed and Bhutto 
"could not betray his own land" (Dawn, 16 July, 1972). "Land" here 
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clearly means Sindh, and the statement thus reflects the importance of 
the Sindhi language to the Sindhils sense of identity. 
Historical foundations 
In the following chapter I present a chronology of political 
mobilisations by the Mohajir- movement in Sindh. I will argue that the 
first Urdu-speaking political leader openly to espouse a contemporary 
Adhaji. r identity in Sindh was Mahmud-ul Haq Usmani, who failed to 
mobilise the population of urban Sindh around this concept in the 
national elections of December 1970. It is interesting that many of the 
details of ffohajir identity that Usmani proposed were later adopted by 
the leaders of the MQM. One of the most important of these details was a 
selective view of Muslim political nobilisation before the Partition of 
India. Writing in 1987, Usmani conveyed this view in the following 
terms: 
"That the Pakistan movement received its strength primarily 
from the impending fear of the majority community rather 
than the love of Islam as a way of life is evident from 
the fact that the movement had its focal centre not in 
the Muslim majority areas but in those areas where Muslims 
were in a clear minority. " 
(Dawn, 27 May 1987, Karachi). 
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This statement suggests that it was the Urdu-speaking Muslims 
of such areas as United and Central Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh and 
Xadhya Pradesh) who showed a greater longing for Pakistan than those 
who eventually fell within its borders. We have seen in Chapter 2 that 
the results of pre- Independence elections give some credence to this 
theory, especially those of 1937, although it is important to note that 
the electorates were very small at this time because of property and 
other restrictions on voting. 
The important point for contemporary Sindh is that the leaders 
of the MQM consciously link Nobajlrs with the Muslims of central 
northern Indian provinces, and thus implicitly suggest that today's 
Urdu-speakers are still more "pro-Pakistan" than their Sindhi 
contemporaries. The link between the Xobajirs of contemporary Sindh and 
the Muslims of the provinces of northern India before Independence, was 
conveyed to me by the Secretary of the XQM, Azim * Ahmed Tariq, in the 
following terms: 
nPakistan history involves the minority provinces of 
India, where the Muslims overcame a great stuggle to 
create the country. UP [United Provinces], Aligarh etc. 
were the main centres of activity. " 
(interview, 6 February 1991, Karachi). 
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Similarly, the leader of the MobaJI-r Ittebad Tehx'Jk [MobaJir, United 
Movement; a small rival group to the XQMI, Dr. Saleem Haider, expressed 
such a sentiment when he said: "other Pakistanis do not care for other 
Indian Muslims [now left in India] ... [but] Indian Muslims helped us get 
Independence! " (interview, 11 February 1991, Karachi). 
The matter is hotly disputed by Sindhi, nationalists and 
intellectuals, who point out that the Sindh Muslim League, under G. M. 
Syed, was the first League in India to formally adopt a Pakistan 
Resolution in 1938 (Syed, 1949, p. 202). However, as we have seen, it was 
the intellectuals of the United Provinces, and notably those of the 
Aligarh school, that formed the most crucial element of the All India 
Muslim League. and who directed a majority of its sessions. 
A second controversial element in the historical construction of 
a Mohajir identity is the suggestion that all migrants from India made 
great sacrifices for Pakistan. Azim Ahmed Tariq can again comment on 
this matter: 
"When our children apply for education they are asked 
where their parents come f rom ... in professional 
institutions also. Ve thought we had given such 
sacrifices ... Two million were killed in the Partition 
- this memory returned to us" 
(interview, 13 March 1991, Karachi). 
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The boundaries between those original migrants and the current 
leadership of the MQM (who were all born in Pakistan after 1947), are 
thus blurred by the use of the term "we". In this way, the sacrifices of 
migration can be assumed by all Xdbajirs. Similarly, in an interview 
with "Dawn" in October 1990, Altaf Hussain declared, "Let me remind you 
that our elders laid down their lives for the creation of this country 
and now it is our turn to make it strong and prosperous. " (Dawn, 16 
October 1990, Karachi). Here again, a direct line is drawn between the 
MQM, modern Xobaj1z-s, and all those post-Partition migrants who lef t 
India in an atmosphere of communal violence. 
For our purposes, however, it is instructive to draw a 
distinction between the situations compelling various groups of Muslim 
migrants to leave India. Of course, many of those migrants are still 
living in Pakistan and can offer personal insights. Professor Karrar 
Husain, a prominent academic in Karachi and former Governor of Quetta 
University, moved from Meerut College near Delhi after Partition, to 
Karachi, where he stayed with friends among previous migrants before 
finding a Job and a home (interview, 13 January 1991, Karachi). The 
Professor claims there was no communal violence near his home at the 
time, and that he decided to migrate solely because he believed he would 
be discriminated against as a Muslim in the new India (ibid). Similarly, 
an elderly Xobajir- woman described the story behind her family's post- 
Partition migration thus: 
"We came from Bijnoor in U. P and came out of pride 
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The train journey was incredible. Sometimes there would 
be attacks an carriages, but nosily people were very kind, 
showering us with food. We had so many boiled eggs by the 
time we arrived! " 
(interview, 16 January 1991, Karachi). 
Again the declared motivation was not communal violence, but 
"pride" in wanting to be a part of the new Muslim state. Furthermore, 
some Indian Civil Service officers were transferred to Karachi with 
their families for work, after being given the choice of which of the 
two new States to serve. Braibanti recognises that it is impossible to 
determine exactly how many migrated, but by the mid 1960s it is likely 
that up to 20% of Pakistan's Federal Civil Service officers had 
transferred from India (Braibanti, 1966, p. 267). 
The 1951 Census of Pakistan used the term "muhajii", and defined 
it for the enumerators as follows: 
"A mubajlr is a person who has moved into 
Pakistan as a result of partition or for fear of 
disturbances connected therewith ... many immigrants 
did not make that claim, particularly those who were 
returning to their province of birth, or whose move 
was not connected with partition. " 
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(Census of Pakistan 1951, Vol. VI, p. 19,36) 
Thus, in official terms, a Nobajlr- was defined as a migrant moving 
through Partition-related disturbances or "fear". In this way, "economic 
migrants", particularly those who decided to join Pakistan some years 
after Independence, were not Nobajirs according to official definitions. 
This refers to some 1.1 million migrants who moved to West Pakistan 
between 1951 and 1961; over 16% of the total migration to the western 
wing between Independence and 1961 (Census of Pakistan 1961, Vol. III, 
Table 9, pp. 302-3). Indeed, by the time of the 1961 Census, the term 
Mobajir- was no longer used to refer to migrants from India. 
Interestingly, the official definition also suggests that the 
migrants from East Punjab, who were largely motivated by communal 
violence in moving into Pakistan, were more accurately termed Mohajirs 
than those who migrated from relatively more peaceful areas. rhis fact 
is conveniently neglected in the MQM's construction of a Xobajir 
identity in Sindh, which refers specifically to Urdu-speakers in Sindh 
and not generally to former East Punjabis. 
It seems that communal violence was not as serious in U. P and 
many other northern Indian regions (from where many Sindh Xchajirs 
originated; see Table 4.4) as was the case in Punjab. This is not to say 
that there was no communal violence in U. P. Before Partition the province 
had experienced serious episodes of blood-letting and communal rioting. 
However, by 1947 the momentum of violence had slackened there and many 
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No. of persons born in Indian region residing in 
Region Qj Origin Sindh PunAab 
United Provinces (and states) 367,456 77,705 
Bihar, Orissa, Nepal, Sikkim 
and states 4,444 386 
W. Bengal, Assam and states 49,316 12,433 
Coorg, Madras and states, Mysore, 
Andeman and Nicobar islands 58,029 8,249 
Bombay, Baroda, Junagadh, Munawar, 
West Indian states 344,943 24,398 
Central Provinces, Hyderabad, 
Bhopal and Central India 106,174 46,264 
East Punjab, Ajmer, Delhi, 
Rajputana and states 454,125 3,979,008 
TOTALS 1,384,487 4,148,443 
Source: Census of Pakistan 1961, Vol. 3, West Pakistan, Karachi, Table . 9. 
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Muslims who decided to migrate at that time did so either through a 
considered view of their economic prospects, or bacause of a wish to be 
part of the newly-achieved Muslim State. 
In Punjab and Bihar, these motives for migration were 
overshadowed by the communal violence that broke out between Hindus, 
Sikhs and Muslims, which forced communities to try and move to where 
they might be safer. The identification with sacrifice for Pakistan would 
thus apply more readily to Punjab than to Sindh, yet it is in the latter 
where the perception has most often been raised. As Mohammad Waseem 
points out: 
"It is indeed peculiar to hear stories of sacrifice 
projected from the XQM platform, which pale in the 
face of carnage which was let loose in Punjab. One 
hears less from the migrants from East Punjab about 
their 'sacrif ices'. " 
(Dawn, 28 June 1990, Karachi). 
It is thought that up to one million Muslims died in immediate post- 
Partition violence (ibid). Precise figures concerning refugee movements 
and casualties will probably never be available, yet it is important to 
differentiate between the conditions associated with migrants to Sindh 
and to Punjab. As Table 4.4 and Figure 4.1 show, Sindh received a 
sizeable proportion of migrants from the killing fields of Punjab. 
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Indeed, Census data such as that portrayea in Table 4.4, suggests that 
East Punjabi migrants were the largest single group of new arrivals in 
Sindh after Partition and up to 1961. However, the number of migrants 
entering Sindh from the centra 1- northern provinces of India was not fa. r 
short of those arriving from Punjab, while in West Punjab the vast 
majority of new arrivals were from East Punjab. Thus, aside from the 
migrants who travelled first through Punjab and then on to Sindh, the 
people Joining Sindh from the Central Provinces would probably not have 
experienced the sort of violence that was being committed in Punjab. 
With sacrifice assumed as a part of a Nobajir identity (as many 
of the MQM statements suggest), the obvious next step rhetorically is to 
claim that XdbajIz-: s have somehow invested more in Pakistan than other 
communities and are thus "more Pakistani". On this matter we can again 
refer to Azim Tariq, who declared in a speech delivered on the aftermath 
of an MQM anti-government "Black Day" strike in Karachi, that, "Those 
who claim to be living here for 5,000 years did not offer any sacrifice 
for this land. " (Dawn, 27 May 1989, Karachi). Remembering that G. M Syed 
often claims the Sindhi identity to be 5000 years old Untarview, 13 
March 1991, Karachi), it is clear to whom Tariq's statement is 
addressed. 
Many Sindhis react angrily to the suggestion that they are 
somehow "less Pakistani" than the Mobajirs. Hameed Haroon, the Sindhi 
owner of the Dawn Group of newspapers, points out that before the XQM 
emerged the Kobajirs tended to support groups such as Jamaat-I Islami, 
which openly sided with non-democratic military regimes (interview, 9 
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February 1991, Karachi). In this sense Nobajirs were politically 
"retrogressive not progressive" (ibid). Meanwhile, the Sindhi electorate 
has mostly sided with the PPP -a nominally democratic party with a 
national political agenda. Haroon stresses the importance of historical 
myth and perception in the construction of identities, and the manner in 
which this can "hide" certain other processes and influences. In this he 
is referring specifically to the antagonistic effect on the mood of 
Nobajirs that militant Sindhi nationalism has exerted (ibid). 
The MQM claims not only that the Sindhi nationalists have 
failed to make any sacrifice for Pakistan, but that they are now working 
for the State's disintegration. Altaf Hussain declared in 1989 that he 
was fighting the Sindbudesb movement [the proposed name af an 
independent Sindh], and that Xdbajirs were "struggling for the solidarity 
of Pakistan" (Dawn, 1 October 1989, Karachi). The link between Nabajirs 
and an identification with Pakistan can clearly be seen in parts of 
Orangi for example, where green Pakistani flags flutter above houses an 
the same flagpoles as those of the MQN (in a manner that is rare in 
non-ffobajir- districts). The message conveyed is clearly that the MQM is 
at one with the State of Pakistan. Symbolism concerning loyalty to 
Pakistan is a powerful weapon in politics. Benazir Bhutto claims that 
Altaf Hussain is facing a pending charge of "f lag-burning" (of a 
Pakistan flag) in the grounds of the Nazar-d Quald-I Azam [Jinnah's tomb 
in Karachi] (Interview, 22 January 1992, Karachi). Whatever the veracity 
of this incident, the charge is a loaded one because it focusses on 
Altaf's own claims to a greater patriotism for Pakistan. 
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Bibaris 
Loyalty to the State of Pakistan also links a Xohajir identity 
to a powerful sub-group of Urdu-speakers, the Bibaris. The name 
originated in East Pakistan, where non-Bengali post-Partition migrants 
were referred to en nasse as Bibaris, since many had originated from 
the Urdu /H in di- speaking province of Bihar. These people were, in a sense, 
the Xobajir-s of East Pakistan. 
If physical and cultural dislocation are elements of Xobajir- 
identity, then Bibaris are probably the most dislocated of all. The 
community formed a bloc of approximately 490,000 Muslim refugees who 
entered East Pakistan up to 1951 (Tayyeb, 1966, pp. 169-71), again 
largely motivated by the dangers associated with communal genocide (as 
in Punjab). Like ffohajjrs in West Pakistan, the Bibaris identified with 
the "national" culture of Pakistan and differentiated themselves from the 
Bengali majority by virtue of speaking Urdu/Hindi. Friction between hcst 
and migrant was more immediate and more explosive in East Pakistan, 
however, and major BiharI-Bengali riots emerged in the early 1950s 
(O'Donnell, 1984, p, 50). By the time of the imposition of Martial Law in 
East Pakistan in 1970, many Bibaris were openly siding with the 
Pakistan army, and some formed groups of militant razakars [civilian 
militia] which aimed to hamper the actions of Bengali separatists (ibid, 
P. 98). 
The stance of the Bibar-Is over the secession of East Pakistan 
earned them pariah status with the Bengali majority community following 
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the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. After the war, several thousand 
Bibaris were living in camps, disenfranchised. Negotiations to move the 
refugees to Pakistan repeatedly stalled. In Karachi, meanwhile, there 
were reports that a camp of 10,000 Bibarls: were "living in circumstances 
allegedly worse than their compatriots in Bangladesh. " (The Economist, 
13 May 1972, p. 15). By the 1980s, as will be demonstrated in the 
following chapter, the MQM was using the issue of the repatriation to 
Pakistan of 250,000 still "stranded" Bibar-Is (whom the Movement refers 
to as "Pakistanis living abroad") as a principal political demand. 
Notwithstanding these problems, many Bibarls did manage to 
enter Sindh after 1971, and Karachi in particular. ffere they have largely 
joined in supporting the MQM, which sometimes welcomed then with 
rehabilitation camps and projects. The largest concentration of Bjharis 
is in Orangi, where they form a component of some 650,000 Xohajir-s 
(Verheijen, 1990, p. 24). The prominent banker Zia Sbafi Khan (Intarview, 
15 January 1991, Karachi) observed that the Bibaris are a particularly 
"vocal" element of the Mahajir connunity. Benazir Bhutto goes further, 
and links the community with a wave of illegal immigration and 
militancy, explaining: "Through the seventies, and particularly from 
1977, a new mercenary breed came in. They are violent, they have nothing 
but scorn for their elders" (interview, 22 January 1992, Karachi). 
The PPP leader also claims that one million illegal immigrants 
have joined Karachi from Bangladesh between 1985 and 1990 (quoting an 
unspecified "Karachi University study"; ibid). Ironically, many of these 
immigrants are Bengalis, who also have become concentrated in parts of 
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Orangi. Poor and often without legal residency, such immigrants (often 
get sucked into the bottom of the socio-economic pile where they find 
work as domestic servants or prostitutes (Newsline, December 1990, 
Karachi, p. 94). Given this background, it is perhaps not surprising that 
many Bibar-Is are active supporters of the politics of the MQM. 
The iRyth of oppression 
I will show in Chapter 5 that a growing perception of Nobajir, 
community marginalisation in urban Sindh fed into the emergence of the 
Nobajir movement in the late 1970s. In a sense, the bedrock of the All 
Pakistan Xohajir Students Organisation (APMSO) was the everday issue of 
places within colleges in the cities and opportunities for subsequent 
employment. The MQM similarly focussed on access to employment in its 
rhetoric and documents, and this, no doubt, attracted the semi-educated 
industrial and commercial workers of the city who have formed the 
bedrock of the Movement's support. In terms of party rhetoric, these 
matters have certainly been accorded more attention than religious or 
cultural factors. 
In economic terms, a gradual reduction in the influence of 
XdbaJ1r-s began shortly after Independence, but it is important to set 
this process in the appropriate context. The point is that as harbingers 
of the Muslim League, which formed the first national government, and as 
a major component of the first federal bureaucracy (some of which 
transferred from India), many Muslims from centra 1- northern India came 
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to Pakistan as members of a dominant community. In 1948,55.6% of the 
new probationers in the elite Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) had come 
from parts of northern India excluding any of the Pakistan provinces or 
East Punjab. This compares with just 5.6% from East Pakistan, for 
example (Government of Pakistan, 1965, Annual Reports of the Pakistan 
Public Service Commission 1948-64, Table 8). It is claimed that at 
Partition there was just one Sindhi Indian Civil Service officer 
(interview with journalist and former All-India Muslim Students 
Federation leader, 31 January 1991, Karachi). The Sindhi lawyer Siraj-ul 
Haq claims that even by the late 1950s, of 32 federal secretaries in 
Pakistan, 19 were Nobajirs (Interview, 13 February 1991, Karachi). 
Furthermore, every district officer in Sindh at this time was a non- 
Sindhi, and a substantial number were Xdbajirs (interview with Civil 
Service officer, 10 February 1991, Karachi). 
Throughout the 1950s, however, the growing preponderance of 
Punjabis in government entailed a diminution in the presence of Nobajirs 
in the corridors of central power. By 1963, when Ayub Khan was 
President, Punjabis had moved from just under 39% of the CSP intake in 
1948 to over 45% (Annual Reports, ibid). By this time, the continuing 
process of land compensation for NobaJirs: under Martial Law Regulation 
84 had uncovered the fact that most of the verbal affidavits for land 
were fraudulent (interview with Justice Dorab Patel, 12 January 1991, 
Karachi). This is known to have angered Ayub Khan considerably 
(inter-view with Civil Service officer, 10 February 1991, ibid). rhe 
federal capital had also been moved to Punjab and it soon became 
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apparent that Ayub wished to shift the balance of power further away 
from Mobajlr-s. In 1959 a Presidential Order heralded the sacking of 37 
senior civil servants, most of whom were Nobajirs (Burki, 1980, p. 42). In 
the industrial sector, also, the Pakistan Industrial Development 
Corporation, an increasingly Punjab and Pakhtun-dominated agency, was 
becoming the major owner and investor in Pakistan's industry. This 
further diluted the national powers of Mbbajir-s as an economic 
community. 
The Quata S)rstem 
In psychological terms, however, it appears to be the 
legislation of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 's government (1971-77) that 
institutionalised a marginalisation of Mobajir inf luence in the most 
important arms of the state. The lynch-pins of this were the Language 
Bill of July 1972, and the Civil Service reforms and Quota System of 
1973. The latter designated quotas for federal government employment 
based on ascribed provincial population ratios. Within each Province 
there were extra arrangements to address inequalities across districts. 
Quotas an employment had been in place in the public sector in Pakistan 
since 1949, but the Z. A Bhutto government was faced with the task of 
redesigning the system after the breakaway of East Pakistan. By August 
1973, the current system was established, the details of which are shown 
in Table 4.5. 
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Area of domicile Quota M 
Punjab/ Islamabad 50.0 
NWFP 11.5 
Rural Sindh 11.4 
Urban Sindh 7.6 
Northern areas/FATA 4.0 
Baluchistan 3.5 
Azad Kashmir 2.0 
merit 10.0 
Source: Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, memo. no. F 
819172 (TRV), 31 August; 1973, Islamabad. 
Most importantly for the Xbbajlzýs, the special arrangements in 
Sindh involved a 60/40% split of the overall provincial quota of 19% 
between rural and urban areas respectively (the latter defined as cities 
over 100,000 in population in 1973, which means Karachi, Hyderabad and 
Sukkur). The quotas were to apply to federal government employment, and 
to places in the federal Quaid-i Azam University in Islamabad. Other 
educational institutions can enforce their own specific systems (for 
example, since 1982, Dow Medical College in Karachi can only take 
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students with a Karachi domicile; Dawn, 2 February 1982, Karachi). 
Enforcement of such quotas is based on "domicile certificates", an 
example of a questionnaire for which is shown in Appendix 4. The 
importance of such documents has led to a vibrant trade in forgeries. 
The quotas meant that Xdbajlrýs living in SindhIs major cities 
(the great majority of the community) could contest a 7.6% quota of 
federal government jobs (in addition to 10% nationally reserved for an 
open merit competition). 
We are concerned here with the real and perceived effects of 
such measures on the Xobajlr community. The Quota System in Sindh was 
intended to give an extra boost to rural Sindhis, whose limited access 
to educational facilities put them at a distinct disadvantage when 
competing with urbanites for jobs and education in the state sector. 
Unfortunately, the measures could also be interpreted as a snub to the 
MobaJIrs, not least because the population of three largest cities in 
Sindh is believed to have far exceeded 7.6% of the national total in and 
after 1973 (unofficial estimates in the early 1990s put the population 
of Karachi alone at around 9% of the national population). MQM secretary 
Azim. Tariq believes that: 
"These two things [Language Bill and Quota System] sparked 
it all off in the province. MobaJIrs were dealt a serious 
blow. Questions came in every mind; why? Why rural/urban 
discrinination in Sindh? " 
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(Interview, 13 March 1991, Karachi). 
As far as the federal bureaucracy is concerned, the measures 
seem to have "worked". While the total employment of officers domiciled 
in urban Sindh has declined by 8.4% between 1973 and 1983, the number 
of officers domiciled in rural Sindh has increased by over three times 
(Government of Pakistan, 1984, Federal Government Civil Servants Census 
Report, January 1983, Islamabad). The key fact, however, is that in 1983 
the number of officers from urban Sindh, at 23,370, was still three 
times greater than the number from rural Sindh (ibid). 
Frustration also exists among Xobajir students who believe that 
achieving places in institutions of higher education has become 
increasingly difficult. One recent Karachi graduate told me that: 
"When we got qualified in a subject, say medicine, and 
f ound we could not get a job as a doctor, that was it. 
What could we do? Shine shoes on the roadside? ... This 
was made worse because of domicile certificates ... If 
you have good 'A' levels but you don't get into Karachi 
University that's it. No other chances. " 
(discussion with Nobajlr student, 15 February 1991, Karachi). 
The domicile controversy also involves a trade in forged documentation 
that supposedly allows students from outside urban Sindh to gain access 
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to places in colleges reserved f or urban-domiciled citizens. The 
racketeering has been conducted for years by militant ethnic student 
organisations who set up stalls at admissions fairs processing domicile 
applications. This was the climate in which the All Pakistan NdbajIr 
Students Organisation (APMSO) was encouraged to grow in Karachi in 
1978. The MQM also openly alleges that outsiders are stealing college 
places and government jobs in urban Sindh "under the cover of domicile 
certificates" (MQM, Nohajir Qaum! Xdvement*?, undated fly-sheet, Karachi). 
The problem with domicile certificates, as Appendix 4 shows, is 
that they "betray" the ethnic community of Mobailrs by recording the 
place of birth of the father. In a sense, they act as an "ethnic 
passport". Within the XoIajIr community at more educated levels (where 
the battle for government Jobs and higher education takes place) there 
clearly exists a perception that employers in the 1970s would ask 
questions about the origins of parents, and would act accordingly in 
detriment to Xdbajirs (interview with Nadeem Nusrat, 13 March 1991, 
Karachi). This fact was even conceded by a Sindhi erstwhile journalist 
(dismissed under General Zia and now a lawyer), who claimed "the Sindhis 
did act stupidly, asking those questions" (interview, 13 February 1991, 
Karachi). The extent of this discriminatory process is impossible to 
determine now. The important point is that it is a part of a wider 
Xobajir mythology. XQX chief Altaf Hussain articulated this view when he 
claimed that the Movement is a "Mazloom Qauml Movement! ' (national 
movement of "the oppressed"]; (Star, 16 August 1990, Karachi). 
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The irony of the "oppression" scenario projected by some 
Mc? bajirs is that, relative to some others in Pakistan, the community 
began life in the State in a strong position, equalled only by the 
Punjabis. Just a few miles from the cities of Karachi or Hyderabad where 
the MQM is based, far more economically and politically "oppressed" 
conditions than most urbanites experience can be found among the 
Sindhis. The situation is one echoed in many societies, where increasing 
competition for limited resources becomes orchestrated in the sphere of 
ethnic politics, particularly when some form of state codification of 
community quotas is in operation. In India, Washbrook has observed a 
similar relationship between state intervention in the public sector 
labour market, and persistent "ethnic" politics (Vashbrook, 1989, p. 180). 
The danger is that once these perceptions take root and are propagated 
by such agencies as the MQM, they often distort the "realities" of 
relative opportunities on the ground, and hamper the opportunity for a 
broad-based ideological politics across the population. A rhetoric of 
discrimination can matter more for political mobilisations around state 
resources than the "facts" of ethnic or community based achievements and 
representations. 
NaWir identity and class 
Although ethnic politics can often deny the development of 
broad-based class politics, within ethnic communities there is often a 
class stratification, and this applies also to the Nobajlrs. The NobaJIr 
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community ranges from katchl abadl dwellers, through lower middle- 
class workers, to high-income groups. The true power-base*of the Xdbajir- 
movement is in the middle and lower income bands which form the bulk of 
the population of Karachi, and sizeable communities in Hyderabad and 
Sukkur. *'-' It is to these people that the MQM addresses itself quite 
specifically. Chapter 6 deals more extensively with who the Nobajirs are 
(or are said to be) in Karachi, and how they relate to various agencies 
of the local state. In the present context Table 4.6 shows a selection of 
Mobajirareas in Karachi and their likely income levels. 
At 1992 rates, Rs. 1,000 was approximately US$50, and it should 
be noted that the average household size of the katcbi abadis in Karachi 
is around seven people (discussion with Pervin Rehman of Orangi Pilot 
Project, 27 January 1992, Karachi). Thus, the socio-economic position of 
these Mbbajirýs is very different from middle or upper income Xbbaii-rs. 
For purposes of comparison, the average monthly income in January 1992 
of an office clerk with matriculation- level education would be around 
Rs. 2,000 (US$100), and a graduate assistant engineer around Rs. 5,000 
(US$250). 
An important question confronting communities that wish to 
achieve "subnationality" recognition, is whether such class differences 
can be subsumed within the national or subnational identity, and whether 
all strata of the community recognise themselves as members of the 
community. The feasibility of such vertical community unity depends on 
the use in nationalism of inclusive cultural or historic "stories". These 
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TABLE 4.6: Income levp. Is nf relected Kahajjr distrInts in Karachi 
District Xc? bajir Ave. monthly 
Chiragh Colony KA (Landhi) 
Karachi Airport Colony KA 
Orangi* 
83.7 750 - 1,000 (1988) 
89.1 750 - 2,000 (1988) 
65.0 2,000 (1989) 
Sources: Figures supplied by Sindh Katc-bi Abadis Authority, February 
1992, except for 
*t - OpplA. K. j Verbeijen, January 1990, p-10. 
stories help to form vertical bands in society, while economic factors 
divide the population between horizontal strata which cut across "ethnic" 
and nationalist community definitions. Thus, Germany's Third Reich in the 
1930s stressed the rhetoric of "Ein Volk' [one people], which united all 
Germans but separated them from neighbouring communities (Gellner, 1983, 
p. l4). 
In these terms, religion, language, or a collective historical 
memory can unite people without raising questions of economic 
differences. However, when the community identity becomes articulated by 
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a particular sub-nationalist party, such as the MQM, the unity of the 
community also depends on the political and economic programme of that 
party - in a sense, what the party "has to off er" its people when they 
rally behind an ethnic f lag. For example, higher-income capital or land- 
owning citizens in a community could be alienated by socialist or 
communist party-style policies that aimed to redistribute economic power 
and property. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the 1990r. have 
opened with a violent schism between sections of MQM supporters. The 
split has revolved around how far the party should broaden its appeal 
across ethnic and socio-economic boundaries. 
4.6 
Identity in Sindh involves a complex combination of the 
"multiple overlapping components" that Daniel Bell (Bell, 1975, p. 156) 
believes are the essence of ethnicity. Like the Census categories in 
former Yugoslavia, community groups in Sindh encompass ethnic, 
linguistic and religious groupings. The demands made by the leadership 
of these groups vary from winning a simple recognition of community 
status, to the gaining of community autonomy or even Independence, as is 
demanded by certain elements of the Sindhi nationalist movement. 
Many of the "ethnic" identities in Sindh, to the list of which 
the KQX leadership has sought to add the XcLajir's, are well-established 
and broadly recognised communities with long histories and apparently 
sound socio-cultural foundations. This is true of the Pakhtuns, about 
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whom Barth modelled a primordialist theory of ethnicity (Barth, 1969), 
and the Baluchis, about whom Gankovsky has written in similar terms 
(Gankovsky, 1982). It is also true in many respects of the Sindhis, 
which is a point of crucial significance in relation to the formation of 
a Mohajiz- identity in Sindh. 
Yet even within these seemingly hard-and-fast ethnic categories, 
some degree of confusion over the exact boundaries of group identities 
emerges. Sindhi society seems to sometimes encompass certain Baluchis 
living in the Province, even when they speak Baluchi in their own homes 
(this is the view of Sindhi nationalist Hamida Xhuhro, at least). 
Similarly, some ffohajirs, who the MQM and other Urdu-speaking leaders 
have sought to distinguish from Sindhis, are the product of mixed 
parentage and display features of both Sindhi and Mohajir society. Ahmed 
Rashid (Frida y *rimes, 3-9 January 1991, Lahore) estimates that there are 
some 200,000 such people in the city of Hyderabad alone, upon whom great 
pressure has been brought to bear from all sides of the ethnic divide in 
the province. Clearly for these people, there can be no definitive ethnic 
Ilgivens". 
I have shown that all the major community identities in Sindh 
display some paradoxical features in their definition, but in many ways 
Mohajir identity seems particularly difficult to def ine. For a start, it 
is a very new identity in Sindh. rhe term was first used in the Province 
around the time of Partition, when migrants and refugees arrived from 
India. However, at this time the term war. used with Islamic 
connotations, and referred, in official circles at least, to those who 
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had been compelled to move by religious persecution. Controversy and 
resentment quickly* arose in Sindh over the motives of later migrants 
who came to seek better economic opportunities. This controversy 
heightened as it became apparent that the system of compensation for 
abandoned property in India was being abused by many of the new 
settlers in Sindh. 
Yet the term Nobajir, particularly as used by the MQM (as I will 
show in the next chapter), refers specifically to the second or third 
. generations of migrant-offspring who were 
born and have lived in Sindh 
for years. Mdhajir- identity further seems to address Urdu-speakers with 
a heritage in central- northern India, rather than the descendents of 
Punjabi migrants who formed the largest group of migrants in both Sindh 
and Punjab. This is the f irst aspect in which the identity is a 
problematical one. The second involves a familiar device of ethnic and 
nationalist constructions; that of a selective use of history. In this 
nanner, Kobajlr identity-construction is not dissimilar from that of 
Sindhi identity, which also blurs the boundaries between ancient Indus 
civilizations and the people who currently live beside the Indus River. 
The purpose of a selective use of history in both cases is to 
arrogate virtues for each respective community. In the case of the 
Sindhis, the link to a prehistoric civilization suggests a propensity for 
technological and societal advancement that predates developments in 
neighbouring communities. In the case of the XdbaJ1rs the motives behind 
a selective use of history are not dissimilar, in that a certain 
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superiority of the community is implied by an emphasis on such factors 
as a beautiful language and personal sacrifice for Pakistan. 
However, the way in which pre-Independence history is 
selectively used by the Xc2bajir leadership implies a different 
relationship to the State in Pakistan than is intended by Sindhi 
nationalists. The elements of cultural arrogance that many XdbaJiz- 
leaders have promoted are intended to emphasise a particularly strong 
link to the foundations of the State of Pakistan. In a sense, XdbaJ1r 
leaders have suggested that their people are "more Pakistani" than those 
around them. In this way, the Bibar-is have fallen easily under the 
umbrella of the NobaJir movement, since many of them actively supported 
Pakistan at a time when the State was breaking up, often at great 
personal danger. This is certainly the view of some Sindhi nationalists, 
and particularly GA Syed who told me that he thought Pakistan was a 
"fraud" (inter-view, 13 March 1991, Karachi). Syed and his Sindhi 
nationalist colleagues are implying that Pakistan was only built as a 
coherent State through a deception and subordination of its constituent 
communities. We can see here the fundamental differences in "national 
vision" between the political leaders of the two major communities in 
Sindh province. 
This difference in political outloook is crucial to the 
development of a contemporary Xbbajir- identity in Sindh. The rhetoric of 
the MQM as to how Xabajir identity is constructed will be discussed 
further in the following chapter, but I would argue here that the actions 
and words of local non-Mobajirs have been especially important to the 
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progress made by the Xc7bajir- movement. Such processes of "ethnic rift" 
eventually gain their own momentum. In his theory of pluralist society, 
M. G. Smith postulated that multiethnic societies have a greater tendency 
for local disputes rapidly to become general inter-ethnic schisms (M. G. 
Smith, 1969, pp. 438-9). Events such as "the Hyderabad massacre" of 1988 
have shown this to be the case in Sindh. 
Yet it is not just violence that has induced a sense of 
alienation from Sindhis among the Xdbajir community. Certain Sindhi 
leaders have also promoted more subtle factors to distance Sindhis from 
Nobajir-s. One of the most important factors is a bond to "land". "You 
can't become a nation on someone else's land" claims Mumtaz Bhutto of 
the SNF (interview, 21 June 1991, London). Sentiments such as these 
among the Sindhi leadership have served only to alienate non-Sindhis. I 
have shown that, in the 1970s, when central government was headed by a 
charismatic and powerful Sindhi, the Xchajirs underwent some important 
changes. At this time, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto more than once 
referred to his "people" and his "land" as Sindhis and Sindh. Given the 
particular relationship of the Urdu-speaking community to the central 
state, as I have described it, such rhetoric could only have accelerated 
a sense of alienation within Sindh among the Nobajirs. 
The Nobajir movement has also been encouraged by economic 
factors. It can be argued that economic tensions in the urban areas are 
necessarily an important area for MQM campaigning, and in addressing 
these tensions the Movement draws on a socio-cultural rhetoric for 
legitimisation. On the one hand, administrative processes are central to 
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this factor. Washbrook claims that India's system of state-defined 
"communities" has encouraged ethnic mobilisation (Vashbrook, 1989, 
p. 180). Similarly, in Pakistan, it was the Bhutto period in the 1970s, 
which codified "nationalities" in relation to access to federal 
government employment, when the roots of the contemporary Nobajir- 
movement were sown. Secondly, the nature of politics in Pakistan is such 
that emotive community identifications are powerful techniques for 
mobilising groups to chase limited resources. By the end of the 1970s, 
the national Islamic party lamaat-l Islaml was facing a crisis of 
confidence among its potential electorate in Sindh's cities. This was 
because it had failed to address the economic problems of the young 
working-class population of Sindh's cities, and had freely allied with 
military regimes such as that of Ayub Khan. A void was created into 
which a newly redefined concept of ethnic politics has stepped. 
In these terms, the construction of a Nobajir identity must be 
closely linked with the question of political leadership. From this 
perspective, such an identity would be seen less as a spontaneous 
movement of oppressed people rising "from below", and more as a highly 
powerful and effective political force mobilised by Altaf Hussain and 
his colleagues in the nid-1980s. The justifications for such a view are 
many. Firstly, I will show later that the political arena into which 
Altaf Hussain stepped was that of a failed attempt at constructing a 
new political Nobajir, identity in the early 1970s. Some of the specific 
policies of this earlier movement were more radical than those later 
followed by the MQM, but the basic concept of a contemporary Xdbajir 
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identity based loosely on such factors as the Urdu language were much 
the same. This earlier movement won just a handful of votes in the 
elections of 1970. 
The nature of political leadership and the policies that it 
adopts relate principally to the way in which the battle for state 
control is waged. Jamaat-i Islaml had offered some access to 
representation and power through allying with the military regimes. In 
the first years of the Zia-ul Haq administration, Jamaat was the only 
political party granted the freedom to operate as such by the General, 
and acted as a close advisor to government. Yet by 1984, the party had 
become alienated by Zia's lack of substantial progress on the 
institutional isation of Islam, and even by the lack of democracy. 
Meanwhile, ethnic pressure-groups were emerging, particularly in the 
college and university campuses where Altaf Hussain was launching the 
MQM. We can now turn to a more detailed analysis of the development of 
Xobajir, political mobilisation under the MQM. 
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FOOTNOTES: 
1. BBC 2,31 July 1992; "East - Held to Ransom" 
2, Channel 4 (Barraclough Carey), 14 November 1990; "Despatches - Kingmaker of 
Karachi', 
3, The 'aide memoiren is a description of research (see appendix one), that introduces 
the main themes of discussion and the aims of research, to initiate the interview, In 
this case the description was handed to the respondent in cases where English could be 
read, while in the quoted example of Cantori and Benedict, the "aide memoire" was 
retained by the interviewer, and used as a reminder of questions to be asked, 
4, The assistant was recruited through the "favours for friends" principle; a strong 
one in South Asia, In this case, a friend and former business associate of a family in 
London known to the author offered assistance willingly through having been 
recommended by his friends in London, 
5, Vang", "The News' and 'Dawn', 22 January 1992, Karachi, 
6, The Awami National Party emerged in 1986, under the Pakhtun nationalist Wali Khan, 
son of the famous Frontier leader of the early twentieth century, Abdul 6haffar Khan, 
The party is nominally not a nationalist one, but is heavily supported by Pakhtuns to 
the exclusion of other communities, 
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7, The bulk of the Hindus in Sindh -(45%: Herald, Election Special, October 1990, 
Karachi, p, 59) live in the arid rural district of Tharparkar in the south-east, a 
district that borders Rajasthan and Kathiawar in India, Sindh as a whole houses some 
95% of Pakistan's Hindus, totalling around 1,4 million (Herald, ibid), 
8, The Sabri Aasjid [Babri mosque] in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, India, was the source 
of a dispute with Hindu groups led by the BJP, who claimed that the mosque was sited 
on the birthplace of the Hindu god Rama (an incarnation of Vishnu), Militant 
supporters of the BJP led an assault upon the mosque in December 1992, which saw it 
torn down by bare hands, 
9.1 would have liked to conduct more formal interviews with lfohaiirs (and others) to 
see how they responded to the rhetoric of the MQM (and thus to establish the 
Movement's true bases of support), For various reasons, this was not feasible, I was 
able, however, to collect information on this issue frop a large number of informal 
interviews and discussions and from talks with journalists, activists and others, It 
seems clear to me that the MQM has targeted what it calls lower middle-class Adhajir 
households for particular support, along with students and other "educated people" and 
that such people have been especially resonsive to its economic and ethnic rhetorics, 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter I explained how contemporary Xdbajir 
identity in Sindh differs from the identities of other groups in the 
Province with longer histories of community presence. I suggested that 
the difference lies not only in outward community features and 
characteristics such as language or socio-cultural heritage, but also in 
the relationship of the community to the state at its various levels. 
The N6haj1r-s of Sindh have a declared affinity with the State of 
Pakistan, from which the community appears to feel isolated within its 
location in the Province of Sindh. This alienation is heightened by the 
stance of Sindhi nationalists towards the national state, which is 
largely antagonistic and irreconcilable. For Sindhi political leaders the 
most important state structure is Sindh itself. Their aim is to effect 
the secession of the Province as a new State in which Sindhis are 
dominant. 
These socio-political relationships between communities and 
between a community and the state help to determine the processes of 
identity-construction and political mobilisation in a community. Clapham 
has suggested that the "Third Vorld" state is characterised. by what he 
calls "a structure of control" over political and administrative 
insitutions inherited from the former colonial power (Clapham, 1985, 
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p. 39), and that "where the state provides a source of power and wealth 
entirely disproportionate to that available from any other organised 
force within society, the quest for state power takes on a pathological 
dimension" Mid, p. 40). 
In these terms, the political leaders of a community will 
determine their policy with reference to that community's particular 
relationship to the state. I have already argued that Altaf Hussain and 
his colleagues consciously - and rapidly - constructed a MdbajIr 
identity at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s. Before this 
time, the f ew attempts at the same goal made by leaders such as 
Muzaffar Hussain had suggested that there was little support among the 
Urdu-speakers of Sindh for a political Nobajlz- identity. Thus, the MQM 
has consciously been the primary agent of the contemporary XdhajIr 
movement in Sindh, and has largely promoted mythologies which underpin 
an emergent Mobajlr identity. 
The apparent weaknesses and paradoxes of the Mobajir identity 
in Sindh that I described in the previous chapter (in terms of its 
temporal inconsistency) might suggest that the MQM's "ethnic" agenda was 
merely a strategy for winning power. However, I have also suggested that 
there are valid urban economic foundations for some form of "community" 
among the XdbaJIrs of Sindh. The question facing this chapter is how the 
MQM has identified and built upon this sense of community in its 
mobilisation of a ffohajIr identity, and how it has directed itself 
towards winning power for the community. Because of the community's 
relationship to the state in Pakistan, power has been sought at both the 
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provincial and national levels. In Section Three I will focus further on 
the micro-level of politics in the Mdbaj1z- movement, and examine how 
important the local state in urban Sindh has been to the MQM. 
In this chapter I examine the nature and development of the 
MQM, encompassing the party's structure, rhetoric and leadership. To 
examine such a Movement it is sometimes useful to adopt the terminology 
of contemporary deve loping- world political studies. With reference to 
elements of the MQM such as the leadership of Altaf Hussain, who was at 
the helm of the Movement until late 1992, it is therefore necessary to 
discuss charisma, described by Clapham in wider developing world 
contexts (Clapham, 1985, p. 46), in addition to clientalism, eclecticism 
and aspects of political "theatre". All of these concepts are essential 
to the story of the XQM. 
As a single political agency which claims to represent the 
ethnic movement of the Xchajirs, the MQM represents a complex 
combination of "movement" and "party". In many ways the MQM has failed 
to present a coherent political programme, preferring to rely on ethnic 
or vague ideological rhetoric. In many respects, the Movement can be 
described as secular, democratic and economically "progressive" in style, 
and formed on the basis of protecting and promoting the Urdu-speaking 
community of urban Sindh. Yet its main policies varied between three 
distinct phases between 1984 and 1992, and generally have been eclectic 
and based largely on vague promises rather than on detailed plans. 
Proposed principles and aims have often been at variance with actions, 
and a controversial involvement in violence and intimidation has 
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alienated many potential supporters. The student- orig ins of the MQM have 
persisted in the form of the APMSO (now the "student wing" of the MQM), 
and have heavily influenced both the policies and structure of the 
Movement to date. Finally, by once presenting itself as an "ethnic" 
party, the MQK has defined a finite constituency beyond which it is 
proving difficult to expand. In many ways, the MQM presents the sort of 
complexity in Third World politics that Manor claims is making orthodox 
political theory there seem increasingly inappropriate (Manor, 1991, 
p. D. This complexity will be examined in detail, and with reference to 
examples from elsewhere in the developing world. 
This chapter presents the story of the MQH in four main 
sections. rhe first section describes- the methodology used in my 
research to analyse the MQM, and the principal sources of primary 
material. The second section presents a political history of the Xohajlz- 
movement, from the events and developments preceding the MQM, to the 
rise and fall of the MQM itself -a period spanning from the launch of 
the party in 1984 to its virtual collapse by 1993. In the third section, 
the policies and ideologies of the Movement over the eight years of its 
rise and fall are critically examined, while the following section looks 
at the MQM's internal structure, including its funding and organisation, 
and the role of the leader, Altaf Hussain. The concluding section of the 
chapter places the NQM and its politics in the wider context of 
"polities" and political movements in postcolonial developing countries. 
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5.2 XETHODOLOGY 
The sources of primary material used f or analysing Nobajir 
political mobilisation in this research are principally the interviews, 
less formal discussions and press archives outlined in the previous 
chapter. In addition to such material, this chapter utilises further 
important sources of primary information. The first of these sources is 
electoral data from the Election Commission of Pakistan (Islamabad), the 
Provincial Election Authority (Karachi), and the press (various). 
Secondly, official party statements and documents, in Urdu and English, 
have been examined. Aside from such sources, use is made of various 
discussions and observations, such as attendance at a workers' rally 
addressed by Altaf Hussain (Abbasi Sbabeed Hospital, Nazimabad, Karachi, 
13 March 1991), discussions with well-wishers visiting Altaf Hussain in 
hospital (19 January 1991, and 13 March 1991, Karachi), and tours of 
observation in Karachi and Hyderabad. 
The party documents principally concern those of the NQM and 
PPP. However, interviews and discussions were held with other political 
parties, as. follows: 
- Xdbaj! r Qaumi Kovement (NQM) 
- Nobajir rttebad Tebrik (MIT) 
- Pakistan People's Party (PPP) 
- National Democratic Party (NDP) 
- Islaml Tamboor-i Ittebad UJI) 
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- Jamaat-I Islami 
Jlye Sindb 
Jiye Sindb Front (Khuhro Group) 
- Sindh National Front (SNF) 
- Qauml Nabaz-e Azadl (QKA) 
- Pakistan Minority Front (PMF) 
In the case of the MQM and PPP, discussions were held with 
various leaders and members. With many of the smaller parties, however, 
interviews were held principally with one leader, including Sirdar Mazari 
(NDP), Professor Ghafoor Ahmed Uanaat-i Islami), Mijmtaz Bhutto (SNF) 
and Mairaj Xohaimmad Khan (QHA). 
In general terms, the aim was to use a broad range of primary 
sources. Care was taken to obtain an appreciation of the precise 
language used by political actors and by MQM leaders and activists in 
particular. To this end, an appraisal of written Urdu was developed as 
part of the research programme, so that party documents in Urdu could 
be analysed in detail. In terms of events and details used in the 
chronology 
. 
(section 5.3) and elsewhere, efforts were made to 
substantiate events and claims by using more than one documentary 
source where possible. 
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5.3 HISTORY OF XOHAJER MATIONALISX 
Period 1: 1970-78. 
Dr. Mohammad Waseem (Dawn, 8 May 1990, Karachi) has attempted 
to chart the decline of JVdbaJ1r- interest and power in the main organs of 
the state of Pakistan in the early years following Independence, in the 
form of a somewhat unwieldy table, reproduced here as Table 5.1. We can 
see that in the first period (1947-58), JYdbaJ1. rs apparently were 
dominant in all sectors other than the army. During the military rule 
that followed, however (1958-71), NobaJirs became relegated to last place 
in politics, and by the tine of General Zia's takeover in 1977, had also 
slipped to second place in the bureaucracy, behind Punjabis (ibid). 
Finally, the table also suggests that political influence has been 
restored to the XdbaJ1. r community after a period of alienation in the 
1977-88 period, possibly by the XQM. 
The table is not based on any f irm empirical data, and it 
probably acts as much as one Xchajlr's view of his community's history 
within Pakistan as a description of "actual" community relationships 
with the state over 45 years. However, certain basic points about the 
years of Independence for the Urdu-speaking community of Sindh are 
usefully made in Dr Waseem's Table. The single key factor is the element 
of the political alienation of the JYdbaJ1r community within the State of 
Pakistan, particularly in relation to the Punjabi community. This 
alienation grows from an initial position of dominant community 
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[Community power ranked on a scale of 'A, B, C, O', from highest to lowest 
respectively; Bureaucracy, Army, Business and Politics] 
Com-munit .y Bureau'y A=IY- Blmaý FQL 
KohaLjirs A0AA 
Punjabis BAcB 
Sindhis/Pakhtuns/Bengalis 000c 
Baluchis 0000 
Punjabis B A B B 
Mohajirs A 0 A 0 
Bengalis c 0 0 c 
Pakhtuns 0 c 0 c 
Sindhis 0 0 0 c 
Baluchis 0 0 0 0 
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(TABLE 16 cont. ) 
Punjabis B A B A 
Kohajirs A 0 A 0 
Sindhis c 0 0 c 
Pakhtuns 0 c 0 c 
Baluchis 0 0 0 c 
Punjabis A A B B 
Kohajirs B 0 A 0 
Sindhis c 0 0 c 
Pakhtuns 0 c 0 c 
Baluchis 0 0 0 c 
Punjabis A A A c 
Mohajirs B 0 B c 
Sindhis c 0 0 c 
Pakhtuns 0 c 0 c 
Baluchis 0 0 0 c 
Source: Mobammad Vaseem, Dawn 8 jYa7 19-90, Xaracbl- 
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representation in the immediate post- Independence period, - (in 
that representation of the "migrant community" in the first government 
of Pakistan greatly outweighed the size of this community in relation to 
others within the national population), and is balanced by a steady 
dominance of the community in other sectors such as business and 
bureaucracy. 
It is not easy to determine the degree of representation of 
different communities and political groups in Pakistan before 1970, 
however, as the State was woefully lacking in democratic processes. The 
Presidential Elections of 1965 in which Ayub Khan faced Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah's sisiter Fatima, did suggest that the cities of Karachi and Dacca 
acted differently, in political terms, from most of the rest of Pakistan. 
It was in these two cities that Jinnah scored her only victories. It. 
should be noted, however, that Ayub's "Basic Democracy" system, under 
which 80,000 representatives cast the final votes, was a system 
vulnerable to the sort of "feudal" political bargaining that operates 
most effectively in rural areas where waderas, Pir-s and tribal chiefs 
hold sway. In this sense, the election of 1965 was hardly an exercise in 
full democracy, 
In East Pakistan, in particular, popular opposition to the 
military regime was mounting by the end ot' the 1960s. In 1969, Ayub 
stepped down, handing the mantle of power to General Yahya Khan, who 
finally scheduled general elections for 1970. The results of these 
elections, and the political aftermath that led to the creation of 
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Bangladesh in 1971, have been described in Chapter 2. It is useful to 
focus here an what was happening in urban Sindh at this tine. 
Before the December 1970 elections it had already become clear 
in West Pakistan that the Sindhi politician Zulfikar Ali Bhutto would 
sweep the elections. Among the Kohajir community of urban Sindh, two 
figures stood out as vocal opponents to this prospect. One was Yawab 
Muzaffar Hussain, who formed the Sindh-Karachi-Punjabi-Pakhtun-Nobajiz- 
Mahaz (SKMPPMM) [Sindh-Karach i- Punjab i-Pa kh tun- NobaJir- Front] in 1970, 
to contest five urban constituencies in Sindh and one in Multan, Punjab, 
where a concentrated community of Urdu-speakers are situated (Dawn 7 
December 1970, Karachi). The rhetoric of the Xabaz included a : foreboding 
appraisal of Jiye Sindh, described as an "affront to the Muslims of 
Sindh ... a conspiracy of Bbarat (India] and Hindus" (Dawn, 2 November 
1970, Karachi). Such terminology betrayed a fear that a Bhutto 
administration would give a fillip to Sindhi secessionists, which, I will 
show, is exactly the anti-State of Pakistan "conspiracy" rhetoric 
deployed by the MQM after 1988. The Kabaz also set a precedent for the 
XQM by condemning both wader-as and traditional Islamic parties, 
particularly Jamaat-l Islami (Dawn, 2 November, fbid). 
In this way, the SKPPMM voiced some of the concerns that I 
demonstrated are important to MobaJIr- identity in Sindh. Me most 
important of these is a sense of loyalty to the State of Pakistan per 
se, and in the case of the SKPPMM, an alliance with other communities in 
Sindh who are felt to be similarly "patriotic". Just as importantly, the 
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Sindhis are not only pointedly excluded from this grouping, but are 
portrayed as dangerous secessionists or anti-Pakistan elements. 
A second notably vocal Xobajir leader in the early 1970s was 
Mahmud-ul. Haq Usmani, secretary-general of the National Awami Party 
(NAP), whose policy for Sindh amounted to a forthright demand for the 
"separation" of Karachi, Hyderabad and other areas from the Province of 
Sindh (Dawn, 5 July and 10 July 1972, Karachi). Usmani still lives in 
Sindh, although he now advocates integration in the province, acting as 
Convenor of the Sindh Unity Board in the late 1980s. It is interesting 
to note that in an article discussing Xdhajir, nationality (Dawn, 27 May 
1987, Karachi), Usmani reproduces the Nohajir community "myth" presented 
in the previous chapter, namely that minority-province Muslims were at 
the forefront of the Pakistan movement, and that all Kuslim migrants 
left India due to communal rioting. 
In the elections of December 1970/January 1971, the PPP were 
victorious in West Pakistan with 61% of the vote (Burki, 1980, p. 56) and 
formed the new Government of Pakistan (in coalition with the National 
Awami Party in NWFP and the JUI in Baluchistan). In Sindh, certain 
ethnic Nobajir- leaders (such as Muzaffar Hussain and Usmani) again 
began warning of Sindhi hegemony in the Province, particularly with the 
passing of the Sindhi Language Bill of July 1972. 
Across Sindh Province, the elections had seen the urban areas at 
variance again with the electoral situation elsewhere in the country. 
Most Xbbajir localities were behind Islamic parties such as Jamaat-i 
Islaml and Able Sunnat [Sunni Muslims; led by Naulana Noorani who now 
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Party Vote (Z) NA Seats'*' 
PPP 27.3 2 
lamat-1 Islaml 22.7 2 
Able Sunnat 20.1 2 
Ansari (Independent) 4.8 1 
JUI 3.3 
National Awami Party (Wali Khan) 1.0 
Others/Independents 20.8 
TOTAL 100.0 7 
Source: Dawn, 9 December 1970, KaracbI. 
f- Zational Assembly. 
heads the JUPI, which won its only seats in Karachi. The SKMPPMM 
achieved very little support anywhere in Sindh (or in the one seat it 
contested in Punjab). Meanwhile, the traditional Xc2baJIr strongholds in 
Karachi of Liaquatabad and Nazimabad were won by the lamaat-l Islaml, 
o, o -n 
ý5 7_.. r7 
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with 40.6% and 36.3% of the vote respectively (seats NW 132 and 131; 
Dawn, 9 December, ibid). Able Sunnat won seats in Landhi/Korangi and 
Ranchore Lines area, with 36.8% and 31.8% of the vote respectively (NV 
128 and 134, ibid). The full picture in Karachi is shown in Table 5.2. 
The "pro-Urdu" lobby at the time of the 1972 Language Bill 
disturbances comprised the Karachi Citizens Committee, Karachi Suba 
[province] Conference (a secessionist group 'demanding the separation of 
Karachi from Sindh; Dawn, 8 July 1972, Karachi), the Karachi University 
Students' Union, the SKMPPMM, the All Pakistan Young Sbia Nutalbat 
["demands"] Party, the National Awami Party (Naulana Bhashani Group), 
I. H. Qureshi (former vice-chancellor of Karachi University) and various 
other "observers" including Syed Muhammad Taqi (ediýor at the tine of 
*Jan8l'). 
It also seems apparent that Islamic leaders, such as Naulana 
Abdul Hamid Khan Ehashani of the ITAP (who achieved 3.4% of the Karachi 
vote in 1970, with just under 17% in the Nazimabad area; Dawn, 9 
December 1970, Karachi), Professor Ghafoor Ahmed of . 7amaat-1 Islaml and 
Naulana loorani of Able Sunnat, were vocally opposed to Bhutto's Sindh- 
oriented regime. 
Indeed, in this early phase, when XdbaJIrs were represented by 
various disparate groups, we see the seeds of a more galvanised Xdbaj1. r 
subnationalism being sown. The link is provided by two factors. Firstly, 
the specific types of groups and leaders involved, such as the student 
element centring on Karachi University and an openly secessionist 
element (represented now by the MIT), became important in the Xc2baj1. r 
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movement of the 1980s. Secondly, on Dccasions. the rhetoric and issues 
raised by the "pro-Urdu" lobby were strikingly similar to those employed 
later by Altaf Hussain and the MQM. For example, on the eve of the 1970 
elections, Maulana Bhashani was talking, in terms resonant with much of 
South Asian politics in general, of poorer people also having access to 
the assemblies, rather than Just the "jagirdars (wealthy landowners] and 
industrialists" (Dawn, 29 November 1970, Karachi). Compare this 
sentiment with that expressed by Altaf Hussain in 1991: 
"A few families have for a long time ruled this 
country. It is impossible for common, poor, middle 
class to come into politics, in Assemblies, parliament 
... MQM has proved that it wants rule of 98% rather 
than rule of 2%" 
(interview, 13 March 1991, Karachi). 
Similarly, the All Pakistan Young Shia Mutalbat Party (APYSHP) was at 
one point qalling for "compensation" to be paid by the government to 
victims of rioti-ng. in Karachi. I will show that this was a very familiar 
cry in urban Sindh after 1988. These rhetorical devices describe 
important aspects of the people forming - and supporting - the MQM. In 
particular, we can see an urbanised, populist form of rhetoric, which 
would seem strange coming from Sindhi nationalists, who themselves are 
often these wealthy landowners and "jagirdard'. The Nobajir leaders are 
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thus appealing to different sentiments in the urban areas of Sindh than 
are voiced usually in the rural areas. I will argue that this is an 
important point -when considering the "political void" in urban areas 
that the MQM successfully addressed in its early years. 
The Zulfikar Ali Bhutto era was central to the intellectual 
foundations of XdbajIr nationalism in establishing administrative 
procedures that "compartmentalised" Sindh and Pakistan society, and in 
promoting regional cultures such as that of the Sindhis. One of the most 
damaging perceptions that developed among the XdbajIz- community was 
that administrative procedures were being based on spurious assessments 
of the size of the population of urban Sindh. 
The quota assigned to SJ. ndhls urban areas was calculated by 
assessing the size of cities over 100,000 in population under the 1972 
Census. In practice this signified the three cities of Karachi, Hyderabad 
and Sukkur. Karachi itself was assessed at 3.515 million people in 1972 
(Government of Pakistan, Federal Bureau of Statistics, 1982, p. 15). This 
would signify an average annual growth rate of the city since 1951 of 
5.84%1, if census figures are used. There is a claim, voiced by the 
Nobajlr writer M. A. Siddiqui (interview, 26 January 1991, Karachi) that 
in a Sindh High Court writ in 1973 (still unheard; Herald, May 1991, 
p. 52), the interior ministry in 1972 was proved to have. ordered a 
deliberate under-enumeration of urban Sindh by around 12.5%. However, a 
growth rate of 5.8% per annum in Karachi is close to unofficial 
estimates of its current rate (inter-view with KDA director Abu Shamim 
Arif, 12 April 1991, Karachi). Indeed, the problem of adequate assessment 
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of the urban areas seems to arise later with the Martial Law authorities 
of General Zia. The 1981 Census suggests *a 4.2% growth rate per annum in 
Karachi since 1972. It seems unlikely that either the birth rate, the 
rate of migration, or the combination of the two in urban Sindh, would 
have reduced so much between the 1960s/70s and 1970s/80s. In these 
terms, the belief in urban Sindh in the 1970s that the Quota System was 
based on an unfair enumeration of cities in Sindh, seems to be a 
plausible element of a historical "mythology" that necessarily has to 
base itself on uncertain details. Indeed, a charge of under-enumeration 
would apply more directly to the Zia period. 
Again, however, the important point is how such factors are 
perceived, since nobody can know the "true" f igures in such a situation 
(this is especially so in Pakistan, where most Censuses since 
Independence are believed to have been innaccurate). Furthermore, the 
extension of the Quota System for another ten years in 1983, based on 
the same original figures, ensured that the issue continued to be 
explosive into the 1990s. These factors are potentially effective foci 
for rhetorical mobilisation by political orators, and I will later show 
how the XQX capitalised on them. 
Period 2: 1978-84 
The f irst period had seen a sudden, yet apparently isolated, 
explosion of pro-Kc7bajir- sentiment in Sindh's major urban areas, in 
1972. The following years saw a growing opposition to the Bhutto 
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government in the urban areas, and particularly in urban Sindh under the 
leadership of Jamaat-l Islaml. Political opposition to Bhutto did not, 
however, include any form of political mobilisation directed specifically 
at the MdbajIrs at this time. 
The second period saw the emergence of the student group APMSO 
in Karachi in 1978, a group which would be a direct forerunner of the 
MQM. Student politics have always been explosive and significant in 
Pakistan, as in many other developing countries, not least since all the 
major political parties have active and sometimes effectively semi- 
autonomous student wings which enact wider conflicts and clashes in the 
grounds of colleges and universities. Students at Dacca University had 
set the scene for political involvement as early as February 1952, when 
a demonstration against the official status of Urdu turned into a bloody 
confrontation with police. In Karachi, certain institutions also rose to 
the political forefront, including Urdu College, and Karachi University 
(the latter established in 1951). 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's tenure in central government ended on 5 
July 1977, when Army Chief of Staff General Zia took over in Islamabad 
with a group of loyal federal ministers, following the elections in 
March 1977. The PPP had claimed to have won 77.5% of seats and 58% of 
the national vote in the elections (figures supplied by Election 
Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1991), and this unleashed a popular 
protest by the opposition Pakistan National Alliance TNA) who claimed 
the elections had been rigged. 
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The protest was led by the principal member of the PNA, Jamaat- 
i Islami, whose geographical focus of support ensured that popular 
unrest unleashed by the the PNA was largely centred on Karachi. Esposito 
claims that, at this time, Friday prayers and sermons in the city's 
mosques became highly politicised (Esposito, 1986, p. 342). Tamaat 
managed to mobilise frustrated industrial workers, the unemployed and 
students in the major urban centres of Sindh (Akmal Hussain, 1989, 
p. 230), where the impact of agitation on the national economy is always 
felt most. 
In the early 1970s, the Sbia student group APYSMP, based at the 
university in Karachi, had shown itself to be active and vocal at such 
times as the promulgation of the Language Bill. The Nobajlr- student 
community had been dominated up to 1978, however, by the student wing 
of the Tamaat-1 Islami, the Islaml Jamiat-i Talaba (IJT). This group 
confronted other groups such as the Jiye Sindh Students Federation, the 
People's Student Federation and the Baluchi Students' Organisation, who 
largely represented Sindhi and other communities. rhus, in the Nobajlr 
student community an Islamic group was dominant in contrast to the 
ethnic groups that dominated the student populations of other 
communities. The importance of such student groups to the politics of 
developing-world countries is often far greater than the relatively 
limited resources available to such groups. Clapham cites the examples 
of Sudan and Thailand in 1964 and 1973 respectively, in which 
apparently strong regimes were felled by student-led movements (Clapham, 
1985, p. 83). In Pakistan, the size and importance of Karachi and its 
-248- 
educational institutions has determined that student politics exercise a 
considerable leverage on the general political situation, not least since 
the introduction of firearms to the campuses in the late 1970s. 
The IJT was the least well-equipped party intellectually to deal 
with the burgeoning number of ethnic groups that were growing to f ight 
for their niches in the colleges, since it was nominally an anti- 
regionalist "national" party. All student groups became powerful and 
aggressive, setting-up intimidating stalls and offices at applications 
fairs to trade the all-important domicile certificates. There was also an 
increasing resort to arms by the groups, prompted by the flood of 
weapons into Pakistan after the escalation of the Afghan war across the 
border. In August 1979, Kalashnikov rifles were brandished for the first 
time on the Karachi University campus, as the new Students' Union 
president Husain Haqqani (of the IJT, later an advisor to Nawaz Sharif) 
deployed an armed escort at a swearing-in ceremony (Viewpoint, 20 July 
1989, Lahore). 
Student life had become "ethnic-oriented" in all spheres, from 
admissions, to the control of canteens, bus-services and social groups 
(discussion with former Karachi University student, 27 March 1991, 
Karachi). It is difficult to determine why such a political process 
should have accelerated at this time. Sindh University academic Zafar 
Hassan Shah observes that the 1973 Constitution, framed under the first 
Bhutto government, was more centralising than that of 1962, over which 
Ayub Khan presided, and made no provision for a "provincial list" of 
powers (Zafar Hassan Shah, 1983, p. 160). This centralising aspect of the 
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Bhutto government, which was present despite rhetoric concerning -the 
encouragement of provincial cultures, may have inadvertently prompted a 
narrow regionalist politics. Another possible explanation involves the 
bankruptcy of Islamic politics at the end of the 1970s, over which 
Bhutto performed somersaults in the last months of his rule to try and 
calm the criticism from the Jamaat-i IsIami-led opposition. 
Among some Nobajir students disillusion with the way that the 
"national" IJT tackled the political situation in Karachi probably led in 
part to a group of Karachi University students forming their own 
"ethnic" Nobajir- group. On 11 June 1978, Altaf Hussain, Azin Ahmed Tariq, 
Saleem Haider, Imran Faroaq and ten others announced the formation of 
the APMSO. The "All Pakistan" element in the name ot the group reflected 
the pro-Pakistan sentiments of the Nobajirs, yet the ethnic nature of 
the group's politics meant that it was firmly based in Karachi (and in 
Hyderabad shortly afterwards). 
Many believe that the prominence of the IJT before the 
formation of the APMSO indicates that Altaf and others were previously 
members of the IJT (in addition to the common Sbia factor; the sect that 
, Tamaat priný-Apally represents). The official MQM line is that this is not 
the case (inter-view with MQM worker Syed Manzoor Yazdani, 4 December 
1991, London). Indeed, the MQX will condemn Islamic "fundamentalists". 
One MQM women's worker claimed that "Islam has been exploited, 
especially by General Zia and the Jamaat-l Islami ........ They never did 
anything for the people" (interview, 8 February 1991, Karachi). This 
reflects the way in which many Xdbaj1x-s became disillusioned with the 
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ability of the Islamic parties to address everyday problems in urban 
Sindh, and perhaps explains why the new ethnic approach of the APMSO 
was successful as a result. In the campuses, the APMSO and IJT are now 
enemies, of ten engaging in armed skirmishes. (Clashes in 
January /February 1991 left some students dead; see Dawn, 30 January 
1991, Karachi). 
The MQM leadership's ambivalent stance on the traditional 
Islamic parties, and its general lack of Islamic rhetoric, means that it 
is unlikely that Altaf Hussain and others were actually members of IJT 
previously (in addition to them having been too young before 1978 to be 
important members of any political group). The matter cannot be easily 
verified, however, and remains a favourite topic for speculation in urban 
Sindh. At the lower levels of support and membership, it seems clear 
that the APHSO did draw many from the ranks of the IJT (interview with 
Zafaryab Ahmed of "Viewpoint", 25 February 1991, Lahore), particularly so 
in the city of Hyderabad. 
Azim Ahmed Tariq claims that Mobajlrs felt "threatened" in 
educational institutions by other groups, and that they "could only stop 
all this by Joining hands" (interview, 6 February 1991, Karachi). Altaf 
Hussain's personal assistant Nadeem Nusrat was more explicit in 
describing the problems faced at the notorious "admissions fairs", and 
more generally, as follows: 
"Problems have included the behaviour of Sindhis in 
educational institutions. Ve are pushed around, beaten, 
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our documents torn, we are threatened as . 
'outsiders"' 
(inter-view, 13 March 1991, Karachi). 
While the extent of such activities as domicile-fraud is 
probably greatly exaggerated in the politics of Karachi's campuses, there 
is no doubt that most ethnic student groups have been intimidatory 
towards their rivals. Aside from this fact, however, there is the more 
fundamentally disturbing problem of limited educational opportunities. 
The importance of this to the perception of sampled Nobajir students has 
been described in the previous chapter. Karachi has only one general 
university (in addition to one small and specifically engineering 
"university") and no polytechnic or similar institution. Failure to 
achieve a place at college or university is made worse when students 
perceive that non-Mobajirs have reached university with much lower 
performances in exams due to regional quota arrangements (interview 
with Nobajir- matriculation students, 8 February 1991, Karachi2). As the 
population of Karachi grows, Karachi University's three thousand places 
become ever more coveted by a swelling number of applications. The 
University claims that, in 1989, the ratio of suitable applications to 
places was at least three to one (figures supplied by Karachi 
University, April 1991). The frustration of students becomes worse as it 
becomes perceived that even with qualifications the quest for employment 
in Sindh is not made much easierO. Unemployment and student poliitcs 
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are a potent mix in South Asia (as elsewhere), as can be seen in Kashmir 
and India's Jharkhand, 
The rise of the APMSO in Karachi was rapid and effective, with 
the group soon replacing the IJT as the most influential student body in 
the city. The organisation also gained a reputation for militaristion and 
violence. A key event in the history of student politics in urban Sindh 
was a battle between the APMSO and the PSF at Karachi University on 8 
July 1989, following the announcement of admissions for the following 
academic year. The battle was accompanied by the kidnapping of many PSF 
members (Newsline, February 1990, Karachi), and the posting of an army 
"Rangers" unit on the University campus for the first time in its 
history (Viewpoint, 20 July 1989, Lahore>. 
The work of Altaf Hussain and Azim Tariq with the APMSO saw 
them expelled from Karachi University in 1980 (interview with Azim 
Ahmed Tar1q, 13 February 1991, Karachi). The organisation survived, 
however, and expanded its "offices" (often located within the grounds of 
colleges such as DJ College, Karachi; see Figure 5.1) across Karachi and 
Hyderabad. Altaf Hussain left Pakistan to spend some time with family 
members in the United States, but returned in 1983/84 to make his next 
major political move. 
Period 3.1984 - 1993 
As hated as the Z. A. Bhutto years and its associated measures 
were in the cities of Sindh, Zia's arrival in 1977 heralded little 
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improvement. One of his first acts was the banning of all political 
organisations. The Quota System, despised by many XbbaJ12-s, was also 
extended (Viewpoint, 13 July 1989, Lahore). By 1984, the original group 
of fourteen founder members of APMSO had fallen broadly into two camps. 
First, there were those XobaJIrs demanding the "separation" of major 
urban areas of Sindh, to form a new suba (province]. Meanwhile, some 
other Nohajirs were talking only of achieving "due rights" for their 
community within Sindh. 
The secessionist group was led by Saleem Haider, by then a 
practising doctor in Karachi, who launched the Nobajlr Ittahad Tahrik 
(MIT) in March 1984 Untparview with Dr. Saleem Haider, 11 February 1991, 
Karachi). This group echoes the Karachi Suba Conference of the early 
1970s, which wanted the establishment of Karachi Division as a separate 
Province. As Dr. Haider explained, "we are working on the bifurcation 
of the province; only this will solve the problems" (ibid). The MIT 
incorporates a fair amount of ethnic chauvinism directed at the Sindhis, 
who Dr. Haider describes as gudban [donkeys; ibid]. 
However, Haider failed to enrol many of the former APMSO 
leaders Into the MIT, while Altaf Hussain and Azim Ahmed Tariq were 
more successful in attracting members to their organisation. Syed 
Muhammad Taqi, erstwhile editor of Jan8- and observer at the "pro-Urdu', 
lobby in July 1972, claims that in early 1984 Altaf Hussain came to him, 
as a senior intellectual Xdbajir figure in Karachi, f or -advice on the 
nature of a new political movement (interview with S. M. Taqi, 13 January 
1991, Karachi). At this time, Altaf was' thinking along the lines of an 
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ethnic Xdbaj1r forum (ibid) and Saleem Haider's moves in March may have 
made up his mind. Five days later, on 18 March 19b4, the MQM war. 
launched. While Altaf had lobbied influential Xobajiz- intellectuals in 
Karachi such as Taqi, he decided to build a "grassroots" party among the 
working classes and students of urban Sindh. In the early days, much of 
the groundwork was done by Altaf, Tariq and others, who went from door 
to door in Karachi seeking interest and financial support (interview 
with sub-editor of "The Star", Osman Yami, 27 January 1991, Karachi). By 
1986 the work had born fruit, and the Movement became recognised as an 
established political party in urban Sindh (despite the fact that 
political parties were officially illegal at this time). 
I would argue that the subsequent political chronology of the 
MQM can usefully be examined with reference to three main phases, 
between each of which significant developments in the Movement occurred. 
XQK: Early Phase; 1984-88 
The early phase of MQM development is marked by a relatively 
rapid rise of the Movement to political "hegemony" in urban Sindh. The 
rhetoric of the Movement at this time was largely "ethnic", in that it 
condemned immigration into Sindh, particularly by Afghan refugees. The 
MQM projected the XobaJIrs as a "subnationality" alongside the Sindhis 
(that is, allied to the Sindhis in policy but not in terms of their 
identity). It also demanded that the XobaJir community be officially 
recognised in the Constitution as a "nationality" of Pakistan. After 
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1985, large-scale rioting began to emerge in Karachi, principally between 
Pakhtuns and Nobajirs (the latter often incorporating Bibaris). With this 
development, the MQM emerged as an avowedly ethnic force supporting the 
Bibarls and NdbaJIrs against "attacks", and condemning the government 
and police for fomenting the violence. As a result, Altaf Hussain and 
some of his colleagues were imprisoned twice in Karachi Jail for 
stirring-up ethnic tensions. In terms of policy, as I will show later, 
the MQM in this period appeared as little more than an ethnic "pressure- 
group". 
The first nonths of the Movement involved intensive lobbying 
for support and donations by Altaf Hussain and his colleagues among the 
population in Karachi, from the large Meman and Kbc7ja business-houses 
such as Dawood, Habib and Adamjee, to the skilled and semi-skilled 
Nobajir industrial and commercial labour in Nazinabad, Liaquatabad and 
elsewhere. Writing in "Dawn", Anmer Mooraj claimed that few Xc7bajIr 
intellectuals were willing to listen at this time, because "Altaf Hussain 
was regarded as little more than a lemon tea Bolshevik with a faintly 
diabolical air" (Dawn, 2 February 1990, Karachi). Similarly the "Star" 
sub-editor, 
- 
Osman Yami, explained that he thought Altaf was just a 
"showboy" at first, without any durability or sincerity. Now, Yami claims 
he is "like a younger brother to me" (interview, 27 January 1991, 
Karachi). 
The rapid rise of the Movement meant that two years after its 
launch, the MQM was addressing large rallies in the heart of Karachi and 
Hyderabad, and in 1987 it was returned as the largest single party in 
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Karachi after the Local Bodies elections. (with 29.5% of the vote, and 
46.6% of councillor seats in the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation; 
figures supplied by Provincial Election Authority, Karachi; and KMC, 
Karachi, 1991). The rise of the party in Karachi can be considered 
somewhat "meteoric", since the wider environment was one of political 
suppression under the Zia regime. 
This fact has led many to suggest that the MQM received illicit 
state patronage to create further disunity in the politics of Sindh. Such 
theories are largely speculative and revolve around two scenarios. The 
first involves Jamaat-i Islami. Initially close to Zia and his policies 
of "Islamisation", Tamaat was by the mid-1980s becoming estranged from 
the military regime over the pace of the Islamisation programme, and 
over various specific issues such as a ban an student unions in 1984 
(interview with Sirdar Mazari, 13 February 1991, Karachi). It is reputed 
that the Governor of Sindh at the time, Justice Qadeeruddin, admitted 
later that funds had been channelled to the MQM from the army for the 
purpose of defusing Jamaat-i Islami in its stronghold of urban Sindh. 
(See Viewpoint, 26 July 1990, Lahore; and Justice Dorab Patel linterview, 
12 January 1991, Karachi] who claims to have personally witnessed 
Qadeeruddin's "confession"). 
A second scenario concerns the Movement for the Restoration of 
Democracy (MRD), led by Benazir Bhutto's PPP, which in August 1983 
achieved a substantial display of public support in rural areas of Sindh 
with its protests against the military government. Aside from the PPP, 
various Sindhi nationalist and political figures such as Mumtaz Bhutto 
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and Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi were prominent in the MRD (Inqlab Sind, 21 
August 1983, London). The Zia regime responded heavily and aggressively 
to the movement. Some are of the opinion that when the MQM emerged on 
the scene a year later, it was fostered as a movement that could defuse 
the support of the MRD by acting as a political counterbalance in the 
urban areas of the Province (interview with Mairaj Mohammad Khan of the 
QMA, 17 January 1991, Karachi). 
Such accounts imply either the complete planning and 
construction of the MQM by the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency USI; 
Interview with Akmal Hussain, 24 February 1991, Lahore), or a turning- 
of-a-blind-eye as the MQK developed and at a time when other groups, 
such as the PPP, were being heavily suppressed Unterview with Mobajir 
publisher, 16 January 1991, Karachi). Interestingly, the MQM's own line 
is thzýt Zia had nothing to do with the formation of the Movement 
(interview with MQM women's worker, 6 February 1991, Karachi; this could 
be a denial of covert processes for obvious political reasons). 
The idea of a Nobajir nationalist movement was certainly not 
"created" in 1984; the existence of earlier groups, especially the APMSO 
in which Altaf Hussain played a pioneering role, proves that a Xobajir- 
political identity of sorts had developed some time earlier. Furthermore, 
without access to classified material an extremely sensitive issues, it 
is impossible to either confirm or deny the theories of army involvement 
(such a source was not available to this researcher). It seems clear, 
however, that the Zia regime created many divisions in Pakistan society 
as it attempted to frame a "government" line on Islam. Partisan action 
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on the part of the authorities helped to exacerbate such divisions. In 
the Karachi riots of November 1986 most student groups were forcibly 
disarmed by the police, while the IJT and Muslim Students Federation 
were not (Viewpoint, 6 November 1986, Lahore). Similarly, there are 
numerous reports of the law and order agencies acting half-heartedly in 
several instances. In the former case, an example can be cited of an 
attack in a Bibar-1 locality of Orangi in December 1986, during which the 
police are accused of failing to arrive on the scene until eight hours 
had passed, by which time twenty people had died (Herald, December 1986, 
Karachi, p. 6). In other cases, the army is accused of acting rapidly and 
brutally, such as in the Afghan area of Bangash Colony in January 1987 
(Dawn, 13 January 1987, Karachi). In many instances such inconsistencies 
might relate to the fear or inexperience of the police (who are often 
armed less powerfully than their foes), but the problem is that their 
actions may become perceived as a form of ethnic partisanship. 
Interestingly, some claim that the MQM was suppressed by Zia 
along with all other political groups at this time (interview with 
Rasreen Jaleel, 6 February 1991, Karachi). Indeed, Altaf Hussain was 
Jailed twice during the Zia years <December 1986 - January 1987, and 
August 1987 - January 1988, when he was moved to Civil Hospital, 
Karachi, for kidney treatment). At one point in 1987,32 "civil disorder" 
charges were filed against him (Dawn, 28 September 1987, Karachi). 
Significantly, internment in Karachi Jail did not seem to limit Altaf 
Hussain's ability to deliver statements and comments, as newspaper 
reports of the time testify. At any rate, whatever the precise 
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involvement of the army in the formation of the MQM, the Movement soon 
was established as an autonomous political agency. 
Before 1986, the APMSO retained a highly influential position in 
Xdbajir politics in urban Sindh, at a time when instances of large-scale 
civil disturbances were emerging in Karachi. The "Bushra Zaidi incident" 
in April 1985, saw sustained rioting in which the APMSO played a key 
role by organising an unruly demonstration at the funeral of the 
stricken schoolgirl (Tambiah, 1990, p. 74()). On 8 August 1986, however, 
the MQM-proper achieved its first major display of public support at a 
large rally in Nishtar Park, central Karachi. The park is a favourite 
venue for political meetings, since it is situated in the heart of the 
city, Just a few hundred yards from the huge tomb of the Quald-i Azam. 
It was to be the scene of many NQM rallies after 1986. 
At the August 1986 rally the tone of the early period of the 
KQM was clearly set. The rally emphasised the "subnationality" nature of 
Mobajlr-s alongside Sindhis4, and the unity of the two against 
"outsiders", namely Afghans, Pakhtuns and Punjabis (Dawn, 9 August 1986). 
The issue of the Bibaris was also raised at the rally by Altaf Hussain 
in the foll9wing terms: 
"Let not the East Pakistan tragedy be repeated. The 
BIbarls rendered great sacrifices for Pakistan, 
but they are still not wanted in the country while 
the army has been safe back home. Should anything 
happen again, guard your houses. " 
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(Dawn, 9 August, ibid; italics added). 
Here, the position of the Biharls in East Pakistan, fighting separatists, 
is obliquely compared to the assumed position of the MobaJIrs in Sindh, 
should another [Sindhil separatist movement gain a foothold in Pakistan. 
The "repatriation" of the Blharls to Pakistan from Bangladesh has been 
one of the more continuous MQM issues, and one in regard to which 
conspicuously little had been achieved by 1993. We can see, however, that 
in this rhetoric concerning patriotism and anti-secessionism, the MQK is 
attempting to appeal to an aspect of Mobajir identity that I identified 
in the previous chapter. The MQM also correctly gauged that Bibarls 
would support such "Pakistan nationalist" sentiments, given their own 
relationship to the Bengali majority community in the former East 
Pakistan. 
This issue also highlights a seeming paradox in the rhetoric of 
the MQM in this early phase, which characterises the particular 
relationship of the Movement to the state in Pakistan. On the one hand, 
Altaf Hussain was declaring his solidarity with Sindhi compatriots, 
while on the other hand, Sindhi nationalists and separatists were 
roundly condemned as anti-Pakistan forces. The complexity of this matter 
was "resolved" shortly afterwards, when the MQM became more avowedly 
anti-Sindhi. In these terms, the MQM was initially attempting to 
reconcile a relationship with the provincial state, which encompassed 
the politics of the largest ethnic group in the Province, with a 
particular allegiance to the central state. 
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As I will show later in my discussion of the MQK's rhetoric and 
ideology, the rich have been excluded explicitly from the Movement's 
definition of the Nobajir community, for being 1jaradarriya (monopolists; 
ibid]. As discussed in the previous chapter, in relation to vertical 
community solidarity, this political rhetoric creates a paradoxical 
exclusion of certain potential Xdbajix-s from the political community as 
portrayed by the MQM. The factor became more significant in the later 
period of the Movement, and may have contributed indirectly to a split 
in the party after 1991. (It is probably the case that the funding of 
the Movement also suffered over this matter). 
A particular quality of the August 1986 rally that the MQM has 
been keen to highlight concerns the discipline and organisation of the 
meeting. The Movement describes the rally in the following terms: 
"It had started raining from the evening of 6th August 
...... but from the morning of 8th August scores of suzukis, 
trucks and motor cycles carrying Xdbaj1r- youth in very 
large numbers had made the beeline for the Nishta! r Park. 
Rain could not dampen their spirits and people were amazed 
to see lacs of Xc2bajir youth gather in and around the park, 
in streets and on rooftops motionless, sitting in pouring 
rain, listening to the speech of their Quaid Altaf Hussain 
with rapt attention [sic]. " 
(MQM, 1990b M, pp. 6-7; italics added) 
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The somewhat sinister discipline of such rallies, in which Altaf Hussain 
exercises considerable control over the crowds, has been repeated often 
since this rally. The first major Hyderabad meeting came shortly 
afterwards, and displayed important similarities to the first Karachi 
rally in that it was characterised by a preponderance of young males, 
many of whom were well-armed (Nation, 6 November 1986, Lahore). 
The MQM claims that such large gatherings demonstrate the 
principle of Nobajir Ittebad [unity]; (although attendance figures, and 
thus the proportion of the community appearing at such rallies, are 
notoriously difficult to verify). The MQM set out straight away to show 
that it alone was the sole representative of the Xobajlrýs. Such a claim 
was occasionally weakened by events, such as those of early 1987, when 
violence flared between supporters of the MQM and those of the MIT in 
Karachi (Star, 5 April 1987, Karachi). Since this time the latter has 
maintained a rather low profile in the city, but has undoubtably 
commanded some secret suppport. The main difference between the groups 
is that the MQM were close to Jiye Sindh in the early phase as "fellow 
subnationalists", while the MIT are totally opposed to working with 
Sindhi nationalists. Another small group, the Xbbaj1r- Rabita Council 
(Mohajir Coordination Council] has remained as a small front with a 
policy to "support and supplement the MQM" (Ishtiaq Azhar, president of 
MRC; Herald, September 1990, Karachi, p. 50). The group has only briefly 
indulged in electoral politics on its own account (in Hyderabad in the 
National Assembly elections of 1988), and is generally supported by the 
MQM as a useful source of publicity. 
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The 31 October 1986 rally in ffyderabad was indirectly the 
catalyst for another feature of the early MQM period, namely the 
occurrence of large-scale civil disturbances, mostly centring on the city 
of Karachi. The Bushra Zaidi incident was the first in a series of riots 
that became characterised by their spread from a specific incident, such 
as a clash between bus-passengers and transporters (in the case of the 
November 1986 rioting), to sustained and bloody ethnic rioting. Such 
disturbances largely involved Nohajirs (often specifically incorporating 
Bibaris) and Pakhtuns. The dynamics of such rioting are discussed more 
fully in Chapter 7, but it is useful here to examine the associated 
rhetoric. The Bibarl factor was important in these incidents of unrest, 
particularly since many of the later inter-ethnic reprisals occurred in 
parts of Orangi where the Bibaz-1 commmunity lives in close proximity to 
the Pakhtuns. 
The rhetoric of the MQM leadership at this time was very much 
directed at "Afghans", who were claimed to be at the root of the unrest, 
both directly and through being involved in the illicit drugs, arms, land 
and transport "mafias" that bring their own pressures to bear on the 
city of Karachi. In January 1987 the MQM "demanded" the repatriation of 
Afghans living in Sindh (Dawn, 21 January 1987, Karachi). Days later, in 
a statement following his release from a first period in jail, Altaf 
Hussain declared that if Pakistan can keep and "feed" Afghans, then it 
should bring "its own people" from Bangladesh (Muslim, 24 January 1987, 
Karachi). Here we see a linkage of the Bibari and Afghan issues which is 
characteristic of MQM rhetoric, and the issuing of statements from jail. 
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(See -Figure 5.2, showing an MQM document of December 1987, entitled 
"Altaf Hussain's third letter from jail to the mothers and sisters" - an 
emotional document referring to the incarceration of numerous XdhaJ1. r 
men in Karachi Jail). Interestingly, much MQM malice at this time was 
directed at the police in Sindh, who were perceived to be drawn 
predominantly from the Punjabi and Pakhtun communities in the Province. 
Table 5.3 provides an analysis of "attacks" claimed to have been 
inflicted on Ndbajirs. The incidents between 1986 and the end of 1987 
reported in the document frequently protest at police action, in terms of 
"indiscriminate firing", beating, and rape. The police element is linked 
to an ethnic grievance, with the Kovement claiming that Xdbajirs are 
discriminated against in police recruitment (MQM, 1990c). 
In October 1988 the MQM faced the impending national and 
provincial elections by producing its most public manifesto to date, the 
"Charter of Resolution". The full text of the charter can be found in 
Appendix 7. It is interesting to note that among the 25 points, eight 
dealt with "local preference", ý, two with the confinement and repatriation 
of Afghans, and one with the "repatriation" of Bibaris (MQM, 1988a). 
These points faithfully mirror the sentiments of the early period. After 
1988 however, changes occurred that saw a redefinition of the term 
"local" by the MQM. 
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Police 
Unidentified attackers Punknown miscreants" 7 
"Drug naf ia" 2 
Source: MQ)f, 1990a, pp7-11. 
XQM: Kiddle Fbase; 1988-90 
The second major period of MQM development was characterised by 
a significant change in its relationship with the Sindhi community. The 
change was prompted not only by important developments within Sindhi 
nationalism, but also by the failure of a short-lived agreement with the 
new PPP government that was installed after the elections of October 
1988. It wps in this period also that the MQM reached its electoral 
zenith, over the two rounds of elections in 1988 and 1990. In essence, 
the Movement's outward rhetoric remained essentially that of an ethnic 
pressure-group at this time, but its animosity became rapidly directed 
towards the Sindhi compatriots of the XdbaJ1rs rather than the Pakhtuns 
or other migrants into Sindh. Finally, the second period saw a rise in 
the significance of the MQM's second major bastion of support; the city 
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of Hyderabad and other smaller towns, where events increasingly came to 
influence the policy of the central MQM leadership based in Karachi. (I 
discuss the spatial and structural organisation of the Movement in a 
later section). 
In Summer 1988 a new strain of militant Sindhi nationalism 
emerged, in part under a new splinter group, the Jiye Sindh Progressive 
Party USPP) led by Dr. Qadir Magsi. Dr. Magsi aligned himself firmly 
against the MQM and Nobajir-s. It is believed that the JSPP was involved 
in the 30 September 1988 bombing campaign in Hyderabad that killed 
around 250 people, most of them Xdhajirs (Viewpoint, 24 May 1990, 
Lahore). The violence of such attacks and their blatantly ethnic 
sectarian nature only served to hasten the alienation of many Xclajlr 
citizens in Sindh from their Sindhi neighbours. 
Outside of Karachi, jYohajir- communities live in relatively small 
concentrations, surrounded by Sindhi people. Here, Xohajirs and Sindhis 
compete directly for resources. By 1988 there was some evidence that an 
"ethnic rift" was developing in such cities as Sukkur and Hyderabad, 
whereby sectarian violence was polarising the two communities. 
Thý-- transformation of the XQM in this period can be illustrated 
in part by the difference between the Xobaiir community in Karachi and 
that elsewhere. In ffyderabad, the Xdbaj1. r community is physically 
concentrated in the central urban area, and particularly in the Pucca 
Q11a Fort district. Sindhis meanwhile concentrate in suburban districts 
such as Qasimabad, and the semi-rural environs of the city. The 
polarisation between the two communities is considerable. The two 
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central urban constituencies are National Assembly seats . 
(NAs) 168 and 
169. In the 1988 elections, the MQM won these seats with 73.17% and 
68.60% of the vote respectively, with the former supplying the new mayor 
of the city, Aftab Ahmed Shaikh (Election Commission of Pakistan, 1988, 
Vol. III, pp. 52-3). All the surrounding constituencies were won 
comfortably by the PPP. On the ground, spatial polarisation exists 
between the communities, not only in terms of housing districts, but 
also in terms of schools, restaurants, and even hospitals. With each 
sectarian attack or reprisal the polarisation exacerbates as people flee 
certain districts. 
Within this spatial configuration, certain key nodes of conflict 
recur. One is Haider Chowk on the edge of the city centre; a chawAr 
[square] that commemorates Haider Bux Jatoi, a revered historical figure 
of Sindhi Har-i politics. The square has acted as a symbolic focus for 
nationalist regalia and conflict. In May 1988, youths supporting the MQM 
erected pictures in the square of figures important to Urdu heritage, 
such as Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (the founder of Aligarh University), Liaquat 
Ali Khan (the first Prime Minister of Pakistan) and Altaf Hussain (Star, 
8 May 1988, Karachi). The action was a symbolic rebuff for the Sindhis, 
with whom MQM youths had clashed a mouth before (ibid), and it provoked 
further ethnic sectarian conflict. Each successive incident increased the 
level of physical and psychological polarisation in the city. 
While the MQM is by far the most important Nobajir- agency in 
Hyderabad, other less moderate Mohajir leaders receive support there in 
a way that they do not in Karachi. Dr. Saleem Haider of the MIT for 
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example, contested the two central National Assembly seats of Hyderabad 
in 1988, when he did not stand in Karachi. (His greatest vote, however, 
was 1.7% in NA 169; Election Commission of Pakistan, 1988, vol. III, p. 53). 
Furthermore, in 1988, Maulana Wasi Mazhar Nadvi of the MRC made in 
Hyderabad the Council's only . 
independent foray into electoral 
competition. However, after winning just 0.4% of the vote across the two 
seats contested, the Xaulana has since retired from electoral politics 
(Election Commission; ibid). 
The importance of such figures in the day-to-day life of 
Hyderabad is greater than election performance alone would suggest. 
Maulana Wasi Mazhar Nadvi runs a popular Urdu weekly paper in the city, 
which has been openly advocating a separate Mobajir "suba" (province]; 
(Newsline, February 1990, Karachi, p. 44). Such figures occupy an 
important position alongside the the MQM in Hyderabad's politics, while 
in Karachi the MQM is totally dominant in Xobajir politics. Similarly an 
the Sindhi side of politics in Hyderabad, there is evidence that extreme 
nationalists such as Dr. Qadir Magsi have a following, particularly 
among Sindhi youth (Herald, June 1990, Karachi, p. 50(c)). In elect. ions, 
however, thp PPP is dominant in the major Sindhi districts of Hyderabad, 
as it is throughout most parts of Sindh. 
In Sukkur, also, a bitter ethnic divide has developed between 
the small urban concentration of Nobajirs (mostly traders and owners of 
small businesses) and the surrounding Sindhi community. Here also 
scattered incidents of ethnic sectarian violence were emerging by early 
1988, before this form of violence had reached the streets in Karachi 
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far to the South (see incidents in Dawn, 26 April 1988, Karachi). The 
MQM's penetration of political life in Sukkur has not so far been 
spectacular. The Movement's one candidate standing for the National 
Assembly in the city in the October 1990 elections received just seven 
votes (Nazur Mohammad, NA 151; Election Commission of Pakistan, 1990. 
Vol II, p. 69), while traditional pre-1980s ffohajlr- candidates such as 
Haulana Noorani of the JUP were more popular (ibid). The Provincial 
Assembly elections were more encouraging, with the MQM candidate Syed 
Saleem Shaukat achieving 46.7% of the vote in one of the six seats, and 
narrowly losing to the PDA candidate (Election Commission, ibid, p. 309). 
In general terms, these figures support the theory that MQM support and 
influence among Nobajir-s decline with distance northwards from Karachi. 
In effect, the everyday reality of Mobailr/Sindhi competition, 
conflict and polarisation in Sukkur is closer to the situation in 
Hyderabad and smaller towns than to that in Karachi. An example of this 
was presented on 8/9 February 1991, when an incident of murder and 
ethnic reprisal flared in Sukkur (Dawn, 9 February 1991, Karachi) at a 
time when Karachi and Hyderabad had been relatively free of such 
incidents for some time (the incident is analysed further in Chapter 7). 
The growth of the Mobajir-/Sindhi ethnic "rift" through 1988 in 
the interior of Sindh found its way into the metropolis of Karachi after 
the September 1988 bombing in Hyderabad. The Summer of 1988 had seen 
repeated Nobajir/Sindhi clashes emerging, especially in Hyderabad 
(Morning News, 20 June 1988, Karachi), accompanied by such vitriolic 
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Sindhi rhetoric as the Pir, of Pagaro's suggestion that all jYobajIrs 
should leave Sindh (ibid). Altaf Hussain meanwhile continued to stress 
the "Joint struggle" of Xobajiz-s and Sindhis against the jagir-dari 
system, notably at a large women's rally in Karachi (Daily News, 16 July 
1988, Karachi). Even so, after the September bombing, sectarian reprisals 
against Sindhis began to emerge in parts of Karachi, such as Landhi and 
Liaquatabad. Altaf Hussain's immediate reaction was again to blame the 
"police" (Dawn, 2 October 1988, Karachi). On the ground, however, it 
seemed that the large-scale riots of the 1980s were disappearing, to be 
replaced by sudden ethnic sectarian attacks and reprisals among the 
affected peoples of Karachi. 
Of most immediate concern was the holding of new elections in 
October 1988, following the sudden assassination of General Zia and many 
of his colleagues in August 1988 (the assassination, despite various 
theories, remains a mystery in 1993). The experience of the Zia years 
had been bitter enough for Altaf Hussain to condemn Nawaz Sharif (the 
Chief Minister of Punjab under Zia) and his Pakistan Muslim League (PML) 
for having "treated the MQM as separatists in the pay of India" 
(Frontier Post, 22 November 1988, Lahore). As I have shown, the 
suggested slur on the MQM's patriotism is designed to strike a chord 
with Nobajir supporters, to whom this aspect is important to community 
identity. Following the elections, the MQM began - ironically - to enter 
into negotiations on an accord with the new PPP government. The election 
results for Sindh are shown in Table 5.4. 
Nationally, the MQM achieved Just 5.2% of the vote compared to 
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ppp 46.54 31 67.40 
MQM 25.00 13 28.30 
111 11.32 - 0.00 
Source: Election Commission of Pakistan, 1988, vols II, IrI. 
the PPP's 38.7% (Herald, Election 90 Special Issue, p. 9). This discrepancy 
of support (which is underpinned by the MQN's ethnic stance), shows how 
much the MQM, in its ethnic subnationalist form, has been inextricably 
tied-into a politics of alliance- building in Pakistan in its quest for 
substantial political power. In the Provincial Assembly of Sindh, the 
MQM was also some way behind the PPP, but its preponderance in the 
economically and politically vital large urban centres meant that some 
form of agreement between the two largest parties in the Province 
seemed wise for both sides. Benazir Bhutto knows the significance of the 
MQM's dominance of Karachi, and she explained to me that the MQM can 
use this power to "paralyse the whole of Pakistan" Untez-view, 22 
January 1992, Karachi). The FDA leader's appraisal of the MQM does not 
seem misplaced, since Azim Ahmed Tariq boasted an the completion of a 
protest strike in Karachi in 1989, that: 
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"We could have stopped everything, not only in Sindh 
but in the entire country, if we wanted. The economy 
would have come to a halt, and the wheel of industry 
would have been Jammed. " 
(Dawn, 27 May 1989, Karachi). 
In this statement we see a clear recognition by the MQK of the 
importance of the city of Karachi, and the way in which this position 
can be exploited by the Movement. In the following chapter I examine the 
city of Karachi and its institutions in more detail, and examine the 
importance the MQM has placed on winning control of these urban 
institutions. 
On 2 December 1988 the Chief Minister of Sindh and President of 
the Sindh PPP, Syed Qaim Ali Shah, and MQM Chairman Azim Ahmed Tariq 
signed an accord entitled the Karachi Declaration, in which 59 points 
were agreed. The full text of the accord is shown in Appendix 5. Table 
5.5 shows a break-down of- the main areas under which the 59 points 
f ell. 
The large number of points in the accord make it an extremely 
unwieldy document. It is interesting to note that while some long- 
standing Nobajir issues such as the Quota System and the necessity for 
a proper Census were low on the agenda, education remained the most 
important factor, reflecting the APMSO origins of the MQM. Indeed, it was 
over one of the education points7 that strains appeared Just weeks after 
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the signing of the accord, when MQM secretary-general Dr. Imran Farooq 
accused the PPP of breach of agreement (Nation, 24 December 1988, 
Karachi). Another interesting element of the accord was that, unlike the 
Charter of Resolution of November 1988, there was no demand for 
Nobaffrs to be recognised as a nationality. This demand had proved 
fruitless, possibly under the pressure of members of the central 
government in Islamabad (I will show later that an alliance with the 
Pakistan Muslim League (PML) necessitated the dropping of the 
nationality demand). 
In the months after the signing of the accord a rift developed 
between the PPP and the MQM, in tandem with a grim exacerbation of 
ethnic conflict throughout Sindh. For its part, the MQM made a series of 
vague and unlikely demands that could not readily be fulfilled. Among 
the most contentious were a call for a review of all "political 
victimisation" cases filed after July 1977 (the seizure of government by 
General Zia, point 56), and a demand for "compensation" for "all persons 
who have suffered in different unwarranted attacks at various localities" 
(point 57; see Appendix 5). 
On the side of the PPP it seems that even more unscrupulous 
motives were at work. The accord was necessary politically to placate 
the urban areas of Sindh, but some of those close to the PPP leadership 
at the tine, notably the PPP negotiator P. K. Shahani, believe that the 
party never intended to honour the main points of the agreement 
(interview, 12 February 1991, Karachi). The MQM quickly came to this 
conclusion also, and began to exert considerable pressure on the 
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Higher education 10 
Local preference in Sindh employment 8 
Niscellaneous administrative issues 8 
Law and order/justice 6 
Urban issues 5 
Government efficiency/democracy 5 
General economic problems 4 
National culture 4 
Health 
Unity in Sindh 2 
Census/quotas 2 
Repatriation 1 
Source: Information Department, Government of Sindh, 1989. 
government in the ensuing months. 
By March 1989, shooting attacks in Karachi and Hyderabad, often 
launched by masked youths on motorcycles or in cars, and often claiming 
innocent people as victims, were becoming all too familiar (Pakistan 
Times, 22 March 1989, Lahore). By May 1989, the MQM was beginning to 
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hold public protest rallies, condemning the government for failing to 
control law and order, and for indiscriminately arresting NobaJIX-s (Star, 
21 Kay 1989, Karachi). On 26 May 1989, the MQM conducted a "Black Day" 
strike against the government, which it claimed was highly successful 
(Nation, 27 May 1989, Lahore). On this day, Karachi awoke to countless 
black flags and banners hanging from businesses and homes sympathetic 
to the MQM (Nation, ibid). The incidents *of violence that followed are 
too numerous to mention individually, By this time, the MQK had also 
begun to hold negotiations with the opposition IJI, headed by Nawaz 
Sharif, leading to an agreement of formal alliance between the NQM and 
IJI in October 1989. 
After the Summer of 1989, MQM rhetoric came to resemble that of 
Mobajlr leaders in the early 1970s in its warnings of an underground 
movement for Sindbudesh. In September 1989, Altaf Hussain made a now 
famous statement that "as long as one Mdbajir is alive, Sindbudesh will 
never be realised" (Leader, 18 September 1989, Karachi). In this manner, 
the PPP government of Benazir Bhutto was equated with the separatist 
movement, while the MQM were termed "pro-Pakistan". Thus, Altaf Hussain 
described one of his first meetings with the opposition leader Nawaz 
Sharif, on 30 May 1989, as a "meeting between two patriots" (Dawn, 31 
May 1989, Karachi). Here, again, we see an emulation of the "loyal 
community myth" discussed in the previous chapter. Such rhetoric has 
evident appeal among the Nobajirs of Sindh. 
In its negotiations with the government, the MQM was pushing 
certain points relating to greater involvement and autonomy for itself 
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in the affairs of urban Sindh (see Appendix 6). In February 1989, 
specific controversial matters were under discussion, such as a demand 
for the release of all MQM workers arrested to date (Information 
Department, Government of Sindh, 1989, p. 19), on the assumption that they 
were arrested spuriously. The demand was implausible, and contravened 
point 10 in the Karachi Declaration, which states that "No one can claim 
to be outside the bounds or the rule of the law" (ibid, p. 2; see Appendix 
5). Benazir Bhutto speaks bitterly of this demand now: 
"I refused to meet ethnic leaders; Altaf Hussain, 
G. M. Syed. We only do ideological politics, not ethnic 
politics. Then later we said IO. K. ', we will sign an 
accord with you. All they wanted was to get their people 
out of Jail. They managed this and started destabilising 
the province. " 
(inter-view, 22 January 1992, Karachi). 
Another demand under discussion in February 1989 and the 
ensuing months was the issue of the Bibarls (to whom the MQM referred 
as "Pakistanis living abroad"; see point 34 of the Karachi declaration). 
Again, such a population shift would be problematic for a country that 
has enough problems catering for its existing population, and it seems 
hardly surprising that nothing could be delivered on the matter. 
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Such difficulties in the -relationship between the PPP and MQM 
proved insurmountable. On 23 October 1989 the accord was formally 
broken, according to Altaf Hussain over a failure to resolve the Bibar-I 
issue (Dawn, 23 October 1989, Karachi). Less than 24 hours later the MQM 
signed a new accord of 17 points with the IJI, in which "repatriation" 
of Blbax-ls, of whom there were said-to be 250,000 (Frontier Post, 26 
October 1989, Karachi), was more explicitly discussed. 
Accompanying the "crossing of the floor" by the MQM was a 
change in rhetoric from the days of the Movement's inception, whereby 
Punjabis and Pakhtuns were now heralded as the allies of Nobajirs, and 
Sindhis (or more precisely Sindbudesb) were defined as the enemy. In 
October 1989 Altaf Hussain criticised the PPP for creating a rift 
between Nobajirs and Punjabis, and claimed that the latter had "put their 
labour to turn the land of Sindh into a productive one" (Muslim, 26 
October 1989, Karachi). Not long afterwards, the MQM leader made a 
direct appeal to Pakhtuns and Punjabis to "Join the MQM in its struggle, 
and to thwart SindludesY (Dawn, 16 November 1989, Karachi). Such 
rhetoric was almost a complete reversal of that deployed in the August 
1986 rally. 
The MQM's estrangement from the PPP was complete and soon 
everything was being blamed on Benazir Bhutto. In November 1989, for 
example, the belief that the MQM was implicitly working for a 
bifurcation of Sindh (a goal that the PPP leader attributes to "certain 
elements" within the movement; Interview, 22 January 1992, Karachi) was 
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dismissed by Altaf Hussain as a 11rumour" circulated by the "PPP's 
disinformation cell" (Morning News, 28 November 1989, Karachi). 
On 26 January 1990, the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) held 
a huge rally at the grounds surrounding the tomb of Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah. A bizarre argument broke out with BBC Radio's Urdu Service over 
the size of the audience, which pro-MQM sources put at between 26 lakhs 
(2.6 million; Daily News, 27 January 1990, Karachi) and Altaf Hussain's 
absurd figure of 60 lakhs (6 million; Newsline, February 1990, Karachi, 
p. 33)19. Just over a week later, the MQM called another paralysing strike 
in Karachi and Hyderabad, in the middle of a government-called "week of 
solidarity" for the Muslims of Kashmir. The strike was dubbed "Black 
Vednesday" by the press (Dawn, 9 February 1990, Karachi) on account of 
the ethnic violence which accompanied it. The violence is thought to 
have claimed around 40 lives (Star, 8 February 1990, Karachi). 
The pressure continued in April as Altaf Hussain launched a 
"fast unto death" to protest the "killing of Xdbajirdl (Daily News, 9 
April 1990, Karachi). When the fast ended five days later, after talks 
with the COP leaders and the Chief Minister of Sindh, Altaf finally 
redefined his demand for the release of all arrested Nobajirs to a call 
for the "arrest of all murderers" (Dawn, 15 April 1990, Karachi). This 
change of stance demonstrated the importance of the COP in "refining" 
the ethnic stance of the MQM, relating to the fact that the COP (which 
can be equated effectively with the IJI of 1990 onwards) included anti- 
ethnic "national" parties such as the Pakistan Muslim League and the 
Jamaat-I Islaml (who the MQM had previously considered enemies). 
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The fundamental change in the rhetoric of the MQM at this time 
also demonstrates the important relationship Altaf Hussain was forging 
with the IJI, which allowed him to achieve representation in the central 
government with the elections of 1.990. A cynical assessment of' this 
relationship would suggest that the MQM was little more than a vehicle 
for Altaf Hussain and his colleagues to gain power in the central state. 
However, I have shown that the MQM capitalised on an existing political 
void in urban Sindh, and mobilised - with striking success in the early 
years - around social and intellectual factors that struck chords in the 
Urdu-speaking community. In particular, the MQM had claimed to be 
addressing questions of employment, resource mobilisation and identity. 
The apparent paradox presented by the changes of central ideology in the 
MQM relate more precisely to the pressures of operating an ethnic-based 
movement within a nixed and diverse polity. The dropping of the ethnic 
stance by the MQM was a response to the necessities of political 
alliance that are synonymous with winning a share in central power in 
Pakistan. In so doing, however, the MQM seemed to drop its initial 
2-alson dleltre in the eyes of many Nobajirs, and thus damaged the 
essential leEltimacy of the Movement by 1990. The fact that this was 
felt by many supporters was demonstrated by the manner in which 
factionalism has emerged in the KQM following the alliance of the MQM 
with the IJI. The result has been the formation of a separate wing of 
the party, which is fundamentally hostile towards the remaining central 
core of the MQM. 
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May 1990 saw an incident that served finally to sever the PPP 
and the MQM into bitterly opposed camps. The "truth" of the "Pucca Q11a 
incident" will probably never be known, since each side makes wildly 
contrasting claims, but the basic sequence of events seems to have been 
as follows: 
- On 27 May 1990, the police moved into the PUcca Q11a Fort area of 
Hyderabad, as part of an operation to recover a suspected cache of 
illegal arms. 
- The police encountered a demonstration by women complaining that 
water to the area had been cut off. 
Firing broke out; the MQM view is that the police fired 
indiscriminately on the women. The police complain that snipers on roof- 
tops began firing at their party and the police retaliated. 
- The army suddenly move_d in, to enthusiastic welcome by the Nohajirs 
in Fucca Qi1a, while the police dispersed (reputedly to the enthusiastic 
reception of Sindhis in the suburbs of the city). 
-A wave of violence followed in Karachi, involving both clashes with 
the police, and individual murders, mostly of Sindhis. 
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Among the many mysteries of the Pucca Q11a operation is the 
timing of the demonstration by the women, and the fact that it was 
supplied with printed portraits of General Zia to be waved aloft (Herald, 
June 1990, p. 33). Another disturbing aspect was the sudden intervention 
of the army, and the way it was welcomed by crowds of Xchajirs. 
Meanwhile, the departing police were garlanded by Sindhis at the 
outskirts of the city (ibid), thus suggesting that even the law 
enforcement agencies had become ethnically polarised. 
The MQM description of the incident, as described in a letter to 
Amnesty International, is as follows: 
"It all started when the police surrounded Pucka Qila 
in Hyderabad and opened fire indiscriminately killing 
over 40 people including women and children and wounding 
hundreds ........ Xdbailr women came out with copies of the 
Holy Quran (Holy Book of the Muslims) over their heads 
appealing to the police to stop the massacre. They were 
in turn shot and killed and the pages of the Holy Book 
lay scattered all over the ground ......... On the 28th 
May 1990 another 30 people were killed and more than 200 
injured in their renewed attacks in Karachi by an extremely 
prejudiced faction of the police, rangers and PPF's 
terrorists [sic]. " 
(MQM, ref: 1414/5/90,29 May 1990, italics added). 
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The tone of the letter claims that firstly all the killings in 
Hyderabad and those that followed in Karachi were committed by PPP 
agencies, and secondly that the PPP was supporting the formation of 
Sindhudesb. Altaf Hussain claims that the police "shouted slogans of 
, Teay-Sindb and Sindbu-Desb" (ibid) as they engaged in the operation. 
However, many question-marks surround the incident. The Inspector 
General of Police in Hyderabad (a Pakhtun), for example, has been quoted 
in Sindhi newspapers as denying that water was cut off before the 
incident in Pucca Q11a (Viewpoint, 7 June 1990, Lahore). Furthermore, 
while the MQM claims that at least 60 people were killed within hours 
of the start of the disturbances (MQM letter to Amnesty International, 
ibid), the Inspector General of Police claimed that only 40 new graves 
had appeared in the city four days after the event, some of which must 
have been the result of natural deaths (Viewpoint, 26 July 1990, Lahore). 
Benazir Bhutto, meanwhile, refers us to the official enquiry conducted 
after the incident, which concluded late in 1990 that only five people 
had been killed in the incident (interview, 22 January 1992, Karachi). 
What is certain is that Pucca Q11a worsened the ethnic hatred in 
Sindh and gave a new lease of life to violence in Karachi. Further 
misery ensued on 15 July 1990 when a series of bomb blasts in 
Hyderabad, and on a train leaving Karachi, killed over 30 people (Dawn, 
16 July 1990, Karachi). The general level of violence was accompanied by 
largely non-political crime, as the law-enforcement agencies lost their 
grip on the province. Through 1990, there were 76 reported kidnappings 
for ransom in Karachi alone, 42 of those between August (when the Bhutto 
-283- 
government was dismissed for failing to control law and order, amongst 
other charges) and October, when the new elections were held (Herald, 
January 1991, Karachi, p. 83). 
The worsening situation helped to precipitate the dismissal of 
Bhutto's government in August 1990. The MQM approached the ensuing 
elections with a strikingly non-ethnic rhetoric. Altaf Hussain claimed 
that the XQM was becoming a 'Wazloom Qauml Movement'. [National Movement 
of the "Oppressed"] and that its policy was f or the "uplift of the 
people who are being exploited for last 40 years" (Star, 16 August 1990, 
Karachi). 
XQ, K Late Pbase: 1990-92. 
The 1990 elections saw a dramatic surge in the fortunes of the 
IJI coalition, including a further improvement in the MQK vote over that 
of 1988 and the installation of a new government at the centre and in 
the provinces. The Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA, the largest 
component of which is the PPP9) has claimed electoral malpractise (PDA, 
1991), but the result stands. The details of the results are shown in 
Table 5.6. 
We can see that the PDA's national vote barely changed, falling 
from 38.7% in 1988 (PPP) to 36.83% in 1990. In the Sindh Provincial 
Assembly, the PDA vote also dropped to 35.46% from 45.23% (PPP) in 1988 
(Election Commission of Pakistan, 1990, Val. 11; 1988, Vol. ID, but the 
PDA remained the largest single party. Only an alliance of anti-PDA 
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111 37.37 106 51.21 
PDA 36.83 44 21.26 
MQM 5.54 15 7.25 
PDA 41.80 23 56.10 
26.82 15 36.59 
8.81 3 7.32 
PDA 35.46 46 46.0 
MQM 28.94 28 28.0 
8.46 6 6.0 
SNA (Hl)* 1.44 1 1.0 
Source: Election Commission of Pakistan, 1990, Vol. II. 
, IF - SIndb National Alliance, (Hamid Jatoi Group). 
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could deny Benazir Bhutto the Sindh government. The alliance was 
masterminded by Jam Sadiq Ali, a controversial PPP dissident, who 
encouraged the MQM to sit in coalition with Sindhi and Pakhtun 
nationalists (the SNA and ANP), Islamic parties (namely Jamaat-i Islaml, 
part of IJI) and other remnants of the Zia era. 
The price that Altaf Hussain paid to deny Benazir Bhutto power 
was described in the following terns: 
"They started to say, 'broaden the KQH - don't limit it 
just to XdbajJr-s'. That's why we started to address all 
downtrodden people of Pakistan. In future we will launch 
Wuttabeda Qauml Movement. " 
(interview, 13 March 1991, Karachi). 
The ambiguous "they" refers to the IJI government with whom the 
MQM has been able to hold office, as a close advisor to the Prime 
Minister explained (inter-view, 21 February 1991, Islamabad). It seems 
that the MQM's move away from strident ethnic politics was part of its 
bargain with the IJI. This factor caused some embarrassment shortly 
after the signing of the MQM-IJI accord in October 1989. In December 
1988, Mian Zahid Sarfraz of the IJI told reporters that the MQM had 
dropped its nationality demand (Dawn, 11 December 1989, Karachi). Less 
than 24 hours later, Azim Ahmed Tariq announced that Sarfraz "was either 
labouring under a delusion or ... his statement had been misrepresented 
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by the press" (Dawn, 12 December 1989, Karachi). By March 1990 however, 
Altaf Hussain was telling the press that the Movement would no longer 
"insist" on recognition of XdbajIr-s as a nationality (Frontier Post, 2 
March 1990, Lahore). The brief confusion could mark the fact that Azim 
Tariq was not as willing to denounce the "ethnic stance" as the IJI had 
hoped. By early 1993, however, Azim Tariq was heading Altaf Hussain's 
part of the broken MQM, while other leaders were leading a rival "pro- 
ethnic" faction of the MQM. 
The explanation for the MQM's ethnic stance in earlier times was 
given by the party leader, when he was asked why the name and purpose 
of the MQM had so far been restricted to just Xohajirs: 
"The answer is if you want to do something for the 
betterment of the people, you will first start from 
your own home, your own locality, and where you live. 
Only when you have achieved that goal in your area 
will you spread to other areas. " 
(Nation, 19. January 1990, Lahore). 
Here we see the proposed sequence of events that would lead to 
the Nuttaheda Qauml Novement, as described by Altaf Hussain (interview, 
13 March 1991, Karachi): 
-287- 
1. The MQM proves that it is a "new political phenomenon" in Pakistan by 
placing young, "middle-class" representatives in the Assemblies, and by 
conducting its work in a disciplined and scrupulous manner, avoiding all 
bribery, scandal and "horse-trading". 
2. Representatives from mazlooml (oppressed] communities in other parts 
of Pakistan who are not adequately represented by the existing political 
structure, organise themselves and approach the MQM to negotiate an 
alliance. 
3. The Nuttabeda Qaumi Movement is launched formally, composed of groups 
in all provinces following the same disciplined code as the HQN, to 
contest for the rights of the gbar-ibon [downtrodden] in a national 
f orum. 
I have shown that as far as the MQM is concerned, the f irst of 
these phases has been effectively completed, since the Movement has 
achieved a large mandate in XdbajIr- areas. By 1993 the MQM held every 
National Assembly seat but one in Karachi, and both of the urban seats 
in Hyderabad. The MQM has also placed representatives not only in the 
Provincial and National Assemblies, but in the Senate (upper house of 
parliament), and in key civic agencies. MQM workers claim that the 
second phase is now well underway, with community representatives 
approaching Altaf Hussain from other provinces (dIscussion with MQM 
administrative secretary, 19 January 1991, Karachi). To emphasise this 
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broadening of MQM appeal across communities, I was continually told by 
advisors, workers and Assembly ministers of the XQM during a visit to 
Altaf Hussain in Abbasi Sbabeed Hospital, Nazimabad (19 January 1991), 
that floods of non-Mobajirs had been coming to visit the stricken leader 
in his hospital bed. I was shown a long queue of people hoping to see 
the MQM leader, and told: 
"All these visitors are generally poor people ........ There 
are not just XdbajIz-s here but others - Punjabis and 
Patbans, [Pakhtuns]. Altaf cares for these people - 
that's why they come. " 
(discussion with MQX technical advisor, 19 January 1991, Karachi). 
Judging by the dress of the visitors, however, and the manner in 
which those randomly selected from the queue could usually speak Urdu, 
it seems clear that much as the Movement might like otherwise, very few 
non-NdbaJIzýs would associate with the NQM, and few would venture beyond 
armed MQM guards into such a shrine to the Movement as the Abbasl 
Sbabeed Hospital has become on occasions. In these terns, the suggestion 
that large groups of non-jYobaj1r-s support the Movement is probably 
another element of political "mythology". 
The implementation of the Nuttabeda Qauni Novement programme 
led to serious internal differences in the MQM. Altaf Hussain was in 
hospital in January, nominally for "myalgia", although a second visit 
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came at the end of February, the purpose of which was the subject of 
many rumours. "Herald" magazine claimed to have "hospital sources" that 
said the leader had been poisoned (March 1991, Karachi). This particular 
explanation may be apocryphal, but. there is no denying the fact that the 
Nuttabeda scheme has exposed violent differences within the Movement. 
"As you know, " explained Altaf Hussain from his hospital bed, "we have 
some problems at the moment" (interview, 13 March 1991, Karachi). 
The rift exposed a "dissident group" within the MQM leadership, 
who wanted to retain the original militant Nobajir subnationalist policy 
and also were opposed to broadening the base of the Movement beyond 
Nobajirs. The dissident group involved nine MQM members, headed by 
Bader Iqbal (MPA and provincial transport minister), Aamir Khan and 
Afaq Ahmed (joint secretaries of the MQM). "Dawn" U March 1991, 
Karachi) linked the subsequent resignation of these figures to the 
suspension in February of APMSO secretary-general Shahid Qureshi, 
suggesting that he was also a supporter of the dissident faction. Other 
sources suggested that the controversy had arisen over cases of 
corruption, possibly involving the late Sindh Chief Minister Jam Sadiq 
Ali (Frontier Post, 4 March 1991, Lahore). 
The incident caused some bad publicity for the MQM, particularly 
when Bader Iqbal claimed that his resignation on 20 February had been 
obtained "under duress" (Dawn, 5 March 1991, Karachi). Following the 
incident all 27 XQN MPAs handed in their resignations to Sindh Assembly 
speaker Razique Khan to show that the MQN should not be seen to be 
party to scandal or intrigue. The resignations were rejected, but four 
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XPAs involved with the dissident group in addition to two MNAs were 
subsequently sacked by the MQM (Herald, March 1991, Karachi, p. 47). The 
purge involved the complete dissolution of the "Zone A" Committee of the 
XQM (Karachi East; Landhi, Korangi, Shah Faisal Colony and Malir; Dawn, 
8 March 1991, Karachi). 
Open reporting of the split, and various speculative theories in 
the press, led to another bout of press intimidation in March 1991. For 
a few days it seemed as if the violence had returned to Karachi as 
newspaper distributors were threatened, bundles of newspapers were 
stolen or burnt, a journalist was severely beaten, and the offices of the 
Urdu daily "Takbeei" suffered an arson attack. Altaf Hussain freely 
accused other groups such as Jamaat-i Islaml and the PPP of being 
involved in the incidents (ibid, p. 24). This was despite the fact that he 
had announced boycotts of "Herald", "Takbeee', "Dawn" and "The Star" 
newspapers (Qauml Akbar, 16 March 1991, Karachi; and Star, 20 March 91, 
Karachi), and received a delegation of the All Pakistan Newspaper 
Society (APRS) and Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors (CPNE) at the 
Maz-kaz [headquarters] in Azizabad which was followed by an abrupt 
cessation of the Violence (Herald, April 1991, Karachi, p. 25). The APMSO 
also tried to turn the internal split to the MQM's advantage, claiming 
that the Movement was the only political force in Pakistan to follow 
strict codes of "accountability" (Dawn, 12 March 1991, Karachi). 
The dissidents' return to Karachi in July 1992 led to gun- 
battles between rival members of the Movement in Karachi East, until 
army units were dispatched to end the fighting. The operation has not 
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only marked a loss of patience on behalf of the army f or the MQM, but 
has also exposed elements of militarisation and violence within the MQM 
that the Movement has always denied, such as the use of kbels 
Isubterranenan torture chambers] and hidden stocks of arms. 
The internal problems have left the MQM in a state of limbo 
since March 1991, with Altaf Hussain continuing to spend much time 
either in Abbasi Sbabeed Hospital or in London. With its position as 
largest single party in the provincial administration of Sindh, 
furthermore, arrests and resignations have led the Sindh ministry also 
to be somewhat in limbo, a situation only partially resolved by the 
dismissal of the national and all provincial ministries in July 1993 
pending new elections in October of that year. Meanwhile, tame newspaper 
articles headed "By our staff reporter" have repeatedly expressed the 
sentiments of the Movement's central leadership, such as the following: 
"He [Altaf Hussain] said MQM was a patriotic party 
which had been raising its voice for the rights of 
poor and the suppressed people of the country without 
discrimination. " 
(The News, 23 January 1992, Karachi). 
Similarly, the leader was quoted as saying: 
"The days are approaching fast when all Punjabis, 
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Pakhtuns, Sindhis, XdbajIrs and Baluchis will unitedly 
end the exploitation once for all" 
(Dawn, 23 January 1992, Karachi). 
By 1992, such an expansion into a party for oppressed people of 
Pakistan, whatever their ethnic community, was the policy proposal of 
the central core of the leadership headed by Altaf Hussain and Azim 
Tariq. Meanwhile, the dissident MQM group, calling itself the Haqiqi 
Group ["genuine" group'O) has become a semi-permanent feature, based 
principally in Islamabad in the manner of an administration in exile. 
Here, it has close relations with the MRC (whose leader, Ishtiaq Azhar, 
sits in the Senate in the capital), and makes frequent public statements, 
such as a condemnation of G. M. Syed's plans for "Sindbudesb" (The News, 
20 January 1992, Karachi). Such language closely echoes that of the days 
of violence in Karachi and Hyderabad between 1988 and 1990. 
The two factions of the MQM can broadly be equated with the 
difference between the Movement in its early days, and the Movement 
after the politics of alliance was undertaken in order to win political 
representation at other levels. That large numbers of Xe2bajIr-s in 
Karachi support the "dissidents", to the point where they are willing to 
take up arms against their former colleagues, reiterates the point that 
there is a constituency for the ethnic, subnationalist politics presented 
by the MQM at its outset. This constituency clearly still feels the 
alienation - and violent reaction - that a larger Ndbajir community 
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appeared to feel through the 1970s and 1980s. In Hyderabad, furthermore, 
the conspicuous lack of a split in the party structure or among its 
supporters suggests that the majority of Xbbailzýs in Hyderabad feel 
differently to the supporters of the dissidents in Karachi. 
Alternatively, loyalty to Al-taf Hussain and his proposals may be 
stronger in Hyderabad than the will to protect the early policies of 
ethnic XdbaJ1r activism. The depth of the split will be tested for the 
first time in the elections of 7 October 1993. 
The most recent developments for the MQM have thus been 
extremely damaging. Altaf Hussain left for London, in Autumn 1991, where 
he remains as of mid-1993. The strength of the dissidents will depend 
on the support they can gain from either the existing MQM, or from the 
IJI government, which has allowed the MQM to hold provincial and 
national office since 1990. It is not inconceivable that some sort of 
rmppr-ocbement can be engineered, although in 1992 this did not seem 
likely given the violence of -the confrontations in Karachi between 
supporters of the opposing factions. Meanwhile, Azim Tariq reluctantly 
heads what is left of Altaf Hussain's MQM, which has been severely 
undermined by the apparent retirement of its Quaid. Worst of all for 
Tariq, the crucial battle for favour with the important institutions of 
the central state is being won by the RaqIqI group, who clearly command 
the support of the army and its related intelligence directorates 
(Herald, January 1993, Karachi, p. 60). Since the army is the most 
powerful institution in the State of Pakistan, this relationship will 
prove very important for the "dissident" MQM. 
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The split in the MQM highlights its ambiguous nature, which in 
turn relates to the demands imposed by winning real power in Pakistan. 
The MQM has fluctuated between being a "movement" and a "party". 
Initially, the XQM was very much the former, concentrating on its 
"ethnic" rhetoric. Altaf Hussain's Muttaheda proposal indicates that he 
wishes the MQK to move towards the status a political party proper. The 
complexity of the problem, and the emergence of the internal schism, 
relate in part to the fundamental shifts and apparent confusions of MQK 
policy and programme over the years. The split has also highlighted the 
political needs, and grievances, of some of those who have rallied to the 
. Kobajir- flag. Those needs and grievances have involved a complex 
combination of physical problems relating to unemployment, education or 
access to resources and representation, with cultural and social factors 
such as a sense of "ethnic" assertiveness. In these terms, the Nobajlr 
community of Sindh has been shown, politically at least, to be far from 
a unitary and monolithic comunity. 
5.4 POLICY KFD IDEOLOGY OF THE XQX 
The MQM has failed to develop a consistent ideiology over time; 
indeed, there have been several reversals of policy or fundamantal 
changes of direction. Clapham remarks that this is not unusual in 
developing-world politics - indeed it could be said to be an integral 
part of countries where Western-style ideological politics is not strong 
(Clapham, 1985, pp. 79-80). I would argue that the reason ethnic political 
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groups seem to change their spots so readily in the political arena 
relates to the fact that ethnic communities themselves are not 
monolithic, but are "fluid" (Clapham, ibid, p. 80). A politics mobilising 
"ethnic groups", therefore, must exercise a "... clientalist politics 
expressed through the medium of ethnicity", if it is to maintain any 
form of unity and coherence (ibid). In other words, the policy of ethnic 
groups must be fully responsive to changes and developments in the 
communities they represent. When a party or movement aims to interface 
with other community and political groups in order to gain access to 
power, the bargaining and trade-offs that constitute a clientalist 
politics become ever more complex. (Clapham defines "clientalism" as a 
system of securing wider political support within the framework of a 
"fragile" state and a considerable socio-economic gap between political 
patrons and the majority of the client population; Clapham, 1985, pp. 54- 
7.1 would argue that the XQM attempts this in its politics by stressing 
the importance of the local [urban) state, and by holding out to its 
supporters [clients] the prospect of employment and/or other rewards in 
this patron-contalled political arena). 
The major policies and aims presented by the MQM can be 
analysed in the context of the three major chronological periods in the 
Movement's development. My argument is that during the first two 
periods, the MQM acted principally as an ethnic pressure-group. The 
change between these two periods primarily involved the object of 
opposition within an overarching ethnic rhetoric. The third period saw a 
more fundamental shift in the z-alson dLitre of the Movement, whereby a 
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fundamental transformation from "movement" to "party" was claimed to be 
underway. The following are broadly the three periods of policy, derived 
from the dominant rhetoric delivered by the party during each period: 
- Period 1,1984-88; ethnic assertion of Kobajirs (including demand for 
nationality recognition), battling the "discrimination of MobaJ17-s", 
parallel status to Sindhis as a subnationality, opposition to immigrants 
into urban Sindh other than Bibarls, including suggestions for 
"repatriation". 
- Period 2,1988-90; pro-Pakistan, and subsequent "thwarting of 
Sindbudesb"; claims of "massacres" being committed in Sindh, violent 
estrangement from the PPP, which the MQM claims is tantamount to a 
Sindhi nationalist agency. Much talk of "martyrs", wrongful imprisonment 
of NobaJIrs, and demands for "compensation" from the government. 
- Period 3,1990-1992; Xuttabeda Qaumi Movement, pro-poor, confronting 
feudalism, creating "real democracy", "realism and practicalism". 
Emergence of dissident HaqIqI Gi-oup, whose policy is a return to that of 
period one above. 
Rhetoric has been more forthcoming than detailed manifestos in 
the history of the MQM. The rhetoric is delivered principally in 
pamphlets and sheets in Urdu issued from MQM offices around Karachi and 
Hyderabad, and more recently from a so-called I'Mobajlr academy" in 
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Liaquatabad (which appears to be little more than a printing press). 
Before 1988, these documents, in addition to press interviews and 
statements, conveyed the ideas of the Movement, without presenting any 
detailed economic, social or political programme as such. A key factor of 
the Movement's policy, which makes the MQM very much a "movement", is 
the value placed on the words and thoughts of the Quaid, Altaf Hussain. 
When pressing for details of party policy over time, I was continually 
referred to newspaper and television interviews given by Altaf Hussain, 
and pamphlets issued under his name. These were seen as an adequate 
source of central XQM policy over time, and in this way the Movement 
was effectively equated with its leader. 
In November 1988, the MQM produced the 25-point Qarardad-e 
Maqasid [Charter of Resolutions] in preparation for the general elections 
of 15 November. This was the first detailed "manifesto" of the Movement 
in both English and Urdu. A month later the Charter was followed by the 
Karachi Declaration of 59 points; the accord between the MQM and PPP. By 
1991, these documents were considered by the MQM to be out of date, 
although a new formal manifesto has not yet been prepared (Interview 
with XQM worker, 6 February 1991, Karachi). 
The two documents of 1988 indicate the "Movement's" failure to 
present a detailed programme. The Charter of Resolution, for example, 
concentrated either on "local preference" issues for urban Sindh, or on 
very specific and somewhat trivial matters. For example, point 17 
suggests that the postal tariff for India should be brought into line 
with that of other neighbouring countries (see Appendix 7). The Charter 
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suggested a parochial vision rooted principally in Karachi, while the 
Declaration dealt with broader issues in a vague manner, as shown by 
point 5: 
"Pakistan Peoples Party and Mohajir Qaumi Movement 
stand for the rights of all oppressed people and 
different segments of the society. " 
(see Appendix 5). 
Here we see the beginnings ot the wider vision that has become 
encapsulated in the Muttabeda Qauml Xovement idea, yet the rhetoric 
hardly delivers precise details of how the vision is to be won. The 
grand sentiments were somewhat negated by a perspective on Sindh and no 
further. Indeed, of the 59 points of the Declaration, 20 deal specifically 
with Sindh. 
The rhetoric of Urdu 
The Urdu documents provide an appreciation of the "language" of 
the Movement, and of the changes in rhetoric over time. Here again there 
is a tendency for dramatic and grand vocabulary to be more prominent 
than hard details. This matter is an interesting one, relating to the 
poetic and literary heritage of the Urdu language, around which XdbajJr 
society is partly structured. 
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I argued in the previous chapter that the notion of Xobajir 
ethnicity conveyed by the MQM involves a specific Urdu heritage, This 
relates to a northern Indian XuEbal history, to which such figures as 
Iqbal were important both in his capacity as a poet and as a 
protagonist of Muslim autonomy in India. The nuances of such an Urdu 
heritage are displayed in the Urdu party literature of the HQM. 
In the first period, qaumiat [nationality] was a recurrent theme. 
"Nobajir Qaumlat aur Zamee2Y' [Nobajir nationality and territory3 by MQM 
secretary-general Dr. Imran Faroaq, explains the importance of language 
and other factors to land or territory. There follows an appraisal of 
how such features underpin Xobajir nationality. In this way, an implicit 
comparison is made to Sindhi identity, to which zameen is far more 
important. The document shows that the early period of the Movement's 
development involved in-depth analysis of the "nationality" question, and 
the nature of Kc7. bajlr identity and community. The first edition of this 
document was published in October 1986, when 1,000 copies were printed. 
By April 1988,5,000 copies of the third edition were being printed, 
rising to 10,000 by January 1989 with the fourth edition (MQM, January 
1989). 
A postscript to the fourth edition by Altaf Hussain stresses the 
importance of taqat [power] and ittebad [unity], both important to the 
Movement in the light of internal differences within the MQM, and rival 
XdbajIr organisations. The postscript explains: 
"In the world the only nations that progress and 
-300- 
achieve respect are those who have strength; the weak 
and confused nations always suffer destruction and 
disgrace. The strength of the nation depends on the 
unity of kindred spirits, and if a part of XdbajIr 
territory is lost and our riches depleted, it will 
be necessary for our powers to be united on one 
platform, and your strength will serve*as an example. " 
(Altaf Hussain, MQN, January 1989, author's translation). 
Taqat relates to the contentious aspect of militarisation In the 
Xabajir movement, beginning with the APMSO in the late 1970s. Some argue 
that the movement had no choice but to be militant and strong, to avoid 
the tababi aUr zillat [destruction and disgrace] that would have resulted 
from existing rival groups being well-armed (interview with minority 
leader, 1 March 1991, Karachi). The IfQM's policy on arms is closer to 
that of the United States, where citizens have the right to carry 
firearms and licences are readily issued, than to that of Britain, where 
the granting of licences is very restricted. Because of a history of 
British colonialism the British policy prevails generally in Pakistan. 
Point 3 of the Charter of Resolution demands that the issuing of arms 
licences be made as easy as the granting of television or radio licences 
(Appendix 7). 
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The importance of ittebad under the XQM banner is repeatedly 
stressed in party documents and statements. The following extract 
explains the policy: 
"XOHAJIR CONSENSUS: 
Ve believe that a serviceable XdhajIr unity and a 
strong foundation will inevitably deliver the prize of 
an agreement and consensus within the JYdbajIr- community. " 
(MQM, (undated) "Hum aur hamarey scocIP; [Us and our Ideas]; author's 
translation) 
The yakjabartl (consensus] sought by the MQM is a unanimous vote for 
the Movement. Large rallies aim to display effectively such a unity to 
the outside world. In an rather more sinister light, the intimidation of 
rival groups such as MIT or JUP in Karachi and Hyderabad by armed 
supporters of the MQM in the early years of the Movement, such that the 
MIT has not dared to hold a rally in Karachi since 1987, might also 
achieve the goal of suggesting that the MQM is the one representative of 
Nobajirs. I have suggested, however, that the continuing existence of 
these rival groups, in addition to the emergence of factionalism within 
the MQM, suggest that there is not complete consensus among Xdlajir-s on 
the MQM's status as undisputed leader of the community. 
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The stressing of importance of stength and unity relates to the 
perceived pressures exerted on the Xohajiz-s, which are described by the 
XQX in the tollowing terms: 
"NO-ha fl The first generation has been buried 
in this land, the second has grown into its youth, 
and the third-born have still not been accepted as 
'sons of the soil'. 
Afaba fl Under the quota system and domicile, 
the sanctuary ol admissions and government and semi- 
semi-government positions has been removed lrom them. 
Afoýb afI Even in their big areas of residence 
their due rights have been taken away. " 
(XQM, (undated), ". Jfcbajir Qauml Movement? '; author's translation). 
The mazli! miat of Nobijirs is explained in physical and 
psychological terms. Firstly, the Sindhi hosts of the community are 
claimed still not to have "accepted" the Xcbajirs, which has served as a 
defining force in the emergence of the Kdbajir- identity in itself. In 
these terms, the MQK is claiming that such contingent processes in 
community identity construction, such as the approach of neighbour 
communities, are of great importance. Again, this theory reminds us of 
such work as Akbar Ahmed's an "district ethnicity" (A. S. Ahmed, 1990b). 
It is also interesting to note that the MQK's statement above makes a 
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connection between the original post-Partition Muslim migrants, and the 
Urdu-speakers of contemporary Sindh, by* identifying the two groups as 
merely generations in the same "community". Thus, as discussed In the 
previous chapter, the temporal boundaries between NobaJirs are so 
blurred that the term Nobailr ran be appropriated for present-day Urdu- 
speakers. 
Secondly, the physical factor of public-sector employment and 
admissions to higher education is cited, whereby non-locals are accused 
of stealing jobs and places "under the Quota System and domicile" 
(either through the general unfairness of the Quota System, or through 
clandestine domicile arrangements). These grievances are bound-up with 
the conditions of society in the local urban state in Karachi and 
Hyderabad, which * ecompass the operation of clandestine syndicate 
organisations or "mafias", with whom the NQK has waged a battle for 
local power (I will return to the local urban state in Karachi in Section 
Three of the dissertation). Finally, an interesting reference is made to 
"land", not in the sense of zameen as the Sindhi leaders would say, but 
merely in the sense of 6b5di brA eie 'ilaqp [big areas of 
residence]. Thus, by concentrating physically in urban Sindh, the 
Mobajirs can claim to be owed certain special rights Chuq6f q) in those 
areas. This is an interesting connection of community with geographical 
boundaries (albeit vague, unspecified ones), that becomes significant in 
the context of policies for the partition in Sindh (which some strands 
of the Nobajir movement, such as the MIT, support). 
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The term "sons of the sail" is a familiar one across Asia, which 
perhaps explains why it is written in Urdu and then translated into 
English in the above document. In Malaysia, the Malays have used exactly 
the same term Obhum1putra"; Weiner, 1978, p. 16) to differentiate 
themselves from supposedly less loyal communities (by virtue of a 
shorter history of settlement in Malaysia) such as the Chinese. In India, 
Weiner: has analysed how the term is used widely in ethnic politics 
(Weiner, 1978). In Sindh, "sons of the soil" was a familiar and 
contentious term in the 1970s, when friction grew between the Kbbajirs 
and the supposedly pro-Sindhi Bhutto government. At the time of the 
Language Bill, Bhutto referred to himself as a "son of the soil", and 
explained that as a consequence he could "not betray his own land" 
(Dawn, 16 July 1972, Karachi). Here, Bhutto was clearly referring to 
Sindh, and was making a classicly Sindhi nationalist connection between 
the "land" of the province and Sindhi culture in particular. Such 
statements clearly alienated the Nohajlr community. 
The poetic use of Urdu in the description of such matters is 
aptly displayed in the document shown in Figure 5.4, which describes the 
denial of buqooq to XdbajIrs as "NQM mazloomiat ka sambal bay" [The MQH 
has flowered from oppression]; (MQM, February 1989). Here, --ambal is 
difficult to translate, broadly meaning "flower", but a specific type of 
flower. The word brings a romantic, poetic sense to political discourse, 
which might seem unusual to the European observer. Me HQH's statement, 
printed on a map of Pakistan (including all of Jammu and Kashmir) 
reflects two of the themes that the MQM has raised fairly continuously. 
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Firstly, the Movement is presented as "pro- Pakistan" (within which 
disputed Muslim areas such as Kashmir and Jammu are assumed to belong 
to Pakistan), and, secondly, the Movement is assumed to be battling 
valiantly against oppression. 
The turning-point towards a Muttabeda Qaumi Xovement in the 
late 1980s involved an extension of the concept of mazloomiat from the 
Mobajir- community to the peoples of Pakistan as a whole, as implied in 
the above document. The rhetoric of this latest phase of MQK development 
is portrayed in an "interview" with Altaf Hussain dated September 1990, 
printed at the "Nobailr Academy" in I. I. aquatabad (which seemed to have 
started operation around late 1988). The document, ot which 2,500 were 
printed, claims simply "Rum nay Shar-iboa ka sqr-Xacba irf'rhai. " Eve have 
made the downtrodden hold their heads in pride]; (XQM, September 1990). 
Here, the emphasis in the rhetoric clearly shifts away from the Xaha. 7irs 
and the various oppressions they are said to have suffered, to the 
ghar-ibon [downtrodden, destitute] of Pakistan in general. Tbe new phase 
involves a battle-cry against "feudals" and Jjaz-adarrl7a [monopolists, 
big businesses]. This change of emphasis in the rhetoric has led to the 
schism of 1991 between Altaf and his immediate supporters, and those 
who wish to assert the rights of Xohajirs alone and pursue the concept 
of qaumlat [nationality]. 
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Ideology and eclecticism 
Since 1990 the MQM has also claimed to be tollowing a "new" 
doctrine termed "Realism and Practicalism". This was one of the main 
themes raised in author's second meeting with Altaf Hussain (13 March 
1991, Abbasi Sbabeed Hospital, Karachi), and it is modelled on the 
changing broad ideologies of the late twentieth century, notably the 
collapse of communist states. In 1991, an 14QM press conterence explained 
in detail the philosophy of Realism and Practicalism (XQX, 1991a), the 
main points of which are as follows: 
1. All major political ideologies have changed over time. 
2. Within certain political philosophies, different systems are necessary 
for different places; for example Mao's form of Marxism for China. 
Culture, values, en%rironment and so on vary across space and time. 
3. The world had two main political philosophies; capitalism and 
socialism. It would be wrong to totally reject both. 
4. Socialism's failing is that it ignores "human nature", thus workers 
are de-motivated. 
5. In capitalism, greed accumulates, and nauzobillab I self- sanctit icati an I 
becomes prevalent. Also, the rich capitalist countries at the UN gain 
veto rights, while the 40 Muslim countries have none. 
6. In Pakistan, feudalism is prevalent and the "priveleged class" rules 
the country. 
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7. Fundamentally similar Asian countries such as South Korea or Malaysia 
have shown great developnem-L since Independence. 
8. Feudalism and capitalism are linked through the bureaucracy. 
9. The NQM wants to "end the rule of the 2%, and create the rule of 98%. " 
(ibid, pp. 2-10), that is, to end the rule of feudalism. 
The "philosophy" attempts to confront Pakistan's particular 
problem of "feudalism" in which wadaras and bureaucrats hold central 
power, while noting the perceived failures of socialism (inefficiency) 
and capitalism (western hegemony and greed). Thus, while much of the 
MQM's philosophy sounds vague and populistic, in terms of overturning 
the elite and putting capital and political representation into the hands 
of ordinary Pakistanis, the aim is to work within the bounds of 
"capitalism" and democracy. It is interesting that Islam is rarely 
mentioned by the KQM, except occasionally in condemnation of traditional 
Islamic political parties. 
In this way, the MQK can be described as an avowedly secular 
party, like the PPP, in separating religious affairs from the political 
sphere. In another interpretation, held by former JanE editor S. M. Taqi, 
the MQM deliberately avoids religious issues and rhetoric to avoid 
splitting its audience along sectarian lines (Intez-view, 13 January 1991, 
Karachi). 
However, the deliberately eclectic nature of Realism and 
Practicalism leaves the philosophy open to charges of lack of clarity 
and incisiveness. rhe greatest failing of the philosophy is the fact that 
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the MQM has become a coalition member of the IJI. The Movement 
therefore stands alongside wader-as and Pirs such as the Jatois of the 
NPP (the largest land-owning dynasty in Sindh), religious parties, and 
industrialists, bureaucrats and technocrats of the Zia era. The IJI, and 
its principal component the PML, symbolises the traditional power 
structure that Altaf Hussain claims to want to overturn. The sole 
purpose of such a paradoxical alliance is to deny power to the hated 
PPP. 
In these terms, the lack of legitimacy of the MQK as a true 
movement is transparent. While the populist rhetoric has garnered the 
support of many "ordinary" citizens an the streets, the MQM's alliance 
with feudal landowners, Islamic groups, former ministers of the Zia 
regime and the pro-army Pakistan Muslin League (PML) has clearly shown 
that access to power in the central and local state has been the primary 
concern of the MQN leader-ship. 
I would argue that there are two ways to see these somersaults 
in policy by the MQM, depending again on whether the state is seen as a 
passive political actor, or as an active political arena. In the former 
case, the MQM's approach to policy formation could be seen as little 
more than a cynical attempt to frame a deliberately flexible and non- 
committal ideology that is aimed solely at the winning of personal 
power. With the state taken as an active agency, the changes in MQK 
policy over time reflect the demands imposed by the necessities of 
alliance in contemporary Pakistan's political system. With the aim of 
winning power and representation, the policy and ideology of a 
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political movement must respond to the pressures and demands ol the 
principal axes of power in the state. In Pakistan in 1990, the key. to 
power for the MQK was represented by the Islamic Democratic Alliance 
(IJI) -a collection of bureaucratic, clerical, landowning and ex-army 
forces. 
But an alliance with these forces has been rejected by a major 
part of the MQM's constituency in urban Sindh, leading to factionalism. I 
would argue that this process points to the nature of the poliLical void 
that exists in Sindh's urban areas, and more importantly, to the way 
that this void has continued to exist through and possibly beyond the 
life of the MQM. 
The XQX, *democracy" and the press 
A notion of "democracy" is important to the MQK, and is 
enshrined in both the Karachi Declaration of December 1988 (points I 
and 3; Appendix 5), and more obliquely in the Charter of Resolution 
(points 9 and 10; Appendix 7). However, some of the policies of the 
Movement have been at variance with a Western view of democracy, which 
largely supports the freedom of the press. Press intimidation has now 
been openly undertaken by the MQM on four occasions; in June 1987 
(boycott of ", Tan8"), June 1969 (*Jang" again with a one-day boycott), 
January 1990 ("Qaumi Akbaz" offices occupied by KQM militants for five 
days) and March 1991 <boycott of "Takbeer", "Herald", "Dawn" and "The 
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Star"). I will describe these episodes, and then offer my analysis of the 
political processes they represent. 
The "Qauml Akbaz-" episode followed Altaf Hussain taking a 
dislike to the amount of coverage the MQN was receiving (Dawn, 14 
January 1990, Karachi), and the lifting of the boycott was followed by a 
particularly distasteful episode in which the newspaper printed a 
picture on the front page for five consecutive days of its editor bowing 
before Altaf Hussain (Herald, April 1991, Karachi, p. 28). In these terms, 
Altaf Hussain's powers of control over Karachi's institutions such as 
newspapers were conveyed powerfully to the public. 
The March 1991 episode was as a result of reports in the press 
about the internal split in the MQM. The boycotts and violence in March 
had followed a grim warning in the form of an infamous letter to the 
"Herald" magazine, from the Senator and President of the Mohajir Rabita 
Council (MRC) in February 1991. The letter stated: 
"This is to bring to your notice the constantly 
abusive and misleading articles being published in both 
Herald and Newsline about the MQM. 
I 
To hurt and violate the sentiments of the urban 
population of Sindh can result in serious repercussions 
for the press with a bias against the MQM. Remember that 
journalists' excesses are committed through their pens, 
while the public has other means at its disposal. " 
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(Herald, February 1991, Karachi, p. 1D. 
A proof of the letter had been shown to the author prior to its 
despatch by an MQM women's worker, Hasreen Jaleel. When asked if the 
Movement should not be able to accept some criticism an occasion, Jaleel 
replied "the press always comments on the bad points - we have to make 
them point out the good things we are doing also" (interview, 24 January 
1991, Karachi). Jaleel thus shows that despite denials of complicity in 
press intimidation, at least some members of the Movement leel that it 
is a Justifiable policy. As a result of the stance of the MQM on this 
matter, symbolic projects like "cleanliness weeks" have gained a great 
importance for the press, who risk chastisement or worse if they fail to 
report on the events to the MQM's liking. 
The result has been a generally effective intimidation of the 
Karachi press since 1986. The editor of a leading Eng lish- language daily 
revealed to me that most published articles an the MQN are either 
handed to the newspaper complete by the Movement (in the case of the 
Urdu newspapers), or the newspaper is "advised" on what to write (more 
common with the English newspapers, which have a smaller circulation; 
discussion with the editor of a major Karachi daily newspaper, 20 
January 1992, Karachi). Unfortunately, such intimidation of the media, 
which is hardly democratic, is also followed by the state in general, 
which has a Ministry of Information and an official "media policy". 
"Herald" again came under fire at the end of 1991, when it 
published a feature on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the 
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heading "Kidnapping, extortion, torture, rape ...... Can the CIA under the 
Jam-Marwat Combine get away with anything ? '"I (Herald, October 1991, 
Karachi). Copies of the magazine were forcibly confiscated from 
distributors in Karachi on publication (PPP, 1992a, p. 39). Because the 
MQM is a member of the ruling ISI coalition, this episode showed a 
sinister linkage between MQM-sponsored initimidation and the central 
state. The matter also demonstrated the power of political leadership 
over the perpetrators of the violence on the streets. On this occasion, 
the thugs were acting against an article criticising the government 
rather than the MQM directly. The episode also highlighted the 
importance of the reverse relationship between the central government 
and the MQM. By allying with the Movement, the IJI has been able to 
exercise a strict control on the explosive urban areas of Sindh. Many 
leaders have learnt to their cost the dangers of losing such control in 
Karachi in particular. 
These episodes highlight several important elements of society 
in metropolitan Pakistan. Firstly, the MQM was defining its own notion 
of democracy when attacking the press, which revolved around forcibly 
changing the balance of selected news towards what the Movement itself 
felt was important and should be presented to the public. In political 
terms, therefore, the episodes underlined the patrinonialist nature of 
MQM politics, in that Altaf and his immediate colleagues decided - and 
enforced - their definition of important information and how it was 
disseminated in the public domain. 
-313- 
Secondly, some of the episodes also highlighted a socio-cultural 
differentiation between sections of the MobaJir- community in Karachi, 
which can almost be decribed as a class differentiation. I am referring 
in particular to the attacks on the English-language publications such 
as "Dawn" and "Herald". These attacks were conducted on newspapers that 
are disseminated among a fairly small segment of the population (those 
who regularly use English), and which are little read among the real 
powerbase of MQM support, which I will demonstrate in the following 
chapter is concentrated in the semi-educated industrial and commercial 
workforce. The hostility of the attacks suggested a rejection of the 
Urdu-speakers who work for and read these publications, and thus, in a 
sense, their exclusion from the Xc? bajlr- community as delined by the MQM. 
The attacks on Engl ish- language publications can thus be 
distinguished from those on the Urdu papers, which were aimed at 
actually influencing and/or impressing the actual supporters of the MQK, 
and underlining to them the nature of the battle for the institutions of 
the local state that was being waged by the Movement. Interestingly, 
there is a dividing line between the attacks on Urdu papers, and those 
on English ones, falling around the end of 1990.1 would argue that this 
dividing line corresponds with the time that the MQK won major 
representation at all levels following alliance with the IJI, and thus 
reflects the fact* that the Movement thought much of the battle in the 
cities, for its own support at least, had been won by this time. 
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The secessionist dimension 
An accusation often levelled at the MQM is that it is trying 
illicitly to effect an administrative or other form of separation of 
Karachi and/or Hyderabad from Sindh province. Several observers have 
claimed the existence of some sort of "hidden hand" working in Sindh, or 
a "hidden agenda" of the MQM. Jam Saqi, leader of the Sindh Har'i 
Committee, claims that the MQK is working to achieve "free port" status 
for Karachi, like that of the city of Hong Kong (IRewsline, February 1990, 
p. 46). This is a theory held also by a prominent academic at Quaid-i 
Azam University, Islamabad (inter-view, 18 February 1991, Islamabad). 
Benazir Bhutto, meanwhile, claims that "certain elements within the MQM" 
are working for a division of the province (interview, 22 January 1992, 
Karachi), while the leader of the Punjabi faction of the PPI, Ghulam 
Sarwar Awan, accuses the KQM as a whole of working for this goal 
(Muslim, 16 February 1990, Karachi). 
However, MIT chief Dr. Saleem Haider claims that the fact that 
Altaf Hussain did not wan_t a division of Sindh was the very reason that 
the MIT was formed by Haider, with the express purpose of partition 
(interview, 11 February 1991, Karachi). The matter is clearly another one 
about which there is a lack of unanimity within the KQK. Altaf Hussain 
and the Nuttabeda faction do have their sights set on a broader 
leadership within a united Pakistan. However, the emergence of the Haqiql 
Group, and their serious differences with Altaf, in addition to the words 
of Dr. Saleem. Haider of the MIT, suggest that it could be the dissidents 
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of the MQM who are the "hidden hand" wanting an ethnic division of the 
province. Seen thus, the matter of secession could be the one that best 
defines the two major strands of the Xobajir movement. 
The mayor of Hyderabad, Aftab Ahmed Sheikh, has hinted at an 
"administrative separation" of Sindhis and ffobajlrs (Herald, June 1990, 
Karachi, p. 48). Similarly, Karachi mayor Dr. Farooq Sattar described the 
situation as follows: 
"Karachi is the lifeline of the count. ry, Lhe economic 
giant of the country, so it cannot be seen in limited 
terms; it needs to have federal and 'special' status as 
well as provincial status. " 
(interview, 26 February 1991, Karachi). 
The mayor suggested such experiments as autonomous local 
bodies, an idea revived in principle in 1979 but yet to be fully effected 
(ibid). Such a policy echoes the designation of Karachi as the Federal 
Capital Area in 1943, which was not revoked until 1958. Dr. Sattar and 
his supporters may be thinking along the lines of a similar designation 
of "special status" for Karachi now. 
It does seem, therefore, that an "administrative separation" of 
Karachi, and possibly Hyderabad, from the affairs and government of 
Sindh province, is an the MQK's agenda. A less moderate vision is 
occasionally suggested by some Xbbajirs. In New Delhi, the Sunday Mail 
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(29 February 1992) reported that a "mounting movement" in Pakistan. was 
suggesting a state of Kobaffristan", comprising not only parts of urban 
Sindh but Jammu and Kashmir, and all of Punjab; Tass, 29 February 1992, 
BBC VS archive). Such a proposal echoes that of NAP secretary-general 
Mahmud-ul Haq Usmani in 1972, who proposed making Karachi division a 
"Xubaflrlstan" (Dawn, 5 July 1972, Karachi; as we have seen, Usmani 
gained very little popular support for his ideas at the time). In 
contemporary Pakistan, the idea is not thought to amount to anything 
more than an obscure intellectual vision Untex-view with Zafar Abbas of 
Herald, 4 March 1992, Karachi). 
Thus since 1991, the MQM has split, its leader is in self- 
imposed exile in London, and a general crisis has blighted the immediate 
future of the Movement. The tensions that led to the schism have many 
foundations, but one may be the centralised, secretive and relatively 
undemocratic nature of the Movement's internal structure. It is useful to 
examine this structure up to the split in March 1991. 
5.5 XQX - DITERIFAL STRUCTURE 
The structure of the MQK is not dissimilar to that of the pre- 
1957 Jramaat-l Islaml. The similarity lies in the upper leadership (based 
on Naulana Maudoodi's concept of an Islamic state; Bahadur, 1977, p. 142), 
whereby the Amlr [ruler/commander], heads a single Xaj11s-1 Sboora 
[assembly of councillors], with a Qayyam [secretary-general] as 
immediate second- in- command. After 1957, a second Executive Council 
-317- 
Ofajlls-l Am1a) was instituti-ed, to democratise the internal workings of 
the party. 
In the MQM, the Quaid-i Tebrik (leader of the novement] stands 
immediately above the Chairman (Azin Ahmed Tariq) and Secretary- General 
(Dr. Imran Farooq), who are part of the single executive council; the 
Markaz (headquarters /off ice]. 
The Quaid and the Narkaz represent the central body of the MQM, 
and comprise the long-serving original tounders of the APMSO and MQM 
(excepting three of the original APMSO team). Like a centralised state, 
all final decisions ultimately rest with the Xar-Iraz. Appointments and 
expulsions in lower committees are made at the discretion of the Xarkaz, 
whose own composition ultimately rests with the Quaid (the dissidents 
were initially expelled from the Movement by the Narkaz, before they 
set-up the Haqiqi Group). Occasionally, an entire local committee can be 
expelled by the Markaz, and the committee administered from the centre. 
As far as is known, this has only happened once, in March 1991, when 
the Zone 'A' committee (comprising four sectors in Karachi East) was 
dismissed over the dissident issue. The Zone's party administration was 
then assum., ed by the Narkaz pending re-selection of officers (Dawn, 8 
March 1991, Karachi), rather like Martial Law or a State of Emergency in 
a state. 
The day-to-day functioning of the Movement is very centralised, 
in that once a week the secretaries or representatives of all committees 
from Zones down to Units, meet with the Narkaz in Azizabad. Here matters 
are discussed and nominations for new Unit members or complaints about 
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existing members raised. Where necessary the. Xaz-kaz makes f inal 
decisions on such matters. Holding of office in the Movement is not easy 
and begins at councillor, sub-committee or Unit level, after stringent 
conditions of XbbaJ1r identity, including "discipline" and complete 
dedication to the Movement, are satisfied. 
The composition of the Xarkaz (before the split) is believed not 
to have changed since the inception of the movement. The Narkaz is 
situated in the middle-income residential district of Azizabad (Karachi 
Central), adjacent to Altaf Hussain's house. I'here are many ways in which 
the MQM operates and appears as a form of "secondary state", and one 
is the manner in which "going to Azizabad" is used to mean meeting the 
MQM, as if this were the capital of the State. Even the elected members 
of the MQM - the MRAs and MPAs - are answerable to the Xarkaz, and 
they can be expelled from the MQM by the Xarkaz causing the vacancy of 
their seat (this happened with a group of MQM MPAs during the emergence 
of the dissident issue in 1991, who were expelled from the MQK by the 
Xar-lraz despite their resignation papers having been refused by the 
Speaker of the Provincial Assembly). In these terms, the the functioning 
of the MQM while in power is also very centralised around the 
QualdliYa. rAraz structure. 
XQX wings 
Below the Xarkaz, the Movement is structured on two levels: 
Firstly there are the horizontal "committees" based on spatial 
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delimitations of urban areas, starting with the Zones (f ive in Karachi, 
one in Hyderabad), followed by the Units. Secondly, the spatial 
organisation is structured vertically between six "committees" and 
"wings", which are as follows; roughly in order of size'2: 
- MQM Labour wing 
- Student wing (APMSO) 
- MQM Women's wing 
- Khidmat-I Kbalq [Peoples Service] Committee 
- Medical Committee 
- Legal Aid Committee 
Of these groups the Labour wing is the largest. 1'he wing is 
divided into sub-groups between major employers, such as the large 
national banks, and acts essentially as a Nohajir trade union. The wing 
wields a considerable. influence in the local politics of such cities as 
Karachi, where it is effectively the dominant labour syndicate. In 
February 1992 controversy broke out at the Pakistan Steel works in the 
city where the labour wing is the largest union. A former-army general 
had been appointed as the new chairman of the works and had ordered 
many redundancies, leading to a bitter dispute with the MQM labour wing 
who threatened to make the "trouble spill onto the streets" (interview 
with Zafar Abbas of "Herald", 4 March 1992, Karachi). 
The student wing of the 14QM was described as such by a Narkaz 
secretary (discussion, 14 March 1991, Karachi), although sometimes the 
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links between the APMSO and -MQM have been deliberately understated. In 
March 1990, a hostage amnesty in the presence of representatives of the 
press saw the APMSO release eighteen hostages in exchange for nine held 
by the PSF (Frontier Post, 9 April 1990, Lahore). The exchange led Altaf 
Hussain to make the embarassing claim that links between the APMSO and 
MQM were weak: 
"The MQM has never held anybody hostage and never 
has it released anybody. It was APMSO which is an 
independent and sovereign body. " 
(Frontier Post, 9 March 1990, Lahore). 
However, the MQM does usually describe the APXSO as a "student 
wing" of the parent movement, on the same level as the women's wing and 
workers' wing, for example (interview with Radeem Nusrat, 13 March 1991, 
Karachi). Furthermore, the MQM appears to have control over appointments 
and expulsions in the APXSO, as it demonstrated in February 1991 by 
suspending ýhe organisation's general secretary Shahid Qureshi for one 
year (Dawn, 28 February 1991, Karachi). The newspaper report, originating 
from an official MQM release, hinted that the expulsion was evidence of 
"internal differences" between the MQM and APMSO. 
The situation seems to be that "student wings" in Pakistan are 
occasionally involved in violent incidents that put political pressure on 
their parent bodies. Altaf Hussain's denial of responsibility for APMSO 
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actions above (Frontier Post, 9 March, ibid. ) conflicts with the general 
climate of solidarity between the organisations. Azim Tariq, for example, 
recently described the APXSO as the MQM's "training organisation" (Dawn, 
4 February 1991, Karachi). Tension between parent political party and 
student body is not restricted to the MQM, furthermore. The PSF, for 
example, recently claimed that the PPP was trying to abolish its Karachi 
office, and asserted its independence from the strictures of the People's 
Party (Dawn, 3 February 1991, Karachi). 
The women's wing is the smallest of the "wings", and has set up 
its units more slowly than the others. However it is now an important 
element of the Movement, and it achieved a publicity-coup an 15 July 
1988 when it staged a large rally, addressed by Altaf Hussain, at 
Nishtar Park, Karachi <MQX, 1990b, p. ii). The ideology of the women's 
wing is basically the same as that of the Movement as a whole. However, 
while some MQM women are MPAs, and the women work as enthusiastically 
as their male colleagues within the Movement, it is thought there are no 
(and as far as is known, there cannot be) women in the central Xarkaz. 
Nevertheless, the women's wing is one of the MQX's more progressive 
features, at least within the general context of politics in Pakistan. 
A structure incorporating such "wings" is similar to the nature 
of other political parties in Pakistan, such as the Jamaat-i Islami with 
its "fronts". The importance of women in administration and 
representation in the MQM differs from the Islamic parties, however, 
(while the Islamic parties have women's "wings", the women cannot 
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represent the parties in office) and is more closely related to the 
situation in the secular PPP. 
XQK Committees 
Of the committees, the Kbldmat-i Kbalq is probably the most 
important. It began as part of the APMSO in 1979 to aid incoming Ellar-i 
refugees in a camp at Majeed Colony, Landhi, and became a founding 
component of the MQM in 1984 (MQM, 1990c). The rise in its expenditure 
through the 1980s is illustrated in Table 5.7. The MQM claims that 
funding comes from donations from members and supporters (interviews 
with MQM workers, 6 February 1991, Karachi; and 4 December 1991, 
London), including donations from sympathisers in Saudi Arabia, USA and 
Britain, from door-to-door collections in Pakistan, and from money- 
raising events such as bazaars and competitions (ibid). The question of 
funding again impinges an the shady area of the MQM's illicit 
involvement with the army and the ISI, and again nothing can be said 
for certain on this matter. Many people feel that the resources 
displayed by the Movement, particularly in arms, so soon after its 
creation, point to a "hidden source" of assistance (interviews, 4 March 
1991 and February 1991). 
As can be seen from Table 5.7, the committee now has 
considerable resources at its disposal, and it has acted as the major 
emergency service at times of disaster in Karachi and Hyderabad, such as 
after a bomb-blast in a busy bazaar in the central Saddar district of 
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. 
Y=L Expend. (Rs. ) Major Projects 
1978/79 37,000 Reception of Bibarls 
1988/89 27,900,000 Muft Bazar [Free market]; 
Rs. 21.6m distributed in 
goods 
1989/90 23,400,000 "Refugee rehabilitation" 
(Rs. 8m); bloodbank/ 
ambulances/hearses 
(Rs. 8.1m) 
Source: XQX, 1990C. 
Karachi in July 1987 (discussion with Pakhtun student, 15 April 1991, 
Karachi). However, through being affiliated to the MQK, most of the work 
conducted by all the committees such as the KbIdmat-I Kbalq, Medical and 
Legal Aid Committees, has been among communities of Xdbajlxýs rather 
than among the population at large. This is the irony of welfare groups 
affiliated to ethnic movements, in that the work they conduct 
deliberately excludes certain sectors of the population. 
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Furthermore, much of the Kbidmat-I Khalq work can best be 
described as symbolic, and some projects such as the cheap Hid 
markets': 3 are not appreciated by everyone (former traders of the Eid 
markets complain of being undercut in price and pushed out of business 
by the Kbidmat-I KhaIq bazaars; discussion with group of Punjabi 
traders, 25 March 1991, Karachi). 
The following are some of the more symbolic projects that have 
been undertaken by the Kbidmat-l Kbalq Committee up to 1990: 
- September 1988; Hafta-I Satai; [literally "seven-day week"; meaning a 
mass cleaning, painting and decorating campaign in Karachi] 
- April 1989; cheap Eid bazaars. 
- 9/10 June 1989; Muft bazar ["free bazaar"]; goods collected in Karachi 
and donated to poor families. 
- October 1989; second Hafta-i Satai. 
As discussed in the context of press intimidation, such projects 
as these take on an importance far greater than they would normally 
seem to command. The MQM maintains that the press prefer to report only 
negative and damaging news about the Movement (see Muslim, 29 June 
1987, Karachi), and use the little coverage accorded to these symbolic 
KbIdmat-I Kbalq ventures as evidence. 
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The XQX and secrecy 
In general, the MQM is a secretive and self-conscious 
organisation -that does not easily allow information about itself to be 
released. One Punjab Journalist complained about the Movement: 
"Its members do not act maturely; they won't give 
interviews, don't chat, there's never any 'off-the- 
record' discussion, they never invite anyone to their 
hDmes. It's fascistic. " 
(interview with freelance journalist, 24 February 1991, Lahore). 
Before I was able to interview any of the MQM leadership, the 
Movement insisted that references and guarantees be given, that 
testified to the fact that I was a university researcher and not a spy 
or journalist. An MQM administrative secretary explained why this 
process was deemed necessary: 
"Up to now we have not released any literature in 
English. We are afraid of saboteurs - people who will 
find out the weaknesses and exploit them; like social 
organisations. That is why we have to establish you 
are Just working for a university. There have been 
instances of sabotage, but I cannot give details. " 
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(discussion, 19 January 1991., Karachi). 
The MQM speak consistently of "conspiracy" (see Muslim, 30 
December 1989, Karachi; or Dawn, 7 March 1991, Karachi) and 
"disinformation cells" (Morning News, 28 November 1989, Karachi), 
claiming that this is the explanation for any instances of the MQM being 
implicated in violence (Dawn, 28 November 1989, Karachi). rhe secretive 
and suspicious nature of the MQK, has prompted a variety of theories as 
to its origins and full sources of funding. 
Internal -tensions 
Within the Movement, differences have occurred not only within 
the main Karachi XQM in 1991/92, but also on occasion between the 
Movement in Karachi and in Hyderabad. As discussed earlier, Xobajir 
politics in the latter city are generally more anti-Sindhi, and 
effectively more "militantly ethnic" than in Karachi; in many ways they 
are closer to the dissident Haqiqi Group MQM and the rival MIT (although 
a stronger devotion to the QUald has ensured that the dissidents have 
not been widely supported in Hyderabad). Again, differences are hardly 
reported freely in the media, but strains have occasionally been evident. 
In July 1990, following bomb blasts in Hyderabad in Xiobajir localities, 
several sectarian reprisals instantly followed, including the murder of 
six Sindhi youths in Latif Bhitai Hospital, Hyderabad, by X61aj1r 
militants. The "Frontier Post" (25 July 1990, Lahore) reported that the 
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Hyderabad APMSO then plotted a general terrorist attack on Sindhi 
students in the city, scheduled for five days after the blast. This led 
to a serious disagreement with the Karachi MQN, who by then wanted to 
move away from such ethnic sectarian tactics. 
Within Hyderabad, the militant faction, headed by a group called 
Iqbal Ladla is strong and prominent. The MQM mayor of Hyderabad, Aftab 
Ahmed Shaikh, evidently faced serious difficulties with the Karachi 
leadership over how to handle this faction, and briefly left for the 
United States in some controversy in August 1990 (Herald, January 1991, 
Karachi, pp. 120-1). The emergence of the dissident HaqIqJ Group in 1991 
has reopened such internal tensions in the Movement. 
Quald-i Teltrik 
The leadership status of Altaf Hussain is of central importance 
to the MQM, and unites the whole of the Movement, including the 
breakaway dissident group. In some ways this is similar to the situation 
prevailing in Sindhi nationalism, where G. M Syed is accepted as leader 
by all the various nationalist groups and factions. However, Altaf 
Hussain does not command the support of the MIT, and in this way his 
leadership among the X6baj1r- political community is not as great as is 
G. M Syed's among the Sindhis. In another aspect, Altaf Hussain is similar 
to Gandhi, who never held a post in the Indian National Congress but 
was accepted as one of its key leaders. Within the MQM, the position of 
Altaf Hussain is similarly detached. He holds no formal office in the 
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Movement, and contests no positions in the Assemblies (Azim, Ahmed Tariq 
used to say he would do the same, but has since run for Senator; Herald, 
March 1991, Karachi, p. 65). 
In this way Altaf's position differs from that of the Amir- of 
, 7amaat-1 Islami (who undergoes an election every five years by a ballot 
of members), and the "Co-chairperson" position of Benazir Bhutto, who 
has held National Assembly seats and can be subject nominally to re- 
election or removal procedures. As discussed, Bhutto claims that Altaf 
Hussain does not hold office because he has a pending conviction for 
"f lag- burning" (interview, 22 January 1992, Karachi). Whatever the truth 
of this, the position of the Quaid and the lack of official procedures 
for his election, ref lect the manner in which the MQM is more a 
"movement" than a "party". In these terms, Altaf is an ethnic leader 
rather than a party chief, claiming to represent the whole XdbaJir 
community. 
The symbolic importance of the Quaid in Karachi can be seen in 
the various large pictures of Altaf Hussain around the city (the 
relationship of the Movement to urban space, including images of Altaf, 
is discussed. in Chapter 6). The importance of reverence of the Quaid 
among most MQN supporters is crucial. Visits to Abbas! Sbabeed Hospital 
displayed the relationship between supporters and Altaf Hussain. As the 
Quaid lay in bed, a constant stream of well-wishers queued to see him. 
Filing past his bed, many started crying as they briefly held his hand, 
while Altaf touched their heads, in the manner of a religious leader. One 
group of men brought a pair of goats to the bedside, for the Quaid to 
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perform "sadqa" [the-Muslim act of blessing a family through touching 
their animals' heads]. In this sense in particular, many MQM supporters 
see Altaf as a leader in spiritual and religious as well as ethnic terms. 
His authority is felt to cover all areas of life. Meanwhile, among the 
lines of queuing visitors, a group of young women explained: 
"We are praying for him, that he will quickly recover. 
Ve are not afraid - our leader will care for us. We are 
prepared to die for him if it is necessary. " 
(discussion, 19 January 1991, Karachi). 
The value of this statement is contentious, since the women's 
words were translated from Urdu by an MQM worker, and there was 
certainly a sense of "playing to the gallery". However the "cult of the 
leader" is clearly important to the MQM. In March 1991, Altaf Hussain's 
second stay in hospital of the year was accompanied by rumours of an 
attempt an his life. Much of the city of Karachi, and particularly the 
Abbasl Sbapeed Hospital, became garlanded with banners stressing 
allegiance to the leader and death to the Sbadar-on [traitors]. The 
uniform nature of many of these banners - with white script on pink 
canvas - suggested an official MQM printing source. 
In these terms, charismatic power seems to be very much the 
cord that held the MQX together until the split. Clapham suggests that a 
notion of charismatic authority in the developing- world was developed by 
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many analysts in relation to particular national leaders in the 
immediate post-war Independence years (Clapham, 1985, pp. 46-7). In many 
new States emerging at this time, leaders shaped the process of nation- 
building by attempting to equate the institutions of the state with 
their own personal ideology. On a much smaller scale, the MQX gives the 
impression that its own "local state" is synonymous with the words and 
deeds of the Movement's leader, Altaf Hussain. However, Clapham also 
observes that events overtook the concept of charismatic authority in 
the developing world by the 1960s, with such episodes as the overthrow 
of Kwame Nkrumah by the Ghanaians in 1966 (Clapham, 1985, p. 47). 
Similarly again, the abrupt appearance of fissures within the MQM af ter 
late 1991, with one faction declaring total opposition to Altaf Hussain 
while claiming to be the "true" core of the Movement, suggests that 
Altaf's charismatic authority over the MQM is not as all-embracing as it 
might seem. 
The potential symbolic and moral pitfall in the Quaid's position 
is that he can start to seem like a PIr. The spiritual and general social 
authority invested in him by some supporters suggests just this status. 
This is an image the MQM does not want to propagate given its I'anti- 
feudal" rhetoric. As a consequence, "middle-class" values are frequently 
stressed. Until his exile in late 1991, Altaf Hussain took pride in the 
fact that he still lived in his modest Azizabad residence, explaining: 
"I live in a small house - 120 yards in area. The 
leaders of Pakistan - they all have much bigger houses, 
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big bangalows, 1,000s of yards! " 
Untez-view, 13 March 1991, Karachi). 
In the same interview, Altaf clained that Dr. Farocq Sattar was 
"lower middle-class", and had been placed into a position of power (as 
Karachi mayor and XNA) in a nanner rarely seen before in Pakistani 
politics (ibid). 
Thus, Altaf Hussain faces a difficult juggling act in heading a 
grass-roots movement opposed to "feudal" structures, yet being revered 
as the "Plr of Karachi" (Frontier Post, 25 July 1990, Lahore). The 
situation has been complicated since the split of 1991. It is not clear 
what procedures would be enacted in the MQM were the Quaid to be fully 
removed from politics. Nor is it clear at this stage how far the 
dissidents still respect Altaf's over-arching Quaid status (his exile 
abroad suggests that many want him permanently removed from the scene). 
In many ways, the limbo in which Altaf Hussain finds himself in 1992/93 
symbolises that of the Movement as a whole. 
5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In the last chapter I described the chronology of Kc7bajlr 
identity-construction in Sindh, and the way in which the community 
relates to others in the province. I established that one of the most 
important element, --. of contemporary Xobajir- identity in Sindh is the 
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manner in which the experiences of some post-Partition migrants from 
India to Pakistan are assumed as an integral element of the psyche of 
all contemporary Urdu-speakers of Sindh, most of whom are second or 
third generations of Urdu-speaking families based permanently within 
Pakistan. 
In this chapter I have attempted to show how that Urdu-speaking 
political leadership has shaped the construction of a MobaJIr political 
identity. The first stop in the chronology of the contemporary identity 
is the 1970s, when a small Urdu-speaking intelligentsia in Karachi 
developed a concept of a political Nobajir identity. The concept received 
very little public support in the elections of 1970. 
The leadership of Altaf Hussain and his immediate colleagues 
was more pivotal in the shaping of a contemporary MobaJIr identity in 
Sindh, and in the political mobilisation of this identity. The success of 
the Movement has related in large part to the political and oratical 
skills of these community leaders, and they have been rewarded with 
increased representation of the XdhajIr community, and more importantly 
of the MQM, 
-in 
all levels of power, from the local to the national. 
I have suggested that the importance of this element of 
leadership in the Nobajir movement might cause the MQM to be seen as 
vehicle for personal power and little more. This might refer particularly 
to the patrimonialism of Altaf Hussain, both towards the MQM (whose 
virtual collapse has coincided with the exile of Altaf) and towards the 
political environment of Sindh in general. This interpretation is given 
some credence by the problematic nature of Mobajir identity, upon which 
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the MQM was based at its launch. Many of the MQM's opponents (such as 
G. M. Syed and Benazir Bhutto) have suggested that a fundamental weakness 
in the concept of a XobajIr- identity has plagued the KQM with an 
essential lack of legitimacy. 
I have argued that in other parts of South Asia, ethnic 
political agencies have often been viewed as emotive vehicles for 
launching certain leaders into power. Manor has argued that the waxing 
and waning of the ethnic component in Tamil politics has followed the 
relative fortunes of Dravidian political parties in India (Manor, 1983, 
p. 90). In Pakistan, I have shown that Altaf's decision to ally with the 
IJI in 1990 and thus ensure a share in provincial and national 
government after the elections in October of that year, necessitated a 
fundamental change in the rhetoric and policy of the MQM away from 
ethnic politics. Alliance with the IJI also entailed sitting beside those 
agencies in government against whom the MQM had previously claimed to 
be valiantly battling. 
My appraisal of the MQM, however, suggests that it is more than 
just a political vehicle for Altaf Hussain, and that the seemingly 
paradoxical. somersaults in policy over the years reflect the fragmented 
and problematic nature of politics in Pakistan (and indeed in many mult- 
cultural postcolonial States). An examination of the chronology of the 
MdbaJIr, movement, and particularly the political developments in urban 
Sindh before the emergence of Altaf Hussain, suggest that there was a 
"real" political void among the urban Urdu-speaking electorate of the 
Province, upon which Altaf was later to capitalise. One of the early 
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expressions of this sense of lacking political voice An Sindh's cities 
was the Language Bill riots of July 1972. The rhetoric used at this time 
by the Urdu-speaking leaders appealed to basic elements of Nobajir 
identity (such as a view of history around the time of the Partition of 
India), which the XQM was later to use to great effect. 
One of the important political grievances at this time in urban 
Sindh involved the relationship between Xolajirs and the central state. 
Hany Urdu-speakers feel a particularly important affinity to the 
national State of Pakistan, as a result of their history and heritage. 
The central government of Zia during the 1980s, meanwhile, probably 
looked to the political constituency of urban Sindh as a bulwark against 
the worrying aspects of the Sindhi-led Movement for the Restoration of 
Democracy (MRD). Apart from inflicting a significant economic impact on 
Punjab, whose lifeline to the port of Karachi ran through the areas 
engulfed in the 1983 "uprising" (see the Muslim, 3 October 1983, Lahore), 
the MRD was supported principally by the Sindhis (Rakisits, 1988, p86), 
and thus began to look not dissimilar to a Sindhi nationalist movement. 
These fears of a nationalist awakening were felt in Karachi 
also, which wished not to be severed from the rest of Pakistan. Altaf 
Hussain effectively tapped these fears in his first rallies in the city 
in 1985, in which he delivered powerful valiant "siege-mentality" 
rhetoric. There seems little doubt that he received a good degree of 
patronage from the army and the Zia regime for adopting such a stance. 
Meanwhile, worsening terrorist violence under some strands of the Sindhi 
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nationalist movement through the later 1980s saw the MQM well-placed to 
take the victims of such violence under its wing. 
Yet secession was not the only fear in urban Sindh at this 
time. At the level of the local state, the 1980s saw important 
developments for the worst. In such cities a Karachi, a rapid growth, 
rising unemployment and the degradation of the physical environment in 
the shape of unregulated traffic and slum housing were bringing their 
own pressures to bear. These pressures began to manifest themselves in 
arganised crime and murderous rioting. The central state was distant and 
unaccountable in the disturbances, and seemed unable to offer any 
solutions to the problems. It is likely that sheer fear, particularly in 
such districts as Orangi where brutal ethnic violence between Xobajir-s 
and Pakhtuns was beginning to emerge, helped to rally people behind the 
MQM. The rhetoric of the Movement at this time tapped into this fear, by 
aggressively confronting rivals, and speaking of a liberalisation of 
arms licenses and the repatriation of Pakhtuns and Afghans. 
The mobilisation of the MQM around these fears and tensions led 
to the achievement of "real" power and representation by 1990, in the 
form of seats at local, provincial and national levels. Power had also 
meant near-somersaults in MQK policy, however. I have shown that the 
dropping of the demand for nationality recognition for XdbaJIX-S was at 
the bidding of the IJI, who subsequently admitted the MQM as coalition 
partners in 1990. The acquiescense of Altaf Hussain on this matter 
placed pressures on the loyalty of large sections of the KQM, finally 
erupting into a factionalism which has threatened to split the Kovement 
-336- 
irrevocably. The violent reaction by some Nobajir-s against the 
charismatic and patrimanialist leadership of Altaf Hussain has both 
shown the depth of the political void in urban areas of Sindh, and 
highlighted the fact that the MQM has failed to fill this void after 
seeming to mobilise the electorate so effectively. 
I would argue, however, that it is conditions in the local state, 
and particularly in that of Karachi, that have really shaped the nature 
of the MQM. It is here that tangible achievements have been made by the 
Movement. In the city of Karachi, the MQM has grown to operate 
essentially as a "secondary state" to the official authorities, exercising 
a grip on the press and even on the law and order situation in some 
circumstances, and organising spatially across the city with powerful 
district "units". 
The next Section focusses on the local urban state in Sindh, and 
particularly on Karachi, the heartland of the MobaJir movement. I will 
describe the two elements of political development in Karachi through 
the 1980s and early 1990s that have been central to the rise (and fall) 
of the MQM. Firstly, I examine the geographical and structural 
organisation of the city. In Chapter 61 will establish who the 
supporters of the MQX are in Karachi, which spatial and socio-economic 
niches they occupy, and how they have allowed the MQM to shape life and 
administration in the metropolis. In the following chapter I examine the 
development of serious civil violence in the city through the 1980s, and 
argue that the MQM's battle for control of the urban space has entailed 
a growing "crisis of civil society". 
-337- 
FOOTNOTES. 
I. The growth rate is calculated by projection from the 1961 census f igure over a 
period of eleven years, 
2. These complaints came from two female llohaj'ir matriculation students, who claimed 
that they had been denied places in Karachi University despite achieving over 60% in 
the entrance exams (discussion, 16 January 1991, Karachi), 
3. It is possible that urban unemployment among semi-educated and industrial, 
commercial and clerical workers (who, as I will argue, form the backbone of the MQM's 
support in Karachi) was rising through the 1980s in Sindh's cities, and that this fed 
into the appeal of the MQM's rhetoric in this period, particularly in relation to 
'repatriation" of urban immigrants and securing jobs and education for "locals", 
Obtaining figures for such a pattern proved inherently difficult in the field, 
however, Official unemployment figures are very deceptive since they fail to recognise 
"underemployment", and do not include women in the statistics (since women are not 
considered to ever "work"), The 1981 Census considered that 4,6S% of all males in 
Karachi were "looking for work", yet 17,57% were included in the ill-defined category 
of "others' (Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, 1983), Official data for the 
post-1981 period were not available at the time of fieldwork, However, several civic 
officials (notably the KOA director Abu Shamim Arif) told me that unemployment 
worsened in Karachi throughout the 1980s and that this directly fed into urban 
'frustration", For a discussion of this factor in relation to Karachi, see Van der 
Linden and Selier, 1991, p. 169). 
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4, At the Nishtar 
-Park rally, 
Altaf Hussain called for IYohajirs to be recognised as a 
'subnationality', as a reward for recognising the Sindhis as such (Oawn, 9 August 
1986, Karachi), The ýuaj'd was holding amicable meetings with G, M Syed at this tirae, 
S. A documentary on British television in November 1990 showed a scene from the 14 
July 1988 KQM rally of women in Nishtar Park when Altaf Hussain demanded that the vast 
chattering crowd be silent after the count of three, The crowd promptly obeyed 
(Channel 4/Barraclough Carey, 14 November 1990), 
6. The issues of local preference in the Charter of Resolution involve domicile 
certificates, police recruitment, investment, voting rights, the census, admissions to 
education, health and housing facilities and a sales tax. - see Appendix 7, 
7, The argument involved a charge by Dr, Imran Farooq that the government was planning 
to reduce the number of seats in Karachi Medical College (Nation, 24 December 1988, 
Karachi), 
8, On the evening of the rally, the BBC Urdu Service had reported on the event, 
claiming the attendance to be 50,000, The following day, after angry protests by the 
MQM, the BBC apo log ised and revised its figure to between IS and 3 mi II ion (BBC WS 
Archive, 26/7 January 1990, London; and Newsline, February 1990, Karachi, p. 33), 
9, The PDA is a curious alliance, thought to be designed to prevent the PPP trom 
appearing isolated, It is composed of four elements, First is the PPP, whose chief , 
Benazir Bhutto, is also leader of the Alliance, [he second component is a small 
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faction of the Muslim League, headed by Malik Qasim, which failed to win any seats in 
1988, The third component is the Shia Islamic group, Tahrik-i Nifaz-i Jafaria of 
Allama Sajid Naqvi, which also failed to win any seats in 1988, The final component is 
Air Marshal Asghar Khan's Tehrik-i IsUkIal, Asghar Khan was paradoxically a key 
figure in the PNA that unseated Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977, organising large rallies 
in Punjab, Electorally, the party is also an inconsequential one, Thus, in terms of 
electoral statistics, the PDA can be equated with its primary component, the PPP, 
10, Itaqiqi means "genuine" in a 'biological" or primordial ethnic sense, for example 
'haqiqa hha. 0 ["blood" brother] and 'haqiqi baihaiP ["blood" sister], The term is not 
uncommon in Pakistan for dissident factions who claim to be preserving the original 
purpose of their party, 
I I. The "Jam-Marwat Combine" refers to the former Chief Minister of Sindh, Jam Sadiq 
Ali, and the Home Secretary of the Sindh government, Irfanullah Marwat (son-in-law of 
the President of Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan), The PDA accuse these men of working 
together to use all means, fair and foul, to intimidate and destabilise the PDA, 
including mass arrests of workers and candidates in the Alliance, 
12, As is the care with many aspects of the MQM, the exact size of the wings is either 
not known or not available to external researchers, In relative terms, the Labour wing 
is the largest (in numbers of members), followed by the APMSO and women's wing 
respectively (interview with Nadeem Nusrat of MQM, 13 March 1991, Karachi), 
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13, Eid is the celebration at the end of the month of Ramazan, in which the fast is 
broken with feasts and gatherings, Eid bazaars raising money for the poor are 
traditional at this time, selling gifts such as the skins of animals slaughtered 
ritually for the feasts, 
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SECT IOIW TMM: 
XOHAJIRS AND SPACE: URBANISM, VIOLENCE AND THE STATE 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last chapter I suggested that the seemingly paradoxical 
and sometimes "banal" actions and proclamations of the MQM were related 
in large part to the demands imposed by the political system in a 
multi-cultural postcolonial State such as Pakistan. At the end of the 
chapter I also suggested that, for all the maneouvres and bargains the 
MQM conducted to achieved representation at provincial and national 
levels, the forum in which the Movement has always been most powerful 
and has made its real gains is the local-level urban state. 
In this Section I narrow the focus further onto urban Sindh, and 
particularly to the city of Karachi. There is little doubt that the MQM 
and its electorate are physically and spiritually concentrated in Karachi 
and Hyderabad. The Movement has contested very few seats in elections 
outside these cities, and has never contested a seat outside Sindh. 
Within this configuration, the metropolis of Karachi is both the 
birthplace and the heartland of the MQM, and the economic heart of 
Pakistan as a whole. In this Chapter I will examine how the nature of 
the local state in Karachi, and particular socio- political conditions in 
the city, have been central to the development of the Nobajir movement. 
The Chapter comprises three main sections. The first section 
offers an overview of the city of Karachi, in terms of its history, and 
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social, economic and political structure. Central to the city's history 
and development is the important position it has held as Pakistan's most 
important economic centre and initially as the Federal Capital. Against 
this backdrop, the specific position occupied by the Xobajlrýs and the 
XQM in Karachi is then appraised. The original emphasis of the Movement 
on ethnic politics has occasioned a constant reference to the 
environments of urban Sindh. Significantly, 13 of the 25 points in the 
Charter of Resolution of November 1988 (see Appendix 7) dealt with 
matters relating to Sindh, while 8 of the points in the Karachi 
Declaration (Appendix 5) also dealt with local- preference demands in 
Sindh. It can be argued that the problems that the MQM has experienced 
in transforming an "ethnic novement" into a non-ethnic "political party" 
have been a partial result of this local outlook. 
In the case of Karachi, however, a parochial concern 
simultaneously endows a political movement with national significance. 
Karachi is not just a large Pakistani city, but the largest city and only 
major port in the country. Repeatedly, the fortunes of governments have 
soured when the citizens of Karachi have taken to the streets against 
them. Such a. fate was suffered by the governments of Ayub Khan in 1969, 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977, and Benazir Bhutto to a large extent in 
1988. In the case of Benazir, the President moved to dismiss the 
government only when civil order worsened in Karachi, despite the fact 
that the surrounding rural areas had seen a spiralling level of violence 
for many years. 
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Thus, the MQM's concentration in Karachi has given the Movenent 
a particular significance for the power-brokers of the state in Pakistan. 
As in most large developing-world cities, however, "urban power" relates 
to two often opposing axes. The second main section of this chapter 
examines the nature of the local state in Karachi, and the position 
within this political configuration that the MQM has occupied. On the 
one hand there are the representatives of the state - the urban 
administrations and civic bodies that constitute the "formal sector" of 
society and economy. On the other side there stands the "informal 
sector", which both fills-in the shortfalls of the state in relation to 
urban development, and which creates a powerful secondary society 
intertwined with crime and unauthorised businesses, Between these two 
sectors the police often play an ambiguous role. It will be argued that 
the MQM has gradually "taken control" of the formal sector of urban 
power in Karachi, but in so doing has faced violent confrontation with 
other power-brokers in the city. 
The ramifications of achieving "control" in Karachi are 
particularly signif icant for the state in Pakistan. Gi, ýýen Karachi's 
importance,. success in central government has increasingly come to 
depend an winning the favour of the MQM and its supporters in Karachi 
(at least before the party's collapse in 1992). Yet the bargain carries a 
price - in many ways the MQM has acted as a "secondary state" in the 
city, imposing its dictates with the force of violence, and a sinister 
regulation of the press. Perhaps worse than this are the rumcurs that 
certain elements of the Mobajir- movement would like to see Karachi made 
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into a separate suba [province]. Such a separation would have far- 
reaching consequences for the fortunes of the rest of Pakistan. 
The third section of the chapter examines the process of ethnic 
particularisation across space in Karachi. As part of this discussion, it 
is appropriate to examine conditions in Sindh's - and the MQM's - second 
city, Hyderabad. Here, the worsening of inter-community relations that 
the MQM effectively exacerbated through the second half of the 1980s, 
has created a bitterly divided and violent city. In Karachi, the 
proportions of various ethnic communities are different, yet I will argue 
that inter-community cooperation has worsened in a manner similar to 
the situation prevailing in Hyderabad and elsewhere. 
I examine the outward expression of community polarisation 
within the urban space in Sindh by focussing on the symbolic 
constructions and occupations of space, and the impact of the MQM on 
the physical and visual environment in different parts of the city. I 
will also show that urban development projects in different parts of 
Karachi highlight certain barriers to inter-community cooperation. These 
are the physical expressions of community polarisation in urban 
Pakistan, and in this chapter I will examine the socio-economic and 
political processes and structures that lie behind this polarisation in 
Karachi. First, however, it is appropriate to examine the methods I have 
used to map ethnic and socio-political distributions in the city. 
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62 NETHODOLOGY 
Mapping ethnic community distributions in Karachi using Census 
data is difficult and possibly inappropriate. I will show later on that 
economic data from the Census or civic agencies cannot readily be 
related to patterns of ethnic community distribution. Indeed, the 
controversy over the 1992 Census in Sindh' relates to a feeling on both 
sides of the Sindhi/Xdbaj1. r ethnic divide that official accounts of 
ethnic distribution in the Province have always been distorted and that 
no government can be trusted to be neutral on the matter. In the light 
of this, I have tried to map ethnic community distributions in Karachi 
using a mixture of my own observations of visual markers in the city 
and an adapted spatial map of local electoral units. Some necessary 
words of warning on the use of electoral date in Pakistan, principally 
concerning charges of voting irregularities, will be sounded later on. 
Again, much of the primary material accessed for this chapter 
is derived from the personal interviews, discussions and press archives 
that formed a major element of source material for the previous 
chapters. The meetings of particular relevance to this chapter were 
those with the Mayor of Karachi Dr. Farooq Sattar, the director and 
officers of the Karachi Development Agency (KDA), officers of the Sindh 
Karachi Katchi Abadis Association (KAA), members of the Orangi Pilot 
Project (OPP) and various discussions with community workers and 
residents in different parts of the city of Karachi. In addition to such 
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interviews, several further sources specific to this and the next chapter 
were used. 
The f irst of these sources are the electoral statistics covering 
the period since the rise of the MQM, comprising the Local Bodies 
Elections of 1987 in Sindh, and Provincial/National Elections 1988 and 
1990 (results, voting patterns, registered voters and general associated 
statistics). Between 1977 and 1987 there were no elections in Pakistan 
other than Zia's non-party elections of 1985. These were boycotted by 
the leading opposition party, the PPP, and were thereby rendered 
unrepresentative. Indeed, the elections of 1977 were themselves clouded 
by charges of rigging and irregularities in the light of the 
comprehensive nature of the PPP's victory. It is widely considered in 
Pakistan that the 1970 elections were the only relatively "fair" polls to 
have been held in the country up to 1993. 
The second major primary source I use in this chapter to map 
distributions of communities in Karachi comprises a variety of different 
distribution surveys 2 concerning the following: 
- Land values (residential) 
- Government institutions of higher education 
- Government hospitals, clinics, dispensaries 
- Wage patterns and levels of occupation 
- General economic statistics such as literacy, educational attendance 
and employment data. 
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To complement these distribution surveys, the results of the following 
surveys were also used to develop a detailed picture of socio-economic, 
organisation in Karachi: 
- Commission of Enquiry into Karachi Affairs (COEKA), 1986,1989 
- Specific observation/interview surveys in Orangi Town, Old Golimar, 
Sohrab Goth, Nazimabad, Mauripur. 
The ease of collection of information varied from the purchasing 
or photocopying of material, to lengthy lobbying of agencies and 
supervised analysis of material on site, or primary material collection 
in the field (principally involving observation and interview tours 
around Karachi). The offices contacted in this data collection process 
were numerous, but principally comprised the urban council for Karachi; 
the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMO, the development wing of the 
urban administration; the Karachi Development Agency (KDA), the 
government body concerned with unregulated urban development; the Katchl 
Abadl Association (KAA), the Survey of Pakistan (which is the official 
source of mapping in the city), the Election Commission of Pakistan in 
Islamabad, the Provincial Election Authority in Karachi, the Orangi Pilot 
Project, Karachi, the Sindh Graduates Association, Karachi, the Bureau of 
Statistics, Karachi, and finally the Federal Bureau of Statistics in 
Islamabad. 
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When deciding on a suitable spatial framework to use in mapping 
distributions in the city of Karachi, I found that various systems. had 
been used in the past. One of the more obvious was the KDA's system of 
"analysis zones" (58 zones used in land-use surveys of 1970 and 1985). 
However, this system is not very useful for my purposes, since the zones 
cannot be related easily to data on population and community groups. 
Consequently, I decided to map out a new spatial framework based on the 
Provincial Assembly seats in the city, which were instituted by the 
amended Delimitation of Constituencies Ordinance of 20 July 1988. This 
framework comprises 28 units, across four "zones" (East, West, South, 
Central), which were used in the provincial elections of both 1988 and 
1990. The constituencies are based an combinations of 198 KMC "units", 
in addition to military lands, known as "cantonments" (which are under 
the jurisdiction of the provincial government rather than the city 
administration). The provincial constituency framework was considered to 
offer a greater degree of detail than that of National Assembly seats 
(of which there are 13 in Karachi, also based on KMC units). The main 
advantage of such a political framework is that districts of the city 
can be relýted to political processes since 1987, and so can throw light 
on ethnic distributions in a way that other approaches cannot. 
Formulating a suitable map of the KMC units and electoral 
constituencies, proved to be a very difficult operation"', but probable 
ethnic community distributions and their development spatially over 
time, could ultimately be mapped against a framework of electoral 
constituencies. With such a spatial- pol itica 1 framework established, a 
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second aim was to develop a picture of socio-economic distributions in 
the city by community, to see where the Kohajirs and other groups. fit 
into the urban environment. In this regard, it was also interesting to 
"test" for patterns of correlation between the political and ethnic 
character of urban districts and levels of socio-economic development. 
The need to undertake such a survey arises from the way in which 
community leaders and residents in the city will claim that their areas 
are especially disadvantaged or underdeveloped. The MQM, particularly in 
its earlier phases, would often make this claim about the Nobajir 
community in general (Indian Expatriate, 12 March 1988, [Dawn archivel). 
Similarly, Sindhi residents of Old Golimar told me that their district 
was deliberately deprived of basic facilities like water, sewerage 
systems, employment, health and education by the MQM-dominated urban 
administration (discussions with residents of Old Golimar, 21 January 
1992, Karachi). A comparison of local community grievances with the 
distribution of services in the city also conveys some details on the 
nature and extent of cross-community mobility and cooperation in the 
city. One method I have used in analysing the validity of such claims 
involves a mapping of selected government facilities (in this case 
health and education provision) against "political community" 
distributions. 
The reason that government facilities are sampled in particular 
relates to the fact that claims of discrimination are usually directed at 
the state in general. The authorities are perceived to be responsible for 
basic service provision. In many cases, private schools and clinics are 
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established to fill the shortfalls, as in the case of the Roshan Tara 
school in Old Golimar. The spatial patterns of these facilities are 
sometimes difficult to interpret, since on the one hand they seem to 
indicate a perceived shortfall in local state service provisions, yet on 
the other hand they can also indicate a level of wealth or community 
"power" in a district whereby reasonable public-sector services can be 
supplemented. In these terms, wealthier districts will have both more 
public and more private facilities than the poorer districts. 
Furthermore, the provision of private facilities under the aegis of 
ethnic or political organisations can demonstrate the "secondary state" 
nature of such organisations, whereby the organisations effectively play 
the role of an urban administration and provider of facilities for their 
own localised electorates. In Karachi, it is inevitably the MQX that 
displays the bulk of such symbolic "power" in the urban environment. 
Thus, a close analysis of the relative provision of state and private 
facilities in the city reveals much about the internal dynamics of the 
urban environment. 
Obviously there are notes of caution to be made with regard to 
such a methodology. Firstly, a clear delineation of urban districts is 
often difficult. For example, a district with seemingly poor facilities 
may border one with better facilities and there will be some mobility 
between the two. Secondly, the mapping of social and ethnic communities 
across space using voting patterns and party performance across space 
is subject to the complication that the votes for some parties can be 
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ethnically heterogeneous. Areas that vote heavily for the PPP are not 
necessar-ily inhabited mostly by Sindhis. 
Two points can be made in defence against such charges. Firstly, 
it is apparent that ethnic polarisation in Karachi became entrenched 
throughout the 1980s. Sindhis in a Sindhi area would not readily 
interact with a heavily Mobajir-populated area in the city, even if the 
two communities were spatially proximate. This is partly due to the 
strength of vertical community definitions in Pakistan society such as 
bl. raderl [tribe/clan] factors, but it is also due to the growth of ethnic 
conflicts in the city from the mid-1980s onwards. It is true that such 
polarisation is more stark in cities such as Hyderabad and Sukkur, but 
similar patterns do apply in Karachi. 
Secondly, it can be argued that the ethnic stance of the MQM 
would mean that it has received very few non-. KdbaJ! r- votes to date, 
while social pressures within the Xbbajir community have probably 
deepened the encompassing nature of the Aoba. 7ir-MqM vote. Jhe same 
process has happened with such groups as the AUP and PP1 with respect 
to the Pakhtun community. Even the nominally non-ethnic PPP receives a 
clear majority of its votes in Karachi and elsewhere from the Sindhis 
and Baluchis. I will argue that, increasingly, violence and recrimination 
have led Pakistan's party politics to become ethnically- oriented and 
polarised. 
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6.3 THE CITY OF KARACHI 
The area that is now central Karachi began life as a walled 
district beside the Lyari estuary, established by Hindu merchants in 
1729. Just over a hundred years later, in 1639, Saddar Bazaar was 
established to the north-east of the walled city. In 1843, the British 
arrived under Lord Napier, and colonised the walled district. Interaction 
between the two settlements developed, and the British soon began to 
build in Saddar. In 1885, a horse-drawn tramway was completed, linking 
the bazaar area of Saddar with the walled settlement (Herald, February 
1993, Karachi, p. 66). 
By the time of the Census of 1941, Karachi's population was 
387,000, making it the second largest urban centre in what would later 
become West Pakistan, behind Lahore at 672,000 (Government of Pakistan, 
1990a, pp. 49-50). At this time, just over 31% of the population of 
Karachi city and its immediate rural environs were Hindus (Census of 
India 1941, Vol. XII, p. 28), a higher proportion than prevailed in Lahore, 
where under 27% were Hindus (Census of India 1941, Vol. VI, p. 32). In 
other ways, also, Karachi was a fairly cosmopolitan city in the 
immediate pre- Independence period. rable 6.1 shows the relative 
proportions of languages spoken among the literate community in the city 
at the time of the 1941 Census, compared to the situation at the same 
time in Hyderabad and Sindh as a whole (including the Khairpur district 
which later became part of Sindh province). 
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Sindhi -72.1 57.3 15.5 
Baluchi 6.0 7.6 2.8 
Seraiki 6.0 0.4 8.1 
Gujerati 3.0 10.5 4.0 
Rajastani 2.6 1.0 2. tJ 
Punjabi 1.9 4.2 0.9 
Kachi 1.2 4.7 1.5 
Urdu 1.1 4.2 1.0 
othe'-s 6.1 10.1 3.4 
Source: Census of India 1941, Vol. XII, Sind, pp. 76-7 
Table 6.1 shows that Karachi differed in its socio-cultural 
composition before Independence both from Hyderabad, and from the rest 
of Sindh. Although Sindhis were the largest community throughout the 
province, in Karachi there was also a sizeable community of Gujerati- 
speakers, many of whom were Hindus, and whose roots were in the north- 
west Indian coastal areas around Bombay. There were also more Urdu- 
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speakers in Karachi than was the norm in Sindh, although Table 6.1 
shows that they were not a major community in the city. Fhe "Others" 
column refers to such languages as Brohui, which is the second major 
language in the Baluch community behind Baluchi, Pashto, Western Hindi", 
"Hindustani" and other Indian languages (Census of India, ibid). In these 
languages, also, Karachi was more amply represented than were other 
parts of Sindh. Karachi was a fairly cosmopolitan city at this time 
compared to other towns in Sindh, and particularly compared to 
Hyderabad, which conformed more closely to patterns throughout the rest 
of the Province of Sindh. 
Growth and development of Karachi aLfter Independence 
For Karachi, the emergence of Independent Pakistan entailed a 
tremendous influx of Muslim refugees from India and from northern parts 
of Pakistan. Table 6.2 provides some details on migration to the city 
from 1947 to 1961. The Table shows that the city received a steady flow 
of migrants from India and Pakistan in the first decade after 
Independence, with a majority of migrants coming from within Pakistan 
after 1951. The considerable amount of immediate post-Partition 
migration from India can also be seen. 
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TABLE 6.2: Post-Partition migration tQ Karachl. 1.947-61 
Pprind Higrants from Migrants from TOTAL 
Tndial" Fakis±dnii 
1947-51 655,811 153,400 809,211 
1951-61 182,862 737,923 920,785 
Sources: Calculated from Census of Pakistan 1951, V61.1, p. 45; Census of 
Pakistan 1961, Vol. 3, pp. 136-7,304-5 
#- Plus otber parts of subcontinent 
ff - Including East Pakistan. Note: all figures exclude migration from 
Kasbmir. 1947-51 for Karacbi City onl7, tbereafter for Karacbl Division. 
Housing 
The Karachi administration was f aced with a considerable task 
in housing and employing the new migrants Lo the city. In the years 
following Independence, three forms of urban development were undertaken 
to address the situation. Firstly, in some areas of the city the 
government built complete dwellings or business units, such as "Shoe- 
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makers Colony" in Yazimabad, where 250 units were provided by the 
Pakistan Refugee Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. In Aurangabad, 3000 
units were built and leased on hire-purchase terms (Government of 
Pakistan, 1952, pp. 14-18). 
In most other cases, the federal government made land and core 
services such as roads and water available for migrants to build their 
own houses, either independently or via "Cooperative Housing 
Associations". This was the case with the Pakistan Employees' 
Cooperative Housing Society (PECHS), where 3000 plots were nade 
available by 1952 (ibid, p. 34). In Nazimabad, 1000 acres were set aside 
for migrants to build their own homes, and core roads, two schools, one 
dispensary, one maternity home and a post office were provided (ibid, 
p. 3). Pictures of the schemes in the government documentation of the 
time (ibid) show that the landscape of the city was changing radically, 
with large semi-arid spaces becoming new urban districts. Not all the 
housing was basic either, with sumptious, villas and apartment- blocks 
being built in such areas as the Government Employees' Cooperative 
Housing Society district (ibid, pp. 35-9). Table 6.3 describes the extent 
of the government rehabilitation schemes underway by 1952. 
The growing scale of Karachi's housing problems soon led to the 
illegal subdivision of land - the third major form of new settlement in 
the city. Baldia Township in the west of the -city was the first major 
example of a district growing by subdivision. Its emergence reflected 
the failure of government schemes to keep up with the demand for 
housing (Vahab, 1991, p. 300). By the end of the 1950s many of the early 
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Lalukhet Quarters (Liaquatabad) 
Drigh Village Colony 
Nazimabad 
Pak. Employees Cooperative Housing Society 
Aurangabad 
Pir Ilahi Bux Colony 
Model Colony 
Bihar Colony 
Shoe-makers Colony 
Landhi. Artisan Colony 
Union Cooperative Housing Society 
Government Employees Cooperative Housing Society 
Rizvia Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. 
Source: Government of Pakistan, 1952, pp. 1-50. 
10,700 
8,627 
6,000 
3,000 
3,000 
2,500 
2,250 
900 
250 
100 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
migrants to the city had still not been adequately housed. A survey in 
1.959 found 120,000 families without proper shelter, with 55% living in 
ibuggis [straw and reed-matting structures] (Yap, 1991, p. 82). 
-359- 
After 1965, Orangi Town joined Baldia as a large new katcbi 
abadi on the city's western periphery. Ayub Khan's rule (1958-69) saw 
some renewed attempts to shift city-centre squatters to new "townships" 
in Korangi to the east, and North Karachi to the north, but lack of 
proximity to employment in the city-centre made such schemes 
unattractive (Meyerink, 19d3, p. 15). 
In the 1970s, government housing schemes received a further 
boost with the "Metroville" projects, undertaken by the KDA with UN 
assistance. The plan was to develop lotir exLensive "site and service" 
schemes, encompassing up to 40,000 plots, with associated employment, 
health, education and linance projects (KDA, 1974, p. 33b). rhe plots 
involved a "wet core" (single wall with water outlet), around which 
houses could be built. 
The Metroville projects have been extremely disappointing. 
Metroville II was used in part to house refugee families from 
Bangladesh, but this is reputed by Nientied and Van der Linden to be the 
only instance in which the target socio-economic group was reached by 
the Metroville schemes (Rientied and Van der Linden, 1991, p. 353). 1he 
latest phase, Metroville IV, has not progressed beyond the planning 
stage, and the land was encroached upon in the mid-1980s by illegal 
squatter housing (Nientied, 1987, p. 132). 
The only detailed map of Karachi's katcbi abadis was produced 
by Jan Van der Linden in 1983 (see Figure 6.1 ), since which time such 
settlements have developed further. The Sindh Katcbi Abadis Authority 
(KAA) itself admits to not having a complete map of the settlements 
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No. of KA Area 
settlenents (acres) 
Karachi 539 15,569 
Estimated % total city 
population* population-*. 
2,670,000 34.5 
Hyderabad 457 6,362 720,000 23.6 
Source: Figures supplied b7 Sindb KAA, Tanuar-y 1992. 
-*: - Based on population projections from the 1981 Census. 
(interview with KAA officer, 27 January 1992, Karachi), but estimates 
that the overall situation in Karachi and Hyderabad is similar to that 
depicted in Table 6.4. The figure t*or Karachi br-oadJy agrees with a KDA 
land use survey in 1985, which found Just over 10,968 acres of city land 
to be occupied by katcba dwellings (sell-built insubstantial structures; 
16.7% of residential land] or semi-pucca buildings (self-built structures 
using more substantial materials such as concrete or stone blocks; 83.3% 
of land] (KDA, 1985). 
In contemporary Karachi, the katchi abadis fall into three broad 
categories. Firstly, there are large suburban districts with established 
quarters and pucca or semi-pucca housing, such as Baldia and Orangi. 
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Secondly, there are the small "inf ill" colonies an portions of vacant 
land such as river banks, railway or industrial land, often with katcba 
housing. Examples are Bhutta Goth, Shireen Jinnah Colony or Drigh 
Colony. Thirdly, the city also has older pre-1950 city-centre quarters, 
such as Lyari and Golimar. These are not strictly katcbI abadis in every 
case, since they often involve dwellings on legally apportioned land. 
However, it is useful to examine such districts in conjunction with the 
other katcbI abadis, due to their low-income and irregular nature. 
Employment 
Given such rapid expansion in the years following Independence, 
Karachi quickly grew from being the second largest urban centre in West 
Pakistan, to being by far the largest city in the country. The rate of 
growth in Karachi meant that promotion to first position had taken 
place by the time of the Census of 1951 (Government of Pakistan, 1990a, 
p. 51). 
With such an inf lux of people, the character and function of the 
city obviously underwent some changes. These developments can be 
portrayed in terms of the changing structure of employment in thý city, 
as shown in Table 6.6 (which uses a simple government classification of 
employment modes). 
The Table underlines the fact that, since Independence, patterns 
of occupation in Karachi Division (which includes the immediate rural 
fringe of the city) have altered fundamentally. It is interesting to note 
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% of labour force (over 10 
years of age) 
Owners of agricultural land 
Transport 
Manufacturing 
Construction labourers 
Shops/retail 
Government clerical workers 
Agricultural labourers 
8.9 
3.3 
9.8 
11.3 
5.8 
15.9 
27.0 
12U 
2.6 
10.5 
20.1 
4.8 
19.8 
17.9 
6.3 
Otbers 18.0 
Source: Census of India 1-941, Vol. XII, Sind, pp. 6.9-70; 
Government of Pakistan, ruly 1983, p. 18. 
18.0 
that the proportion of total workers in the city made up of "government 
clerical workers! ' has remained fairly constant and now constitutes the 
third largest employment category in the city, or possibly the second 
largest if employees in state offices of other sectors (such as public- 
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sector manufacturing or transport) are taken into account. In 1941, 
Karachi Division also comprised large rural areas, in which many barls 
lived. In the city, there were a sizeable number of landowners, and a 
large community of labourers to undertake construction work in the 
expanding city. In the decades following Independence, the city's 
industrial and commercial sector expanded considerably, with 
manufacturing and retailing (including hotels and restaurants) now 
constituting the largest sectors of employment in Ue city. Table 6.6 
emphasises the fact that Karachi has developed from a medium-sized city 
into a large industrial and commercial centre. 
I have suggested that the growth of Karachi increased its 
dominance as an urban centre relative to others in Pakistan. In many 
respects this is true, and the city's position as the sole international 
sea-port has ensured that its economic dominance will remain for the 
foreseeable future. There have been efforts to combat the concentration 
of import-export activity in Karachi. Dry-dock facilities in the rail 
terminals of Lahore and Faisalabad in Punjab, and efforts to attract 
investment for new port developments in eastern Baluchistan such as Hub, 
have signalled new attempts at decentralisation. To date, however, these 
projects have made very little impact on the dominance of Karachi as a 
part. 
Table 6.7 indicates the economic position that Karachi holds in 
relation to Sindh, and Pakistan as a whole, by documenting the 
concentration in the city of selected economic activities. The Table 
shows that Karachi holds a position in the economy of Pakistan that far 
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Parameter % in Karachi of total in: 
Population 27.4 6.2 
Working population (age 10 and above) 26.0 5.9 
Manufacturing (1984-85): 
Number of reported establishments 71.5 27.0 
Annual value of production added 76.0 39.9 
House Building Finance Corporation: 
Value of total loans sanctioned (1987-88) 65.7 27.3 
Banking clearing houses: 
Total value of cheques cleared (1989) n/a 61.9 
Source: Government of Pakistan, 1-990a, pp. 12,16,50,185,18-Q, 251; 
Government of Sindb 1.990, pp. 140,276 
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outweighs the proportion of the national population inhabiting the city. 
In Sindh, the city is dominant in most non-agriculimral sectors of the 
economy, accounting for approximately three-quarters of all 
manufacturing industry in the Province. In banking, the city holds an 
even more central role in the economy, handling nearly two thirds of all 
Pakistan's banking transactions. 
This economic dominance obviously holds implications for local 
politics. Because of the central role that the port and industry of 
Karachi occupy in the national economy, local political leaders in the 
city have realised that the stability of the regime in Islamabad depends 
to a great extent on the smooth functioning of Karachi. In these terms, 
episodes such as that of December 1987, when rioting around the access 
routes to Karachi docks was so bad that the part was completely closed 
for several days, have placed a considerable premium on the importance 
of winning political control in Karachi. Thus, Clapham's character isation 
of the developing-world state as an interlocking network of controlling 
institutions (Clapham, 1985, p. 39), can be extended in the case of 
Pakistan to a state in which the winning of control in certain local 
political environments can hold the key to maintaining power in the 
national state as a whole. It is perhaps for this reason that the army 
decided to intervene in the MQM's internal crisis in Karachi only when 
the violence between factions there began to spill onto the streets, in 
such districts as the Korangi industrial area in the east of the city. 
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Spatial patterns of settlement 
I have suggested in previous chapters that the growth of the 
Mc7bajlr- movement in Sindh has been accompanied by an increasing level 
of ethnic polarisation in the Province, which in cities like Hyderabad 
has resulted in a stark ethno-spatial differentiation of homes and work- 
places. In Karachi, the proportions of ethnic groups are different from 
the bipolar Sindhi/Xolajir- situation that prevails in Hyderabad, yet 
ethnic "ghettoisation" is still evident. 
The director of the Karachi Development Agency (KDA), Abu 
Shamim Arif (inter-view, 12 April 1991, Karachi), claims that a 
considerable degree of ethnic ghettoisation has occurred in the 
development of Karachi, but that "it is difficult to form policies to 
tackle this. It's difficult to 'homogenise' the city" (ibid). rhe patterns 
of settlement of new migrants in Karachi cannot be "shaped" easily by 
the agencies of the state. A glance at any map of the city illustrates 
the effects of ethnic ghettoisation. Districts display such names as 
Patban Colony, Baloch Colony, Sarbad [Frontier] Colony, and so on. 
Discussions with various residents of Karachi suggest that the process 
of ghettoisation specifically relates to urban migration, which in turn 
is shaped by the family, culture and language of incoming migrants. The 
situation is illustrated by the story of Karachi academic Karrar Husain, 
who migrated to Karachi from Meerut in United Provinces shortly after 
Independence, and obtained a Job and lodgings with the help of 
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previously- migrated friends and family-members (interview, 13 January 
1991, Karachi). 
Such a maintenance of community links, relating to the 
importance of the family in South Asian culture (whereby any relative 
has an unspoken right to lodge with others where necessary), inevitably 
leads to a spatial process of community agglomeration. This was 
certainly the case with the post-Partition Urdu-speaking migrants who 
moved to Sindh after 1947. Similarly, later migrants from other parts of 
Pakistan have usually found in Karachi a city whose dominant language 
and culture is not their own, and they derive comfort and protection 
from settling within areas of their own culture. This is particularly so 
of the Pakhtun migrants, for two reasons. Firstly, the Pakhtuns have 
usually received little Urdu instruction betore arrival in Karachi (most 
primary education in NWFP is in Pashto). Secondly, they will usually 
maintain bly'aderi Itrfbe/clan] links from the Frontier, whereby even 
intra-Pakhtun tribal groups are differentiated socially and spatially. 
Such patterns of association may be consciously maintained by 
the nature of the migration to Karachi. "Circular" migrants, for example, 
usually consisting of single males who make regular trips to their 
families in the Frontier or Punjab with saved earnings, may feel that 
their semi-pernanent status in Karachi removes the incentive to become 
fully integrated into urban society. Furthermore, much migrant labour in 
the city is organised by another key broker of the informal economy; the 
employment-agent known as the tbekedari. In the three-way process 
between worker, thekedarl and employer (the latter two of whom are often 
-368- 
former migrants from northern areas themselves), maintenance of cultural 
links is important, including the arrangement of lodgings by the 
thakedar-1. Finally, there is evidence that, in the rented sector Which 
in katcbI abadis is thought to account for only about 10% of housing; 
Vahab, 1991, p. 314), landlords will often only rent to individuals or 
families of their own ethnic community (ibid, p. 304). *Ihese processes, 
whereby the ethnic origins and culture of migrants are maintained and 
emulated in the city by agents and employers, translate into patterns of 
ethnic concentration. 
On the subject of ethnic particularism it is necessary to 
mention again the impact of violence and retribution on ethnic 
polarisation. Many residents in Old Golimar, some of whom I encountered 
by chance in the street, claim that since 1988 they have abandoned 
residence in Nobajir-dominated areas such as Nazimabad and moved to the 
largely Sindhi/Baluchl. districts of Old Golimar or Lyari "lor protection" 
(discussions, 21 January 1991, Karachi). Such people have often 
abandoned property and livelihoods in the process, but claim they can 
"never go back" (ibid). In this way, a spatial and psycbological 
polarisation of communities occurs, whereby youngsters brought up in one 
area receive acrimonious appraisals of neighbouring communities which 
cannot easily be contested by the experience ot physical contact with 
members of those communities. 
The MQM also claims that, alter 1988, ethnic violence in Sindh 
was leading to large movements of Xbbajirs out of more rural areas into 
the cities of Hyderabad or Karachi, where "reception camps" were 
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arranged. In June 1990, MQM Secretary- General Dr. Imran Farooq put the 
number of such rural inigrants settling in Karachi in the first six 
months of the year at 15,000 (Dawn, 26 June 1.990, Karachi). 5000 of 
these were said to be accommodated in reception camps (ibid). to 
quantify such local migration is an inherently problematic exerclse, and 
there may well be a degree of exaggeration in the MQM's statistics. In 
September 1989, the National Assembly in Islamabad held a debate as to 
whether such an exodus from rural Sindh was occurring at all (Dawn, 26 
September 1989, Karachi). Yet the personal accounts of residents in Old 
Golimar (discussions, ibid), or citizens in Hyderabad4, do support the 
notion that a process at spatial ethnl. c polarisation has been occurring 
in Sindh. 
The Ntzhajirs and the socio-econamic organisation of districts in Karachi 
Such processes of ethnic concentration and polarisation have led 
to a particular ethno-spatial distribution in Karachi. During the course 
of fieldwork in Winter/Spring of 1991 and Winter/Spring of 1992,1 
undertook various spatial surveys to determine the nature of the "ethnic 
I 
map" in the city, and to establish exactly where the Nobajiz-s fit into 
the picture. 
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Income 
I would argue that it is useful to first examine the socio- 
economic position of communities in Karachi and elsewhere on the basis 
of a three-tier income classification, comprising low, medium and high 
incomes. Many analyses have adopted such a framework, including the 
Karachi Development Agency (KDA), which assigned the incomes shown in 
Table 6.9 to a three-tier socio-economic model, in a study of visitors to 
Karachi's coastal zone conducted in 1988, Greater precision is not 
always possible. 
The categorisation in Table 6.9 provides a useful indication of 
broad income groups in the city. In 1938 <when the daUt ., ias collecl-. ed), 
Rs. 3,000 would be equivalent to approximately US$150. Government figures 
suggest that the average household size in Karachi in the mid-1980s was 
6.4 persons (COEKA, 19d6, pp. 5,7). 
Individual salaries are often difficult to determine as data 
typically relates to household incomes, particularly where whole families 
are engaged in a single set of related activities. Examples of such a 
situation would be family workshops, with members of the household 
engaged in stitching, repairing, printing and such like. Similarly, 
construction and industrial labouring is often undertaken by all the 
able members of a family. At 1989 prices the Zatcbi Abadis Association 
recorded a typical household labouring income in Karachi katcbI abadis 
of around Rs. 500 to 1,000 per month (figures supplied by KAA, February 
1992). 
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Income grQLIR Household monthly ingome (Rs.. 2.! -' 
LOW Less than 3,000 
MEDIUM 3,000 - 10,000 
HIGH 10,000 and above 
Source: KDA "Coastal Zone Development Study", December 1989. 
f- As at mid-1988. 
The three-tier income ±ramework shown in rable 6.9 can be 
usefully compared to an occupation and income survey I conducted in the 
city in 1991 and 1992. Examples of the occupations I selected for 
comparison are shown in Fable 6.1.0. I*he Fable shows that a middle- 
income family would typically be involved in such occupal-Jons as 
shopkeeper, office clerk or industrial worker, Jn each case with ulore 
than one member ot the family contributing to the household income. Low- 
income families are more likely to be engaged in general labouring, 
hawking, sewing or similar activities. 
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LOW 
MIDDLE 
HIGH 
Tballawala 
[push-cart vendor] 
Seamstress 
Shop assistant 
Labourer 
Shopkeeper 
Driver 
Office clerk 
Industrial worker 
Manager of textile 
workshop 
Engineer (graduate) 
Marketing manager 
300 - dOO 
200 - 600 
500 - 900 
200 - 500 
1,000 2,000 
900 1,800 
1,000 2,000 
800 1,500 
3,000 - 6,000 
4,000 - 10,000 
20,000 and above 
Sources: OPP, KAA, discussions Narious) and press (various). 
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Land 
During fieldwork in 1991 and 1992 1 also undertook a detailed 
survey of residential land values across Karachi, to determine the 
economic patterns of housing development in I-, he city across space. rhe 
broad results of the survey were not surprising. I'he most expensive 
residential land J. n Karachi is that close to, and/or with good 
connections to the commercial centre of the city (the high-income 
suburbs of Clifton and Defence also stand out as islands of high-cost 
land). Thus in the central Saddar - N. A. Jinnah Road - Chundigarh Road 
area, residential plots were reportedly selling in early 1992 at 
Rs. 10,000 to 15,000 per square yard. Generally speaking, as distance 
increases from the hub of the city, residential land values decline, to 
Rs. 600 per square yard in Federal V area, and to Rs. 350 per square yard 
in North Karachi for example. Table 6.11 shows examples of districts in 
Karachi within each of the three residential land-price categories of 
low, medium and high-5. 
Regarding this inatter, two important anomalies must be borne in 
mind. Firstly, the influence on land values of proximity to economic 
activity sometimes leads to poor quality old or recently encroached slum 
housing to occupy land of a relatively high value. This is notably the 
case within the old district of Lyari, where land for residential plots 
is Rs. 1,000 per square yard, equivalent to that in PECHS or Jacob Lines, 
but where conditions of housing and density of population are not 
equivalent to the latter. The high value relates to the area's great 
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Qat&xory- Rs. /sq. yd. (1992) Districts* 
LOW 150 - 350 Baldia, Qasba, Orangi, 
Mauripur, Landhi, Bhit, 
Korangi. 
MIDDLE 400 - 750 Nazinabad, N. Nazimabad, 
Liaquatabad, Malir, 
Federal 'B' Area. 
HIGH 800 - 3,000 PECHS, Gulshan-i Iqbal, 
Clifton, Defence. 
Source: Land-value survey, February 1992, witb assistance of Sbaban! 
Associates Chartered Surveyors 
Selected d1stricts. 
proximity to both the city centre and to the Sindh Industrial Trading 
Estate (SITE). At around 100 plots per hectare, the density of Lyari is 
nearly ten times that of Defence, for example, while residential land 
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values in the latter are Just twice thai. oi I. yari (Heyerink, *1983, pp. 20- 
26). 
The second anomaly concerns various other local variations, such 
as spatial relations to transport nodes, or to suburban sources of 
employment. On this matter, the surveyor and former PPP technocrat P. K. 
Shahani is developing a theory of "curf ew- propensity areas" in Karachi 
(interview, 28 January 1992, Karachi). Here, certain districts that have 
been particularly prone to curfew imposition at times of- unrest have 
seen a drop in land values of up to 30Z, while relatively curfew-free 
areas have enjoyed real land-value rises of 10! to 15"P in the last three 
years (ibid). 
The impact of curfew- propensity is shown in Table 6.12, where 
the distorting effect an land values that curfews have imposed in 
selected districts of the city is also assessed. The Fable Is concerned 
with the period from the beginning of 1983 to the end of the f irst 
quarter of 1989, and assesses for each district the proportion of that 
time that a particular district spent under curfew compared to the total 
amount of curfew imposition throughout Karachi in the same period. The 
purpose of the Table is to show how often some districts were suffering 
civil unrest in the 1983-89 period, and to ofter a rough assessment of 
how much of an impact this will have on the district's land and 
property values. the concentration of unrest around certain specific 
districts can then be estimated, although, as will be discussed later, 
curfew imposition does riot alt-tays equate with levels of unrest ill a 
particular district. 
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TARIX 6-19: Curfews in mplectpd djrtrjQts; 1283 - A12ril 19,99 
and "curfew-propensitjL! 
District Curfew days/ % of total Curfew 
part-daysl curf. perio_d. 1 proppnsity 
Shah Faisal Colony 315 74.3 HIGH 
Nazimabad 237 55.9 HIGH 
Orangi 216 50.9 HIGH 
Liaquatabad 202 47.6 HIGH 
New Karachi 29 6.8 LOW 
PIB Colony 23 5.4 LOW 
Qasba Colony 17 4.0 LOW 
Lyari 0 0.0 LOW 
Source: *- COBRA, Implementation Review, 1989, pp. giv-vil. 
Curfew imposition is extremely injurious to economic activity 
and quality of life and will obviously have a negative impact on the 
value of areas perceived to be prone to its imposition. rhe variations 
in curfew likelihood and length relate to a complex variety of factors. 
Low-income "slum" areas like Lyari and Qasba may escape declarations of 
curfew by virtue of being areas of low official and police presence, 
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while areas such as Nazimabad are far better policed. P. K. Shahani claims 
that the factor ol cui-lew propensity is now well established in the land 
and property market (interview, 26 January 1992, Karachi). rhus, while 
the absolute IiSures in ]'able 6.12 will change quickly, their values 
relative to one another will remain relatively constant. 
Political patterns and community distribution 
I will show that the power-base of the MQM in Karachi is 
concentrated in certain middle-income districts ot Central and East 
Zones, while the non-14Q]l vote is mostly concentrated in the low-income 
areas of Karachi East, West and South. Within this broad framework, the 
picture of socio-economic distribution in the city establishes not only 
where the IIQH's Nobajirs live, but exactly In which positions within the 
urban economy they are concentrated. The power-base of the 14QM is 
constituted by the Urdu-speaking shopkeepers, industrial workers and 
office-clerks. I will also show that such patterns of community 
distribution in the urban space are reflected in the distribution of 
visual symbols and community markers - the emblems oi dillerent 
political and ethnic groups. 
I have shown that the KDA preiers to avoid studies of the city 
that record "ethnic" distributions (interview with Abu Shamin Arif, 12 
April 1991, Karachi), and as a result the economic data supplied by such 
agencies as the IML cannot readfly be equated with socio-cultural or 
political patterns. For this reason, I adopf. in this research a inef-hod ol 
-378- 
analysis of electoral data in I. he city, concerning the Seneral elections 
of 1988 and 1990 On coin binati on with 1-he Local EodJes elect. jons ol 
1987). This method provides not only an appropriate spatial framework 
of "units" in the city, namely the 28 Provincial Assembly seats, but also 
a method of linking the economic data of those districts with political 
processes through to the end of the 1980s. 
Although the ethnic affiliation of each voter is not recorded, it 
can be argued that the organisation of most political parties in 
Pakistan is structured along ethnic lines. rhe names, rhetoric and 
leadership of many parties ensure that voters of a particular ethnic 
group are embraced, while those ot certain other groups are excluded. 
This is particularly so in the case of the HQM. Despite developments at 
the turn of the 1990s, the formative years of the Movement involved a 
tremendous ethnic exclusivity of words and policy directed first at 
Afghans, Pakhtuns and to a lesser extent. Punjabls, and then later at 
Sindhis. This means that very few non-Nobajirs will be ready to join its 
ranks. Ironically, Altaf Hussain's attempts to move-away from a solely 
ethnic politics after 1991 have led to a violent rift in the KQM, all of 
which supports the contention that the electorate in Sindh has polarised 
ethnically to a great. extent. 
The MQM is not. the only party pursuing hardline ethnic policies. 
The PPI was formed in Igil, 7 with the express intention of catering for 
two of the communities living in Sindh excluded from the MQM's 
constituency (Muslim, 1.0 March 19tsl, Karachi). Ihe results of the 1990 
elections showed a further ethnic dilferential. lon within the PPI's ranks, 
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as its Punjabi and Pakhtun wings split into two distinct. groups. fhe 
former group, led by Malik Ghulam Sarwar Awan, achieved a signifi. cant 
vote in just two seats (namely the east Lyari area and the central. 
commercial district, and katchi abadis around the Kimari Basin (PS 89 
and 90, South Zone)). I'he pattern of votes for Sarwar Awan reflects the 
heavily Punjabi nature of those districts in which he made a substantial 
showing. 
The Awami National Party was formed in 19,116 by nerging the 
National Democratic Party (NDP), the Awami TeLi-ik of Sindhi nationalist 
Rasul Bux Palejo, and the Pakistan National Party (PIIP) of Baloch 
nationalist Mir Ghaus Bux Bizenjo (BBC WS, SAS 1-8-b6). However, dissent 
among its ranks led to splits almost immediately (Herald Election 
Special, October 1.990, p. 23), and by 1989 the ANP comprised a small 
group headed by Pakhtun nationalist and leftist Vali Khan, son of Abdul 
Ghaffar Khan who had called for a Pakhtunistan at the time of the 
Partition. By virtue of its leadership and its electoral success in 
Pakhtun areas of the city, the ANP in Karachi can be seen as a primarily 
Pakhtun party. For example, in the last election there was no significant 
showing for the ANP in Xdhajir-dominated Central Zone, while the party 
concentrated in West Zone (notably the katcbI abadis of Baldia and 
Qasba), and isolated Pakhtun areas, such as katchi abadis in eastern 
Landhi, and parts of Lyari. rhe emergence of the PPI has not made a 
serious dent in the ANP lallowing. 
Obviously there are parties that embrace followers of all ethnic 
groups and that endeavour not to be seen as ethnic parties. We have seen 
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that Benazir Bhutto and the PDA fall into this camp, with Bhutto 
claiming that "we don't do ethnic politics" (interview, 22 January 1.992, 
Karachi). Similarly, the IJI is nominally a "national" party (in both 
rhetoric and composition, fielding candidates in all four provinces). 
Table 6.13 shows the Provincial : *Issembly -, ote Ju KZtrachi in 19130 and 
1990. The Table shows thal. I. be PDA/PPP -! ot. e declined Jn South Zone 
between 1988 and i9go. rhe IJI does not seem to have benefitted from 
this, since its vote remained stable, while the MQN, PPI (Punjabi 
component) and ANP all increased their vote, suggesting an ethnically 
mixed group of PPP deserters. A desertion from such national parties, 
and the spatial concentrations of votes in their former strongholds, 
suggest a gradual process of ethnic polarisation in the political arena. 
From Table 6.13 it can be seen that the PDA was least in 
evidence in Central Zone, while in South Zone, where the major 
concentration of Karachi Sindhis live (within the urban area), the PDA 
was the largest party in 191-18. Such an ethnic correlation is also 
suggested by a preponderance of PPP slogans and symbols (including the 
red, black and green tricolour, and the arrow - the PPP's voLing 
symbol13) in Sindhi. areas such as Lyari, but not elsewhere. In rural 
Sindh, furthermore, the PPP is clearly the most popular party among the 
Sindhi electorate. 
The data in Table 6.13 provide three useful pointers to the 
spatial organisation of the city. Firstly, East Zone is the most heavily 
populated in the city, and thus provides the largest zonal share of the 
vote. Secondly, between the elections of 1988 and 1990, the MQM vote 
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TABLF 6.13: Vote* in Karnchi. 1988 and 1999. by Zone. 
Party Vote as % of Vote as % of 
Zone vote 
1988 1990 
city 
1988 
vote 
1990 
VEST MQM 48.01 59.69 8.47 10.45 
PPP/PDA 21.13 19.77 3.72 3.46 
PPI 10.35 0.02"' 1.82 0.00 
ANP 7.92 5.71 1.40 1.00 
111 6.56 10.01 1.16 1.75 
CENTRAL MQK 81.14 92.10 22.63 26.15 
PPP/PDA 7.91 2.07 2.21 0.59 
111 6.52 4.86 1.82 1.38 
PPI 1.83 0.01: w* 0.51 0.00 
SOUTH PPP/PDA 39.87 36.30 7.81 5.91 
KQX 31.73 44.20 6.21 7.21 
Iij 6.79 6.69 1.33 1.09 
PPI 3.91 4.05***' 0.77 0.66 
ANP 1.76 2.58 0.34 0.42 
EAST MQM 62.34 73.07 21.75 27.61 
PPP/PDA 17.09 16.48 5.96 6.23 
PPI 6.54 0.09'1: ý 2.28 0.04 
lil 5.18 7.11 1.81 2.69 
Source: Calculations derived from flEures supplied by Provincial Election 
Authority, Karachi 
f- Total valid vote; fil - Falrbtun component only followinE split; 
#it - Punjabi component (92.3Z of PPI vote In Zone), plus Fakbtun 
component. 
-382- 
increased considerably throughout the city. rhe PFPiPDA vote remained 
relatively stable apart trom in Central Zone, while the PPI support 
collapsed, principally due to a split between the Punjabi and Fakhtun 
wings of the party. Me IJI seems to have been the main beneficiary of 
this shift in Pakhtun and Punjabi votes. Fhirdly, Central Zone is clearly 
the heartland of the MQM vote, and strikingly so in 1990. Fhis 
represents the middle-income Xohajir districts of Nazimabad, 
Liaquatabad, Azizabad, Federal V Area and ITorth Karachi. East -one is 
the next most important MQH area, although there is a sizeable element 
of PPP support here, particularly in Halir Colony and Cantonment and 
parts of Landhi. Only in South Zone is the MQM vote balanced by that f or 
other parties. In 1988 the PPP was the largest single party in this 
Zone. 
The nature of the HQH heartlands in terms of facilities and 
development are conterminous with the middle-income character of such 
districts as I have described them. In Chapter 51 discussed notions of 
"mythology" in political rhetoric, whereby the claims of political 
leaders often fail Lo convince in the face of perceived "realities" on 
the ground. In Karachi, the distribution of the Mchajir-s within the city 
highlights how claims of discrimination and economic repression 
promoted by the MQM are another important element of political 
mythology. By virtue of residing in middle-income districts, the 
Nobaji. rs not surprisingly have better facilities at their disposal than 
many of their neighbours. I will also show that political patronage by 
the agencies of the local state is important for the development of 
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facilities in local urban communities. Fhe rise to dominance of the MQM 
in these agencies through the 1980s, in conjunction with the ethnic 
particularism of Pakistan's pol. it. ics, have ensured that the poorest non- 
XoLajir districts in the city have laced the greatest battle for local 
upgrading. 
In the course of fieldwork in Karachi, I undertook a survey of 
public-sector higher education and health facilities. One of the main 
reasons these facilities were selected was that they figure prominently 
in party rhetoric concerning levels of amenities (particularly higher 
education in the case of the MQM). Health facilities are one of the more 
basic amenities, and a lack or abundance of clinics, hospitals or 
dispensaries can suggest much about the general economic profile of 
districts. 
The distribution of the two sets of facilities by zone is shown 
in Table 6.14. We can see that in terms of these two parameters, Central 
Zone fares best, with allocations of higher education and health 
facilities in the public sector exceeding its "population proportion". 
East and South Zones achieve close to parity between their population 
proportions and facilities while West Zone is strikingly underserved, 
containing just one college and two hospitals. Notwithstanding MQM 
rhetoric, facilities are worst in the parts of the city where the MQM 
does least well. 
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zma Proportion Higher Health 
of Pop 'n- education facilities 
NSZA. I X21.1 
WEST 14.98 1 1.96 2 2.50 
CENTRAL 24.67 18 35.29 31 38.75 
SOUTH 25.68 12 23.53 23 28.75 
EAST 34.67 20 39.22 24 30.00 
Source: Survey conducted witb the assistance of the Survey of Pakistan, 
Karacbi. 
* Proportions calculated from 1981 Census of Pakistan 
Electoral malpractice 
Thiý use of electoral data pertaining to Karachi or elsewhere in 
Pakistan should be accompanied by a warning on the issue of possible 
electoral malpractice, especially with regard to the election of 1990. 
The polls were observed by two external delegations; a party from the 
National Democratic Institute (NDD based in the United States, and a 
French delegation of the International Federation of Human Rights. While 
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the former group came to the conclusion that the elections were largely 
fair (Nation, 31 October 1990, Lahore), the French group observed 
localised irregularities that, it claimed, cast doubt on the whole 
electoral process (Nation, ibid). The PDA combined such observations 
with its own findings to produce a White Paper entitled "How an Election 
was Stolen" (PDA, 1991). 
The specific charges differ across the 70 NA seats claimed to 
have been "rigged", but in Karachi the main problem seemed to have been 
a suspiciously large increase in voter registration in particular seats 
following the previous elections. Particular questions surround the 13.6% 
increase in registered votes in NA 188 (Central Zone, Federal V Area to 
North Karachi) and the 16.2% increase in NA 195 (East Zone, Landhi; PDA, 
1991, p. 242). The possible impact of this factor on the Provincial 
Assembly constituencies is examined in Table 6.15. The Table depicts a 
wide variation in voter registration between the seats won by the FDA 
and MQM in 1990 (together accounting for all the city's seats), in a way 
that a simple average does not fully convey. Thus, while most PDA seats 
(four of the six won) saw a registration increase since 1988 of less 
than 4%, only one of the 22 seats won by the MQM fell into this 
category. The highest single increase went to the MQM in PS 83 (Central 
Zone, Federal V Area) which saw an increase in registered voters since 
1988 of 16.76%. In this seat, the MQM won with 90.06% of the vote, up 
from 83.9% of the vote in 1988 despite an overall decline in voter 
turnout between the two polls of just under 7% (Election Commission, 
ibid). 
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Winning Range of increase in seats won M 
PDA 0.97 to 14.03 
HQM 3.86 to 16.76 
Percentage of seats won wlth Increase over 4% 
PDA 33.33 
MQM 95.45 
PDA 5.12 
XQM 8.24 
Source: Election Commission of Pakistan, 1988 and 1990. 
The PDA charge is that the MQM organises registration of under- 
age voters with false documents to vote for the Movement (PDA, 1991, 
p. 242). This is the same as the charge levelled at the MQM by PPI chief 
Sarwar Awan after the 1988 elections (Nation, 31 December 1988, Lahore). 
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It also seems evident that an element of fear and intimidation was at 
work in Karachi. I*he French obser% er team recorded the presence of 
armed police at po11JnS stations durinS the vote in NA 191 (South Zone; 
Muslim, 31 October 1990, Karachi), which may have affected the vote for 
the deposed PPP. rhe PDA also charges that HQM officers were evident 
inside and outside several polling stations during the vote (PDA, ibid, 
p. 242). 
In these terms, electoral data can only be used if such pitfalls 
as electoral malpractice are borne in mind. Fhe discrepancies in voter 
registration figures may of course relate to little more than 
enthusiastic organisation in some areas, against apathy in some others. 
As for the PDA, it should be noted that two of its six Provincial 
Assembly seats in Karachi in 1990 were among those with very high voter 
registration increases: PS 97 (Fast Zone; beginning of rural area east of 
Landhi) registered a 14.03% increase in registered voters since 1988 
(and a 30.54% increase in the PDA vote over that for the PPP in 1988), 
while PS 98 (East Zone; Malir Colony and Cantonment) saw an 11.2% 
increase in registered voters, with aL 33.35% rise in the PPP/PDA vote 
Glection Commission, Jbid - the 14Q]4 vote Increased 27.3% and 35.44% In 
these two seats respectively). Thus, if the large increases in 
registration do represent electoral fraud, the MQM is not the only guilty 
party. The subject has since been swept under the carpet, as the IJI 
government has shown no sign of establishing a review of the results. 
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6.4 THE LOCAL STATE IN KARACHI 
Despite the complications surrounding the use of electoral data, 
I would argue that spatial patterns of voting in Karachi over the last 
two elections provide a relatively accurate indication of the 
distribution of political communities in the city. The data also 
underlines the fact that politics in Karachi and Pakistan have become 
inherently "ethnic", particularly as regards the MQM and similar groups 
such as the PPI. 
This ethnic particularisation has had an impact on the spatial 
spread of economic development across Karachi. rhe manner in which 
development and ethnicity are interwoven in the city concerns the nature 
of the local state, in both the formal and informal sectors, and the 
positions occupied by various communities within the state apparatus. 
The MQX has played a particularly important role within the 
configuration of the local state in Karachi in two ways. Firstly, it has 
increasingly come to dominate the official government agencies, and has 
orchestrated the policies of those agencies accordingly. Secondly, the 
Movement has established a form of "secondary state" in many areas, 
whereby it has provided its own projects and administration 
independently of any official arm of the state. To understand these 
processes, it is useful to analyse I. he nature of the local state in 
Karachi. 
The concept of the "state" at the local level in a city such as 
Karachi involves various government and non-government agencies, the 
-389- 
boundaries between which are not always clear. Frobably the most obvious 
agency of the state in the city is the official urban administration, 
which, as in many cities, is structured around a variety of institutions 
that do not always display effective coordination. Aside from the 
municipal government, however, Karachi also hosts a large and influential 
informal sector of land developers, organised criminal gangs and 
unregulated businesses of one form or another. A bridge between these 
two sectors of Lhe local state is formed by corrupt workers in the 
formal sector, who cooperate with the intormal sector through coercion, 
or a desire to supplement wages. Special mention in this respect must be 
made of the city's police force, which in many localised examples forms 
a bridge between different sectors of the local stai. e. 
The city of Karachi had a municipal government as early as 
1852, just nine years after the British arrived in Sindh (Hashmi, 1983, 
p. 31). This administration began to develop for the first time a 
complete urban programme for Karachi after establishing that epidemics 
in the city originated from conditions in the old walled slum housing 
areas on the Lyari river (Heyerink, 1983, p. 25). 
During the time of Ayub Khan's government, the Karachi 
Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) was structured on a half-elected and half 
government-appointed basis until 1971, when -the Bhutto government 
reinstated its fully-elected status. The councillors in the Corporation 
are elected in the Local Bodies elections, held in Sindh every five years 
since December 1972. rhe total size of the KMC currently stands at 204 
councillors. These councillors are divided between the city's four Zones, 
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with 34 in Karachi West, 46 in Karachi South, 56 in Karachi Central and 
68 in Karachi East. The number of councillors per Zone broadly mirrors 
the distribution of Karachi's population. Before 1987 there were just 
three Zones (West, East and South), after which time Central Zone was 
detached from West. The last Local Bodies elections before fieldwork was 
conducted in the city were held in December 1987. 
With pressures mounting on the administration of the rapidly- 
growing city, the Karachi Development Agency was established in 1957 to 
develop areas of land for housing, and pass them to the jurisdiction of 
the KMC. Thus, all "legal" land in the city is effectively administered 
by the KDA in the first instance. However, coordination between the two 
government agencies has not been smooth, and the KDA effectively 
maintains municipal committee status in many of the areas it developed, 
notably in Gulsban-1 Iqbal in the north-east of the city (where the KDA 
has built its impressive headquarters). In this capacity, the KDA also 
exercises Jurisdiction over the utility boards in some districts. 
Urban utilities basically involve electricity, sewerage, water 
and transport. The relevant government bodies dealing with these are the 
Karachi Electricity Supply Corporation (KESC), The Karachi Water and 
Sewerage Board (KVSB) and the Karachi Transport Corporation (KTC). Each 
of these is a semi-autonomous government body with a partnership 
relationship to the KMC and KDA. Members of these bodies are not 
elected, but appointed with some degree of Jurisdiction exercised by the 
provincial government. The KTC is the least significant, in terms of 
size, since the private transport sector is far larger than the public 
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transport system, with the KTC accounting for just 6.4% of buses on the 
city's roads in 1986 (COEKA, 1986, p. 74). 
Karachi, like many developing- wor ld cities, faces problems of 
adequate utility supply. In 1986, the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board 
(KWSB) claimed that the demand per capita for piped water in the city 
exceeded production by Just under 15 per cent (COEKA, 1986, p. 131). The 
shortfall is expected to rise over the years, as the rate of population 
growth in the city exceeds the rate at which the water supply can be 
improved and increased. By the year 2000, the Board estimates that the 
shortfall in water production will be equivalent to 54.4 per cent of the 
demand for water (figures supplied by KWSB, April 1991). In sewerage, 
there is a similar problem of treatment facilities failing to keep pace 
with demand. In 1986, the KWSB claimed that it could treat only 18.5 per 
cent of the daily production of sewage in the city (COEKA, 1986, p. 132). 
The implications of this large shortfall for health and welfare in the 
city are obvious. 
By the end of the 1980s, water was the largest problem area in 
terms of utility supply in the city - piped water was available to just 
over 47 per cent of homes in katchl abadl areas in 1989 (COHKA, 
Implementation Review, 1989, p. 9xi). Energy has been less of a problem, 
with electricity available to 73 per cent of homes in the same areas, 
and gas available to 32.3 per cent of katchl abadi homes (ibid). 
Certainly, life in Karachi does not seem to entail the sort of persistent 
power-cuts that occur in other cities in Pakistan, such as Lahore or 
Rawalpindi. 
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It is interesting to note that the Federal Commission of Enquiry 
into Karachi Affairs of 1986 (COEKA), which is yet to be put on public 
release, observed a degree of public frustration at the lack of 
coordination between these government agencies (ibid, 1986, p. 98). The 
XQM has addressed this factor as a major urban problem, which it claims 
would be solved by a centralisation of powers under an over-arching KMC. 
Since the Local Bodies Elections of 1987, all the government 
civic agencies in Karachi have experienced a growing preponderance of 
. ffobajlr-s sympathetic to the MQM in their workforce. These polls 
determined the composition of councillors and officers in the Karachi 
Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) - the principal agency of general urban 
development. The details of the results are shown in Table 6.16. 
Commensurate with general electoral and other political data, 
the Local Bodies election results of 1987 show that Central Zone is very 
much dominated by the MQK, while the Movement is weakest in South Zone. 
The decline of the Islamic parties Jamaat-i Ulama-i Fakistan (JUP) and 
Jamaat-l Islaml UD from their previous strength in Abbajir- districts 
was also highlighted by the 1987 elections. 
The councillors are in effect the immediate government 
representatives at the moballab [urban district] level, charged with 
liaising with businesses and residents in their areas and negotiating 
their requirements at the KMC, Often there is a link between community 
grievances over standards of facilities in a particular area and the 
political affiliation of the councillor in that area. In Old Golimar for 
example, some residents complain that 1987 marked a change for the 
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zala IQ±. mi HE F-ml 11 F-EL Others 
West 34 10 7 7 2 17 
South 46 6 10 11 5 31 
Central 56 44 3 1 1 16 
East 68 35 6 5 10 39 
Total 204 95 26 24 18 44 33 
Source: Figures supplied by Provincial Election Authority, Karachi, 
February 19.02. 
worse in the level of attention accorded to the area by the KMC. 
However, those in Noor Muhammad Goth in the north of the area 
specifically blame their councillor, the Baluchi Murad Asif, for failing 
to make any effort to work with local people (inter-views, 21 January 
1992, Karachi). 
The success of councillors obviously varies considerably between 
individual cases. OPP board-member Arif Hasan claims that in the riots 
of December 1986, Hanifabad moballab and its surrounds in Orangi were 
relatively quiet due to the tremendous community work of councillor 
Mohammad Ahmed. In neighbouring Pathan and Frontier Colonies, meanwhile, 
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councillors Sherzada Khan and Ishaq Khan were unable (or unwilling) to 
persuade certain residents not to become involved in the violence 
(inter-view, 11 February 1991, Karachi). This suggests that localised 
political conditions can be important in determining the spread of 
ethnic violence, and that political leadership is thus an integral 
element of community identity- f ormation, expression and management. 
However, there is a general perception in the city that 
councillors are in an influential "middleman" position, by means of which 
they frequently become involved in bribery and extortion. This is the 
view of Jan Van der Linden (interview, 29 January 1992, Karachi), who 
further stated that in most katcbI abadis in the city non-Adbailrs do 
not trust Xdbajir councillors (the largest group in the city) adequately 
to represent their interests, for ethnic reasons (ibid). 
Since the 1987 elections, the KMC has been largely dominated by 
the MQM (who represent Just under 47% of the councillors and held most 
of the executive positions, including the mayor, as of the first half of 
1993). The Movement also accounts for 50% of the councillors in the 
Hyderabad Metropolitan Corporation (figures supplied by HMC, April 
1991). In Karachi, MQM dominance has run through to the other non- 
elected civic agencies such as the KDA, KWSB and KESC. Precise figures 
are not available (the KDA stresses that it is not interested in ethnic 
delineations; inter-view with KDA director, 11 April 1991, Karachi), but a 
housing officer in the KDA assured me that the Authority was dominated 
by MQM sympathisers (interview, 28 January 1992, Karachi). His claim is 
supported by the manner in which the KDA headquarters in Gulsban-i 
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Iqbal is liberally decorated with posters, slogans and colours depicting 
Altaf Hussain and the MQM. Again, the symbolic ambitions of the Movement 
with regard to urban space strikes a somewhat sinister note, 
particularly in the context of a civic agency that is meant to serve all 
Karachiites in a neutral manner. 
This growing preponderance of MQN-sympathisers on the staff of 
the civic agencies in Karachi leads many in non-Mobajir- areas to 
complain that they have been badly treated by the urban administration 
since 1987. Lyari is a constant source of such complaints, which relate 
even to matters beyond death: 
"There is a graveyard owned by a Baloch, but MQM have 
taken over ........ You see other areas - they have all the 
facilities. Every civic agency is 80% MQM and they cry 
that they have no jobs! " 
(discussion, 10 February 1992, Karachi [translation by research 
assistant]). 
Here we can see a recognition of the position that discrimination and 
repression play in the general political mythology presented by the MQM, 
in this case from the point of view of a non-Xobajiz-. Indeed it is the 
non-Nobajlr communities in the city that feel they have a real grievance 
when it comes to amenity supply. Incidents like that of August 1988, in 
which faults at a KWSB pumping station in west Karachi led to some 
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streets in Lyari being f looded with sewage (Dawn, 7 August 1988, 
Karachi), serve only to strengthen theories of community victimisation 
by the civic authorities. 
The MQM meanwhile has repeatedly stressed an interest in 
centralising all civic agencies under the KMC, which at present would 
give the Movement an even stronger grip on the city administration due 
to its preponderance in the Corporation. The Mayor, Dr. Faroaq Sattar, 
claimed this was an essential policy in the interests of "efficiency" and 
giving Karachi "special status" (interview, 26 February 1991, Karachi). 
The Karachi Declaration of December 1988 resulted in part from a list of 
Nnegotiating points" of various urgency presented by the MQM. One of the 
key elements of these points was the issue of administrative 
centralisation in Karachi. Here can be seen a linkage of the MQM's 
centralisation policies with the possible implicit goal of achieving 
administrative or other "separation" of parts of urban Sindh from the 
Provincial administration. Under the list of "further demands" in the 
Karachi Declaration negotiations with the PPP government of 1988/89, 
were two broad points concerning administrative centralisation: 
1. The powers of the KMC, and Hyderabad and Sukkur Municipal 
Corporations should be extended, and the KDA "and other civic agencies" 
should be "nade subordinate to the KMC". 
2. In Hyderabad the HMC should also assume the powers of all civic 
agencies. The processes of centralisation would allow Sindh1s cities to: 
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......... get rid of multiple agencies, resultant mis- 
management and over-lapping of jurisdiction on disputes 
as to the responsibilities of various agencies and a 
truly uniform one umbrella system [sic]. " 
(Government of Sindh, Information Department, 1989, p. 15) 
The MQM also wanted the KMC mayor to be the chairman of KDA's 
governing body, "by virtue of his august office" (Chairman's Note, 27 May 
1989, Government of Sindh, ibid, p. 21). This had not been formally 
achieved by 1993. Meanwhile, pro-MQM publications, such as "The Promise" 
magazine have even proposed the formation of an MQM police force, called 
a "Razakaýr force 447 (The Promise; October 1991, Karachi, p. 13). The MQM in 
turn has suggested that the existing Karachi police force should be 
brought under the control of the KMC (Daily News, 27 January 1990, 
Karachi). Such moves would further anger residents of non-Hi2hajir- 
districts, who already feel that the MQM dominates civic agencies 
through personnel sympathetic to the Movement. 
In these terms, those fearful of an underground movement for 
some form of "partition" in Sindh, are not placated by the MQM's 
policies of striving for complete dominance of the administration of 
urban Sindh. Here again, the Movement can be seen as af orm of 
"secondary state", in that it aims to assume complete administrative 
powers within particular geographical boundaries, including Jurisdiction 
over law and order. In this aim there lies a possibly sinister intention, 
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relating to the violence and militarisation of the Movement over recent 
years. Thus, the position of non-Mobajir-s within a proposed MQM "state" 
would be unclear, much as is the case with the position of non-Sindhis 
under the concept of Sindbudesb. Non-Xc7bajIrs in urban Sindh are not 
seen as "clients" in terms of the MQM's clientalist politics. 
The Police 
The Karachi police f orce often forms one of the important links 
between the local authorities and unregulated development or business in 
the city. The force has also been a source of controversy in terms of 
the relative jurisdiction of government bodies. The MQM has had a 
difficult, and at times argumentative relationship with the police, 
particularly under the Benazir Bhutto government of 1988-90. At this 
time the Movement viewed the police largely as an anti-Xobaill- arm of 
state oppression (Xdbajlzýs in the Sindh police force, especially outside 
Karachi, are believed to be heavily outnumbered by Sindhis). The police 
service is structured around four districts in Karachi (three before 
1987) following the KMC "zones". The total workforce at the end of the 
1980s was 15,397, composed of Karachi Police (12,390), traffic police 
(2,076), and "Eagle" and "Hawk" squadsO (931); (COEKA, Implenentation 
Review, 1989, p. 8). 
The police have been in an increasingly difficult position in 
Karachi, and are reputed to be in a state of poor norale in the face of 
low pay and the increasing use of sophisticated weaponry by criminals 
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in the c,. t,,, (CO-E. KA. 193t, p. 53). Certainly the size of the force in 
Karachi dZes not cc.: pire : avcurably with other South Asian cities. In 
Delhi, fc. - exa=ple, a city purportedly not much larger than Karachi 
(COEYA, I=; le=entaticn Fe-. I. ew, 1969, p. 9), the police force includes 
around 22,000 ccnstables (Tambiah, 1990, p. 747). This compares with 
Karachi's 13,0c)o (COFKA, I=ple=en*, aticn Review, 1989, p. 8). 
Public percepticns of the police, however, are often negative. 
This e=erged during varicu-s discussions with Mob3jir, students and 
traders in Karachi, and with a Fakhtun student whose parents were 
Pushing for him to Join the service (discussions, various, Karachi). 
Opinions e=erging ircm these discussions echo the findings of the COEKA 
in 1986 and V)--9, in their own analysis of letters to civic authorities 
ard cc=plaInts registered at police stations. Instances of political 
Partisanship, physical abuse of detainees and the public at large, and 
sporadic and Irdiscriminate use of violence appear to have considerably 
lowered public confIdeace in the police in recent years. There is also a 
perception, part. 1cularly a=cng the Xchajirs I interviewed, that many 
higher-rankin. - officers in Karachi are involved behind- t he- scenes in 
unregulated private transFc. -t or other operations. This is thought to 
account ! or the variability of police action after Instances of reckless 
driving, accident!; or other Incidents (discussion with Kobajir family, 16 
January 1991, Karachi). The obvious motivation for police officers in 
Karachi to becc=L. involve, -4 in corruption is to supplement pay. 
In the 
=W-19806, j Farachi constable's pay was 1065 Rupees (approximately 
U2153) per =cntla (COEKA, 19b6. p. 161). This compares with the average 
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salary of a shopkeeper, driver or office clerk; a comparison that many 
police officers feel J. s unsatisfactory given the considerotble danger and 
stress they must offen face in the course of their work. 
M2 
No. executlye positionsf 
Sindhi 
Pakhtun 
Punjabi 
MdbaJlr 
10 
4 
4 
3 
Source: XQ)f, 1.989c 
f- District Superintendent to Provincial Inspector General. 
The ambivalent attitude of many MobaJIrs towards the police is 
reflected in IIQK policy on the matter. I noted in Chapter 5 I. bat the 
Movement blamed most at the "attacks" claimed to have been inilicted on 
MobajIrs up to 1988 on the police. However, the MQK specifically links 
hostility towards the police with an ethnic issue, focussing on 
supposedly discriminatory recruitment into the police. Table 6.17 depicts 
MQM data on the recruitment of different ethnic groups into the Sindh 
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police. The situation in Karachi is considered to be particularly poor, 
since of 58 Senior Higher Oiticers (S110s) in the city in 1989, only nine 
were Xobajir-s, -while three ot Lhe lour Seii1or Superfifl-endents and the 
Division Inspector General were claimed to be either Punjabis or 
Pakhtuns (MQM, 1990c). 
In some ways, the MQK's grievance could reflect general urban 
attitudes towards the police, who are often seen to be ineffective, 
partisan and corrupt in many locations in Soul. h Asia and elsewhere. 
Tambiah points to partisan action by i. be police in the Delhi rioting of 
1984 (Tambiah, 3990, p. -747), and suggests that the police were seen as 
sympathetic towards the Pakhtuns in Karachi's ethnic ricting ol J. 9tS6 
(ibid, p. 749). Such actions, claims Fambiah (ibid, p. '152), are not 
surprising when one cousiders that Lbe police are part ot Lhe community, 
and often are members ot opposing ethnic groups themselves. Police 
officers have to live among the people they lind themselves lacing 
across the barricades. 
The role of such agencies in urban violence will be examined at 
length in the following chapter. Interestingly, the response of the MQM 
to perceived injustice at the hands of the police in Sindh has been to 
suggest that the service should come under the control ot the civic 
agencies that the Movement dominates, and principally under the Karachi 
Metropolitan Corporation (KMC). The Movement's argument is that this 
would make the police force more accountable to Lhe city's urban 
administration and more efticient. It goes without. saying, however, that 
such a demand - or argument - also relates to the HQM's desire to 
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control the key agencies of the local state in Karahci, including the 
agencies of law and order. 
The informal sector of the state 
I have shown that the rapid growth of Karachi, particularly 
after the post-Partition influx of migrants from India and other parts 
of Pakistan, meant that the central government lost control of urban 
development in the city at an early stage. This has allowed an important 
informal sector to develop in Karachi. The commodity in which brokers of 
this sector trade is principally land, although transport, finance, drugs, 
arms and other clandestine businesses are also part of the intormal 
sector. 
I will show in the following chapter that a view has developed 
among some commentators that most of the large riots of the mid-1980s 
in Karachi were orchestrated by "mafiar. " in the informal sector of the 
city's economy. Engineer suggests that a focus on such "anti-social 
elements", as opposed to fundamental economic determinants, should not 
be entertained by "serious social scientists" (Engineer, 1989, p. 205). 
Less "foundationalist" writers, however, including Akmal Hussain (A. 
Hussain, 19811, p. 2), Hamza Alavi (Alavi, J. 9b9, p. 245) and Arif Hasan 
(Herald, December 1986, Karachi, p. 11) have all paid due (and proper) 
attention to the roles played by identifiable I'mafia" (or criminal) 
groups in fomenting civil disturbances in Sindh in order to develop an 
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"ethnic snokescreen" lor clandestine activities in drugs and arms (Aril 
Hasan, Herald, January 1987, p. 45). 
Whatever the situation with regard to urban violence, there has 
been a growth of powerlul and dangerous businesses in the informal 
sector in Karachi, trading drugs, arms, land and transport operations. A 
corollary of such businesses are activities such as "bonded labour" 
supplyg, protection rackets and extortion. In many ways, the land and 
transport businesses have expanded to fill the gaps left by the official 
state in utility provision. KDA development of residential areas has been 
too slow and inappropriate to cope with the rate of migration to the 
city, while the KTC has resoundingly failed to supply sufficient public 
transport. 
Added to such factors is a special relationship between the 
metropolis of Karachi and conditions in the NWFP border regions. The 
relationship principally concerns the two commodities that accelerated 
in importance towards the end of the 1970s. Firstly, Afghanistan and the 
border area with Pakistan has become one of the largest areas of heroin 
production in the world. Lack of state regulation in the crop-growing 
regions during the civil war in Afghanistan, coupled with the tremendous 
profits to be gained from producing opium, have allowed large illicit 
drug businesses to flourish in these areas. Increasingly, these 
businesses have used Karachi as their principal international outlet, 
since it is the nearest large international sea and air-port, and because 
there are important community links between the businesses in the 
border regions and traffickers in Karachi. 
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Secondly, since the late 1970s, Pakistan's pro-Nujabideen policy 
has encouraged a flood of arms into Karachi, both supplied by the West 
and captured from the communist forces (characterised by the ubiquitous 
Kalasbnlkov automatic rifle). Such arms have become an important 
commodity in Pakistan, where student groups, political parties and 
criminal elements have raced to equip themselves with guns in a hostile 
political environment. 
In Karachi, the clandestine business in such commodities has 
focussed on semi-regulated slum areas, where it can operate with 
relative impunity. Often there seems to be a connection with Pakhtun 
districts, due to the Frontier origins of much of the drugs and arms in 
the city. However, it is important not to equate criminal fraternities 
with Pakhtuns in general -a connection that Wali Khan notes is made 
all too often (Herald, January 1987, Karachi, p. 43). 
Government responses to these problems have been clumsy and 
inadequate. In December 1986, "Operation Clean-up" involved the 
bulldozing of slum bazaars and housing in Sohrab Goth, ostensibly to 
seize drugs and arms. At the end of the f irst day, 150 kilograms of 
assorted drugs, f ive pistols and two rifles were recovered (Ameneh Azam 
Ali, Herald, January 1937, Karachi, p. 39). This was at the expense of 
widespread displacement of* families, only some of' whow wu-e re-hotised 
in new apartment blocks (see Figure 6.2). The operation also marked the 
beginning of some of the worst rioting the city has seen. 
The operation resoundingly failed to tackle the illegal elements 
of the informal economy in Karachi. From the mid-1970s to 1988, the 
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"mafias" had come to exercise a dominant influence on the city's law and 
order situation. The private transport sector had been partially 
regulated during the time oi the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto government, through 
a strict limiting of route permits, but the system was relaxed after 
Bhutto's overthrow. In the land sector meanwhile, dallals [developers] 
have been the key agents of informal sector development. The founder of 
the OPP, Akhter Haneed Khan, describes the dallals in the following 
terms: 
"Dallals have performed the functions of KDA. They have 
acquired land, developed, subdivided and allotted it. 
Further they have arranged supply of water and transport 
and police protection. * 
(Akhter Hameed Khan, August 1990, p. 4; italics added). 
The OPP sees the dallals, in addition to the tha2las who provide 
building materials, credit and advice, as positive agents in the economy, 
facilitating development where the state has failed. However, Arif Hasan 
has observed a change in the power of dallals (Herald, December 1986, 
Karachi, p. 11). Previously they could only perform their duties by paying 
regular bribes to councillors and the local police. Now, with a greater 
flow of money from such avenues as the drugs trade, some dallals have 
been able to buy land outright with large lump sums, and subsequently 
sub-let the land or develop it an their own terms, assuming powers as 
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landlords that they pieviously dJd not. enjoý kibid). 1heir uneasy and 
often fraudulent linkages with government bodies have occasionally been 
exposed. In September 1989 the much-reported "Clifton plot scandal", 
exposed a high-ranking KDA official illegally selling land to dallals at 
1000 rupees per square yard, well. below the legal narket value (Daily 
News, 21 September 1989, Karachi). 1'his example demonstrates the 
important links of corruption between the formal and informal sectors of 
the state in a city such as Karachi. 
The XQM, as the dominant force in the civic agencies of Karachi 
since 1987, has experienced an uneasy relationship with the informal 
sector. The MQM's negotiating points with the PPP government in late 
1988 involved the land market in particular. The Charter of Resolution 
did not mention the issue, but point 15 of the Karachi Declaration (see 
Appendix 5) deals with "land grabbing" by "middlemen". The "Chairman's 
note" of May 1989 returns to this issue in terms of "encroachment" 
(illegal occupation of vacant land by squatters, often organised by 
dallals) with specific reference to Gulsban-1 Iqbal in Karachi East 
(Government of Sindh, Information Department, 1989, p. 22). 
The problem for the MQM is that agents of the informal economy 
act as a parallel force to the official state in katcb! abadis, and as 
such pose a threat to the HQK's grip on the city administration. rhe 
response of the Movement seems to be to confront the corruption of 
government ofticers in civic agencies, and to increase the power of 
those agencies over land development relative to the intormal sector. 
The fact of the matter seems to be, however, according to discussions 
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with various residents across the city (Mobaiirs and otherwise), that 
MQM councillors are just as prone to fixing matters in the official 
machinery in return for bribes as are those representing other parties. 
The informal sector and the shaping of urban development 
Until 1978, the rapidly growing katcbi abadis such as Orangi 
(whose development accelerated after 1972 with an influx of Bibar-is from 
Bangladesh; OPP, February 1991, p. 2) were not even recognised by the 
central state, until the Zia regime enacted a Martial Law Order in which 
all katcb! abadis on safe land before 1 January 1978 would be 
loregularised" (Van der Linden, Meijer and Nientied, 1991, p. 69). In 1985, 
the cut-off date for regularisable katcbI abadis was extended to 23 
March 1985. By this date, the federal Karachi Special Development 
Programme (KSDP) was just beginning work, and ultimately would address 
only a third of the inhabitants in pre-1978 districts (COEKA, 1986, 
p. 51). The importance of federal government recognition of a district is 
great, however, not least in the aspect of security of tenure, which 
encourages inhabitants of lower-income housing to upgrade their 
residences. 
The technically illegal status of many districts means that the 
government's role in development is minimal and the districts remain 
either underserved, or local organisations develop an infrastructure and 
facilities. Thikri, on the south-west fringes of the city, provides an 
example of the former case, while Orangi is an example of the latter. 
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Thikri is a katchi abadi inhabited mostly by Baluchis, and characterised 
by katcýba and semi-pucca housing with poor facilities. With no 
government assistance and no elfective community organisation, the 
district diflers considerably from parts ot Orangi, where the Orangi 
Pilot Project (OPP) has been effective in advising and assisting 
community projects. Table 6.18 presents a comparison of selected 
development statistics for Orangi and Thikri. 
Conditions in Thikri fall somewhere between "urban" and "rural" 
conditions, and are generally closer to the latter in terms of housing 
and sanitation. An OPP team visiting Thikri found a high propensity 
among interviewees to blame the government for poor conditions and lack 
of facilities (OPP, November 1991, p. 4). In Orangi, meanwhile, the non- 
governmental organisation (NGO) Orangi Pilot Project has conducted 
projects to organise health, education, family planning, housing, 
sanitation and employment. As Peter Nientied observed, such community 
organisation is convenient for the government, which is relieved of the 
need to provide assistance and facilities itself (Nientied, 1991, p. 145). 
Non-state development in parts of Orangi has been impressive. 
The OPP's education project began in 1986 and is charged with 
maintaining and improving the 509 private primary and secondary schools 
that existed in Orangi by 1990 (OPP, August 1990, p. 16). All of these 
were apparently established "without any assistance from the Directorate 
of Education" (Akhter Hameed Khan, OPP, April 1991, p. 3). As a result, the 
general level of literacy in Orangi, at around 60% of males and 50% of 
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TABLR 6.19! Se]t-cfed Indice-, of development in Granici and Thikri 
Orangi Thikri 
(OPP area) 
Lanes with underground sewerage W 95.75 1.21 
Average number of roams per household 2.13 1.56 
Children immunised (% under-fives) 88.60 41.54 
Current education attendance; 
-male all ages M* 26.00 13.30 
-female all ages (%)* 25.30 10.20 
Literacy (10 years and above) - male M* 61.79 37.39 
- female M* 53.02 25.42 
Sources. OPP, November 1.991 
*Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, JU17 1$)83- 
females (see Table 6.18) is similar to the average for the city as a 
whole. 
Other low-income housing areas have also increasingly relied on 
private organisation for the development of facilities. Lyari, for 
example, differs from Orangi by beii)g an older and more centia4y- 
located low-income housing area, nominally under the jurisdiction of the 
government. Old Golimar, an the north-east fringe of Lyari in Vest Zone, 
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is a largely Sindhi and Baluchi district. The area is served by two 
government schools (one primary, one middle) in which over-crowding is 
great, and there are few facilities such as toilets or fans (Star, 31 May 
1990, Karachi). 
A private organisation, the Sindh Graduate Association (SGA), 
established a private primary school, the "Rosban Tara School" in 1985 
(see Figure 6.3). Here, unlike in the government schools, the students 
pdy a nominal fee of Rs. 20 per month, which includes provision of a 
uniform and materials, although around 20 of the 161 pupils in January 
1992 were exempt from fees (interview with Ghulam Hussain of SGA, 21 
January 1992, Karachi). The school provides tuition in Urdu, Sindhi and 
English, while government schools use only Urdu. Local residents claim 
that about 80% of children in the area do not attend school, however, 
because of work commitments, or because they cannot afford the fees at 
the Roshan Tara (interview, 21 January 1992, Karachi). The boys shown 
standing outside the gate in Figure 6.3, for example, cannot attend the 
school. 
Residents also claim that they are neglected by the government 
in other ways. High on the list of complaints is water (the supply of 
which is extremely sporadic, sometimes only flowing for one or two 
hours per day), followed by unemployment, sporadic electricity supply, 
overcrowding and geneýal developmental neglect. The area has no health 
dispensary. The author was also shown an arterial road in the area that 
had not been developed beyond the rough foundations stage, apparently 
for over eight months (see Figure 6.4). No motor vehicles can use the 
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road, and people falling ill in the surrounding lanes can only be moved 
by stretcher to the main Manghopir Road. 
These selected examples of conditions in different parts of 
Karachi show that. a non-governmental organisation can play an important 
role in the shaping of local development. The stark differences in 
development between the parts of Orangi in which the OPP has been 
working, and other districts in Karachi such as Fhikri or Lyari, testify 
to the differences in the relationship with urban civic agencies that 
these districts enjoy. In particular, the relationship between these 
districts and the MQM, which has come to dominate the urban civic 
agencies, in part shapes the levels of facilities and development in any 
given district. Some largely symbolic acts have occasionally underlined 
the important relationship between the XQM and certain moballabs in 
Karachi. An OPP document of April 1991 shows phoi. ob-7-apbs ot Lhe MQM 
mayor Farooq Sattar being given a detailed presentation of the OPP's 
work in Orangi (OPP, April 1991, p. 8). Indeed, the Project leaders 
emphasised to me that relations with the MQN-dominated KMC were good 
(inter-view with Perveen Rehman, 15 February 1992, Karachi). 
Such visits by the mayor of Karachi would not occur in Lyari or 
Thikri. It is unlortunate that the OPP has been unable to replicate its 
work effectively in these non-Mobajir dominated communities in the city. 
Although the OPP has undertaken a "Village Program" in selected rural 
areas of Sindh (OPP, April 1991, p. 17), projects outside oi Orangi have 
not effectively addressed non-XobaJ1. r inhabited districts. One ot the lew 
projects undertaken by the OPP outside of Karachi, for example, war. 
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located in Urdu-speaking districts of Sukkur city (ibid, p. -I). It is true 
that non-Rohajir communities in Karachi have not been able to develop 
organisations within their own communities, along the lines of the OPP, 
to the same extent as the Hobajirs of Orangi, and have tended to look 
instead to the local government for help. I would argue, however, that 
the OPP has been given an unfair advantage over the efforts of other 
communities in the city through its particularly favourable relationship 
with the urban administration dominated by the XQH. 
6.5 ETHRIC POLARISATION 
I have argued that the visit of Dr. Farooq Sattar to the OPP 
underlined the important relationship between Mobailrs in Orangi and the 
local state. The manner in which the MQM's dominance of the local state 
has shaped urban development in Karachi in terms of the patronage 
towards such community organisations reflects an institutionalisation of 
ethnic divisions in the city. I have suggested that the transposition of 
voting patterns onto a spatial framework of Karachi can describe with 
accuracy the pattern of ethnic distribution in the local urban space. rhe 
apparent lack of nobility between districts that was discovered in 
various personal discussions in the city, even when facilities in a 
neighbouring area are much better, serves to strengthen a sense oi this 
correlation. I would argue that the process of ethnic polarisation in the 
city is both reflected and reinforced by the symbolic power of the MQM. 
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I have suggested that political graffiti, colours, slogans and 
party symbols are important elements of the urban space in Karachi. For 
the MQM, this 3neans the red, green and white tricolour (echoing -the red, 
green and black colours of the older PPP), often depicted in the shape 
of a patan8- (kite] - the MQM's voting symbol. The choice of symbol has a 
cultural significance. In Punjab and parts of northern India, the flying 
of home-made kites during holiday periods, and particularly in Spring, 
is a common practice. In southern districts such as Sindh or 
Baluchistan, the practice is not common, however. The patang marks a 
cultural link with northern India and Punjab rather than with Sindh. 
Another common symbol of the MQM is the portrait of Altaf 
Hussain, whose importance as Quaid of the Movement has been described 
in the previous chapter. (This feature also reflects the importance of 
personalities in the politics of South Asia in general). Figure 6.5 shows 
an example of a portrait, in this case on the front of a Post Office in 
Razimabad. This particular example displays many interesting features. 
The portrait itself shows the tricolour upon which is emblazoned the 
distinctive "Xbbaj1r! ' slogan. Just above is a flag of Pakistan, 
suggesting a loyal link between the MQM and the "nation". The fact that 
the portrait is erected on a Post Office is also significant, reflecting 
the links bet-. -ieen Lhe MQM and the formal sector of the urban 
administration in particular. In the background are the long apartment 
blocks distinctive of much of the housing in Nazimabad, Liaquatabad, 
Azizabad and surrounding districts of Central Zone. Finally, as the 
photograph was taken at the time of the split in the MQM, the Post 
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Office is also draped with a banner declaring loyalLy to Altat Hussain 
and demanding "accountability" of the Shadaron (traitors]. This is a 
powerful visual symbol of the socio-political environment in Karachi in 
the first hall ot 1991. 
The preponderance of such MQM symbols in the city seems to be 
in direct proportion to the Xdhajir- nature of the district in question. 
Thus the middle-income noballabs of Central Zone show a wealth oi 
portraits and colours, not least in Nazimabad. Burns Road, a Xobajir 
dominated commercial district in central Karachi shows a particular 
concentration of portraits, flags, patan8-s and other regalia, some of 
which are very elaborate with coloured electric lighting and sturdy 
moorings. 
Conversely, in non-MQM areas, the lack of such symbols is 
offset by the regalia of other parties and agencies. Pakhtun areas, such 
as Benares Chowk and parts of Orangi, often display the flags and 
colours of the ANP, PPI, Tamaat-I Ulama-1 Islam (a party popular among 
Afghans) or the rising Fakbtunkbwa X1111 Awaml Party (PKMAP - the 
Pakhtun People's Workers' Party -a seemingly paradoxical blend of 
ethnic and socialist rheoric). During fieldwork in 1992, the busy traffic 
interchange in the middle of Benares C. howk was overlooked by a large 
portrait of Wali Khan, against the black, red and white tricolour of the 
ANP (echoing the use of portraits of Altaf Hussain in other areas). 
Similarly, In Sindhi and Baluchi areas, such as Lyari or various katcbI 
abadis, the dominant symbolism is often that of the PPP, in terms of the 
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tricolour, portraits of members of the Bhutto family, depictions of an 
arrow (the party's voting symbol), or simply "PPP" graffiti. 
The location of such visual imagery is important. Benares Chowk 
is a particularly significant physical and symbolic interchange, as 
Chapter 7 will describe in the context of urban violence in Karachi. The 
cbowk owes its importance to its posiLion as a narrow interchange 
between Nazimabad and the Pakhtun-dominated gateway of Orangi. A 
similar location is Haider Chowk in Hyderabad, which is not only an 
important traffic interchange (such that blocking the square commands 
considerable attention), but also recalls in its name Haider Bux Jatoi, 
an important historical. figure in Sindhi politics. rhe emotional charge 
of such an image has been powerful on many occasions, when ethnic 
conflict between Sindhis and Xobajirs in Hyderabad has centred an the 
square. 
Symbolism associated with the split in the MQM in 1991/92 was 
very prevalent in Karachi during both periods of fieldwork. During the 
controversies, Abbasi Shabeed Hospital in Nazimabad emerged as another 
important symbolic node, this time on behalf of the Xdbajir-s. Altaf 
Hussain's various periods in the hospital were accompanied by the 
increasing transformation of the building into a sort of shrine for the 
Quaid. Not only were the outer walls draped with huge banners and 
tricolours, daubed with slogans stressing allegiance to Altaf, 
celebrations of Mobajir- ethnicity and warnings to Sadaron [traitors], but 
admittance to the hospital during the leader's stay became restricted to 
one gate. Here, all visitors were stopped and searched by MQM workers 
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equipped with guns and two-way radios. In this way, the MQM had 
effectively "taken control" of this public amenity. Such control extended 
to Altaf Hussain addressing large rallies within the grounds of the 
hospital, overlooked by armed workers on the rooftops and balconies of 
the buildings surrounding the complex. (I attended such a rally, for 
, Yobajiz- bank workers, on 13 March 1991). This phenomenon, in which a 
public amenity begins to resemble an MQM office, extends to the 
situation in the KDA headquarters since 1987, as described earlier. rhe 
situation is extremely intimidating for non-Nobaiirs, many of whom teel 
that they no longer dare to visit such places as Abbasi Sbabeed Hospital 
(discussions with residents of Old Golimar, 21 January 1992, Karachi). 
It has been suggested that the MQN amounts to a type of 
"secondary state" in Karachi, in that its own organisation and members 
have frequently served as the dominant administrative body in the city. 
In August 1988, for example, the NobaJir-dominated Zonal Municipal 
Committee of East Zone declared that the official language of the Zone 
was Urdu (Dawn, 4 August 1988, Karachi). The move was largely symbolic, 
in that the Committee had no authority to effect such legislation, yet it 
both characterised the MQM's assumption of symbolic power in the city, 
and intimidated sections of non-NobaJIrs in the districts under the 
Committee's jurisdiction. 
In other ways, the Movement has made more legitimate and 
permanent transformations of Karachi's environment. Duncan notes how Sri 
Lankans changed the street-names of Kandy after Independence to project 
a vision of Sinhala nationalism (Duncan, 1989, p. 197). In Beijing, 
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meanwhile, communist symbolism was inserted into the ancient imperial 
origins of Tianenmen Square with the construction of the tomb of Mao 
Zedong (Wagner, 1991, p. 137). Similarly, the British used specific 
architectural forms such as Western classical designs or the 
construction of churches to symbolise their penetration and control of 
the Indian environment (Metcalf, 1989, p. 7). 
Unlike Hyderabad or other towns in Sindh, Karachi contains very 
few symbols of Sindhi society in streetnames, monuments or buildings. 
But as the city grew rapidly after the Partition of India, it did come to 
reflect Indian Muslim figures important to Xobajir lore. M. A Jinnah road, 
for example, is the principle commercial spine road of central Karachi. 
Looking north along the road from the city-centre, the skyline is 
dominated by the enormous tomb of the Quald-i Azam. Similarly, the 
northern suburb of Lalukhet was renamed "Liaquatabad" in 1951 by the 
then federal administration in the city, after the assassination of 
Pakistan's first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. The names of other 
streets and districts reflect figures important to the Mobajir heritage 
in particular, such as Sbar-ab-1 Gballb [Ghalib Street], recalling the 
great nineteenth and twentieth century poet of the Urdu language, 
Gulshan-1 Iqbal [Iqbal Quarters], or Jehengir Road in PECHS or Sbabr-ab-l 
Noorjaban in North Nazimabad, which both recall Xqgbal emperors. 
The MQM has continued this process in its own terms. At the 
beginning of 1992, the mayor Dr. Farooq Sattar announced that the 
Goharabad katchl abadl was to be renamed "Gulsban-i Altaf% after the 
leader of the MQM (The News, 20 January 1992, Karachi). The move 
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reflects a desire to demonstrate the symbolic dominance of the Karachi 
environment by the MQM, and was accompanied by a paternalistic 
statement irom the MQM provincial transport minister Hashim Ali: 
"He [Ali] said that the injustice meted Out to the 
people of Goharabad in the past has been rectified 
by the Haq Parast leadership. " 
(The News, ibid; italics added). 
Here can be seen the characteristic "injustice" rhetoric of the MQM, 
which I have suggested is essential to MQM "mythology" in terms of the 
construction of a Xobaiir- identity. Furthermore, the use of the tern 
"rectified" suggests a sense of contml over the sccio-political 
environment, which by the early 1990s the MQM felt it could express, 
using the language of its own rhetoric and constructed "mythology". It 
is also intersting to note that the MQM are identified in this example 
as the Haq Farasts [Seekers of Truth/Justice], a name which combines 
well with an "injustice" vocabulary'O. 
I have argued that the socio-political environment in Karachi 
and elsewhere in Pakistan is riven by ethnic polarisation. Community 
grievances concerning such matters as civic amenity supply and quality 
are all too often articulated by a loose affiliation of ethnic political 
groups. In December 1988, for example, "Dawn" reported that complaints 
about poor facilities in the city were being conveyed separately by the 
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Ralocb Qaumi Nor-ement [BalucliJ National HovenieiLIA, Uie Pakht: Llakhwa Ailli 
Ittebad [the OnJI-cd Paklitun 'ýJorkersl, the Rakhtur Awami Tehrlk (the 
Pakhtun People's Party], the United Baloch Federation, and others (Dawn, 
16 December 1988, Karachi). In the wider political arena it has been 
argued that votes for such parties as the ANP, PPI, MQM and to some 
extents the PPP, can be related to the distribution of ethnic groups in 
the city. This increasingly "ethnic" nature of Pakistan's politics has 
been reflected in a powerful visual symbolism on the ground. Thus, the 
"territory" of a particular ethnic group is marked by graffiti, party 
colours, portraits of political personalities and so on, much as graffiti 
in cities in the West marks the territories of "gangs" (see Ley and 
Cybriwsky, 1984, p. 495). At tines of crisis or excitement, such as an 
election or an internal party controversy, the amount and impact of such 
visual symbolism - or symbolic violence - seems to increase. 
In the case of the MQM, the "markers" on the ground also convey 
the power of the Movement in the city, not only in terms of the 
dominance of civic agencies but also as regards press and other 
intimidation. The symbolism of this power is reflected in the erection 
of XQM regalia on official buildings like Post Offices, hospitals, or 
government offices. Such processes also imply a limit on inter-community 
mobilisation. A hospital bedecked in MQM banners is threatening to a 
non-Nobajir- both visually, and physically in the treatment that the 
visitor might receive within. Mobility between amenities across 
districts is hampered by the growing ethnic part icu lar isation of the 
socio-political environment, and the visual symbolism of communities on 
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the ground serves only to emphasise the ethnic particular isation. The 
parallel with Belfast or Beirut, where community polarisation and 
associated symbolism in the urban space are evident, hardly needs to be 
stressed. 
6.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Although the MQM has become the largest single body in the 
Hyderabad Municipal Council since 1987, and is represented by the city's 
mayor Aftab Ahmed Shaikh, the Movement is not able to assert complete 
control in this city since there is a sizeable non-Nc2bajlr constituency 
under its jurisdiction. In symbolic terms, furthermore, Hyderabad has 
always been important to Sindhi society. After Karachi, it is the largest 
city in the Province, and was the provincial capital between 1948 and 
1958 (when Karachi was the Federal capital). I have shown that Karachi 
differs from Hyderabad in certain key respects. 
This chapter has sought to establish, firstly, the political, 
economic and social development of Karachi since Independence. I have 
established that the city has always held a unique position within the 
State of Pakistan, both culturally, and economically. The economic 
dominance of the city within Pakistan has given Karachi a national 
significance, which in many ways fills the gap left by the removal of 
the seat of central government during the 1950s to Punjab Province. The 
continuing dominance of the city within Pakistan, maintained through the 
years by heavy immigration from within and beyond Pakistan, has ensured 
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that control over the city's major institutions will give a political 
movement in Karachi the right to bargain directly with the central 
government in Islamabad. 
In the second main section of the chapter, I analysed how the 
Xc7bajir community, as defined by the MQM, fits into the political, 
economic and social organisation of the city of Karachi. I have 
identified spatial concentrations in Central and East Zones, and an 
occupational concentration in the semi-educated commercial, industrial 
and artisan categories of employment. Such patterns of community 
distribution, I have argued, are supported by the manner in which 
society in Karachi has become ethnically polarised. Symbolic markers on 
the ground effectively portray this polarisation, such that ethnic 
communities identify their territories in a manner not dissimilar to 
urban "gangs" in Western cities. The overwhelming picture, demonstrated 
by the ubiquity of Altaf Hussain's face and the MQM tricolour, is the 
MQM's physical dominance of most of the urban space of Karachi. 
The final main section of the chapter suggested that the local 
state in Karachi can be broken down into three axes - the formal sector 
of the state, the informal sector, and a form of MQN "secondary state", 
which combines elements of both. Since 1987, the MQM has held a 
dominant grip on the formal sector of urban power in terms of a growing 
concentration in the civic agencies starting with the KMC. In a sense, 
the battle with the PPP government through 1989-90 was about real 
administrative power being accorded to the MQM in its strongholds in 
urban Sindh. Because of the position of Karachi within the national 
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economy, the battle had national repercussions. The PPP ultimately lost. 
the battle when the President, seated in Islamabad, decided to win peace 
in Pakistan's economic heart by dismissing the PPP government at 
provincial and national levels. 
The informal sector in Karachi is constituted by lucrative and 
powerful businesses, which operate alongside community projects that aim 
to fill the gaps left by the official state in such areas as housing and 
employment. These projects include "Non-Government Organ isati ons", which 
have official recognition. The most powerful of these is the Orangi Pilot 
Project, although here again the work is conducted principally among 
Xohajirs and Bibax-ls in parts of Orangi. The OPP enjoys good relations 
with the MQM, which, I have suggested, helps to explain its position as 
the only significant and effective community developmental project in 
Karachi. This is where the "secondary state" developed by the MQM in 
Karachi intersects between the formal and informal sectors of society in 
the city. 
I have argued that the informal sector in Karachi is made more 
powerful and explosive than is the case in many other cities by the 
injection of drugs and arms money. Here, the MQM faces a threat - the 
power of the Movement lies primarily in the "official" agencies of the 
local state, which form the backbone of its "secondary state". The MQM's 
response has been a call for the powers of those agencies to be 
strengthened and centralised, to strengthen the formal sector of 
administration and thus increase the MQM's grip on the whole city. The 
battle between the MQM and the urban "mafias" reached a zenith in the 
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horrific riots after 1986, which I will examine in more detail in the 
following chapter. 
Yet the nature of the local state in Karachi, as in all 
developing-world cities, is not a situation of two neatly 
compartmentalised axes of power, the formal and the informal. Firstly, 
the boundary between the formal and informal sectors is notoriously 
blurred, and corruption and bribery form a bridge between these sectors. 
The bridge is constituted by a variety of actors in the urban arena. 
Councillors, members of utility boards and the KDA, and any government 
servants who can circumvent the tortuously slow and inefficient 
procedures of planning and development in the city, tend to form one of 
the most significant links between formal and informal sectors. The 
motives driving government workers to such acts include a desire to 
supplement wages with bribes or backhand payments, a loyalty to family 
or community requirements and demands, or a response to a genuine 
demand among the population for a more efficient system of planning and 
development. 
Certainly, linkages between the formal and informal sectors have 
been noted in most developing-world societies, in both economic and 
political terms. In Kenya, the International Labour Office actually 
recommended the strengthening of such links as a policy to improve the 
economy (ILO, 1972, pp. 228-31). In Mexico, meanwhile, effective access to 
political patronage either through bribery, community links or vote- 
bargaining has been seen to correlate with the levels of services a low- 
income housing area will enjoy (Gilbert and Gugler, 1981, p. 94). In 
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cynical, political terms, winning votes for the MQM was almost certainly 
on the Mayor's mind when he visited the OPP areas of Orangi (see above) 
-a visit to Lyari or Thikri would not achieve any such gains for the 
MQM. In administrative terms, the Federal Government of Pakistan itself 
identified an extreme dissatisfication with the levels and quality of 
service offered by civic agencies in Karachi in 1985/86, and thus by 
inference identified a demand for unofficial processes that circumvented 
direct access with such government offices (COEKA, 1986, p. 22). 
In the same study, the Federal Commission also identified a 
deep-rooted belief among the urban citizens it interviewed that the 
police force in Karachi was riddled with corruption, notably with 
respect to the enforcement of traffic standards and the granting of 
route permits for private transport operators (ibid, p. 72). The police 
form another important linkage between informal and formal sectors of 
the state in the city of Karachi. I have shown that the issues here also 
are common to many develop ing-w or Id societies, not least in South Asia. 
Bayart, in a general analysis of contemporary studies of Third World 
politics, describes the "politics of the belly" in Cameroon, as 
corruption there has come to be known (Bayart, 1991, p. 65). Clapham 
expands on the metaphor of eating by recalling a scene in a novel by 
the Ghanaian writer, Ayi Kewei Armah (Clapham, 1985, p. 53). In this 
scene, a policeman manning a roadblock in the immediate aftermath of the 
overthrow of the corrupt regime of Kwame Nkrumah, points to his mouth 
as travellers try to pass, to indicate that a bribe is needed before he 
will do his duty. The message is that everday realities, whatever the 
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nature of wider political aspects, lead many police to become corrupt in 
developing - world cities. This relates not only to inadequate wages in 
relation to difficult working conditions, but also to the fact that the 
police are closely integrated into the communities in which they work, 
and inevitably become involved themselves in the processes and demands 
relating to the informal sector of the economy. 
The second way in which the boundaries between formal and 
informal sectors of the local urban state are blurred, is the manner in 
which the MQM has increasingly constituted a "secondary state" parallel 
to the official state. I have shown that since the municipal elections of 
1987, the MQM has grown not only to physically dominate the staff in 
civic agencies, headed by the large elected body of local councillors, 
the KMC, but has also gained the confidence to physically and 
symbolically assume public amenities under the banner of the MQK. In the 
first respect, despite noble proclamations of accountability and 
integrity, my own discussions with people on the ground have suggested 
that XQM councillors are as liable as anyone else to act in a partisan 
manner, and to use their positions of administrative power to extract 
bribes for any positive action. This is hardly surprising, given my 
account of police corruption. Also, the developmental neglect of certain 
districts in the city antipathetic to the MQM, in sharp contrast to 
conditions in neighbouring areas where the Movement is heavily 
supported, suggests that the MQK adopts the principle of political 
patronage for services in its running of the civic agencies. 
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Secondly, the MQM has increasingly transformed public amenities 
and facilities inLo J4QI4 holdings. The most striking examples are 
probably the APMSO-dominated colleges and the university, which portray 
a physical dominance by Nobajlrs sympathetic to the MQM with the 
draping of huge tricolours and banners over the college buildings. 
DS College, in the centre of Karachi, even holds an official APMSO office 
within its playground. Another fine example of such processes was the 
transformation of Abbasi Sbabeed Hospital through 1991 into Altaf 
Hussain's personal residence. At this time, entrance to the hospital was 
regulated by armed MQM guards -a situation hardly reassuring for those 
communities who have been on the receiving end of the Movement's wrath. 
Again, the outside of the hospital displayed, in dramatic terms, the 
process that was underway. 
I would argue that to fashion administration and development 
in the city of Karachi in the form of the structure and organisation of 
the MQM, is a fine example of patrimonialist politics in the 
contemporary developing world. The ability of Altaf Hussain and his 
colleagues to shape the city (or the Mc7bajir- areas at least), into both 
symbols of "patriotic" community development and MQM zameen, to the 
extent of starting to rename districts after members of the MQM or 
physically forcing the local press to print what the MQM wanted, has 
been achieved after a long battle to win administrative dominance in the 
city. In the national and provincial political arenas, a failure to 
effectively address matters outside of Karachi or Hyderabad have led the 
MQM to be somewhat ineffectual. Conditions in Karachi, however, show 
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that the Movement is very much an effective force in the local urban 
state. 
The "battle for control" in Karachi started to spill into the 
streets in the mid-1980s, and the MQM played an increasingly pivotal 
role in this battle. The deployment of the army in Karachi since June 
1992 has exposed the violence and militarism behind the scenes of the 
MQM, which always seemed apparent in the spiralling urban violence of 
the latter half of the 1980s. In the following chapter I will examine 
this crisis of civil order in Karachi in terms of its relationship to 
the MQM, and to the wider fabric of society in Pakistan as a whole. 
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FOOTNOTES: 
I, As discussed in Chapter 4, the 1991 Census for Sindh Province had still note been 
completed by mid-1993, in part because of clairis made by the MQM and others that the 
provincial government Census officials could not be trusted to be impartial on the 
enumeration of ethnic proportions in the Province, (The MQM and MIT leadership have 
suggested, without any reliable data of their own, that Sindhis are now actually 
outweighed by non-Sindhis in the Province), 
2. The distribution surveys were conducted with the assistance of PA Shahani 
Associates Chartered Surveyors, and the Survey of Pakistan, 
3, The Provincial Election Authority supplied a list of the delimitations of 
provincial and national seats in the city, but did not have an accurate map of the 
relevant KMC units. At the KMC itself, there was just one master-map of the units, 
situated literally on the drawing board with the units shown in ink lines, After many 
dicussions with KMC officers, it was finally decided to dispatch an assistant with the 
rolled master-copy to a photocopying shop in a bazaar, 
4, A British television documentary (BBC 2,12 April 1990) examined the processes of 
ethnic polarisation in Hyderabad, where Sindhis living in the city centre are moving 
to outer northern and western suburbs such as Qasimabad, while fthajirs are moving in 
from such suburbs to Latifabad in the south or Pucca Qila in the city-centre, the 
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programme also focussed on the problems of those with mixed marriages, who in some 
cases were being intimidated by both sides of the ethnic divide, 
5. The land values are per square yard, f or open residential plots, for 
January/February 1992, 
6. Like many Asian countries, Pakistan adopts a system of party symbols during 
elections to assist illiterate voters, Most parties have retained their original 
symbols over several elections as these become familiar to the voters, The MQM symbol 
is a kite, the IJI's a bicycle, the PPP's an arrow and so on, 
7, The term Ira, -Oar forc, #' was used to describe the gihari vigilante groups that 
fought with Bengali secessionists in the run-up to the formation of Bangladesh, and 
use of the term here suggests a possible Bihari link with the writer, 
8, The Eagle and Hawk squads are special semi-military police units, with jurisdiction 
over anti-terrorist and serious crime matters, 
9, Bonded labour (Matia mazdoor) exists in many parts of Pakistan today, including 
the notorious brick kilns of Punjab, Where poor families owe a debt to a particular 
employer or landlord, they can 'repay' the debt by engaging the whole family in labour 
remunerated only with board or lodging for a certain period, In this way, the family 
is made dependent on the employer by debt, The process can become an inexorable cycle 
from which families can never break free, since they never earn any money with which 
they could go elsewhere, The process also accounts for low school attendance in 
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certain areas (see Herald, October 1990, Karachi, p, 89), Recently there has been some 
evidence of the debt of such families being "bought" by employers in Karachi (that is 
transferred to new creditors), and the families "imported" from northern areas to 
continue their wageless work in the city (Arif Hasan claims that much Pakhtun labour 
in the clandestine businesses of Karachi is "imported bonded labour", which has no 
civil or union rights: Herald, December 1986, p. 13), 
10, "hlaq Parast" [Seeker of Justice/Truth] was the "codename" adopted by MQM 
candidates during the Zia regime, when political parties were banned (other parties 
undertook similar measures), According to the Movement, the name has been retained at 
post-Zia election times, as the public have become familiar with the ter*m (interview 
with MQM worker, 6 February 1991, Karachi), 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this Section of the dissertation is to examine 
the MobaJiz- movement in contemporary Sindh from a "nicro-level" 
perspective within Karachi city. In the previous chapter I looked at the 
ways in which the MQM has sought to control the political economy of 
the local state in Karachi. In this chapter I examine the often 
contradictory relationships between the MQN, political violence and civil 
disorder in urban Sindh (and especially Karachi). I will argue that 
interaction with, and control of civil disorder in Karachi and Hyderabad, 
were important defining features of the rise of the Nobajir movement 
under the XQM in the 1980s. 
The previous chapter touched on some of the issues relating to 
the political geography of Karachi that have had an impact on the 
development of civil disorder in the city. I will return in this chapter 
to the relationship between civil society and official institutions in 
the city, including the police, which I suggested in the previous chapter 
has been characterised by a considerable degree of public "frustration". 
From investigations conducted in the second half of the 1980s, the 
Federal Government of Pakistan uncovered profound problems of 
accountability, confidence and efficiency in many civic agencies in 
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Karachi in the mid-1980s. It is interesting that the legal process was 
also claimed to suffer from these problems, such that many people have 
begun to feel that thay must take the law into their own hands (COEKA, 
1986, p. 20). 
In the informal sector of the state in Karachi, powerful "mafia" 
groups equipped with abundant firepower have almost certainly 
capitalised on such feelings of frustration among the urban population, 
and have contributed to an increasingly anarchic and dangerous 
environment in the city. Perhaps more obviously, the MQN has also 
capitalised on such feelings among the Urdu-speaking people of Karachi, 
and notably among the largely "Bibar-S' communities of Orangi katcbi 
abadl, to whom a powerful secondary state is appealing since they live 
on the margins of the formal state. I will argue that, in the latter half 
of the 1980s, the MQM deliberately tapped into this explosive atmosphere 
in Karachi, and translated it into electoral success for the Novement in 
1988 and 1990. The success was at the price of serious civil disorder in 
many instances. 
While widespread disturbances occurred in Karachi in 1965 and 
1972, the riots that began to emerge in Karachi in the mid 1980s were 
unique in many ways. The first major episode was the infamous "Bushra 
Zaidi" riot of April 1985. The disturbances spread beyond the initial 
point of focus to engulf many parts of the city in "ethnic" violence, 
continuing sporadically for over a week. The "spark" had been a traffic 
accident in which a XobaJ1. r secondary- school pupil, Bushra Zaidi, was 
run-over and killed by a bus. In the hours and days that followed, it 
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seemed as if a hidden reserve of anger and violence had been tapped. In 
Orangi, Pakhtuns and Blharis battled with one another in an ostensibly 
"ethnic" conflict, while elsewhere in the city, taxis, buses and 
rickshaws; were attacked and used to build burning barricades on the 
streets. Throughout the episode, the police acted unpredictably. 
sometimes tear-gassing or firing upon angry crowds, and at other tines 
failing to respond to an incident until it was too late. 
The "Bushra Zaidi incident" proved to be just the first of a new 
wave of large-scale urban disturbances to hit Karachi. At tines, Sindh's 
second largest city, Hyderabad, also suffered bouts of violence. Since 
late 1990, the two cities have been relatively peaceful, although, it will 
be argued, the conditions for unrest have hardly changed. 
Urban violence in Sindh encompasses a complex combination of 
incidents and processes, from "ethnic rioting", to the spilling-over of a 
bazaar dispute, to basic crime. Sometimes the various processes seem 
unconnected. Certainly, some local-specific factors determine the precise 
nature and development of the incidents of violence, such as the 
recurrence of particular geographical "nodes" of violence and conflict. I 
will argue, however, that there are underlying processes linking many 
such incidents, relating both to the battle for the control of Karachi 
city and to the nature of the local-level state in the city (see Chapter 
6). 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Methodological 
issues are discussed in section 7.2. In section 7.3 1 examine various 
debates on the nature and significance of urban violence, particularly in 
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South Asia. Section 7.4 presents a critical analysis of the chronology of 
major civil disturbances in Karachi. I will argue that the latter half of 
the 1980s saw a qualitative shift in the pattern of violence - and in 
the MQM's role in relation to civil disorder. In Section 7.5 1 focus 
further on the differing modes of civil violence in Karachi's history, 
and attempt to expose some of the underlying political and societal 
processes at work. The final section of the chapter presents my 
concluding comments an bow civil violence has developed in Karachi over 
the years, and the role played by the MQX within this pattern of 
development. 
7.2 XETHODOLOGY 
Violence in Sindh indirectly played a major role in the planning 
of this research by causing an initial research visit to be postponed in 
the Summer of 1990, and by shaping and to some extent limiting 
subsequent visits to the field. Society in Sindh is affected by two 
forms of violence and each of these shaped my research methodolgy. 
Firstly, most rural areas of Sindh are severely disturbed by the 
operation of dacolts lbanditsJ, whose activities in kidnapping, murder, 
extortion, protection and political intimidation make large areas of the 
province essentially out-of-bounds, certainly after dark. The bandits 
work for the highest bidder, and become involved in disputes between 
landowners and industrialists, or in extorting protection money from 
landlords by intimidating the bai-Is and villagers on their lands. The 
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scale and danger of such violence is open to interpretation. rhe 
government of Nawaz Sharif repeatedly said that the situation was under 
control (The News, 20 February 1991, Rawalpindi). Obviously, the 
government has had every reason to say this, as they wish to convince 
industry that there are no dangers to investment in rural areas or small 
towns in the Province (as former Sindh Chief Minister Jam Sadiq Ali 
stressed in January 1992; Dawn, 18 January 1992, Karachi). 
By contrast, most unofficial sources state that the situation in 
rural Sindh is as chaotic as ever. "Herald" magazine reported that in 
the first two months of 1991 there were 3000 reported cases of 
kidnapping in the province, and probably many more unreported cases 
(March 1991, Karachi, p. 33). The tendency has been to suggest that much 
of the violence and crime is politically motivated, but it seems that 
this would account for only a small portion of the total number of 
incidents. The acceleration of violence, particularly in Karachi, between 
the time that Benazir Bhutto's administration was dismissed in August 
1990 and when the new authorities were installed in November (when the 
police and army were in a limbo period in terms of major operations and 
planning), suggests a more basic link to the powers of the law 
enforcement agencies, whoever they might serve politically (Herald, 
January 1991, Karachi, p. 84). In general, it seems likely most bandits 
are motivated by money. This was suggested by a British television 
documentary on banditry in rural Sindh in mid-1992 (BBC2, "East", 31 
July 1992). 
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Bacoits, however, are largely a phenomenon of rural Sindh, where 
they can operate most effectively in the difficult terrain, and 
especially in the bela [forest] areas around the Indus River. Since 1985, 
the major Sindh cities of Karachi and Hyderabad have seen two different 
forms of violence. The first, particularly concerning Karachi, involves 
the 1<)85-88 period, during which many large "ethnic riots" occurred. 
These involved a complex set of interactions between Pakhtuns, Xchajlrs 
and police. After 1988, however, a more continuous wave of ethnic- 
sectarian conflict began to take hold, this time originating largely in 
Hyderabad (and to some extent Sukkur) and spreading to Karachi, 
principally in the form of sectarian reprisals for terrorist attacks. 
This form of violence became more "politicised" than the first, in that 
it was presented as a sectarian battle between Xchajiz-s, represented by 
the MQM, and Sindhis, represented by Jiye Sindh and the PPP provincial 
and national governnent. The difference between the two major periods of 
urban violence mirrors differences in the socio-political environment in 
Karachi on the one hand, and Hyderabad, Sukkur and other towns on the 
other. The differences are also reflected in the fact that while Karachi 
seems to have been relatively free of ethnic sectarian violence since 
late 1990, Hyderabad and Sukkur have not been so peaceful. 
My research was necessarily conducted with an eye to violence 
and civil disorder in rural and urban areas of Sindh. Rural violence 
meant that, on the recommendation of several sources, not least the 
British Foreign Office (see Appendix 1), first-hand investigation of the 
position of the NobaJir- movement and "identity" in smaller towns and 
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villages had to be abandoned. An initial postponement of fieldwork in 
May/June 1990 because of serious ethnic violence in Karachi also placed 
a pressure on time in the second half of the PhD research period. At 
this time I had to consider abandoning the research in its current form 
in the event of such widespread violence continuing unabated for any 
length of time. 
It was recognised, however, that violence is unfortunately an 
InLegral part. ot Ifte Iii inat)y parLs of Pakist. an where the central 
state's day-to-day Jurisdiction is thin. I will also argue that an 
element of violence has been central to the development of the 
contemporary Nobajlr movement in Sindh, both in terms of an ethnic 
cleavage with Sindhi society, and of the battle for control by the MQK 
in the urban areas. In this respect, my research accepted the danger of 
violence as a mirror to the topics I was investigating. 
The sources of primary material for this section of the 
dissertation are similar to those used in previous chapters, namely 
interviews and discussions, and press and other archival material. 
Special mention should also be made of certain official documents, and 
in particular the Federal Government Commission of Enquiry into Karachi 
Af fairs (henceforth COEKA), launched in March 1986 following the 
occurrence of several riots in the metropolis. It is interesting to note 
that the findings and recommendations of the Commission had not been 
put on general public release by 1993 because of the sensitive issues 
under discussion. However, full details were obtained for this research 
of the original document of 1986, and of the first Implementation Review 
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in 1989. All these sources are in one sense "secondary", in that the 
author was not present at any incidences of violence. This is important, 
as a violent episode Is probably more likely to be distorted in 
recollections after the event than is a less charged event. I will show 
how this was the case with the Fucca Qi1a incident of May 1990, which 
became something of a turning-point in the political battle between the 
MQM and the central and provincial PPP government at the turn of the 
1990s. For these reasons, efforts were always made to cross-reference 
details obtained from one source with others from the press, archives, 
official documentation and personal communications, wherever possible. 
7.3 URBAN VIOLENCE - ISSUES AND DEBATES 
It was within an existing arena of sectarian, criminal and 
general civil violence that the relatively new category of "ethnic" 
violence emerged in the mid-1980s. After an incident of violence, people 
look for explanations as to what is happening, and these are not always 
readily forthcoming. 
Although the reasons for urban violence offered by such 
agencies as the police, the government or the press can be shrouded in 
confusingly simplistic general isati ons, details on the place and nature 
of the disturbances and the nature of the people involved allow us to 
glimpse the underlying dynamics of violence. The seemingly paradoxical 
nature of "ethnic rioting" in Karachi since 1985 raises many questions. 
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Zia Mohyeddin, an expatriate Pakistani writer in Britain, reacted to the 
reports of the riots of December 1986 with the following words: 
"Like many of you, I was stunned by the events 
of December 1986. It was a carnage, the likes of 
which had not happened since the holocaust of 1947. 
Amazing motives were assigned. I was told it was 
an ethnic problem. 'Ethnic', I said in disbelief. 
'Ethnic problems are problems we have to deal with 
in America and England"' 
(Zia Kohyeddin, 1988, p. 195) 
The sudden explosion of large "ethnic riots" after 1985 was in many 
ways as bewildering as the sudden calm that has descended on the city 
of Karachi since the elections of November 1990 (broken seriously only 
by a terrorist bomb in the centre of the city in November 19911, and by 
internal MQM conflict in 1991/92). 
To examine the internal dynamics of a riot and thus to attempt 
to understand what prompts it, many observers have turned to the 
better-documented episodes of serious civil disorder in history. In 
practice, this has tended to involve extensive analysis of pre- and 
early industrial disturbances in Europe, or the urban riots in the 
metropolitan West in the latter half of the twentieth century. Here, some 
historians have attempted to identify the "faces in the crowd", as did 
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E. P. Thompson (Thompson, 1978). In South Asia, Stanley Tambiah (Tambiah, 
1986,1990) and Asghar Ali Engineer (Engineer, 1989) have examined 
various more recent violent episodes in Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka, 
while in Pakistan Akmal Hussain (A. Hussain, 1987,1988) has examined 
rioting in Karachi in terms of certain wider theories of violence in 
postcolonial society. Different approaches to riots and rioters have 
developed in terms of the generality or specificity of examples of 
violence, that relate both to political viewpoints and to the development 
of general paradigms in the social sciences. Debates have focussed in 
particular on group-action "rioting", and have oscillated between 
ascribing primary importance to local-specific factors or to a wider 
socio-political awareness and motivations. 
Violence and -the Crowd 
In the context of European history, the "crowd" involved in a 
violent incident has been read in two different ways. On the one hand 
are scholars such as J. M. Thompson and Michelot, who viewed crowds like 
those of the French Revolution as I'le peuple", or a group of politically 
conscious individuals embarking upon a particular predetermined course 
of action. On the other side stood such historians as Burke and Taine, 
who viewed rioting crowds more as "the mob", or an unruly collection of 
opportunists rioting to reinforce a culture of criminality (after G. 
Rude, 1981, p. 7-8). 
-441 - 
rhe political difference in these two theories of the crowd is 
reflected in the language adopted by the state when reacting to violent 
episodes. Where a riot is directed at the ruling government, the crowd 
is often a "mob", a collection of criminals with little or no political 
consciousness. In Pakistan this approach was reflected in the press 
reports of the July 1972 Language Bill riots in Karachi. After 11 July, 
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto invoked the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 
in which newspaper reports on the violence had to be issued under police 
censorship. The language of such reports referred to rioters as 
"miscreants" (Dawn, 12 July 1972, Karachi) or "roving groups of urchins" 
(Dawn, 15 July 1972, Karachi), and to the riots as "sectional clashes" 
(Dawn, 12 July 1972) or "minor incidents" (Dawn, 15 July 1972). In other 
situations, the description of incidents is in more positive and 
sympathetic terms, particularly where a newspaper itself is opposed to 
some or all of the policies of the government, or if it is discussing 
issues outside of Pakistan with which it feels sympathy, such as the 
actions of Muslims in Kashmir against the Indian state. 
In December 1986, "Dawn" echoed Zia Mohyeddin in describing the 
largest riot ever to strike Karachi as "carnage", although a report by 
Zaffar Abbas ended with the words; 
"The government knows the root causes of the problem, 
and its failure in providing basic amenities, and 
solving major problems like those of unemployment 
and transport. " 
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(Dawn, 24 December 1986, Karachi) 
Here, the riot, or "problem", is described not as the action of a "mob", 
but as the response of politically conscious "people" protesting at the 
government's handling of such issues as employment and amenity supply. 
The way in which the violence is interpreted depends on the position of 
the analyst, whether it is from the point of view of the state, or of a 
citizen protesting at perceived failures of the state authorities in 
addressing economic problems. 
In some instances the individuals in a crowd can be identified, 
as in incidences of arrest by the police. In Europe, historians have used 
police records to examine the type of people involved in disturbances. 
This allowed George Rude to summise of disturbances in eighteenth- 
century France and England that it was "exceptional" for slum-dwellers, 
vagrants or intellectuals and professionals to be involved in riots. The 
rioters here were rather the "lower-order" working masses (Rude, 1981, 
p-204). In late twentieth century Karachi, police records are a 
problematic source for scholars. Since obtaining such data directly from 
the police is extremely difficult, details have to be collected through 
the filter of the press or official governments reports, which are far 
from unbiased or apolitical. On occasions, however, the nature of 
arrested people is mentioned in terms that identify them as 
predominantly male, and mostly young (sometimes no more than teenagers 
or occasionally even younger). Such broad details can be gleaned, for 
example, from the use of the word "urchins" (Dawn, 15 July 1972, 
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Karachi). In some cases, the politicisation of student groups has also 
led them to be involved in certain stages of the outbreak of violent 
incidents, notably in the disturbance that followed the running-down of 
the female student Bushra Zaidi in Nazinabad, April 1985 (Tanbiah, 1990, 
p. 749). 
The "spark' 
The involvement of a student organisation in one stage of the 
development of the Bushra Zaidi riot supports Tambiah's assertion that 
urban riots in South Asia are not "fickle, momentary" affairs, but are 
rooted in wider underlying societal processes involving a search for 
justice (Tambiah, 1990, p. 751). Indeed, the "spontaneity" of a disturbance 
is another aspect over which debates have developed. The issue relates 
to whether the crowd is seen as an entity in itself, acting 
independently of the individual consciousnesses of its members, or 
whether it is the predetermined actions of individuals which dictate the 
action of a crowd. This factor also relates to the question of political 
leadership and its effect on rioting groups. 
Waddington, Jones and Crichter identified two theoretical 
approaches that have been used in studies of crowd action (Waddington 
et al., 1989). On the one hand is the "structura I- functi ona list" school 
that influenced most of the social sciences in the 1960s (and less so 
the 1970s). Smelser equated individual behaviour with collective 
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behaviour, and identified riots as being one of the results of the 
interplay of underlying societal structures beyond the control of any 
individual (Smelser, 1962, p. 23). Thus, violence erupts at points of 
"weakness" in the structures of society (Waddington, Jones and Chrichter, 
1989, p. 7). Although disclaiming a structura I- functionalist approach, 
Castells also once questioned the extent of individual action in the 
structures of the urban system (Castells, 1976, p. 7). Structural Marxism 
has not generally had much to say about agency or consciousness. 
Smelser identified a model of collective disturbance in which a 
linear pattern of events is followed, leading from "structural strain" 
through "precipitating factors" and ultimately to "social control" 
(Smelser, 1962, after Waddington et al., 1989, p. 173). Waddington, Jones 
and Chrichter (ibid), on the other hand, f ollow a less precise line, 
claiming that individual riots revolve around specific "flashpoints" 
relating to the context in hand. In their view, a disturbance does not 
repeatedly follow a single linear development but can occur at various 
levels, termed structural, ideological, cultural, contextual, situational, 
and interactional (Waddington et al., 1989, p. 157). Each level involves a 
different course of development and ultimate abatement, and involves an 
interplay of various forms of language and group perception. 
These differences in theoretical approach relate to the 
perceived "spontaneity" of crowd action. In Britain, the Scarman Report 
following the Brixton riot of 1981 repeatedly referred to the "spark" of 
a disturbance, the specific catalyst - such as an arrest - that moves 
the crowd to action (Waddington et al., 1989, p. 1). Gustave Le Bon, on 
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the other hand, saw the crowd as an "irrational" entity, gripped by a 
mass hysteria that could not function on any individual basis (Le Bon, 
1952, p. 61-2). The significance of this debate also relates to the 
factor of public consensus and support for rioting groups. Rude suggests 
that outbreaks of violence cannot be "triggered" without an underlying 
groundswell of support extending further than those actually 
participating in the violence (Rude, 1981, pp. 244-5). 
In summary, many perspectives on crowd action seem to follow 
either structural-functionalist (and/or Marxist), or pluralist (local- 
specific) avenues. Here we can also recall the debate an "communalism" 
(discussed in Chapter Two), whereby some have related the rise of 
"communal" violence in India to the development of the capitalist 
economy in the subcontinent and the socio-economic disparities it 
brought about. (See Chakrabarty, 1989, p. 186 in the case of Calcutta 
riots, Engineer, 1989, p. 210 on Sikh-Hindu violence in Punjab). Others, 
meanwhile, claim that the "communal" wave rode a variety of local- 
specific political factors (as Bayly, 1985 suggests). I will-argue that 
in the case of Karachi, violence has related both to local political 
factors such as the position of the I'mafias" and the police, and to 
underlying societal structures - including unemployment in the formal 
sector - upon which charismatic political leaders such Altaf Hussain 
have effectively played. 
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Violence and Gender 
I have suggested that most urban violence in Sindh involves 
young males. It should be added, however, that disturbances go through 
various complex stages of development, from outbreak, to spread, 
sustainment and finally abatement, and in some of these stages, in some 
cases, women have clearly played an important role. 
This was the case in the riot that developed on 31 October 
1986, starting in Sohrab Goth, northern Karachi, where women were a 
crucial element in a dispute that "triggered" wider urban violence. The 
trouble began when MQM supporters travelling to a rally in Hyderabad 
refused to pay their bus fares, since the MQM leader had promised that 
some buses would be provided for supporters free of charge. When the 
drivers demanded their fares at Sohrab Goth a violent argument 
developed between passengers and fare-collectors, in which women 
passengers played an important part in terns of being abused by and 
abusing the bus-drivers (Dawn, 1 November 1986, Karachi). Women, or more 
precisely the concept of women and their honour in Pakistan's society, 
were thus important in this early stage of the development of the 
unrest, although women were not largely involved in the violent 
incidents that followed over the next few days. 
The importance of gender to violence in South Asian society has 
been considered by Stanley Tambiah, who depicts it as a powerful 
symbolic focus for incidences of "ethnic" rivalry between communities 
(Tambiah, 1990, p. 746). In the South Asian examples discussed by 
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rambiah, an attacking crowd will sometimes want to strike at the heart 
of the targeted community, and the involvement of women becomes a 
psychologically effective way of doing this. Thus, civil disorder can 
involve the rape and abduction of women. 
The cultural importance of the sanctity of a community's women 
and the level of reprisal provoked by such attacks was well 
demonstrated by the rape of Farhana Hayat in Karachi, December 1991, 
after which elders of the Hayat clan invoked Pakhtun tribal codes in 
calling for the hunting-down and killing of those responsible 
(Independent, 30 December 1991, London). The anger of the response 
demonstrates the heat produced by violent incidents involving women. 
Akmal Hussain comments on this factor in wider terms, relating it to the 
development of violence in South Asian society (interview with Aknal 
Hussain, 24 February 1991, Lahore). Thus, where "proximate identities" 
clash in violent, bipolar ethnic situations, violence progresses onto a 
psychologically damaging plane, involving such acts as rape (ibid). This 
can be seen in examples across space and time in South Asia - Sri 
Lankan army operations against the Tamils, Indian army operations in 
Kashmir, or the Pakistan army's operations against the secession of 
Bangladesh in 1970/71. 
The MQX has often conveyed the symbolic importance in "ethnic" 
politics of attacks against women. The most obvious example is that of 
the Fucca Q11a incident, described in Chapter 5. A letter of appeal to 
the Human Rights Commission in Geneva following the incident lists 
"killings, brutalities, massacres and abductions of women" as the various 
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ills being brought to bear on Xobajirs (MQX, I June 1990, Karachi). 
Another letter to the Pakistan High Commission complains of "confirmed 
reports of five rape cases by police in Hyderabad" (MQM, 30 May 1990, 
London). The tone of such letters uses violence inflicted on women as an 
indication of the particular gravity of the incidents. In this way, the 
MQX plays on the issue of gender as a tool in ethnic political rhetoric. 
Institutional responses to urban violence 
Whatever the accuracy of "ethnic" labels, the use of such 
identities in relation to civil unrest in Karachi has been taken as a 
given in certain quarters, notably in the press and in official 
government reports. In June 1990 the Sindh provincial government of 
Benazir Bhutto's PPP presented a report to the Federal Government in 
Islamabad on major riots in Sindh urban areas between 1985 and 1990. 
The report identified 27 major riots, and each war. described as a 
bipolar battle, with the "sides" defined as political groups (Dawn, 6 
. June 1990, Karachi). 1he groups were the MQX, the PPI, the PSF (People's 
Student Federation), the PPP and 11ye Sindb. Every riot was descibed as 
involving the MQM on one side against one of the other groups on the 
other. It seems likely that the situation was hopelessly simplified by 
such a report, which generalises wholesale about the effect of political 
leadership on unrest on the streets, and laid the blame implicitly on 
the doorstep of one group in particular, the MQX. The generalisation 
extended from the manner in which the report was presented in the 
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Assembly (relating to the partisan interests of the government at the 
time), to the way in which the matter was reported by the press (which 
could relate to a tendency to adopt readily accessible "explanations" for 
urban violence). 
The response of the Zia government to the large-scale riots 
that began to emerge in Karachi after 1985 was to order a Commission of 
Enquiry into Karachi Affairs to be presented in early 1986, which would 
suggest certain responses and development projects. The implementation 
of these was to be reported in 1989 and in subsequent years as 
appropriate. The Commission combined extensive interviews with various 
"prominent citizens" in Karachi with data from the police and utility 
boards. It is, as of 1993, the most concerted attempt by government to 
analyse and address the problems of Karachi, including civil disorder. 
The Commission's report, presented in March 1986, identified 
various urban problems as being at the root of the unrest in Karachi, 
such as the growth of unregulated slum housing areas (katcbi abadis), 
the shortfall in the supply to the urban population of certain utilities 
(particularly water), unemployment, an inadequate transport system, and 
general "frustration" in the population. The frustration is born of 
having to deal with the lengthy and often intimidating bureaucracy of 
government offices. The problem is made worse as it becomes apparent 
that certain sections of the population escape poor amenity supply 
through networks of corruption and the power of wealth. 
There is much in the Commission's report to commend, and it 
does present a broad view of the problems faced by the city. The various 
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responses suggested by the Commission involved civil engineering 
projects such as the development of sewage treatment facilities, the 
rehabilitation of water supply conduits, upgrading ("regularisation") of 
katcbi abadis, training to improve the service and efficiency in 
government offices, and some improvements and reorganisation of the 
transport network. The overall tone of the report was that rioting had 
been provoked by urban economic factors relating to the growth and 
overcrowding of the city through immigration, rather than by the 
entrenchment of "ethnic" particularisation in Sindh's society. In this 
manner the report also followed the policy of the government at the 
time - namely that ethnic groups should not be identified in any reports 
or news, particularly concerning incidences of violence. 
The report was followed by the institution of an Implementation 
Unit in August 1987, which presented its f irst progress report in May 
1989. This report also focussed on the urban economic factors mentioned 
above that were putting strain on the city and which were supposedly 
leading to outbreaks of violence. The report observed, among other 
things, the rise in the proportion of Karachi's population inhabiting 
katcbl abadis from 37% in 1985 to 45% in 1989 (COFKA, 2 May 1989, 
Karachi, p. 7), and the provision of 3389 extra personnel and 100 million 
Rupees for equipment to the city police-force since 1986 (COEKA, 2 May 
1989, p. 82). It is interesting to note that the police data supplied to 
the Implementation Unit, which principally concerns details of curfew 
impositions in Karachi in the period 1983 to the beginning of 1989, 
tended to describe rioting and disturbance in the city in terms of 
-451- 
generalised ethnic labels. The data suggest, for example, that the 
proportion of "ethnic rioting cases" reported as a total of all rioting 
incidents in Karachi rose from 24.7% in 1985 to 54% in 1988 (COEKA, 2 
May 1989, p. 9(i)). The police data, therefore, follow the lead of the 
press in creating a category of "ethnic riot", and suggest that this 
form of rioting gradually increased after 1985. The police view is that 
ethnic polarisation. worsened in Karachi through the 1980s. 
The curfew data supplied by the police to the Commission of 
Enquiry suggest that in 1983 a wave of religious sectarian violence 
broke out on two separate occasions, in February and March respectively, 
in Sohrab Goth, and in the largely Nobajir- northern district of 
Liaquatabad (COEKA, 2 May 1989, p. 9(iv)). Such a religious specification 
for the "reason" for a riot was conspicuously absent from all the data 
on reported disturbances after 1984, although the districts of 
Llaquatabad and Sahrab Goth recur frequently as riot-hit areas (ibid). 
Sectarian violence in Pakistan in the 1980s had much to do with 
the nature of the Zia regime. Before 1984, all political parties were 
banned, and policies of "Islamisation" at the federal level were 
provoking bitter disputes between Sunnis (the sect followed by Zia) and 
SbIas throughout Pakistan over how Islan should be interpreted by the 
state. Af ter 1984, however, the MQM built-up a strong ethnic 
identification for the majority Urdu-speaking culture of Karachi. Because 
of the concurrent locations of sectarian and ethnic rioting between 1983 
and 1984, it can be postulated that in this period some of the same 
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rioting groups redefined their dominant identity and rioted more often 
in the name of ethnicity rather than Islam. 
In these terns, the underlying foundations of violence in 
society, in which communities address their grievances and disputes with 
the use of force, apply in the case of both sectarian and ethnic 
violence. Many aspects of the two forms of violence were identical, not 
least the spatial concentration in Liaquatabad and Sohrab Goth, and the 
modes of violence such as battles with the police, the erection of 
disruptive barricades, and the use of firearms. Thus, to speak of a new 
phenomenon of ethnic violence emerging after 1985 is in many ways to 
obscure pervasive societal stresses and strains that existed throughout 
the period. 
The Commission of Enquiry of 1986 also suggested that 
resentment concerning the ethnic composition of the city police force 
was an important aspect of the involvement of the police in civil 
disorder: 
"Police recruitment on all Pakistan basis for Karachi 
was carried out during the period when Karachi was the 
capital of the country. It has given a certain complexion 
to the police force of Karachi which does not easily match 
with the present character of the city. " 
ICOEKA, March 1986, p. 301 
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The diplomatic language of this statement, which carefully 
avoids identifying ethnic groups for the reasons mentioned earlier, 
echoes a resentment voiced by the MQM that the police force is just 
one of the many areas of employment in Karachi in which Xbbajirs 
are disadvantaged compared to ethnic groups from northern areas. 
However, this hides a general police-citizen resentment that occurs 
in many urban contexts throughout South Asia and beyond. In times 
of violence, battles with the police may quickly develop, not 
necessarily because a rioter feels resentment towards the ethnic 
identity of the police, but because the police are viewed as 
oppressors of the public, either through the enforcement of state 
dictates or through the abuse of power for their own personal 
gains. Frustration at such matters was the initial catalyst at the 
"Bushra Zaidi" incident in 1985. 
The problems with these insitutional approaches to civil 
disorder are that they tend to simplify the situation, and suggest 
that there are identifiable solutions to the urban problem in such 
policies as katcbi abadl regularisation. From the official 
documents and police reports used in this research it seems that 
the formal sector of administration in the city holds two views 
concerning the persistance of civil disorder in Karachi. 
Firstly, it is felt that the root of the problem lies 
largely in the katcbI abadis, not only since they harbour informal 
sector operations and unscrupulous "middlemen", but also because 
they foster a culture of frustration and resentment. The 
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frustration extends to the population of urban Sindh in general, 
since the structural and physical development of the cities has 
generally failed to keep pace with population growth. The official 
agencies of Karachi, even after the Zia era, have demonstrated that 
they consider the rapid growth of Karachi, and particularly that of 
the A-atcbI abadl housing areas, to be at the root of the city's 
problems. A meeting of the Karachi Chambers of Coin rce, the KDA, 
KESC and KWSB in January 1990 delivered a detailed statement to 
this effect (Daily Recorder, 18 January 1990, Karachi). 
Secondly, the urban adninistration has identified an ethnic 
element in the conflict, particularly as regards the perceptions of 
recruitment to the police. The police themselves have also 
suggested that ethnic conflict is increasingly a part of life in 
certain parts of the city. 
Civil disorder in Karachi is a complex phenomenon. I have 
shown that some of the incidents in the city that had previously 
been termed "religious sectarian" conflicts, suddenly became 
"ethnic" conflicts after 1984 according to police records. It 
should also be noted that, in Orangi, a district that represents 
almost every community of Pakistan in its population, certain 
districts have been affected by conflict while some others, such as 
Afridi colony, have been relatively calm, notably during the large- 
scale riots of December 1986 (Herald, January 1987, Karachi, p. 47). 
Such variations seem to relate as much to the relative 
effectiveness and work of individual local councillors as to any 
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pervasive "ethnic" factors (Herald, ibid). It is interesting to 
note that at the time of the December 1986 riots, OPP board-member 
Arif Hasan predicted that the trouble would naturally spread to the 
whole of Pakistan (Herald, ibid, p. 45), when experience has since 
shown this not to be the case. 
I would argue, however, that urban violence in Sindh does 
reflect underlying societal and political strains within Pakistan's 
society. In this respect, I am sympathetic to some aspects of the 
structuralist school of crowd studies, which suggest that rioting 
groups draw on or expose structural tensions deeper than the 
personal desires and motivations of the participants. In Karachi 
the rioting Of the 1980s reflected these underlying societal and 
political processes, but the modes of violence were themselves 
largely determined by the city's own specific physical and socia- 
political features, which might not apply to every other city. This 
is an important distinction to highlight. 
The structural tensions underlying urban violence in Sindh 
are complex. Firstly, I have suggested that resentment of the state 
and its ability to tackle urban problems has been coupled with a 
breakdown in non-violent modes of debate to deliver a persistant 
problem of urban violence. It can be argue that this "frustration" 
has constituted a general crisis in civil society, not just in the 
katcbi abadis but throughout urban Karachi. The successful work of 
individual councillors in certain moballabs can begin to address 
the problem, and show that with an effective approach to the 
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economic and developmental problems that involves the community, 
the question of civil disorder does not so easily arise. In many 
postcolonial societies, where several institutions of state are 
weak or "missing", problems of effective representation of the 
population have arisen. In Pakistan, the problem is especially 
severe as a result of persistant non-elected military rule. 
Secondly, much of the violence through the 1980s in Karachi 
can be related to the MQM's efforts to become the dominant element 
in the local state in the city. Here I am returning to Clapham's 
notion of the state (in this case the local urban state) as a 
fragile "structure of control" over inherited institutions 
(Clapham, 1985, p. 39), and to Washbrook's characterisation of 
ethnic politics as being geared mainly to the nobilisation of local 
economic and political resources (modelled on Dravidian politics in 
India - Washbrook, 1989, p. 178). Such a political battle, in 
Karachi as elsewhere, often becomes expressed as a physical battle 
on the streets between supporters and activists in the political 
environment. 
Karachi's own specific conditions, including its dominant 
position within Pakistan's econony, have also indicated that the 
rise and fall of violence within the city cannot necessarily be 
replicated in other cities which hold less economic importance for 
the central government. When Arif Hasan said the violence would 
automatically spread across Pakistan (Herald, ibid), he was 
probably referring to a general breakdown of civil order in 
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Pakistan's society. This has certainly continued since 1986, while 
the sort of large-scale riots and inter-ethnic battles suffered in 
Karachi have not been seen to the same extent elsewhere. 
I would argue that an effective method of analysing these 
macro and micro elements in the development of urban violence in 
Karachi is to divide the 1980s into two distinct phases, during 
which time repetitive serious civil disorder underwent crucial 
changes. The reasoning behind this is that before and after 1988 
there were clear differences in the internal dynamics of the 
violence in the city, and in associated political rhetoric and 
reactions. An understanding of these factors, and of the reasons 
for the differences between these two periods, goes a long way to 
explaining the underlying processes that have led to civil 
disorder. 
7.4 CHRONOLOGY OF CIVIL DISORDER IN KARACHI 
Period One: 1985-88 
It seems apparent that urban Sindh was virtually free of the 
communal violence that preceded and followed the Partition in 1947, 
unlike many other urban areas such as Bombay, parts of the Punjab 
or Bihar. Interestingly, the Sindhi writer Siraj-ul Haq disputes 
this theory and charges that some anti-Hindu disturbances were 
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"manufactured" in Karachi in 1948 to hasten the departure of local 
Hindus (interview, 13 February 1991, Karachi). 
Between Independence and the 1980s, there were two major 
episodes of widespread unrest in urban Sindh. The first followed 
the Presidential Elections of January 1965, in which Ayub Khan was 
re-elected nationally, but was defeated in the cities of Karachi 
and Dacca to the sister of the Quald-1 Azam, Fatima Jinnah. 
Disturbances occurred when a victory taxi-cade, bedecked in paper 
roses (the election symbol of Ayub) toured Karachi, and 
provocatively entered Xobajir areas such as Liaquatabad and 
Nazimabad, where the vote for Fatima Jinnah had been the strongest 
(Economist, 9 January 1965, London). 
The scenes of violence during this episode, in which-rioters 
clashed with one another and with the police, and burning 
barricades of debris and vehicles were laid to block the roads 
(Economist, ibid), were not to be repeated to any extent until July 
1972, when the newly-installed Bhutto provincial and national 
government passed some contentious measures, such as the Quota 
System and Language Bill. The apparent physical and psychological 
impact of these measures on the formation of the Mobajir 
subnationalist movement have already been discussed. In Sindh, the 
measures were immediately followed by protests among the Xdbajir 
community in Hyderabad, Sukkur and Karachi, which in the latter 
case quickly developed into widespread rioting, mostly directed at 
the local and national authorities. Here again the Nobajir 
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strongholds of Central Zone such as Liaquatabad and Nazinabad were 
the first to suffer curfew impositions (Dawn, 8 July 1972, 
Karachi), while industrial and comrercial areas were also disrupted 
by the erection of barricades and battles with the police (Dawn, 
ibid). The message that the rioters were protesting against the 
government was evident in the form of battles with the police and 
generally disruptive actions, which seemed to challenge the notion 
of "control" of the economic hub of Pakistan. By the llth July the 
government had responded by extending curfews and exercising such 
measures as press censorship over reporting of the troubles (Dawn, 
11 July 1972, Karachi). Here we can see the central state's 
response in the battle for the control of Karachi. 
The 1972 episode, although brief (the matter seemed to have 
been resolved and the disturbances ended after approximately two 
weeks from the passing of the Language Bill), acted as an 
interesting forerunner to the sort of disturbances that flared in 
urban Sindh in the mid-1980s, in terms of modes and distribution of 
violence. In 1972, however, the dominant nature of the unrest was a 
protest at the government. In the 1980s, the increasingly unpopular 
Zia regime faced a similar public confrontation n Pakistan's 
cities, but by this time a complex web of other local and "ethnic" 
factors had also come into play. 
The first major incident of the mid-1980s was the "Bushra 
Zaidi" incident of April 1985. The major element of the 
disturbances appeared to be a battle between groups of Pakhtuns and 
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Xobajirs (principally Bibaris). The unrest spread beyond the location of 
the accident in the northern Nobajir commercial and residential district, 
Nazimabad, to engulf large parts of the city as a whole, after which 48 
consecutive days of curfew were imposed in 8 districts of the city 
(COEKA, Implementation Review, 2 May 1989, Government of Sindh, Karachi, 
p. giv). Tambiah has described the manner in which the initial incident 
developed into a riot in Orangi, some miles away, after a series of 
incidents, notably an unruly APXSO demonstration supporting the funeral 
wake of the girl (Tambiah, 1990). A complex combination of factors were 
at work here - anger and resentment at both transporters and the 
government after another fatal accident, the involvement of a politicised 
"ethnic" organisation, the key role of an important spatial node in 
Karachi (Banar-es Cbowk, a large Junction connecting Nazimabad with 
Orangi), and a later series of ethnic attacks and reprisals between 
Biharis and Pakhtuns in parts of Orangi. 
The incident proved to be the catalyst for several later 
disturbances. During 1985 the police recorded 608 rioting cases, 
claiming 56 lives and injuring 114 (COEKA, Implementation Review, 1989, 
p. 9(i)). Between the Bushra Zaidi accident and the next major incident, 
curfew war. imposed for 59 days in selected parts of Karachi (ibid), in 
response to the continual outbreak of disturbances. From the beginning 
of 1986 to December 1988, there were 2345 recorded incidents of rioting 
in Karachi (COEKA, ibid), mostly displaying similar characteristics to 
the incidents surrounding the April 1985 incident. The key themes were 
sporadic disturbances around the city, often involving the police, and 
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inter-ethnic clashes between Pakhtuns and NobaJIrs, almost invariably 
flaring in Orangi town where large sections of the two communities live 
in neighbouring moballabs. 
April 1985 laid the groundwork for new large-scale riots in 
Karachi. Yet two subsequent episodes in particular came to characterise 
the processes taking place in Karachi in the first period of analysis. 
Episode 1: 31 October 1986 
A particularly salient element of the f irst key incident of the 
f irst period is that it indirectly involved the NQM. The unrest began an 
the day of the Movement's second major rally, and its first major 
meeting in Hyderabad. However, the key theme of the first period of 
unrest up to 1988, is that the MQM was not directly involved in its 
political or rhetorical leadership to the same extent as the period 
beginning at the end of 1988. While the rioting usually involved 
XdbaJIrs, the MQM was still a relatively new force in Karachi and could 
only watch and issue statements after the event. 
The government's stance towards the MQM was much the same as 
its stance towards other political and ethnic groups at this time. 
Consequently, Altaf Hussain was jailed twice in the late 1980s, along 
with many other political leaders. Ve have seen, however, that some 
analysts and observers believe that the MQM war. closely related to the 
Zia regime, and that it was able to operate more freely than other 
political groups in the mid-1980s. Neverthless, the Movement's grip on 
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the street forces operating in the disturbances of this first period was 
far less effective than was the case after 1988. 
The basic sequence of events*2 of the first case study here is 
as follows: 
- The XQM organises its first major rally in Hyderabad, and publicises 
the event extensively in Karachi to attract visitors. Altaf Hussain also 
states publicly that some transport will be provided free of charge to 
those travelling to the rally from Karachi. 
- Many bus-loads of travellers set off for Hyderabad on the morning of 
31 October from Lee Market in central Karachi, including some free buses 
arganised by the XQM. Some people, however, board ordinary buses bound 
for Hyderabad and refuse to pay. 
- These buses travel as far as the point where the Super Highway to 
Hyderabad starts to leave the city at Sohrab Goth. Here there is a bus 
interchange and bazaar area (see Figure 7.1). At this point the 
collectors and drivers on the buses finally resolve that they will go no 
further until the NobaJIr travellers pay their fares. 
- Angry scenes ensue, during which a violent fight breaks out between 
the transporters and the passengers, including a group of women, and 
firearms are used. 
- The battle is Joined by local people (most of whom are Fakhtuns, who 
support the transporters against the XdbajIr- passengers) and firearms 
such as Kalasbnlkov automatic rifles are freely used. Three people are 
killed almost immediately (Morning News, 1 November 1986, Karachi). 
-463- 
- During the evening, violence spreads with groups of Pakhtuns 
conducting raids on Xbbajir (and Blharl) localities on the one hand, and 
Mobajlrs attacking Pakhtun transporters and destroying their vehicles in 
many parts of Karachi on the other, after hearing of the initial 
incidents. In Hyderabad, sporadic reprisal attacks on Pakhtun 
transporters and their vehicles also occur throughout the evening. 
- Disturbances continue into the next morning by which time curfew is 
imposed in Liaquatabad, Gulbahar, Jahorabad, Pak Colony, Nazimabad, 
Orangi, Sindh Industrial Trading Estate (SITE), New Karachi, Landhi, 
Quaidabad and Model Colony in Karachi, and central Hyderabad. Incidents 
continue throughout the next days in various parts of Karachi and 
Hyderabad, including the following: 
- In central Hyderabad, a clothes bazaar (Landa Bazaar) is 
destroyed in an arson attack. 
- In Liaquatabad, a group of "young people" set on f ire a 
minibus and rickshaw by a roadside hotel, pelt passing vehicles and 
police with stones, and build barricades of burning advertising 
hoardings and tyres to obstruct traffic (Viewpoint, 6 November 1986, 
Lahore). 
-- In Nazimabad and surrounding areas, police fire teargas at 
rioting groups, and direct traffic down side-streets to avoid the 
barricades on the main roads. 
- Isolated incidents continue in Karachi and Hyderabad for almost two 
weeks. Curfew continues in Orangi, Liaquatabad, Hazimabad, Quaidabad, New 
Karachi, Sohrab Goth, Shah Faisal Colony and Malir until 11 November. 
-464 - 
This episode appears to constitute an "ethnic riot" between 
Nobajirs and Pakhtuns, arising from a localised incident at Sohrab Goth. 
While the episode was related to the XQX's affairs in that it happened 
on the day of one of its f irst major rallies, the leadership of the 
Movement itself was not directly involved, as it was a hundred 
kilometres away in Hyderabad at the outbreak of rioting. (Little 
information is available of the role played by local MQM cadres in this 
case). Some of the details that suggest an "ethnic rift" include the 
manner in which dispersed reprisals for an initial argument centred 
around attacks on innocent people an the basis of their ethnic identity 
alone. We can also see the central position played by neighbouring 
groups in Orangi township in this incident, and particularly the Bibaris 
and Fakhtuns. 
However, I would argue that there are other important factors 
displayed by the incident. Firstly, societal and geographic factors 
specific to the city of Karachi were important. These comprise the rapid 
appearance of the Kalasbnikov automatic rifle, notably in the context of 
a peripheral katcbI abadl location (forging a link between "mafia" trade 
in arms in the city and the location of such informal sector 
businesses). Also, specific geographic nodes and locations were 
important, such as Orangi, and the Sindh Industrial Trading Estate 
(SITE). These are obviously factors specific to the layout of Karachi. 
The involvement of SITE also conveys the fact that it was not 
Just ethnic rioting that was involved. This theory is reinforced by acts 
of traffic disruption and skirmishes with the police. If the only element 
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of the disorder was a battle between Pakhtuns and Xobajirs or Bibarls, 
the unpopulated area of SITE would not have been a significant node of 
disturbance. I would argue that its appearance in the curfew statistics 
suggets that many of the rioting groups were merely aiming to cause 
general disruption, either to convey a message to the government, or 
through an unfocussed frustration or "criminality". 
These, I will argue, are the ground-rules of the first period of 
civil disorder in Karachi. I can demonstrate that the October/November 
1986 incident was not an isolated case by presenting a second case 
study from this period. 
Episode 2: 12 December 1986 
The second case study has been mentioned in several contexts as 
it raises many important issues. Like the first incident, the December 
1986 unrest incorporated a complex sequence of events that combined to 
create a general atmosphere of prolonged violence. 
Stemming from a slum-clearance operation in Sohrab Goth, 
violence again spread to the ethnically heterogenous Orangi township, 
this time in the form of highly organised and murderous ethnic violence 
launched by groups of Pakhtuns on Bibarl localities. Again, sporadic 
incidents followed throughout the city for some weeks after, effectively 
paralysing the metropolis for a short period. The "ethnic" element in the 
violence encompasses reprisals, perhaps for ills committed by Bibar-Is 
and Nobajlrs an the Pakhtun community in the incidents of April 1985 
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and October/Novenber 1986 (the second of which had abated just weeks 
before the December episode). From the Pakhtun side, not only was there 
evidence of considerable behind-the-scenes organisation in the violence, 
but rhetoric disseminated among the Pakhtuns also claimed that -the 
MobaJiz-s of Karachi were implicitly siding with the central government 
in a policy to rid Karachi of Pakhtuns. 
If violent episodes of urban unrest can be ranked on a scale of 
disruption caused, then the December 1986 period can probably be 
labelled the worst that Karachi, and indeed Pakistan, had seen by 1993. 
The incident, with that of October/November and others, led to 1986 
officially being a year of 185 deaths in Karachi from urban unrest, an 
increase of 230% over 1985 (Karachi police figures; COEKA, 
Implementation Review, 1989, p. 9 W), and the highest annual toll to 
date by 1992 (ibid). Unofficial sources suggest a much higher toll. "The 
Star" evening newspaper claimed that 170 people were killed in the first 
two weeks of the December 1986 episode alone (Star, 24 December 1986, 
Karachi). The same pattern of escalation applied to the number of 
reported rioting incidents in 1986, which grew 50.8% over the 1985 
figure to 917 cases (ibid). 
The December rioting began with "Operation Clean-up" in Schrab 
Goth. The Operation was part of the central government's policy to be 
seen to be doing something decisive about urban problems, and 
particularly those in the key city Karachi, following the riots beginning 
in 1985 and the much-publicised Commission of Enquiry of early 1986. 
The sequence of events in the episode was broadly as follows: 
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- In the evening of 11 December, the police raid houses in Crangi, 
confiscating a cache of home-made bombs and arresting many people. 
- In the early hours of Friday, 12 December, "Operation Clean-up" is 
launched in Sohrab Goth by the police and army, to bulldoze slum housing 
and bazaars and evict local tenants, in an effort to seize suspected 
stores of arms and drugs. Indefinite curfew is announced. 
- The Sohrab GDth operation continues through Friday and into Saturday 
(13 December), by which time over 200kg of heroin are reputedly 
discovered (Herald, January 1987, Karachi, p. 39). Meanwhile, angry 
reactions to the operation ensue throughout Karachi, particularly among 
Pakhtuns, some of whom form blockades with rickshaws, buses and taxis 
to disrupt traffic. 
- Printed hand-bills in Pashto appear from an unknown source, claiming 
that Operation Clean-up is a scheme with a hidden agenda to drive the 
Pakhtun community from Karachi altogether, with the support of Mobajirs 
living in the city (interview with Arif Hasan, 11 February 1991, 
Karachi). In Orangi - scene of violence in April 1985 and November 1986 
- tension mounts between the NobajirlBibarl inhabitants and the 
Pakhtuns. 
- Early on Sunday morning (14 December), an angry crowd of Pakhtuns 
form at Banares Cbowk, disrupting traffic and building burning 
barricades. 
- Mid-morning, the Pirabad mosque (on the hills above Qasba Colony, 
Orangi) issues calls for "attack" from its loudspeakers. Machine-guns 
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f ire from the hills into Qasba Colony below, and large groups of 
Pakhtuns storm into Qasba and Aligarh Colonies. 
- Arson attacks on non-Pakhtun houses and businesses ensue, focussing 
an Qasba and Aligarh Colonies, and the large bazaar area in the latter. 
The violence spirals, and begins to involve the indiscriminate looting 
and murder of non-Pakhtuns (BBC VS, SAS, 19 December 1986, London). 
Police intervention seems to be sporadic, largely allowing the violence 
to run its course, but occasionally tear-gassing crowds, sometimes 
including those attempting to resist the Pakhtun groups with rocks and 
stones (Ameneh Azam Ali, Herald, January 1987, Karachi, p. 41). 
- At 3pm, curfew is announced, and at 4.30pm army contingents finally 
arrive in Orangi to establish relative calm. 
- In the following days, incidents continue throughout Karachi. Groups of 
Pakhtuns, sometimes riding in pick-up vans, continue to select non- 
Pakhtun businesses and homes for brutal attack. In Orangi, the Bibari 
locality of Sector 11 is submitted to a sustained attack by Pakhtun 
youths. Throughout the city, Nobajir groups build barricades, arson- 
attack buildings, and battle with the police in a general protest at the 
security situation. 
- The city is effectively "frozen" for approximately one week, including 
closure of the docks to all incoming and outgoing traffic. Curfew 
remains in many areas of the city (restricting movement on main roads 
to a limited period in the middle of the day and inviting firing from 
police or army contingents when ignored). This remains in place 
continuously until 26 January 1987 in Landhi, Korangi, Shah Faisal 
-469- 
Colony, North Karachi and Liaquatabad (COEKA, Implementation Review, 
1989, p-g(vi)). Meanwhile, in Hyderabad, unrest slowly Sathers pace 
through January, largely involving attacks by groups of Nobajlrs on 
symbols of the state, such as police stations and post offices, 
seemingly to demonstrate a loss of confidence in the state's ability to 
protect the Nobajir community (Muslim, 15 January 1987, Karachi). 
The second incident, like the first, spread from an initial 
localised event, to general rioting in many parts of the city, involving 
brutal ethnic-sectarian violence in parts of Orangi. A sinister aspect of 
the December 1986 episode was the level of organisation of many of the 
attacks in Orangi, starting the day after Operation Clean-up. These 
attacks involved an ample supply of heavy firearms and ammunition, the 
use of loudspeakers in the Pirabad mosque to issue instructions, the 
mysterious distribution of hand-bills in Pashto urging violence and 
reprisal, and a singling-out of non-Pakhtun owned businesses and homes 
for burning and looting. It is interesting that many of these general 
features were prominent in the Delhi riots of 1984, and notably the 
manner in which Sikh homes and businesses were singled-out for 
destruction by Congress-Party supporters (Tambiah, 1990, p. 745). 
Such organisational features of the violence of December 1986 in 
Karachi have led many to conclude that powerful "nafias" were behind the 
scenes, mobilising disenchanted Pakhtun youth along emotive ethnic lines. 
Akmal Hussain, in a detailed analysis of this particular episode claims 
that: 
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"The Mafia syndicates when threatened by the Sohrab 
Gotb affair, retaliated by mobilizing the Patban 
community on the basis of primordial emotions. If 
the purpose was to show the power of the Mafia bosses 
by paralyzing Karachi, it was achieved. " 
(Akmal Hussain, 1987, p. 4; italics added) 
There were certainly ways in which ethnic factors could be used to 
incite violence. Pakhtun identity involves powerful codes of revenge and 
retribution for ills committed to its community. Ameneh Azam Ali 
(Herald, December 1986, Karachi, p. 5) suggests that events at the end of 
1986 provided some Pakhtuns in Orangi with the opportunity to avenge 
deaths committed by neighbouring Bibar-is in the Bushra Zaidi incident of 
1985. Meanwhile, the motivation for the "nafias" in causing unrest would 
relate to a desire to put a stop to the sort of government crack-down 
on the drugs and arms business heralded by Operation Clean-up in Sohrab 
Goth. 
Other important features of the incident include the development 
of violence around specific spatial "nodes". Firstly, Orangi was again 
the scene of brutal ethnic violence. This may relate to the way in which 
communities such as Pakhtuns and Bibar-Is are closely concentrated in 
neighbouring streets, with the Pakhtuns tending to build up the 
hillsides, and the Bibaris occupying the valleys below. Furthermore, the 
police had shown in earlier incidents that they are reluctant to enter 
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police had shown in earlier incidents that they are reluctant to enter 
the semi-regulated katchi abadis of Orangi. Their reluctance relates both 
to a fear of becoming ensnared in the network of narrow and largely 
unsurfaced streets, and to the suspected existence of quantities of 
automatic weapons among certain communities in the area (a suspicion 
vindicated by the use of heavy machine-guns from the hills around Qasba 
and Aligarh Colonies in December 1986). In this way, group violence can 
be undertaken with relative impunity for some hours before the 
intervention of security forces. 
Secondly, Benares Cbowk was again a focus of violence, with 
crowds of Pakhtuns effectively blocking the busy interchange an the 
morning after the Sohrab Goth clearance operation. It was here that 
violence occurred in April 1985, as Bushra Zaidi's dboom [funeral 
procession] passed through. It is interesting that the docks were also 
closed for a brief period during the December 1986 incident. 
Surprisingly, despite the tactical advantage to be gained by paralysing 
the principal outlet to the sea of Pakistan's economy, the docks in 
Karachi are only blocked during the most serious disturbances (brief 
closures occurred again in 1988 and 1989), and even in these cases the 
problem has been the blockage or restricted movement on supply roads in 
the city rather than disturbance in the docks themselves. The reasons 
for this are principally geographical, concerning the location of the 
docks away from major concentrations of habitation, necessitating 
rioters in travelling some distance to reach the area. The Sindh 
Industrial Trading Estate (SITE), or the industrial areas of Korangi on 
-472- 
the other hand, are far more often the focus of disruption, due to their 
greater proximity to concentrations of population, and the existence of 
arterial through-roads in their districts. 
By December 1986 (when the MQM had only Just begun to become 
prominent in urban Sindh's politics, and had yet to sweep the local 
elections) the balance in the battle for control in Karachi was firmly 
in favour of loosely- organ ised groups of Pakhtuns and others, and the 
informal-sector organisations which were possibly behind them. However, 
links between such clandestine agencies and the Pakhtun community in 
the city are unclear. ANP leader Wali Khan stressed at the time that 
the unrest should not be seen in ethnic terms, and that a "Pakhtun drug- 
den" attitude to the problem should not be taken (Star, 24 December 
1986, Karachi). Instead, it was suggested by Pakhtun political leaders 
that ethnic "divide-and-rule" policies were being undertaken by the Zia 
regime, as the Sohrab Goth operation had conspicuously failed to arrest 
key figures in the drugs business or to seize significant quantities of 
drugs or arms (ibid). Furthermore, the seizure of home-made weapons and 
bombs in Orangi the night before the operation, coupled with the 
sporadic police intervention in the violence that ensued, gave credence 
to this conspiracy theory in the minds of many. The benefits of such a 
policy for the government would be to defuse any potential of a unified 
oppositional political power in Pakistan's principal city, at a time when 
disenchantment with Zia's regime was flaring into violence throughout 
Pakistan. 
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Compared to later episodes of violence in the city, it appears 
that the XQX was not active in orchestrating the violence of December 
1986, and was involved only in terms of being the party that most 
Nobajirs and Bibaris in Orangi had started to support. This appears to 
be so in the light of a lack of rhetoric originating from the MQM before 
events, and in view of the fact that the Bibaris in Orangi seemed to be 
largely unsuspecting victims rather than active perpetrators of violence. 
The response of the Movement to the violence was to "demand" the early 
repatriation of Afghans from Karachi (Dawn, 21 January 1987, Karachi), 
and to declare, partly by way of widely distributed posters in Urdu, 
that the citizens of Orangi should forget saving for videor-recorders and 
buy firearms instead (interview with Arif Hasan, 11 February 1991, 
Karachi). Interestingly, MQM documents recalling the events of December 
1986 avoid mentioning "Pakhtuns" as such, and refer specifically to the 
failures of the law enforcement agencies, claiming "This was the worst 
massacre in Pakistan's history but not a single culprit was apprehended 
or arrested" (MQM, 1990b-i, p. 8). Thus, in these terms, and as regards 
the nature of much of the violence in Karachi and later Hyderabad, the 
wrath of the MQM at this time was directed as much at the state and its 
perceived failures and partisanship, as at rival ethnic groups. 
Anti-state sentiments were apparent at many stages in the 
episode. It is interesting that the mysterious Pashto hand-bills 
described a nefarious state policy to rid the city of Pakhtuns, and the 
threat obviously struck a chord with many in the community. Also, the 
violence in Hyderabad that ensued in January 1987 showed more basic 
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anti-state feelings, with attacks on government offices being the major 
locus of disturbance. 
In these terms, three underlying factors can be seen. Firstly, 
there was obviously some form of "ethnic" part icu lar isation and 
polarisation underway, including elements of revenge for previous 
violence. Both the October /November and the December 1986 episodes 
showed instances of homes and businesses being selected for attack on 
ethnic grounds. Secondly, however, there was also a general discontent 
with the actions of the state, expressed by all sides in the 
disturbances, and articulated in violent ways. I would thus suggest that 
Zia's society was one in which a lack of interface between state and 
population over problems of development, or the abuse of civil rights, 
was leading to a general breakdown in civil order. 
Thirdly, the role of "mafias" must also be mentioned. There was 
obviously some degree of organisation in the Pakhtun attacks that 
followed Operation Clean-up. Me level of firearms used in the initial 
raids from the hillsides above Qasba Colony also suggest a considerable 
degree of financing behind the attacks. Certainly, Operation Clean-up 
would have angered those trading in drugs and arms, since the Operation 
threatened to be the start of a new hardline policy by the government 
against their activities. It is not implausible that the "mafias" 
mobilised disenchanted youth to saw confusion and thus hamper these 
policies. I will return to the question of "maflas" in Karachi later. 
The next two years saw similar incidents throughout urban Sindh 
(though none quite on the scale of the December 1986 episode). Police 
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Reported rioting cases 880 548 
"Ethnic rioting" case 365 296 
Houses destroyed 62 105 
Shops/bazaars destroyed 261 164 
Motor vehicles destroyed ill 95 
Deaths 56 135 
Injuries 408 670 
Source., COEKA, Implementation Review, 1989, pp. g(J-M). 
figures for 1987 and 1988 are shown in Table 7.1. The figures only 
involve those incidents reported and recorded, and it can reasonably be 
assumed that the "true" tolls for those elements (which can never be 
fully verified by any source) are higher than official figures suggest. 
In general terms, however, the figures show that while the 
overall climate of "rioting" in Karachi was improving, "ethnic riots" 
were becoming a greater proportion of the total, rising from 41.5% of 
recorded incidents in 1987 to 54.0% in 1988. The trend is also 
demonstrated in the fact that while the destruction of vehicles and 
commercial property declined over the two years, the destruction of 
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personal residences and deaths and injuries increased. These factors are 
part of the transformation to the second major period of civil disorder 
in the 1980s, in which the "ethnic" element appeared to be a greater 
part of the overall violence. 
Period Two: 1988-90 
The riots of 1986 and 1987 demonstrated that the state did not 
have full "control" of the city of Karachi, while the heavy guns and 
community organisation of I'mafia" groups were far more effective in 
certain areas. The result for such communities as Aligarh and Qasba 
Colonies, among others, was that life and property in the city could not 
be protected by any agency. 
This was an important element of the political void in parts of 
the city to which the MQM effectively addressed itself at this time. The 
Movement may not have been an active agency in the large-scale riots of 
1986, but not long after these events the Movement rapidly began to 
assert itself in the politics and life of urban Sindh. Jamaat-i Islaml 
meanwhile, by its own admission, (inter-view with Professor Ghafoor Ahmed 
of Jamaat-I Islami, 27 January 1992, Karachi), deliberately remained 
aloof from the violence, seeing ethnic conflict as a "local issue" (ibid). 
The first major breakthrough for the MQM at this time was the Local 
Bodies elections of December 1987, whereby the MQM became the largest 
single party in the KMC and Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, beginning 
its dominance of the official civic agencies in the two cities. (As I 
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showed in the previous Chapter, the Islamic parties were toppled from 
dominance in these cities with these elections). By this time, the 
Movement had already begun to flex its muscles. On the first anniversary 
of the 31 October 1986 incident, the MQX called a "Protest Day" strike 
to condemn the military government. The strike was effective in largely 
halting economic activity in Karachi for the day, and was accompanied 
with further mob-attacks an symbols of the state such as national 
banks, post offices, police posts and the Korangi telephone exchange 
(Muslim, 1 November 1987, Karachi). 
With such activities as strikes, the XQM was not only becoming 
the pre-emptive force in the disturbances, in a manner that had not 
applied in the large ethnic riots of the first period, but it was 
shifting the emphasis of the violence towards the symbols of the 
national and provincial state rather than agents or henchmen of the 
informal sector in the city. As I have suggested, the MQM has approached 
the battle for control in Karachi by targeting, and ultimately winning, 
dominance of official institutions in the city. This is where the MQM 
feels it can have most impact on the local state. The wider significance 
of strikes and similar activities in Karachi is the way they cause 
disruption in the economic hub of Pakistan. By means of strikes the 
XQM could hope to exercise leverage on the balance of control at a 
national level. 
Yet the ethnic picture was also changing through the 1980s in 
terms of inter-community *conflict. If the large riots of 1986 were 
mainly Karachi affairs, events through 1988 saw the second largest city 
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of Sindh - Hyderabad - taking the lead. By mid-1988, violence was 
beginning to emerge in this city between Xdbajirs and Sindhis, and was 
taking a profoundly ethnic-sectarian form. As described in previous 
chapters, Hyderabad differs from Karachi in that it does not contain 
large populations of Pakhtuns or Punjabis. The events of November and 
December 1986 in Orangi were not directly mirrored in Hyderabad. 
Furthermore, the direct economic and physical competition between 
Sindhis and Nobajirs in Hyderabad heightens the tension between the 
communities in a way that cannot occur in Mobajir-dominated Karachi so 
easily. 
In addition to this basic ethnic pattern on the ground, Sindhi 
politics through 1988 were becoming increasingly anti-Xiobaiir. In April 
1988, the Pir of Pagaro condemned Nobajirs and said they should leave 
Sindh (Morning News, 20 June 1988, Karachi). In March/April, Dr. Qadir 
Magsi's Jiye Sindh Progressive Party USPP) broke away from the G. M Syed 
group, and propounded a more concerted Sindhi nationalist line. On 30 
September, a series of bombings and shootings in Hyderabad claimed over 
160 lives, mostly of Xdbaj1r-s (Dawn, 1 October 1988, Karachi). Magsi is 
currently facing charges of organising the massacre. 
The other aspect of the SindhilXdbajir violence that differed 
from the large Karachi riots of 1986, was the sudden, small-scale and 
almost "engineered" nature of attacks. A Hyderabad Journalist claimed 
that unlike Karachi "there have been no -mob clashes" in Hyderabad city 
Untez-view, 13 April 1991, Hyderabad). The violence involved a frequent 
use of automatic weapons such as the Kalasbnikov rifle, an increasingly 
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sectarian choice of targets where victims were killed or maimed solely 
on the basis of their ethnic identity, and a suddenness of attack, often 
involving a quick strike from a car or the back of a motorcycle. The 
nature of such violence relates partly to a general militarisation in 
society, as automatic weapons became readily available. In rural parts of 
the Province, also, the violence was beginning to involve more 
sophisticated weapons, such as mortars and heavy machine-guns. Zia's 
pro-US policy over the Mujabideen in Afghanistan was facilitating this 
f lood of arms into the region. The use of such weapons in Sindh 
reflected a decline of civil order in the province. 
The 30 September 1988 massacre in Hyderabad led to such modes 
of violence spreading to the streets of Karachi, in the form of ethnic- 
sectarian reprisals largely directed at Sindhis. The situation worsened 
through 1989 and 1990, during the tenureship of the Benazir Bhutto 
government, which was believed by the MQM to support Sindhi nationalism. 
Increasingly, the MQM called the tune and surges of violence began to 
follow statements and events of the Movement, particularly the "Black 
Day" strike of 26 May 1989, "Black Wednesday" on 7 February 1990, and 
Altaf Hussain's "fast unto death" of April 1990. At the same time, it 
seemed that the major riots involving Pakhtun groups were also finally 
coming to an end, as the focus of ethnic tensions shifted. 
I have selected two episodes of civil disorder from this period 
to illustrate the processes that were at work at the time. The first 
episode could have happened at any time before or after this period and 
is, in many ways, symptomatic of daily life in Karachi and other 
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Pakistani cities. For the second incident I have chosen an episode not 
in Karachi, but in Sukkur, the third largest town in Sindh province, 
which contains a sizeable community of Urdu-speakers in the central 
area. The reason I have shifted the focus to this city is that the sort 
of ethnic sectarian violence that it describes was a feature not only of 
Karachi, but also of other towns and cities in Sindh during this later 
part of the 1980s. Indeed, it was often events in Hyderabad or elsewhere 
that prompted retaliatory violence in Karachi during this period. This 
is different from the large riots of the earlier 1980s which were 
largely Karachi affairs. In some ways, the Sukkur incident I have chosen 
is unique in that it happened some time after the height of such ethnic 
sectarian violence in Karachi and Hyderabad. However, the episode is 
instructive on the modes of violence that Sindh's cities suffered after 
1988. 
Episode 3: October 1.989, Karacbi 
- In Quaidabad, Karachi, a prominent Naulana, president of an anti-drugs 
committee, is shot and injured by two men, believed to be drug- 
traffickers. Nearby police fail to apprehend the attackers. 
- The next day, a demonstration is organised by residents of Quaidabad 
to protest at the failure of the police to arrest the traffickers, 
despite having received tip-offs at the time as to their whereabouts. 
- Police fire upon the demonstration, killing several people (Muslim, 29 
October 1989, Karachi). 
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- Later, some "youngsters" (Muslim, ibid) set on fire a minibus in 
protest at the police action. 
- The following day, a crowd of angry residents Eher-ao [barricade] 
Quaidabad police station and are fired upon again by police. 
- Warnings of disaster are broadcast from the loud-speakers of local 
mosques, while various shooting and rioting incidents take place. Calm 
is finally restored after a meeting of the area police commissioner with 
local representatives (Star, 31 October 1989, Karachi). 
Episode 4: February 1991, Sukkur 
- After relative calm in urban Sindh since the Autumn of 1990, Sukkur 
breaks the pattern with a renewed bout of ethnic-sectarian violence. The 
episode begins when Naulana Mazharuddin Sheikh, president of a small 
Sindhi cultural group called Sindhi Mari Ittebad [Valiant Sindhi Union], 
has a heated argument with three men in the old part of Sukkur. A short 
time later, the men fire on the Maulana's decoration shop, killing him 
and wounding four others, who also later die in hospital (Dawn, 9 
February 1991, Karachi). 
- Shortly afterwards in the vicinity of the shooting, a Xohajir- is 
gunned-down and killed. 
- The following day, a series of particularly cold-blooded murders of 
ten Mobajirs take place, whereby the victims are dragged from their 
homes and shot at close range either on the street, or on a bridge over 
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the Indus River in the city centre. The bodies are dumped in the river 
(Herald, March 1991, Karachi, p. 38). 
- "Virtual curfew" is imposed in the Old City area (Herald, ibid). 
The f irst incident shows that many of the everyday stresses and 
problems in the city that lead to civil disorder were continuing in this 
second period. The episode has all the ingredients that exacerbated 
matters during the large riots of 1985-87. Firstly, public anger over 
the infiltration of drugs traffickers into the community in Quaidabad 
heightens tensions. It is interesting to note that many of the local 
residents are opposed to the existence of this clandestine sector of the 
informal economy in their communities, and that community leaders such 
as a maulana have made some efforts to organise against the drugs 
trade. The second key ingredient that turns the frustration and anger in 
the community into civil disorder is the variable and incompetent 
actions of the police. Not only are known villains perceived to be 
allowed to operate with impunity (which could relate either to the 
police having been bribed by the traffickers, or to their reluctance to 
tackle probably armed villains), but when the local people protest, they 
receive much harsher treatment, and are actually fired upon, sustaining 
some deaths. In these terms, people are given the impression that there 
is no justice for the criminals in their communities, and that the police 
are worse than useless in protecting them. It is not surprising that the 
frustration quickly turns into civil disorder on the streets. 
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The second incident, coming at a time when the other two major 
cities in the province had been tree ot ethn ic- sectarian violence since 
Autumn 1990, and in a city which had itself been relatively peaceful 
even when Karachi and Hyderabad were riven with violence, provoked much 
talk of a conspiracy to "destabilise the democratic order established in 
the country after a long struggle" (Pakistan Times, 9 February 1991, 
Lahore'). The nature of the incident mirrored those in Karachi and 
Hyderabad in 1989/90, where brutal murders and reprisals were committed 
purely on the basis of ethnic identities. At the end of the 1980s it 
seemed that a Sindhi/JffdbajIr "ethnic rift" had taken root, which was 
eclipsing the issues of the earlier riots of 1985-87. 
The incident shows how an argument between people who happen 
to belong to different ethnic communities becomes settled with physical 
force, using freely-available firearms. rhis localised disagreement 
quickly spirals into a general ethnic conflict. Reprisals are conducted 
against members of the two ethnic communities, with victims chosen who 
have no connection to the initial incident. With each act of terror, 
further reprisals are undertaken, and the situation quickly balloons out 
of control. The incident is characteristic of those that blighted Karachi 
and Hyderabad throughout the latter part of the 1980s. 
A key element of the violence after 1988 was that the MQX 
played a more active role in its development. The Movement's rhetoric at 
the time involved a liberal reference to "massacres of NobaJIrd' 
(particularly around the time of the Pucca Q11a incident in 1990, and the 
"thwarting of Sindhudesh"). Much of the violence, in Karachi in 
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particular, became centred around acts in the political drama between 
the MQM and the PPP government. The acts of this drama were conducted 
in the urban space of Karachi, where the MQM organised strikes and 
demonstrations. The MQM anti-government "Black Wednesday" strike of 
February 1990, for example, was accompanied by over 40 murders in 
Karachi, many of them brutal ethnic sectarian killings (Star, 8 February 
1990, Karachi). Similarly, Altai Hussain's five-day "fast unto death" two 
months later (conducted initially at Altaf's home in Azizabad and ending 
at the Abbasi Sbabeed Hospital) to protest the "killing of innocent 
people" (Star, 9 April 1990, Karachi) was, ironically, in a week that saw 
over 70 deaths and 300 injuries in ethnic violence in Karachi (Morning 
News, 12 April 1990, Karachi). The relationship of the violence to wider 
political processes at this time was very different to the situation at 
the time of the riots in 1986. Furthermore, unlike the period before 
1988, this later period was one of nominally democratic government. 
Obviously, the violence of MQM supporters was matched by that 
of certain Sindhi nationalists, and this must be mentioned as one of the 
reasons why the climate of ethnic rivalry in Sindh has become so heated 
in recent years. Fhe September 1988 Hyderabad bombings can only be 
described as brutal acts of ethnic terrorism. Ihe lact that the 
casualities were almost exclusively XbbajIz-s points to the violent 
lengths to which certain players in the ethno-political drama will go, 
and also describes the socio-political environment in which the MQM was 
developing and growing. 
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It is interesting to note that the return of democracy in 
Pakistan does not seem to have altered the focus and energy of 
community frustrations with the local and central state. In these terms, 
not only is the state seen as fundamentally "unaccountable" for its 
policies, but organs such as the police are seen as partisan and 
repressive, much as they were under military rule. Such sentiments could 
relate both to the perceived nature of the state under democracy, or to 
a failure to eradicate memories of the nature of the state under 
military rule, even when that rule is removed. Perhaps most likely is the 
fact that democracy in Pakistan cannot always be compared to Western 
versions of democracy. The post-Zia regime has actually seen little 
change in the "feudal" bargainings, "horse-trading" and repression of 
opposition that has pervaded Pakistan's politics since Independence. 
There is still much to be altered in the corridors of Islamabad before 
the population can start to believe that things really have changed 
since the dark days of Zia. 
With regards to urban violence, Tambiah has suggested that 
politics in South Asia often involves an element of widespread civil 
disorder. He cites the examples of the local government elections in 
Bangladesh in 1988, the national elections in India in 1989, and the 
Presidential Referendum in Sri Lanka in 1982, all of which were 
accompanied by large-scale violence (Tambiah, 1990, pp. 753-54). On the 
smaller scale of strikes, political meetings or "events" such as hunger 
strikes, I would argue that conditions in Karachi between 1988 and 1990 
lend credence to Tambiah's account of the mechanics of South Asian 
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democracy and its relationship to widespread civil disorder. I will 
return to this point later. 
PDst-1990 conditions 
By Sunner 1990, and particularly after the Pucca Qi1a incident 
of June in that year, the MQM had firmly aligned itself against the PPP 
government, and had Joined the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) that 
eventually "won" the general election in October 19C)0. In many ways, the 
manner in which the MQM had increasingly begun to "control" political 
and ethnic violence in urban Sindh through the imposition of strikes and 
demonstrations around which the violence concentrated, was demonstrated 
by the fact that the violence abruptly ended in the cities of the 
province after the IJI government was installed. In Sindh, the XQM is 
the principal component of the provincial administration, ironically 
united with the nationalist Sindh National Alliance (SNA) of G. H Syed, 
initially under the tutelage of Chief Minister Jam Sadiq Ali (an 
embittered PPP dissident) until his death in March 1992. In these terms, 
the XQM has achieved its goal of holding office in Sindh, yet has lost 
some direction as a result. 
The sort of ethnic violence that rose to a crescendo in the 
1980s has thus largely disappeared trom the scene in urban Sindh, at 
least for the time being. Mis is not to say that all urban violence has 
ended, however. In the sphere of student politics, the APHSO has be-=n 
battling with the IJT over specific college issues, claiming the li-, res ot 
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some students in the process (Dawn, 30 January 1991, Karachi). In 
Hyderabad meanwhile, six people were killed by a bomb on the occasion 
of an anti-government strike called by the PPP's student wing, the PSF 
(The News, 21 January 1992, Karachi). Shortly before, opposition by 
Sindhi nationalists to the appointment of the interim successor to Sindh 
Chief Minister Jam Sadiq Ali, the Nohajir Tariq Javaid, was punctuated 
with the explosion of seven bombs in the centre of Karachi, injuring at 
least 17 people (Dawn, 4 November 1991, Karachi). Finally, the sort of 
spontaneous violence arising from disputes or accidents, or criminal 
violence such as kidnappings and murders, have continued apace. In these 
terms, the underlying conditions in which the modes of violence in the 
1980s were articulated, are still very much in place. These fears were 
strengthened by the controversial Sukkur incident of February 1991. 
7.5 XODES OF VIOLENCE 
The episodes of violence selected f or analysis above are 
intended to convey the changes and developments that civil society in 
Karachi and other parts of urban Sindh was experiencing through the 
1980s. The episodes show a complex combination of factors, which 
together appear to result in different forms of violence. The violence 
that accelerated in Karachi through the 1980s can broadly be described 
as ethnic, political or criminal violence. (Religious sectarian conf lict 
has occurred in Karachi as in other parts of Pakistan, but during the 
1980s it seemed to be overshadowed by other forms of conflict in the 
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city, and did not appear to be an element of large-scale unrest at this 
time. I will return to this form of violence later). I would argue that 
in terms of societal tensions underpinning civil disorder, these forms 
of violence are not muWally exclusive. I have suggested that one of the 
factors that leads unrest to assume differing modes of expression in 
various contexts, is the element of the specific socio-political and 
physical features of the location of the unrest. It is necessary, 
therefore, to consider how the physical environment of Karachi has 
shaped the unrest that has taken place there. 
Xajor forms of violence in urban Sindh in the 1980s 
The large riots of October /November and December 1986 involved 
a complex range of incidents and events, but the most murderous aspect 
appeared to be ethnic sectarianism, focussing on particular districts of 
Orangi such as Qasba and Aligarh Colonies. Here, Pakhtun groups singled- 
out non-Pakhtun people and property tor increasingly merciless attack, 
with little regard for who fell victim. 
There was also an element of revenge here, a process itselt 
relating to ethnicity, since the Bibaris in parts of Orangi may have 
inflicted similar violence on Pakhtuns. in the unrest of April 1985. Yet 
the involvement of interest-groups behind the scenes places a question- 
mark over the spontaneity of the violence. Rude would suggest that the 
murderous acts could not have been committed without a fundamental 
underlying belief among the wider population in the foundation of the 
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violence (Rude, 1981, pp. 244-5), in this case ethnic particularism. 
Alternatively, Tambiah, using the example of ethnic violence in Sri 
Lanka, suggests that the violence gains its own momentum after a while, 
negating the importance or relevance of it-. s original foundations, and 
eventually forcing disparate communities and viewpoints into polarised 
camps (Tambiah, 1986, pp. 118,121). It is important to try and return to 
those original foundations, however, if the violence is to be understood. 
Certainly the manner in which ethnic violence has waxed and waned in 
urban Sindh casts a shadow over the concept of spontaneous ethnic 
violence. 
After 1988, there were many violent incidents of an ethnic 
nature, but this time involving Sindhis and Xobajirs rather than 
Pakhtuns, and often occurring in places other Lhan Karachi. Here, attacks 
were conducted from speeding cars or motorbikes, by masked men with 
powerful firearms, claiming victims for little reason other than their 
ethnic identity. The incidents are too numerous to mention, but the 
September 1988 massacre in Hyderabad probably brought this form of 
SindhilXobajlz- violence to the streets of Karachi for the first time. A 
particularly important aspect of the post-1988 violence was that it 
became "politicised" by the MQM, who blamed the attacks on Nobajirs on a 
cartel of Sindhi nationalists and the PPP, and who largely ignored the 
countless attacks on Sindhis occurring at the same time. Fhe battle at 
large became articulated by student groups also, with the APKSO on the 
side of the Mohajir-s and the PSF fighting for the Sindhis. Here, the 
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violence involved murder, abducl. ioii, and Lorhire in khels [subterranean 
torture chambers]; (Pakistan Profile, 1-14 June 1990, London, p. 10). 
With regard to the politicisation of violence we can 
"return to 
Tambiah's argument that, in South Asia, processes of democracy and 
"collective violence" are integrally linked (Tambiah, 1990, p. 758). I have 
shown that, in some respects, this theory does apply to urban Sindh, 
particularly in terms of the 1988-90 period. However, it should be 
reiterated that local factors shape the made and expression of urban 
violence in any one city. In the case of Pakistan, I would argue that 
such local factors call into question Tambiah's theory of collective 
violence relating to political processes, modelled on Bangladesh, India 
and Sri Lanka (Tambiah, ibid, pp. 753-54). Firstly, unlike India, 
Pakistan's history involves almost continuous Martial Law, with very 
little participatory democracy. Certainly in the period running up to 
1988, when large-scale ethnic riots had taken place in Karachi, the 
political scene was governed by General Zia whose regime was probably 
the most oppressive of all in Pakistan's history. Furthermore, unlike the 
examples of Sri Lanka or parts of India (such as Punjab), the few 
elections that have taken place in Pakistan have themselves been 
relatively peacefully conducted, and the major bouts of collective urban 
violence have occurred at altogether different times. 
Religious sectarian violence has often flared in Karachi, and 
could be said to be a persistant. problem throughout Pakistan. In many 
ways, this form of violence links the societal tensions and stresses in 
other parts of Pakistan with conditions in Karachi. During my fieldwork 
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period in Winter/Spring 1991, Punjab Province was suffering SunnilSbia 
clashes in the city of Jhang, following the apparently politically- 
motivated murder of a leader of an extremist Sunni party. Many of the 
details of the conflict were similar_ to those of ethnic and other 
conflicts in Sindh throughout the 1980s, such as the use of Kalasbnlkov 
rifles, and the resultant spatial polarisation of communities in the city 
(Herald, February 1991, Karachi, p. 61). In Karachi, meanwhile, religious 
sectarian conflict has signified both inter-Islamic clashes, and attacks 
an religious minorities by Muslims, notably after events in neighbouring 
India involving "communal" conflicts. 
I have suggested that, in many respects, and particularly in 
terms of the location of violence, Islamic sectarian clashes in Karachi 
in 1983/84 were similar in their nature and nodes of expression to 
incidents that were later labelled "ethnic riots". Police data record two 
SunnilSbia riots in February and March 1983 in the districts of 
Liaquatabad and Sohrab Goth, which necessitated the imposition of six 
and ten day periods of curfew respectively in those districts (COEKA, 
Implementation Review, 2 May 1989, Karachi, p. giv). The ethnic nature of 
these districts (largely Pakhtun in Sohrab Goth and Nobajir in 
Liaquatabad), and the fact that they would recur in subsequent ethnic 
unrest, suggests that the sectarian riots of 1983 were forerunners to 
later "ethnic" disturbances. 
In the years following 1983, it seemed as if large-scale Islamic 
sectarian violence in Karachi was overshadowed by other forms of 
violence, at least as far as police data would suggest (ibid). By 1992, 
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however, when ethnic violence had subsided in the city, sectarian 
conflict re-emerged in the form of a dispute between Sunnis and Vababi 
Deobandis over the jurisidicUoti oi a mosque Ju cenlial 1-iiacbJ. Me 
Sunnis have been represented in part by a militant organisation called 
the Sunni Tebrik. Again, the outward expressions of the conflict, such as 
the use of automatic weapons, and attacks on journalists and newspapers 
(Herald, January 1992, Karachi, p. 74), were all too familiar. I would 
argue that these episodes of sectarian violence, when -viewed in 
combination with the other episodes of' violence I have described, 
constitute a picture of continuous inter-community urban violence in 
Karachi, despite the expression of that violence fluctuating between 
ethnic and Islamic conflict. Sectarian violence also links cQnditions in 
Karachi with urban contexts in other parts of Pakistan, to form a 
picture of a crisis in the civil order of the country. 
It is important, however, to distinguish between the conditions 
in which violence flares, and the specif ic modes of that violence once it 
takes a hold. I would argue that "collective violence" in South Asia, and 
its relationship to wider political processes, reflects the underlying 
tensions and weaknesses of some postcolonial South Asian States. In 
previous chapters I have shown how a lack of synthesis between 
community identities and the national State in Pakistan has led to 
societal stresses which have often resulted in serious civil disorder. It 
is true to say that these problems of "national development" apply Just 
as much to Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh, where ethnic or other 
community movements have also risen and sought reparation from the 
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national unit (such as in Kashmir or Punjab in India, or in the Tamil 
areas of India and Sri Lanka). 
The brief experience of democracy in Pakistan since Zia's death 
in 1988 has hardly reassured the regional communities of the country of 
their rights to representation or of the accountability of national 
institutions. Government since 1988 has been punctuated by examples of 
the abuse of power by elected ministries. The Bhutto government was 
rocked by financial scandals that ultimately contributed to its downfall. 
The IJI government that followed was often willing to oppress those who 
opposed its rule. 
This oppression was particularly marked at the provincial level 
in Sindh, since it was in this Province that the the major force of 
opposition to the IJI - the PPP - was based. The provincial 
administration under Jam Sadiq Ali (who was replaced on his death in 
1992) mercilessly intimidated the PDA opposition. "The Jam's" methods 
involved the repeated arrest of PDA delegates, sometimes an the eve of 
Senate or by-elections and occasionally without charge. (See, for 
example, the arrest of MPAs and the surrounding of the residences of 
others by police an the evening before Senate by-elections in December 
1990; Dawn, 1 December 1990, Karachi). Perhaps most unsettling of all 
are the charges made by the PDA that the elections of 1990 were rigged 
to ensure an IJI victory (PDA, 1991). 
All of these practices and allegations suggest that even under 
"democracy", unconstitutional and oppressive measures can be used by the 
state to achieve its aims and settle disputes. Returning again to the 
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example of Sri Lanka, Tambiah observes that one of the island's worst 
ever bouts of civil disorder occurred some months after the staginS of a 
national referendum in 1983 (I'ambiah, 1990, p. 754). As a paper issued by 
a civil rights organisation in Colombo observed: 
"The fact that violence has been used to meet criticism 
and political dissent in the country as a whole, including 
the Sinhala areas, may well have encouraged the belief that 
the ethnic problems could be dealt with in a similar manner" 
(in Tambiah, 1990, pp. 754-5). 
Thus, by using violence, intimidation and oppression itself, the 
government encourages the population to do the same to settle its 
problems. The military governments of Pakistan freely used such methods, 
since they were largely unaccountable at the time. Democratic government 
in Pakistan has not so far suggested that the situation can be 
significantly different. 
Much urban violence in Sindh cannot be termed "ethnic" or 
political, but is more precisely criminal. However, the same perceived 
failures of the state can be noted in regard to the growth of serious 
crime, which has increasingly set foot on the streets of Karachi. Table 
7.2 shows the increase of serious crime in Pakistan through the 1980s. 
Of course, crime is often "politicised" and related to the fund- 
raising of political groups, in the manner of terrorist groups in 
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Crime No. oi reported cases 
19&k 198Q 
Murder 4307 7928 
Kidnapping 3228 6195 
Dacolt7 70 451 
Source: Government of Pakistan, 1990a, p. 375 
Northern Ireland. In Hyderabad, the Iqbal Ladla faction, which clains 
allegiance to the MQM, is suspected of involvement in illicit activities 
such as Sun-running. (It was nominally this faction that was the target 
of the ill-fated Pucca Q11a operation in May 1990). It is impossible to 
verify such political links. Much of the violence in urban Sindh is 
probably motivated by greed, as press reports concerning various arrests 
and "busting" of seemingly autonomous "gangs" would suggest (see The 
News, 20 January 1992, Karachi). In 1990, there were 76 reported 
kidnappings in Karachi. By January 1991, all but four of these had been 
returned after the payment of ransom money, reaching up to three million 
Rupees in some cases (Herald, January 1991, Karachi, p. 84). One 
unfortunate victim, the son of a wealthy Jeweller, was kidnapped twice 
within six months (Herald, ibid). The Nawaz Sharif government reinstated 
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a policy of public hanging in an attempt to present a decisive face an 
violence (although no hangings were conducted under its rule). 
Violence in Karachi and conspiracy theories 
The inherent complexity of the urban violence in Sindh, and 
particularly the mysterious nature of the "masked attackers" involved in 
many incidents of violence in the Karachi in the late 1980s, has not 
surprisingly led to a wealth of conspiracy theories. The theories 
suggest that violence in Karachi is neither ethnic-sectarian, "political" 
or structural in form, but concerns a sponsorship of violence by "hidden 
hands" bent on the disintegration or destabilisation of Pakistan through 
the disruption of its major economic centre. 
The most often held conspiracy theory is that relating to the 
riots of 1986, which some have interpreted as being organised and 
exacerbated by hidden "mafias". These groups can operate without 
interception by the authorities within a general climate of anarchy. Arif 
Hasan termed the process an "ethnic smokescreen" (interview, 11 February 
1991, Karachi), whereby powerful ethnic and tribal rivalries can be 
excited and provoked to develop an ongoing situation of violence and 
reprisal. The process causes the police to employ most of their energy 
in riot-control and curfew supervision, and also creates "no-go" 
districts where clandestine groups can operate more freely. The 
geographical focus of smokescreen- rioting is assumed to relate to the 
pattern of informal-sector land development and other businesses 
-497- 
described in the previous chapter. Vriting in November 1986, Arif Hasan 
claimed that "outsiders" had Just purchased some katcbi abadi land 
around Benares Chowk and in Aligarh Colony, to develop or rent illegally 
(Herald, December 1986, Karachi, p. 7). Fhese areas became the epicentres 
of the two large riots at the end of 1986, supposedly to create a 
"smokescreen" over the work of the "outsiders". 
Similarly, Aknal Hussain speaks of "syndicate organisations" 
which have entered the city with the "large illegal arms market and the 
burgeoning heroin trade" (A. Hussain, 1987, p. 4). With slight differences 
to the "ethnic smokescreen" theory of Arif Hasan above, Akmal Hussain 
suggests that the mafias "mobilised" the Pakhtun community in 
retaliation to the threat posed by the authorities with Operation Clean- 
up (ibid). Christina Lamb, meanwhile, suggests that in Karachi, "vast 
areas are controlled by drug barons" (Lamb, 1991, p. 139). Hamza Alavi 
holds to much the same theory, describing the situation in the following 
terms. 
"There is a well-organized Fatban mafia that is well- 
entrenched in trade in drugs, illegal arms and, not 
least, rackets in urban land ...... There were attempts 
to explain away that violence 11986/871 as an ethnic 
conflict, an explanation that masks its organized 
nature and the interests that lie behind it. " 
(Alavi, 1989, pp. 245-6). 
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Here again the "mafia" is named, although in this instance there is a 
danger of equating the problem with a particular ethnic group, and of 
thinking that collective violence is synonymous with Pakhtun (or Pathan) 
identity; an equation that Wali Khan has warned against. That Pakhtun 
groups were effectively mobilised along ethnic lines in the large-scale 
Karachi riots of the mid-1980s says nothing about the underlying 
interests in land or clandestine businesses that may constitute the 
"nafias", not least with respect to their own identity. It is not clear 
why such interests would want to actively promote unrest, other than 
possibly through wanting to drive down land prices in order to speculate 
in the urban land market. 
The "Indian factor" in Pakistani politics must also be 
mentioned, since it produces the most regular f low of conspiracy 
theories. This matter is more important in such cities as Lahore, 
according to "Nation" editor Arif Nizami (interview, 23 February 1991, 
Lahore), than is the case in urban Sindh, due to differing proxinities to 
cities in India. Nevertheless, the matter has occasionally surfaced in 
Sindh. This was particularly the case in February 1990, when the calling 
of a strike by the MQM in the middle of a "solidarity week" for the 
Muslims of Kashmir, led theories to circulate that the MQM was working 
with Indian agents to destabilise the Pakistani government (Pakistan 
Times, 17 February 1990, Lahore). An interior minister in the Bhutto 
government at the time announced that investigations were being made to 
determine if the Indian intelligence service, the Research and Analysis 
Wing (RAW), was involved in the Karachi disturbances (Daily Leader, 15 
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February 1990, Karachi). The matter remains just one of the many 
unverifiable accusations of Indian intelligence interference in Pakistan, 
and vice versa. 
At around the same time as the "Black Wednesday" strike of 
February 1990, the chief of the PPI Sarwar Awan was voicing a theory 
that Altaf Hussain and the MQM were endeavouring to make Karachi a free 
port, like Hong Kong, and to this end were inciting riots that would 
drive non-NobaJirs opposed to the idea from the city (Muslim, 16 
February 1990, Karachi). The "Hong Kong" theory was also voiced by a 
prominent Sindhi academic'. The theory is that, with the return of Hong- 
Kong to China, the clandestine businesses that have flourished in that 
city will look for another Asian city in which to base their operations. 
These businesses have supposedly looked to Karachi and the MQM as a 
possible "host", and have been harnessing disenchanted poor labour to 
indulge in destabilisation in the city and thus weaken the grip of the 
law-enforcement agencies (interview, 18 February 1991). This theory also 
remains unverifiable, and relates to the question of the "separation" of 
urban Sindh in the MQM's policy, as discussed earlier. The theory is also 
somewhat untenable in economic terms. I have shown that unrest has 
actively discouraged investment in the cities of Sindh. 
The conspiracy theories, particularly those concerning Indian 
intelligence-agency involvement, need to be taken with a pinch of salt. 
The voicing of such theories is a favourite pastime of amateur political 
analysts throughout South Asia, and r found nothing to vindicate such 
theories as the "Hong Kong" model. No doubt there is* much anti-MQM 
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propaganda at work in these theories. Nevertheless, the abundance of 
such theories helps to explain both the complexity and opacity of the 
processes of urban violence that Sindh was suffering at the end of the 
1980s. Furthermore, some credence should be given to "mafia" theories. 
There are undoubtedly some organised criminal gangs operating in 
Karachi, as there are in many South Asian cities, witb another notable 
example being Bombay. (The "Bombay bombings" of early 1993 are 
suspected of being the work of disenchanted Muslim "mafia" organisations 
also involved in urban land market speculation). The details of the large 
riots of 1986 and 1987, for example, suggest that some form of quite 
well-organised networks were contributing in some way to the 
development of civil disorder at the time. 
Xodes of violence in Karachi 
In the previous chapter I described the informal sector of the 
local state in Karachi, and suggested that this sector responds to 
weaknesses and shortfalls of the state in two ways. Firstly, some local 
community organisations and businesses tackle the developmental 
problems that the state has failed to address. Secondly, clandestine and 
illegal businesses take advantage of the lack of state jurisdiction in 
many areas. I have suggested in this chapter that the "mafias" in 
Karachi have, to different degrees at different times, been important 
contestants in the battle for urban space in Karachi. It should also be 
recognised that much urban violence in Sindh is criminal violence, which 
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also takes advantage of lacking or weak official jurisdiction in many 
areas. Criminal violence in urban Sindh is closely related to that in 
rural areas of the province, where I'dacoits" have operated regardless of 
developments in the political arena. 
Conditions in the Frontier region and elsewhere have given form 
to clandestine racketeering businesses in Karachi, and particularly the 
trafficking of heroin from the Golden Crescent (which is constituted by 
Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan). Here again, specific conditions have 
shaped the particularly explosive and militarised modes of violence in 
the socio-political environment of Sindh, in ways that may not 
necessarily apply to other cities in South Asia or elsewhere. 
The transport sector in Karachi also constitutes a significant 
element of the violence. Again, much of the problem stems from the role 
of the central state, which is seen to play a somewhat ineffectual role 
in the improvement of traffic conditions, by exercising little control on 
operators, failing to provide an adequate low-cost public transport 
system of its own, and largely failing to enforce traffic rules. 
Transport legislation, meanwhile, has been slow and bureaucratically 
complex. The circular railway line around the centre of the city has 
proved to be of little attraction to urban travellers. In 1974 a Rapid 
Transport Cell was set-up by the Bhutto government to analyse the 
overall problem. Since then various reports and suggestions have been 
made, concerning such ideas as subways, electric tramways and improved 
government bus services, but no scheme has so far progressed beyond 
embryonic stage (COEKA, March 1986, p. 66). 
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In times of rioting, the proliferation of buses, rickshaws and 
taxis throughout the city has led to their destruction and use as 
material for barricades against movement. The burning of vehicles 
provides an effective barricade on the streets, particularly in the wide 
straight avenues dissected by the raised or planted central reservations 
characteristic of many parts of Karachi, where one side of the street 
can be quickly blocked (see Figures 7.2 and 7.3, which show South Avenue 
in SITE, a frequent scene of disruptive rioting). Tambiah has suggested 
that the burning of rickshaws and buses was an important element of the 
Hindu/Sikh riots in Delhi in 1984. Here, as was the case with the 
Pakhtun-owned vehicles in Karachi, the motivation for the attacks was 
not only to cause disruption but to strike at the economic assets of the 
targeted community (Tambiah, 1990, p. 745). In any given city, the outward 
dynamics of inter-community violence will be shaped by the nature of 
these community assets. 
An important spatial element of the rioting is the aspect of 
"nodal points", that Tambiah observed in the case of Benares Cbowk 
(Tambiah, 1990, p. 749). The area, shown in Figures 7.4 and 7.5, is a 
congested traffic roundabout on a raised causeway over the Orangi Nala 
river. It has frequently been an effective focus for disruptive violence. 
All traffic in or out of Orangi must pass through Ranares Chowk, which 
negotiates the steep hillsides inhabited by semi-pacca Pakhtun colonies 
and the river valley that form the link between Orangi and Karachi. The 
congestion and strategic importance of the Chowk has made it the scene 
of disruptive disturbances many timer., notably in April 1985 when 
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Bushra Zaidi's dhoom Cfuneral procession] passed through, and the 
morning after Operation Clean-up when crowds of angry Pakhtuns blocked 
the Chowk and attacked passers-by. 
The recurrence of specific spatial nodes in the history of 
Sindh's urban violence thus depends on a variety of factors. I have 
described the cultural significance of Haider Cbowk in Hyderabad, the 
importance of which to Sindhis has caused Xobajir- activists to use the 
square as the location of provocative symbols of Xohajiz- lore. The 
square would not be the scene of violence so often, however, were it not 
also an important traffic node, whose blockage causes considerable 
disruption to the city of Hyderabad. 
The frequent occurrence of riots in the industrial area SITE in 
Karachi relates more specifically to physical features. The importance of 
the area to the city reflects the position held by Karachi within the 
national economy. A recognition of this position has led rioters to 
disrupt the area from as early as 1972, particularly on occasions when 
the disturbance involved a general protest at national or local 
government. Socio-political factors cannot be so relevant in the 
targeting of SITE, as the area is not residential and thus "belongs" to 
no particular community. 
7.6 CONCLUSIONS 
The sheer brutality of much of the ethnic violence that occurred 
in the second half of the 1980s in urban Sindh has led many to feel 
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that an "ethnic rift" has grown between Xobajirs and their neiShbours. 
We have also seen in the previous chapter that the production of 
embedded spatial patterns and processes have lent weight to such a 
theory of rift. 
However, I have argued that underlying the process of ethnic 
politics and violence, and linking it with other diverse modes of urban 
violence, is a basic crisis of civil order and state jurisdiction in 
Sindh, and in Pakistan more widely. The crisis has allowed the rise in 
Karachi of agencies that effectively operate "secondary states" within 
the city. Such organisations not only aim to provide facilities and 
opportunities for their own particular segments of the population where 
the state is perceived to have failed, but also to offer a secondary 
system of protection and "Justice" for those communities. On the one 
hand are the agents of violent clandestine businesses in guns, drugs and 
land; the "mafias" who may well have been active forces behind the large 
riots of 1986/87, while on the other hand there is the MQM, which has 
grown to challenge these agencies in such areas as Orangi, and gain its 
own grip on the city through the orchestration of violence (to 
supplement its dominance of civic agencies). By 1988/89, the MQH 
demonstrated that it had indeed gained "control" of politically-motivated 
civil disorder in the city. 
The sudden cessation of ethnic urban violence in Autumn 1990, 
broken seriously only once to date in the Sukkur incident (whose 
location and timing led to further conspiracy theories), has cast some 
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doubt on the depth of the "ethnic rift" within the population of Sindh. 
Sindhi nationalist leader mumtaz Bhtill-o claimed that: 
"I am not over-awed by this Sindhi/Xobajir conflict. 
After all before 1986 they had all lived side by. side. 
There was a flare-up in 1972, but that was isolated. 
Between 1972 and 1986 there were no conflicts. So why 
suddenly now? " 
(interview, 21 June 1991, London). 
The implication is that the violence has been promoted and harnessed by 
political, I'mafia", or other mysterious interests - in this case by the 
Zia regime who is charged with operating divide-and-rule policies in 
Sindh (Mumtaz Bhutto, ibid). Here, the "communalism" debates are again 
recalled, whereby some claim that religion was used as a basis for 
violence for political purposes in pre-Partition India (Dyakov, 1966, 
p. 81), in the same way that ethnicity is used now in Pakistan and 
elsewhere. If this is the case with the Sindhi1Xdbaj1. r conflict, then at 
least there is some hope that communities can be reconciled as rapidly 
as they were pitted against one another. 
But in many ways the damage has already been done, particularly 
in the economic sphere, where ethnic disturbances coupled with unchecked 
crime have frightened off potential investors. Incentives for 
decentralisation, particularly out of Karachi towards the pro,,? ince of 
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Punjab, have led private industrial development to stagnate in Karachi in 
recent years. Between 1985 and 1989, loans sanctioned by the National 
Development Finance Corporation for major projects in Sindh declined in 
number by 47.8%, while in Punjab the number rose over the same period by 
105.9% (Herald, May 1991, Karachi, p. 106). Fear of disruption, as well as 
the sheer physical problems associated with curfews and sabotaged 
facilities, have a grave effect on the economic sphere. Investors 
evidently take these matters seriously. In January 1992, for example, a 
report of differences between Altaf Hussain and the Prime Minister led 
to substantial falls in the Karachi Stock Exchange (The News, Business, 
19 January 1992, Karachi). Meanwhile the Sukkur incident of February 
1991 added to the economic misery there. The President of the Chamber 
of Commerce in the city said that 40 units in the industrial estate had 
closed in the months immediately preceding the incident, leaving the 
estate with a "deserted look" (Herald, March 1991, Karachi, p. 39). The 
violence in February 1991 can only have accelerated this process. Given 
that unemployment is considered by KDA director Abu Shamim Arif to be 
one of the most important sources of frustration among Karachi youth 
(interview, 12 April 1991, Karachi), the economic impact of the violence 
can only bode ill. 
In many ways, the problem is common to many postcolonial 
societies. Wignaraja, in examining South Asian society, suggests that a 
common process of persistant civil disorder springing irom feelings of 
"fear, insecurity and aggression" (Wignaraja, 1989, p. 20) was arising 
throughout the subcontinent at the end of the 1980s. 
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Akmal Hussain has analysed Pakistan's own particular problem of 
civil disorder in terms of an "undermining of civil society" (A. Hussain, 
1990, pp. 367-94). Ile has linked the growing problem of violence to two 
main factors. Firstly, there have been the problems of economic 
development and growth, leading to wide economic disparities across 
regions and sectors of the population. Secondly, the Zia era in Pakistan 
led to particular processes of militarisation and economic dependence in 
society. The dependence was symbolised both by an increasing reliance on 
U. S. aid, and an exploitation of cheap labour opportunities in the Gulf, 
both of which are now being denied or are reducing in importance. 
Militarisation, meanwhile, sprang from the processes I have described 
with respect to Karachi, such as the flood of arms into society, the 
growth of "Mafia type syndicates" (A. Hussain, ibid, p. 386) and the lack 
of participatory political processes to encourage moderate political and 
student groups. In these terms, the growth of violence has related both 
to general problems common to most of the developing world, and to 
Pakistan's own specific political history. 
In Sindh, urban and rural, the security situation has probably 
worsened steadily throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. In 1991 up to 
the end of May, 1,294 kidnappings were reported around the province 
(Herald, July 1991, p. 86), and many more doubtless went unreported. 
Occasionally, and notably during the Benazir Bhutto government of 1988- 
90, such a breakdown of law and order has touched the city of Karachi; 
between August and October 1990, for instance, 42 people were reportedly 
kidnapped for ransom in the city (Herald, January 1991, Karachi, p. 84). 
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Where the state fails, other community organisattions such as the MQM in 
the case of Rcbajirs, biraderi (clan] groups, ethnic or subnationalist 
parties in the case of Pakhtuns, Sindhis and others, or simply crowds of 
angry citizens, offer other forums in which local voices can be heard. 
Often the Kalasbnikav is chosen as the most effective way to end a 
debate. With each violent incident, the bitterness and militarisation of 
such conflicts increases. Communities have memories. 
The shadow of mysterious "hidden hands", about whom nothing can 
be said with any certainty, has fallen over all the incidents of urban 
violence in Karachi. In terms of MQM involvement, the violence through 
the 1980s can be seen effectively as a battle for control of Pakistan's 
economic hub, Karachi. In the large riots of 1986 it seemed that forces 
other than the MQM were dominant in the city. After 1987, however, when 
the Movement began its domination of the city's civic agencies, and 
orchstrated the rise and fall of violence on the streets of Karachi with 
the strikes, demonstrations and "hunger strikes" that it organised, it 
appeared that the MQM had finally "taken control" of urban Sindh. It is 
perhaps significant that the Novement has called for the police to be 
brought under the control of the KMC, which the MQM dominates. This act 
would more or less complete the Movement's grip on the city. 
In these terms, I have argued that a theory of "ethnic rift" 
alone is not an adequate one to "explain" what has been happening in 
urban Sindh over the last few years. Both Ponna Vignaraja (Wignaraja, 
1989, p. 22) and Akmal Hussain (interview, 24 February 1991, Lahore) 
agree that ethnic particularism in South Asia represents a reversion to 
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"proximate identities" as a response to societal problems. A comparison 
of incidences of violence in Karachi over recent years, and between 
Karachi and conditions in other cities in Pakistan, suggests a growing 
problem of persistant urban violence, despite the outward expressions of 
that violence varying between cases. The tensions in the State of 
Pakistan that lie beneath this violence relate to the battle for local 
urban control (which highlights the MQM's role in the violence), to civic 
problems such as burgeoning unemployment, and to the undermining of 
civil society, whereby communities increasingly turn to the Kalasbnikov 
to resolve problems. I would argue that the problem is faced not only by 
Karachi or Pakistan, but also by many contemporary postcolonial 
developing countries. 
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FOOTNOTES: 
I, The bomb exploded in the grounds of the Sindh Government Secretariat buildings, 
killing one person and wounding many others, Responsibility for the bombing has not 
yet been claimed by any agency (Herald, October 1991, Karachi, pp, 37-8), 
2, The following case studies are derived from press sources comprising: "Herald', 
'Newsline", 'Viewpoint", *Dawn', 'The Star', "The Muslim*, 'The Nation', "The Frontier 
Post" and 'Pakistan Times" 
3. The location and timing of the Sukkur incident are significant for two reasons, 
Firstly, the incident happened in a city that is believed to have been largely free of 
such brutal incidents before 1991, even during the height of the violence in Karachi 
and Hyderabad. Secondly, the incident came some months after a general calm had 
descended on other urban areas in Sindh, Many in Pakistan feel that the incident was 
deliberately engineered (by unspecified "anti-democratic elements" - the "hidden hand" 
factor) to attract criticisms of the government's handling of affairs in Sindh, 
4, No further details of this interview can be given, 
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SECTION FOUR 
OVERVIEV AID FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 
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It is the true desire of every artist to impose his 
or her vision on the world; and Fakist'. in, the peeling, 
fragmenting palimpsest, increasingly at war ; -/itb itself, 
may be described as a failure of the dreaming mind. 
(Salman Rushdie, 1983, p. 87). 
In this dissertation I have not only been concerned with questions 
of nationalism, subnationalism and ethnicity in a developing postcolonial 
country, or with the organisation, dynamics and rhetoric of a political 
party/novement, but rather with the intersections between these 
questions, events and themes. 
It is clear that many post-colonial States have faced problems in 
forging a nation - or a sense of a nation - from a diverse collection of 
regional cultures and ethnic groups. In the case of Pakistan, I have 
shown that the problems of nation-building have been hampered by two 
main sets of factors. On the one hand, there is the matter of an unhappy 
imperial legacy. Pakistan was formed on the edges of the British Empire 
in India, and came into being in areas largely devoid of raw materials 
and established industries. In order to overcome these inauspicious 
economic beginnings, it might be supposed that a strong state would be 
required to fashion a process of economic de-, elopment based hesitantly 
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an agrarian reform and initially assisted with import- substitution 
industrialisation and massive injections of foreign aid. On the other 
hand, the possibility of creating a strong and democratic state in 
Pakistan was hampered by certain weaknesses in civil society in the new 
State and by the lack of secure bases upon which might be created a 
sturdy vision of national identity and development. The "nation" of 
Pakistan was always an artifice, and soon after its promulgation in 1947 
it became apparent that the central state (and Punjab) would face a 
series of challenges from those established ethnic groups - Bengalis, 
Sindhis, Baluchis - who could, on occasions, consider themselves to be 
outside the "project" of Pakistan. 
The main power-brokers in Pakistan have attempted to come to terms 
with these tasks - and with the task of nation-building above all - by 
stressing (at least rhetorically) the importance of Islam and Urdu as 
unifying elements of the nation and identity of Pakistan. I have shown 
in this dissertation, however, that neither of these identities is 
sufficiently stable (or widely enough used in the case of Urdu) to form 
a lasting and unproblematic foundation for Pakistani nationalism. In 
practice, therefore, the State of Pakistan has regularly had to be held 
together by the army. In this respect, Pakistan bears out Clapham's 
depiction of the postcolonial developing state as a seemingly 
paradoxical combination of strength and fragility. On the one hand, the 
development of civil institutions in States like Pakistan is sufficiently 
understated that the army can rule by force in order to create or impose 
one version of "national development" among the population. On the other 
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hand, the lack of support for army rule, in tandem with its own internal 
tensions, means that military rule is often vulnerable to sudden coups 
and successions. In Pakistan, too, the territorial reach of the central 
state is far from secure, as is only too evident in the bandit-infested 
regions of Sindh (and to some extents Baluchistan). In a curious echo of 
British days in India, the central state is sometimes condemned to rule 
parts of Pakistan by courtesy of various local leaders and brigands, 
moving to crush them only when the wider interests of the State of 
Pakistan are threatened. 
It was into this wider political climate that the KQM emerged so 
forcefully in the 1980s. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the MQM - and 
certainly its leadership soon became infected by the political 
vocabularies then present more widely in Pakistan; vocabularies which 
emphasised force and the use of arms and which discounted the language 
of a more representational and non-violent politics. But why did the 
Movement emerge in the 1980s (above all) and not earlier, and why in 
Sindh and not in Punjab? A meaningful account of XdbaJ1r subnationalism 
must engage closely with these two questions. In my Judgement, it is 
possible to advance an account of the MQM which does not reduce its 
subject matter to an insubstantial and banal political movement and 
which does not only see its leaders as so many evanescent individuals 
bent only on maximising their own positions within Sindhi society 
(although this is clearly part of the story). 
I have tried to answer the two questions outlined above by 
examining the phenomenon of Xabajir subnationalism at two main levels. 
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At a general level, I have shown that the State of Pakistan was 
fundamentally unstable throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and that this 
instability was heightened by the consolidation of a more militant form 
of Sindhi nationalism in the south of the country. The rise to 
prominence of Sindhi leaders like G. M. Syed undoubtedly helped to foster 
the growth of a Nobajir sense of political identity, both by creating the 
NobaJ11- community as a possible target (or outsider) population, and by 
signalling the political mileage to be gained from mobilising on a 
community or "ethnic" basis. In the 1950s the Nobajiz- community had been 
a relatively prosperous community in Sindh, and Nobajirs were well 
represented in the corridors of power of the central government and in 
Pakistan's growing bureaucracy. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, this 
relative affluence was challenged, and probably diminished, by the 
continued induction of Punjabis into important positions within the 
state and by the removal of the national political centre to the 
Lahore-Rawalpindi- Islamabad region. 
But worse was to come at a local and provincial level. The Bhutto 
government in the early 1970s enacted a number of measures that 
alienated a sizeable part of the XabaJ12- community both economically and 
culturally. The first of such measures was the Sindhi Language Bill, 
which struck at the Urdu-speaking heart of the Nobajlr community. Very 
much related to this, in terms of employment, was the establishment of 
quotas for public-sector employment and higher education places that 
were designed to discriminate positively in favour of the rural 
populations of Sindh. In many developing countries - and possibly in 
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Pakistan - this latter policy could reasonably be accounted a 
progressive one; after all, Michael Lipton has not been alone in 
emphasising the depredations suffered by the "rural class" in the so- 
called Third World (Lipton, 1977; see also Clapham, 1985). From the point 
of view of the Hohajir community, however, these two measures directly 
threatened their present and future prosperity, precisely at a time 
(following the OPEC oil price rises of the mid-1970s) when formal 
sector employment in Pakistan was probably coming under threat. (I say 
probably, because it is difficult to obtain meaningful figures on 
unemployment and underemployment on a regional basis, over time, for 
Pakistan). It is thus surely not a coincidence - but rather a 
"predictable" response - that the APXS0 emerged in 1978 in the college 
campuses of urban Sindh to challenge the threat perceived to lie within 
the community quota scheme, and to engage (sometimes violently) with the 
other militarised student bodies that were then aiming to intimidate the 
dominant Urdu-speaking student population. 
It would be unwise to underplay these economic imperatives in the 
fornation and consolidation of a politicised Xobajir, community identity. 
In many post-colonial developing countries, access to education and 
public-sector jobs are often seen as the gateways to a better (or even 
tolerable) life. The state provides these resources and communities must 
struggle for them (as for any scarce public goods: Weiner, 1965). As the 
job-market tightened, then, it might be supposed, the incentive increased 
for certain Nobajir- individuals (and students at first) to present their 
"community" as a legitimate contender for whatever state largesse was on 
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offer. It may also follow that a Nobajir student community would be well 
placed, along with sympathetic figures in the public arena in urban 
Sindh, to fashion a nascent "ethnic intelligentsia" which could invent or 
re-invent those mythologies of Mobaiii- lore that might strengthen an 
emerging Nobajir- sense of community identity. I have indicated that this 
is precisely what happened from about the late-1970s through until the 
end of the 1980s. 
I have also shown that there were many good reasons why a latent 
sense of Xdbajir identity should flourish in the 1980s. Without needing 
to reiterate certain points, it is clear that Xcbajir subnationalism 
strengthened in the 1980s precisely as the national project of an 
"Islamic" politics began to falter, as Sindhi nationalism began to 
strengthen, and as parts of the economic and political fabric ot urban 
Sindh came under threat from "new" (non-Xobailr) "mafia" groups, 
accompanied by a "Kalasbnlkov culture" fed by conditions across the 
Pakistan border in Afghanistan. 1`o the extent that many Xobajizýs did 
recognise, by the 1980s, that they were involved in a deepening (and 
often defensive) struggle for economic dominance in urban Sindh, then 
developments such as these in Sindh would surely have sharpened their 
sense of community consciousness. By the 1980s it was not implausible 
that some Xdhajirs would feel that they were a community under threat 
in Sindh. This was not. Lbe case in Punjab, and it was not the case in 
Sindh in the 1950s or 1960s, but by the 1980s there were identifiable 
"foundations" upon which the MQM could build in Sindh's society. 
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The problems that the MQM has had to face, however, have been far 
from easy and have related to questions of possible alliance partners 
and questions of territory: to what we might call the geography of 
"subnationalist" struggle. In Section rhree of the dissertation I 
emphasised the importance of Karachi to MQM politics and noted how the 
centrality of this city has served both as a blessing and a curse f or 
the Movement. 
It is clear f irstly that the HQM has scored its greatest successes 
in the Nobajir- areas of Karachi, both in terms of public meetings 
organised and votes polled. Not surprisingly, the MQM has not performed 
well in non-Mobajir areas of urban Sindh - despite its avowedly national 
and secular political stance - nor has it addressed rural areas at all. 
More to the point, the MQM has been able to take control of large parts 
of Karachi. The Movement dominates the official local state (headed by 
the KMO and was able, in the late 1980s, to so reorient these local 
state agencies that the MQM was running a de facto "secondary state" in 
Karachi. State agencies that were meant to serve all community groups 
came increasingly to serve only Xdbajlzýs, and a classically clientalist 
form of politics was thereby reintorced. jýobajirs were encouraged Lo 
vote for the 14QK in the knowledge that the MQM would reward at least 
some of them with jobs and other forms of political patronage. The 
"secondary state" was also a bulwark lor the Xobajir- community against 
the dangers increasingly posed by various "mafia" groups working in (and 
controlling) Karachi's informal economy. The city ot Karachi became, In 
effect, the arena ot conflict between competing ethnic groups in the 
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1980s, with the MQM determined to show its mettle in defending the 
access of Mohajirs to the tormal and public-sector economies of the 
metropolis. Whether or not the MQM had the blessing of Islamabad is a 
moot point; at times it probably did. What matters, in any case, is that 
Karachi is so central to the economy ot Pakist. an as a wbole, that MQH 
control over it conferred great power oti what. oLher%-jise would have been 
little more than a local, urban-based, "ethnic" pressure group. Given the 
violent nature of the struggle for urban space, it is perhaps also 
understandable that the MQK indulged in political violence like most 
other political agencies. In Chapter 71 showed how and when the MQM 
was able to arganise "ethnic" violence in Karachi, (and to a lesser 
extent in Hyderabad and Sukkur). 
For all its successes in Karachi, however, the MQM has remained a 
political prisoner of particular places. I have shown that it was in 
1990, just when the XQ11's control over much ot urban Sindh was well 
established, that Altaf Hussain was encouraged to approach the national 
IJI coalition and subsequently to become a partner within the new 
federal government. It was at this stage that the 11QK's politics 
appeared to descend into meaningless lactionalism and banal 
sloganeering. The Movement started to make grandiose claims about 
wanting to uplitt the rural poor in Pakistan, and simultaneously Joined 
an alliance encompassing largely unpopular Islamic groups, 
subnationa lists, and some of the largest and most "feudal" landowning 
dynasties in southern Pakistan. The MQM's improbable somersaulting lound 
fruition in the supposedly new ideology ot "Practicalism and Realism" 
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that promised all things to all people, and that was quickly rejected by 
those who had supported the MQM as an ethnic political party delivering 
patronage to ethnically allflIaLed political supporters. I'he Movement has 
subsequently split into two tactions, each of which is probably not 
aided by autocratic - it sometimes charismatic - political leaders (and 
" corresponding lack ol accountability). I'he old MQM is now divided into 
" faction that supports class-based politics (or so it says), and 
another that proposes to mobilise alresh along ethnic lines. Moving 
outside Karachi and Sindh has not worked to the advantage ot the 
Movement. 
I have dealt, therefore, with the rise and fall of a political 
movement in the context at the postcolonial state, and subnationalism, 
in Pakistan. Perhaps more importantly, though, I have tried to 
demonstrate how a sometimes confusing, and latterly rather banal, 
political movement, fronted by the MQK, has been imbued with a 
meaningful - if often contradictory - political agenda, and how a study 
of such a political movement can have recourse to some quite traditional 
concepts and analytical procedures from within social science. In my 
Judgement, even a banal politics demands to be explained - it should 
not be mirrored in thought by accounts of politics which deny meaning 
or coherence to the political arena in large parts at the 1hird World. I 
have also demonstrated how geography, or the struggle lor political 
spaces and places, is central to an account of politics in a post- 
colonial country such as Pakistan. If the MQK holds a lesson tor 
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outsiders it is ill Lerms of questions of political meaning and 
meaninglessness, and in regard to political geographies. 
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a. Foreign and Commonwealth Office advice for visitors to Pakistan 
and Sindh, 1990/91 (page 525) 
b. British Deputy High Commission (Karachi) advice for visitors to 
Pakistan at the time of the Gulf War, January 1991 (pages 526-7). 
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FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE 
CONSULAR TRAVEL ADVICE 
COUNTRY: - 
PAKISTAN 
ADVICE TO: 
(a) Visitors - Travel to Pakistan has not been affected by the 
recent change of Government. Those intending to travel to Sindh 
Province should be aware that there has recently been inter-communal 
disturbances there. Visitors to Karachi in particular should be 
aware of the possibility of further clashes and should avoid crowds 
where possible. Those travelling to the interior of Sindh should 
contact the British Deputy High Commission, Karachi, tel: 532041-6. 
In Kashmir ýhere is the possibility of incidents near the line of 
control an4-*travellers are advised to avoid large crowds and 
demonstrations in the area. 
(b) (i) Longer Term Stayers (Employment/Residents) 
(ii) Aid/Charitv Workers - As above 
Issued on 31 August 1990 
By Travel Advice Unit 
Consular Department 
NB: While every care has been taken in preparing these notes, 
neither Her Majesty's Government nor any member of the British 
Consular staff abroad can accept any liability for injury, loss or 
damage arising in respect of any statement contained therein. 
RESCI 
IMMEDIATE ALL WARDENS 
BRITISH DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSION 
KAI; UkCill 
15 January 1991 
I should be grateful if you could inform British 
Nationals in your area of the following advice; - 
We are now entering a period of considerable international 
tension. We cannot rule out the possibility of serious civil 
disorder breaking out in Pakistan if hostilities in the Gulf 
begin. British Nationals should continue to follow our earlier 
advice of keeping a low profile, adopting commonsense security 
measures and stocking-up on essential food and other supplies 
- should shops close. 
We also have reason to believe that the general threat to 
British Nationals in Pakistan has increased. While we are NOT, 
at this stage, formally advising British Nationals to leave 
the country, it would be sensible for them to consider if 
_their 
dependents need to remain here at this time. 
It is their responsibility whether they act on this advice 
but the longer they delay, the more difficult the subsequent 
departure of their dependents may become. 
The nature of the current international crisis means that 
our advice could change at short notice. British Nationals 
should continue to keep in contact-with their Consular 
Warden and the Consular Section of the Deputy High Commission, 
open to the public, 8am to 3pm, Sunday. to Thursday. Out of 
hours, the duty officer can be contacted on an ansaphone 
service by telephoning 532041-6. They should also continue to 
listen to the news broadcasts on the BBC World Service. 
If they are aware of any casual visitors intending to come 
to Pakistan, it-would be sensible to ask them to consider 
postponing their visit for the moment. 
2 We are continuing to watch tile situation very closely and 
will keep you informed. 
J Wattam 
Attache (Consular) 
APPFVDTX 2e TEXT OF THE "AIDE MEKn]EREw 
Nationalism and Subnationallsiz in Pakistan: The Nahajir 
Xovement aims to examine the process of national development in 
Pakistan since Independence, by focussing on the community that played a 
pivotal role in founding the state during the last days of British rule 
in India. Emphasis is placed specifically on the Xc7bajir Qauml Movement 
(MQM) in urban Sindh in the 1980s, which has marked a movement in the 
Xbbaj!. r community away from integrationist, progressive rhetoric and 
action, towards more subnationalist, ethnic expressions. 
The aim is also to challenge traditional eurocentric theories 
and models of nationalism, modernity and development, and suggest a 
more paradoxical and complex experience in the process of "third world" 
national development. 
The research begins with a historical analysis of the Muslim 
community in India, and assesses the controversies and debates 
surrounding the emergence of mutually exclusive and hostile nationalist 
movements under the British, between the Hindu and Muslin communities. 
The theme of paradoxical development in the State of Pakistan is 
initiated with the electoral vagaries of the Pakistan Movement in the 
1940s, leading to the troubled period of Partition, and to the migrations 
and communal violence symbolised by this chapter of history. 
The political achievement of Pakistan is placed very much in the 
context of a specifically limited political intelligentsia leading the 
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national development of far wider communities of people. The research 
approaches this process by focussing specifically on the symbolism over 
time of the various communities that make up Pakistan, and specifically 
the Mohajirs, who not only played a crucial role in the creation of the 
State, but who have also been fundamental elements of the economic, and 
initially the political development of Pakistan up to the present day. 
The political sphere of society is the area in which the 
Mobajlr-s have been increasingly at adds with the dominant central 
power-brokers of Pakistan since Independence, socially, economically and 
culturally. This has marked a change over time in the political 
allegiance of the community. This research aims to analyse this 
political process, examining the motives for and the pressures on the 
Xabajir-s, that have led Lhem to for-n the MQM. Research in Karacbi will 
involve interviews with members of the party, against general political 
commentators, as well as the collection of archival and historical 
material that provides an appreciation of political symbolism, such as 
party manifestos and declarations. I would be most grateful for your 
assistance in this research project. 
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Cambridge 
scholar calls 
on Benazir 
By our correspondent 
, si 
5 
re- 
. ery the 
her 
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I to 
KARACHI: Julian Richard of Cam- 
bridge University called on the 
leader of the opposition in the Na- 
tional Assembly, Benazir Bhutto, on 
Wednesday. Julian Richard, who is 
worldng on a paper about nationali- 
ties of Pakistan, is in the country 
these on his study tour. 
According to a statement, Be- 
nazir Bhutto informed Richard that 
Sindh has been the victim of ethnic 
*division since 1983 and the ethnic 
politics has destroyed the econon-d- 
cal, social and political life of the 
province. 
Benazir Bhutto told the Cam- 
bridge scholar that ethnic organisa- 
tions have conunitted serious crimes 
agah-a their political opponents and 
the provincial administration was 
also violating the human rights on 
mass scales. The present govern- 
ment, she informed him, has a com- 
plete support of these ethnic organi- 
sations and in return these 
organisations were being strength- 
ened by the government. 
Benazir Bhutto said that with a 
planned programme the conspira- 
cies of Sindhudesh and (Jimnnah- 
pur) ? were being initiated. She said 
Sindh was the heart of Pakistm and 
Karachi was the mirror of Sindh. 
Deputy Secretary General of PPP, 
N. D. Khan, Nawab Yusuf Talpur and 
Beguin Ashraf Abbasi were also pre- 
sent during the meeting. 
PPP -sy6ibol 
of federation, 
sayý Benazir 
KARACHI, Jan 22- PPP Co- 
Chairman Benazir Bhutto has said 
her party guarantees the rights of. `ýT 
all nationalities and is the symbol 
-of Federation.. 
She was talking in Nir Julian 
Richard, a, research scholar from 
Cambridge University, who met 
her on Wednesday to discuss the 
nationality issue in Pakistan. 
She said PPP. had been1unction- 
ing in all the four provinces without 
any considerýtion of nationality W 
ethnicity. 
She pointed out that ethnic and 
group politics started in Sindh in 7 
1983. and since then this province 
had been in trouble. 
Ethnic politics had destroved the 
social and political fabric of soci- 
ety, and political opponents -were P 
the targets of this politics, she - 
added. 
She claimed that Sindh govern. 
ment-was violating human rights, * 
and its opponents were being made ... 1 
targets of torture while ethnic'. ' 
organisations were being gi%, en a 
free hand. 
She said the elements opp6s ed to 
Pakistan were' being patronised* 
and sustained efforts were -being' 
made to serup. "Sindhudesh and - 
jinnahpur. ",,... 
,.;, - -. 1. 'She. *, ýiid`,, Sindhqwas,. heart 
Pakistan, and Karachi was the focal 
point of attention. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DOMICILE CERTIFICATE 
1 Name 
2. Fathers's name 
3. Address. 
4- Date of birth 
5. Place of birth (a) District 
(b) Province 
(c) Country. 
6. National Identity Card No. (Attach photo copy) 
7. Are you a citizen of Pakistan by birth? if so, attach all or 
any of the following: - 
(a) Birth Certificate from Hospital /Municipal 
Town C6mmittee/Revpnue official 
(b) Residential Certificate from a grade-1 7 or above Govt: 
Off icer/Senator/MNA/MPA/member of Municipal 
Committee or District Council of the District 
8. If answer to question No. 7 is'No', did you migrate to 
Pakistan from India before 14th April 1951? If the 
answeris'YES' attach residential Certificate from- a 
grade-17 or above Govt; Off icer/Senator/MNA/MPA/ 
Member of Municipal Committee or District Council 
or the District. 
If answer to question No. 8 is 'NO' state whether 
you have aquired Pakistan Citizenship Certificate or 
Naturalization Certificate? (Attach an attested copy). 
9. Are you a migrant from former East Pakistan or 
any other District of Pakistan? If so, surrender you 
Certificate of Domicile (in original) 
10. Period of continuous residence in the District (give date 
of arrival). 
11. Details of immoveable property in the District, if any, 
with supporting documents, 
(for migrant from one District to an other). 
12. Photo Copies of educational Certificate, if a student 
13. Service Certificate from head of office, if in service 
(Private or Government). 
14. Documentary proof of any other occupation 
15. Are you a minor i. e. below 21 years of age, if so attach 
copy of Domicile Certificate of your father/guardian. 
16. Are you a married woman? If so, attach a photo copy of 
Domicile Certificate of your husband or a Certificate 
from a grade-17 Officer or above that your husband is 
permenantly settled in the District. 
SIGNATURE. 
N. B: "Write 'Not applicable ' if a c*olumn is not applicable to you". 
k 
I. Destiny of Pakistan rests on united and unstratif ied society and 
Pakistan Peoples Party and Mohajir Qaumi Movement will reunite the rural 
and urban population through a process of representative Government 
which makes provision for redressal of legitimate grievances and 
political adjustments in a sense of accommodation. 
2. The total system of running government will be improved to 
serve the needs of the people efficiently, effectively and with speed. 
Maximum authority of government will be devolved to the smallest 
functional unit. 
3. Democratic processes by a broad political process give lasting 
stability to civilized rule. 
4. Only an effective and democratic government can mobilise the 
will of the people to correct the imbalances in our economic and 
political structure. 
5. Pakistan Peoples Party and Mohajir Qaumi Movement stand for the 
rights of all oppressed people and different segments of society. 
6. PPP and MQM will endeavour that all groups residing in Pakistan 
live together on the basis of common programme, common principles, 
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common goal, common ideals and common vision so that brother is not 
pitted against brother and province not pitted against another province. 
7. Mohajir Qaumi Movement and Pakistan Peoples Party will singly 
and jointly protect and safeguard the interest of all persons residing 
in the province of Sindh irrespective of their language, creed, religion 
or origin of birth. 
8. Pakistan Peoples Party and Kohajir Qaumi Novement will Jointly 
stamp out lawlessness and will fight for the rule of law. 
9. We will ensure that every citizen of Pakistan is provided 
dignified exsitence and equality before the law to build Pakistan into a 
modern nation state. 
10. No one can claim to be outside the bounds or the rule of law. 
11. Administration will be conducted on accepted norms of good 
government and ensuring high standard of service. 
12. Culture is a central place in our daily life. It Is a cumulative 
experience of the community. Any section of citizens having distinct 
culture, language have the right to preserve and promote the sane. 
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13. Pakistan Peoples Party desires that it is determined to give 
back to the people their right to expression in prose, in verse and all 
other art and cultural forms. 
14. The uneven development in different parts of the country and 
the large scale unemployment have resulted in the influx of people from 
other provinces into Sindh. No body wants to leave his home and hearth 
if he finds meaningful employment nearest to his place of residence. The 
influx specially that of unskilled labour can be arrested if the 
underdeveloped areas are properly developed. 
15. Housing authorities in most of the cities have miserably failed 
to do any planning or maintain any kind of controls on illegal land 
grabbing. The provision of housing facilities has been much shorter than 
the requirements. This has given rise to Katchi Abadis and land grabbing 
by middlemen who are very often the agents of the officials of those 
very authorites who are responsible to provide housing. Under the law, 
land grabbing is already a crime. One only has to maintain controls in 
this regard. At the same time there exists 200 years old localities in 
Karachi, which have not been given lease etc. 
We are committed to provide decent housing to people residing 
in Katchi Abadis, and have given a detailed plan for Housing and 
transformation of Katchi Abadis, and to provide all civilized facilities 
for the residents. 
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16. With reSard to transport a modern fast moving mass transport 
will be introduced in all major cities. That fly overs will be 
constructed over main roads and crossings, modern methods of traffic 
control will be introduced and the problem of parking in the Central 
district will be solved. 
Ring roads will be made in accordance with the Master Plan for 
Karachi. 
17. Educational institutions are made to cater to the local needs 
and the principle is well accepted. 
18. Student exchanges are necessary to strengthen national 
integration. 
19. Students belonging to one region will go to other region and 
their numbers will be balanced to ensure that no body is deprived of 
their legitimate rights. 
20. Karachi girls medical students will not be transferred to 
Nawabshah. 
21. The University Grants Commission will evolve a uniform 
critieria for proper distribution of university grants taking into 
consideration all the internationally accepted criteria. 
-536- 
22. Admisson policy in universities will be on objectives basis and 
consideration will be given for its rationalisation like the example oi 
Karachi University. 
23. The number if educational institutions will be increased keeping 
in view the increase in the primary enrolments rate. 
24. Universities and centres of higher learning will be established 
in all major cities of Sindh. 
25. The allocation for the education sector shall be increased to 
4.5% of the GNP as a non lapsable fund. 
26. Degree colleges in the city of Hyderabad will be affiliated to 
the university with facilities of post-graduate education. 
27. The budget allocation for health will be increased in Sindh. 
28. The condition of the existing hospital will be improved. 
29. Jinnah Post Graduate Medical Centre may be made autonomous to 
provide teaching facilities to Sindh Medical College. 
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30. The expansion of metropolitan Hyderabad makes it imperative to 
provide a 200 bed hospital encompassing with at least four 25 bed 
satellite child and maternity centres. 
31. The shifting of Head Office of autonomous bodies may not be 
permitted unless compelled by objective considerations. 
32. The Khakrapar route will not be opened until permitted by 
normalisation of the relations of India and Pakistan, the national 
security considerations and related questions. 
33. The postal charges for India will be considered in the context 
of the SAARC and Indo-Pakistan Postal Agreements. 
34. Those Pakistanis living abroad by choice or compulsion will 
have all priveleges accorded to citizens of Pakistan. 
35. Afghan refugees will be repatriated according to bilateral 
agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan on the repatriation of Afghan refeugees. In order to 
facilitate speedy repatriation of the Afghan refugees, if permitted by 
financial resources they will be shifted to camps near the Afghan-Pak 
border. Only citizens of Pakistan can purchase property. 
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36. In order to prevent further spreadup of Arms the protection of 
people's security being the prime duty of the Government, the Arms 
Licences would not be issued without the reccommendation of MNAs, MPAs 
and Senators. Steps will be taken to confiscate illegal arms forthwith. 
37. The committee comprising of elected representatives of 
Provincial Assembly of Sindh will examine the scope and the working of 
domicile certificates and National Identity Cards, including the 
proposals of the Mohajir Qaumi Movement so that the rights of the locals 
are fully protected. 
38. Further this committee will also examine the recruitment of 
locals at all levels in the Police Department. 
39. The rights of the locals covered by SRO issued by the 
Government in 1973 and 74. These will be fully enforced. There will be 
rapid industrialisation and the sanctioning power of the new industries 
in the province will be simplified and wherever possible there will be 
one window operation. 
40. The census will be carried out in 1991 on the same criteria as 
that of 1961 including language and the birth place of their parents and 
thereafter the appropriate ratio can be established. National integration 
demands introduction of merit as a sole crtteria for selection al. the 
soonest possible time. It is also provided that no discrimination is 
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practiced against, any citizen. rhe provoncial quotas in federal services 
are on the basis of population of the repsective provinces. There shall 
be no provincial selection board to nake selection for all federal jobs. 
Vithin the province the quota system has been accepted up to 1993 
because of unequal facilities available in the rural and urban areas. 
41. Every effort has been done to maximise educational and health 
facilities in rural areas so that with the provision of equal 
opportunities merit becomes the sole criteria of selection. The idea of 
quota system was to benefit the poorer classes but the benefit has gone 
to people with false domicile certificates causing resentment. Therefore 
the entire matter should be considered by the committee of elected 
representatives so that a lasting and durable formula is evolved in the 
transitional period up to 1993. 
42. For the purpose of getting the strict adherence to urban and 
rural quota in federal and provincial Jobs for the province of Sindh, 
two committees shall be constituted at federal and provincial level 
comprised of elected MNAs and MPAs respectively to keep vigilance over 
the recruitment in federal and provincial Jobs. 
43. Even within Sindh people living in cities have sometimes their 
votes registered in their home villages. It is our considered opinion 
that fresh lists have to be prepared, which should also include voter's 
identity card No. Possession of double identity card is a crime, and 
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this provision has to be invoked to ensure that every voter is 
registered at only one place. In these days of computer programming it 
should not be difficult to ensure correct lists. Also if we allow 
sufficient time to election campaign these irregularities will come to 
surface. 
44. If an 18 years old is good enough for military service and to 
die for the country he is old enough to cast his vote as well. 
45. No discrimination in employment will be allowed on any grounds. 
We are not only stopping the lay offs but have promised that all 
persons laid off under MLR 52 shall be reinstated. 
46. That the system of contract labour in industrial and other 
business organisations shall be abolished. That the preference will be 
given to the locals in the employment of Government and private 
industrial concerns established in Sindh. 
47. All local residents of Sindh who do not own a house should be 
provided plots at concessional rates and loan will be give to help them 
build their houses according to the agreed housing policy. 
48. Karachi Electric Supply Corporation will be deregularlsed from 
VAPDA and its control will be given to the Government of Sindh. 
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49. The rate of fuel adjustment charges will be fixed uniformly 
throughout the country. 
50. Sales Tax will become the part of the divisible pool and 
distributed on the critieria of population, collection, urban-rural ratio 
and the principle of norms and needs. 
51. A committee of experts will be set up immediately to consider 
all aspects of local Government finance including Motor Vehicle Tax and 
it will submit its report in 4 months. 
52. That a committee. of the provincial assembly will be set up to 
look into the structure of local bodies and municipal corporations so 
that there is a proper administration having regard to the functions 
assigned to them and the size of the local bodies reflecting the cost of 
providing services to its citizens. The committee will report within 3 
months so that the necessary ammendments; are made in the legal 
framework of the local government including payment of stipends to the 
councillors. 
53. Hyderabad should be connected with other cities of Pakistan 
with air routes of PIA if it is economically feasible and subject to the 
availability of aircrafts. 
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54. Article 172 (2) states that "All land minerals and other things 
of value within the continental shelf or underlying the oceans within 
the territorial waters of Pakistan shall vest in the Federal Government". 
This will be rigidly followed. 
55. Befitting recognition with solemnity and dignity will be given 
to all poets and those who struggled for Pakistan and democracy. 
56. All persons subject to political victimisation since July 5, 
1977 by being placed as under trial and confined to prison or are in 
custody of various agencies or awaiting trial will have their cases 
reviewed as to the falseness of the charges framed against them and 
after examination of their cases as per accepted norms, rules of 
business and the prevailing law honourably disposed of. 
57. All persons who have suffered in different unwarranted attacks 
at various localities will be adequately compensated monetarily and 
otherwise. For this purpose mohallah committees including elected 
representatives and leaders of various communities will be set up in 
Sohrab Goth, Hyderabad Market Chowk, Green Town, Shah Faisal Colony, 
Golden Town, Azeem Pura, Khawaja Ajmer Nagri, Jalalabad, Qasba Colony, 
Orangi Town, Bewa Colony, Alfalah Society, Aligarh Colony, 5A-1,5A-2, 
5A-3 and 5A-D of New Karachi, Surjani Town, North Karachi, Goth Brahami, 
Goth Thahim and other much affected areas of Sindh. 
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58. The compensation will be reconsidered to the next of kin of the 
persons who were brutally massacred on 30th September 1988, and Ist 
October 1988 in Hyderabad and Karachi. The responsibility of the persons 
for this act will be fixed and appropriate action taken. 
59. In order to monitor the implementation, the time dimension and 
the resource availability there will be quarterly reviews between the 
Chairman of Mohajir Qaumi Movement and the President of Sindh Pakistan 
Peoples Party. 
Signed: 
Syed Qaim Ali Shah; President, Pakistan Peoples Party, Sindh. 
Azeem Ahmed Tariq; Chairman, Mohajir Qaumi Movement. 
Source: Information Department, Government of Sindb, 1959, Karacbl, pp. 1- 
6. 
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MEDIATE DEXANDS: 
I. With drawal of cases against all MQH workers including Haq 
Parast Councillors, office bearers and sympathisers who are - 
(a) Under trial and confined in prisons. 
(b) Who are wanted by different agencies but have not been 
arrested as yet. 
(c) Vho are under trial but have been enlarged on bail. 
All the above persons should be released unconditionally and all 
cases against each of them should be withdrawn and closed for good. The 
charges against them being false and only for purpose of political 
victmisation. 
2. The Mohajir families who have suffered in different attacks. 
since 31-10-1986 on their mohallahs such as Sohrab Goth, Hyderabad 
Market Chowk, Green rown, Shah Faisal Colony, Golden Town, Azeem Pura, 
Khawaja Ajmer Nagri, JaIalabad, Qasba Colony, Orango Town, Bewa Colony, 
Alfalah Society, Aligarh Colony, 5A-1,5A-2,5A-3 and 5A-D of New 
0 
Karachi in planned and deliberate attacks of organised gangs of 
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miscreants with vested interest under complete support and protection of 
the Police and local administration, should be compensated in terms of - 
(D The families renredered homeless should be given alternate 
accommodation in safe localities. 
(ii) The families of persons who have been killed and/or maimed 
should be given adequate monetary compensation. 
(iii) The above deliberate and orgaidsed attacks shDilld be 
investigated, the arms used by them be uncovered and culprits should be 
tried and brought to book. 
(iv) The Kohajir families still living in the above extremely 
sensitive localities are exposed to the imminent danger of such renewed 
attacks. As such they should be provided actual protection and their 
safety should be ensured. Eesides they should be given arms licences for 
their safety as a special case. 
3. The compensations allegedly given to the next of kins of the 
persons who were brutally massacred in Hyderabad on 30.9.1988 be totally 
inadequate they should be compensated adequately, which should not be 
less than 50,000/- inore to each and their expenses for the education of 
their children should be borne by the Government. Similarly the marriage 
and other necessary expenses of the daughters of deceased should also 
be paid by the state. 
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4. The Officers and Of f icia Is of the Police and Local 
Administration of Karachi, Hyderabad, Larkana and Sukkur, who have acted 
negligently or deliberately connived with the miscreants, have shown 
bias for reasons of ethnicity or creed and/or who are guilty of 
deriliction of duty in connection with the various incidents of 
organised attacks mentioned above, should be apprehended, tried and 
punished. 
5. The Police and Administration officers/officials who are guilty 
of committing atrocities particularly on MQK workers and Kohajir people 
in general in Police Stations, in the streets and localities who have 
committed other acts of torture and unlawful house-break, who violated 
the anctity of Mohajirs Homes, who detained innocent family members of 
innocent MQM workers should be tried and give exemplary punishment. 
6. The Mohajir families who were routed from interior Sindh 
especially districts Larkana and Dadu since June 1988 as a result of 
attacks on their homes and hearths and who were forced to leave their 
homes should be rehabilitated, compensated adequately. 
7. The Mohajirs, who are living in interior Sindh should be given 
security of their lives and properties. Their children should be given 
protection of their lives in educational institutions in interior Sindh. 
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8. In order to promote harmony in relations between Mohajirs and 
Sindhis it should be ensured that throughout Sindh the local 
administration and Police Officers should be posted in a manner which 
ensures equitable representation of Mohajir and Sindhi officers, as this 
will go a long way promoting sense of security, justice and fair play in 
both the inhabitants of Sindh, e. g if the Commissioner is Mohajir the 
Deputy Commissioner should be Sindhi. If the DIG is Sindhi the SSG 
should be Mohajir, this system should be adopted at all levels. 
The most immediate and pressing need of the time is that the 
Pakistanis stranded in Bangladesh since the 1971 debacle should be 
repatriated to Pakistan. This issue is of Charter of Resolution of KQM. 
10. Another issue requiring immediate action is the opening of 
Khokrapar Route for the visitors to and irom India as it has been 
causing great difficulties to the Kohajirs and Sindhis. The point is also 
of the MQM Charter. 
11. The active connivance of Hyderabad Police Officials and Local 
Administration Officials with the persons responsible for the Hyderabad 
massacre 30-9-1988 should be investigated, unearthed and such persons 
should be punished on top priority basis. 
12. In order to make up for almost total absence of representation 
of Mohajirs in Police Department a crash programme of recruitment in 
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Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur and other cities of Sindh's Police 
Department be commenced whereby, the Constables, Head Constables, ASI, 
SI, Inspectors and Deputy Superintendent of Police and Senior 
Superintendent of Police levels should be recruited locally from Kohajirs 
on top priority basis. 
13. There should be a similar programme of recruitment for local 
administration to the posts of Assistant Commissioners, SDXr., Deputy 
Comissioners etc, through public service commission on urgent basis. 
14. Since there is inadequate facilities for University Education in 
Hyderabad and Karachi, immediate provision should be made for creation 
of one University in Hyderabad and one for Karachi. 
Source: Information Depar-tment, Government of Sindb, 198.9, Karacbi, 
pp. 17-18. 
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APPERM 7: THE WQM CHARTER OF_YEM, U'I* ION: 2Q Nnvpmber 1968 
1. Sindh domicile should be given to only those people who are 
residents of Sindh at least for 20 years, except those who were settled 
in Sindh after the fall of Dhaka. Domicile certificates of all non-locals 
should be cancelled and the certificate should be made compulsory for 
issuance of ID cards. 
2. Only locals should be recruited to all police and intelligence 
departments and locals should be appointed in the province. 
3. Arms licences should be issued to Mohajirs and Sindhis and the 
procedure should be simplified as in the case of radio and TV licenses. 
4. Afghan refugees should be shifted to camps near the Afghan-Pak 
border and they should not be allowed to buy property or carry out 
business or interfere in the cities. 
5. All immigrants into Sindh from other provinces should be 
provided Jobs in their areas so that the illegal increase in Sindh's 
population is arrested. 
6. Katchi Abadis set up by 1973 only should be regularised and 
landgrabbing should be declared a crime. The police station concerned 
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should be held responsible for any landSrabbinS in its jurisdiction. All 
allotments to non-locals as rewards should be stopped. 
7. A modern and fast transport system should be introduced in 
Karachi and Hyderabad and government transport should be given to 
municipalities. Driving licenses should not be issued to non-matriculates 
and locals should be preferred in issuance of professional driving 
licenses. 
8. Locals should be given first preference for all government and 
semi-government corporations and administration jobs, from the lower to 
the highest level. All non-locals already posted in these positions 
should be sent to their respective provinces. Locals should be preferred 
for all trade and industrial facilities like issuance of licenser., quotas, 
NOCs for industries and tenders. 
9. Only locals of Sindh should be given the right to vote as 
hundreds of thousands of non-locals have voting-right in Sindh as well 
as their home provinces. 
10. Minimum voting age should be reduced to 18 years. 
11 An honest census should be held to determine the population of 
Sindhis and Mohajirs and they should be given their proportionate share 
in power, Jobs and educational institutions both in the Centre and in 
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the province. A joint committee comprising elected representatives of 
Sindhis and Mohajirs should be set up to implement the quota system in 
a fair and just way. Fen per cent quota of merit in federal jobs should 
be abolished and these jobs should be distributed among all the 
provinces according to their population. All federal Jobs, including 
those in admnistration or defence, should be alloctaed according to the 
population ratio. 
12. Mohajirs should be constitutionally declared a separate 
nationality in Pakistan. 
13. Locals should be preferred in all public and private sector, 
industrial units in Sindh and contract system should be abolished. 
14. Uniform service and retirement rules should be made for all 
federal, provincial, government and semi-government departments and 
corporations. All anti-Kohajir policies in these organisations should be 
changed and lay off of Mohajirs should be stopped. 
15. Pakistanis stranded in Bangladesh should be accepted and 
repatriated as Pakistanis. 
16. The Khakrapar rail route with India should be immediately 
reopened. 
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17. The same postal tariff should be fixed for India as is being 
applied to other neighbouring countries of Pakistan. 
18. All locals should be given first preference in admissions to 
educational institutions in Sindh. 
19. A new hospital should be set up attached to the Sindh Medical 
College. 
20. All local residents of Sindh who do not own a house should be 
provided plots at concessional rates and loans should be given to help 
them build their houses. 
21. KESC should be separated from WAPDA and services of all non- 
locals in KESC should be deputed to VAPDA. 
22. Municipal Committees should be given the right to collect the 
Motor Vehicle Tax. 
23. Fuel adjustment charges should be made uniform throughout the 
country. 
24. Sindh government should be authorised to collect sales tax. 
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25. Annual "Urs" of Shah Latif Bhitai and death anniversary. of 
Liaquat Ali Khan should be declared national public holidays and 
observed as national days. 
Source: Information Department, Government of Sindb, 1989, Karacbi, 
pp. 10-11. 
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